Coal Diver Everything you wanted to know about coal, but were afraid to ask.

This is a text-only version of the document "Upper Big Branch Mine-South, Report of Investigation, Fatal Underground Mine Explosion, Mining Safety and Health Administration,". To see the original version of the document click here.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION COAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REPORT OF INVESTIGATION Fatal Underground Mine Explosion April 5, 2010 Upper Big Branch Mine-South, Performance Coal Company Montcoal, Raleigh County, West Virginia, ID No. 46-08436 by
Norman G. Page District Manager District 6, Pikeville, KY Steaven D. Caudill Special Investigator District 6, Pikeville, KY John F. Godsey Staff Assistant District 6, Pikeville, KY Andrew D. Moore Mining Engineer District 6, Pikeville, KY Sandin E. Phillipson Geologist PSHTC, Pittsburgh, PA David A. Steffey Mining Engineer District 6, Pikeville, KY Richard T. Stoltz Chief, Ventilation Division PSHTC, Pittsburgh, PA Timothy R. Watkins District Manager District 12, Pineville, WV Dean R. Cripps Electrical Engineer District 8, Benton, IL Charles J. Maggard Staff Assistant District 7, Barbourville, KY Thomas A. Morley Mining Engineer PSHTC, Pittsburgh, PA Hubert E. Sherer Mining Engineer Arlington, VA Clete R. Stephan General Engineer PSHTC, Pittsburgh, PA Jerry W. Vance Training Specialist Educ. Field Services, Morgantown, WV

Alvin L. Brown Program Analyst District 7, Barbourville, KY

Originating Office Mine Safety and Health Administration Office of the Administrator Coal Mine Safety and Health 1100 Wilson Boulevard Arlington, Virginia 22209 Kevin G. Stricklin, Administrator

TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................. 1 MINE MAP ................................................................................. 11 GENERAL INFORMATION ....................................................... 12
Mine Information ..................................................................................... 12 Management Structure ........................................................................... 13

DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT......................................... 14
Events Preceding the Explosion ........................................................... 14 Description of the April 5, 2010 Accident ............................................. 18 Accident Notification, Mine Evacuation and Initial Emergency Response ................................................................................................. 19
Accident Notification .......................................................................................... 19 Mine Evacuation .................................................................................................. 20 Initial Emergency Response—Arrival of Rescuers and Other Personnel to the Accident Scene............................................................ 20

Rescue Operations ................................................................................. 23
Monday, April 5, 2010 ......................................................................................... 23 Tuesday, April 6, 2010 ........................................................................................ 26 Wednesday, April 7, 2010 ................................................................................... 26 Thursday, April 8, 2010....................................................................................... 26 Friday, April 9, 2010 ............................................................................................ 26

Location of the Victims........................................................................... 28 Family Liaisons ....................................................................................... 30 Recovery of Victims................................................................................ 30 Mine Recovery Operations (April 13 - June 24) ....................................31

INVESTIGATION OF THE ACCIDENT ..................................... 34
Involvement with Other Investigations .................................................34
WVOMHST and GIIP ............................................................................................ 34 Miners’ Representatives ..................................................................................... 34

Underground Investigation Teams........................................................ 34
Mine Mapping Teams .......................................................................................... 35 Mine Dust Survey ................................................................................................ 35 Flames and Forces Team ................................................................................... 35 Electrical Teams.................................................................................................. 35 Geology Team ..................................................................................................... 36 Ventilation Survey............................................................................................... 36

Evidence Collection and Testing ...........................................................37
Photography ........................................................................................................ 37 Evidence Testing ................................................................................................. 37 Electrical Testing ................................................................................................ 38 Gas Sampling ...................................................................................................... 39 i

Interviews ................................................................................................40

PRACTICES AT UBB THAT LED TO THE EXPLOSION ......... 40
Examinations........................................................................................... 40
Failure to Perform Examinations ....................................................................... 41 Failure to Identify Obvious Hazards .................................................................. 42 Failure to Record Hazards .................................................................................. 45 Failure to Correct Hazards ................................................................................. 50

Inadequate Training ................................................................................54
Experienced Miner Training ............................................................................... 54 Task Training ....................................................................................................... 56 Annual Refresher Training ................................................................................. 56 Other Training Deficiencies ................................................................................ 56 Contractor Training Issues ................................................................................ 57

Engineering Issues .................................................................................58 Culture of Intimidation of Miners........................................................... 58 Advance Notice of Inspections.............................................................. 60 Mine Accident Incidence Rate ...............................................................61
Inspection History (1/1/09 to 4/5/10) .................................................................. 62 Longwall Citation History................................................................................... 64

PHYSICAL CAUSES OF THE ACCIDENT ............................... 65
Methane was Allowed to Accumulate on the Tailgate End of the Longwall ................................................................................65 The Explosion was a Methane Ignition/Explosion that Originated in the Tailgate and Transitioned into a Coal Dust Explosion ...............................................................................65
The Explosion Originated in the Tailgate Entry of the Longwall .................... 66 The Extent of the Explosion is Consistent ........................................................ 67 There was Only Limited Detection of Methane Underground ......................... 69 Analysis of Methane Liberation at the Bandytown Fan ................................... 70 The Explosion was not Caused by Cutting into a Gas Well ............................ 77 A Seismic Event did not Cause the Explosion ................................................. 79 The Geochemistry of Natural Gas and Coal Bed Methane .............................. 79

Methane Accumulations that Led to the Explosion ............................. 80
Geological Background ...................................................................................... 81 UBB has a Geological Fault Zone, which Serves as a Conduit for Methane ............................................................................................................... 85 The Role of Overburden and Stresses in Opening the Fractures ................... 90 Methane Likely Migrated from Behind the Shields to the Shearer ................. 97 A Roof Fall in Tailgate 1 North Restricted Airflow, Likely Allowing ............... 99

The Methane Ignited at the Shearer, then Created a Methane Explosion in Tailgate 1 North ...............................................................109
Other Ignition Sources ..................................................................................... 116 The Ignition on the Longwall Shearer ............................................................. 119

ii

The Localized Methane Explosion Transitioned into a Coal Dust Explosion, Caused by Dangerous Coal Accumulations and Inadequate Rock Dusting ...................................122
Coking in Mine Dust and Visual Observation Led Investigators to Determine the Path of the Flame ......................................... 123 Accumulations of Coal Dust and Float Coal Dust .......................................... 129 Rock Dusting ..................................................................................................... 130

OTHER PCC PLANS ............................................................... 133
Ventilation Plan .....................................................................................133
The Approved Plan in Effect April 5, 2010 ...................................................... 133 Recent Revisions to the Approved Ventilation Plan and Map ....................... 135 Disapproved Revisions to the Ventilation Plan and Map .............................. 137

Methane/Dust Control Section of the Ventilation Plan ......................139
MMU 050-0 (Longwall Shearer) Plan Requirements ....................................... 140 Water Spray Configuration in Use as Reported by Massey Energy ............. 142 Water Test – Compliance with the Ventilation Plan ....................................... 143 Difference in Water Nozzles Used by the Operator on the Shearer .............. 146 Shield Tips ......................................................................................................... 146 Stageloader/Crusher ......................................................................................... 147 UBB Clean-up Program .................................................................................... 147 Lung Diseases from Coal ................................................................................. 147

Roof Control Plan ..................................................................................148
Headgate 1 North .............................................................................................. 149 Tailgate 1 North ................................................................................................. 151

Emergency Response Plan (ERP) .......................................................152
Training .............................................................................................................. 152 Mine Communication and Tracking ................................................................. 152 Mine Emergency Evacuation and Firefighting Program of Instruction (MEEFP) ...................................................................... 154 Refuge Alternatives .......................................................................................... 156 SCSR’s ............................................................................................................... 156

ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS ...................................................... 157 CONCLUSION ......................................................................... 160 ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS .................................................... 161 APPENDICES
Appendix A - List of Deceased and Injured Miners Appendix B - Map of the Mine Appendix C - List of Massey's Corporate Structure and Employees Appendix D - List of Personnel Who Exercised Their Fifth Amendment Rights Appendix E - Mine Rescue Personnel and Teams Responding Appendix F - UBB Boreholes

iii

Appendix G - Accident Investigation Protocols Appendix H - Post-Accident Mapping Team Map Appendix I - PIL No. 110-V-8 Procedures for Copying Photographs Appendix J - Mine Dust Results Appendix K - Inspection History Appendix L - Mine Map Showing Direction of Primary Forces and Mine Dust Sampling Areas Appendix M - Seismic Events in Southern West Virginia Appendix N - WVDEP Surface Blasting Appendix O - Geochemistry of Natural Gas and Coalbed Methane Appendix P - Reconstruction of Ventilation Map Appendix Q - Petrographic Analyses Appendix R - Water Supply System to the Longwall Shearer Dust Sprays Appendix S - Sediment Analysis from Water Baskets and Spray Nozzels Appendix T - Detailed Discussion of Elimination of Electrical Ignition Sources Appendix U - Testing Results for All Equipment Tested at A&CC Appendix U-1 - Executive Summary of Investigation of Remote Control Units Appendix U-2 - Executive Summary of Investigation of Longwall Lighting System Components Appendix U-3 - Executive Summary of Investigation of Electrohydraulic Shield Control Components Appendix U-4 - Executive Summary of Investigation of Longwall Communication System Components Appendix U-5 - Executive Summary of Investigation of Portable Methane and Multi-gas Detectors Appendix U-6 - Executive Summary of the Investigation of Power Supply, Amplifier Battery, Tracking Tag, and Tag Reader Components Associated with Pyott-Boone Tracking Boss Tracker System and Minecom UHF Leaky Feeder System Appendix U-7 - Executive Summary of Investigation of Koehler-Bright Star Model 5100 and 5200 Series Cap Lamps and Cap Lamp Components Appendix U-8 - Executive Summary of the Investigation of Seven Power Air Purifying Respiratory (PAPR) Helmet Battery Assemblies and Pieces Appendix U-9 - Executive Summary of Investigation of Low-Energy Non-Permissible Electrical Items (Watches and Calculators) Appendix U-10 - Executive Summary of Investigation of Machine-Mounted Methane Monitors Appendix U-11 - Executive Summary of Investigation of High-Energy Non-Permissible Electrical Items Appendix U-12 - Executive Summary of Investigation of a Nelson-Kellerman Anemometer Appendix U-13 - Executive Summary of Investigation of Portable Radios Appendix U-14 - Executive Summary of Investigation of Pyott-Boone CO Monitors Appendix U-15 - Executive Summary of Investigation of Programmable Logic Controller Components Appendix V - Vaisala National Lightning Detection Report 258028 Appendix W - Mine Electrical System

iv

Appendix X - Examination of Components of JOY Mining Machinery JNA Control System Appendix Y - Executive Summary of Investigation of a Digital Video Recorder (DVR) Appendix Z - Mine Map Showing Extent of Flame, Incombustible Content and Coke Appendix AA - Results of Proximate Analysis Testing Appendix AB - Rock Dust Crew Notebook Appendix AC - Belt Examination Book (4/1/2010 - 4/5/2010) Appendix AD - Belt Examination Book (3/16/2010 - 4/1/2010) Appendix AE - Additional Information on UBB MMU's Appendix AF - Methane and Dust Control - Safety Precautions from Ventilation Plan Appendix AG - Specifications of Water Sprays Appendix AH - Roof Control Plan - Headgate and Tailgate Support Appendix AI - Stability Analysis of Gateroad Design Appendix AJ - Operation of the Minecom UHF Leaky Feeder System, Pyott-Boone Tracking, and Pyott-Boone Carbon Monoxide Monitoring System Appendix AK - Mine Emergency Evacuation and Firefighting Plan Appendix AL - Summary of Examination of Three Refuge Alternatives Appendix AM - Examination and Testing of Self-Contained Selt-Rescuers (SCSRs) Appendix AN - List of Personnel Assisting in the Investigation

v

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
On April 5, 2010, at approximately 3:02 p.m., a massive coal dust explosion occurred at the Upper Big Branch Mine-South (UBB), killing 29 miners and injuring two. UBB is operated by Performance Coal Company (PCC), a former subsidiary of Massey Energy Company (Massey) (together PCC/Massey), and is located in Montcoal, West Virginia. This tragic explosion was the largest coal mine disaster in the United States in 40 years. Immediately following the explosion, President Barack Obama called Secretary of Labor Hilda Solis and Assistant Secretary for Mine Safety and Health Joseph Main to the White House and charged them with conducting the most thorough and comprehensive investigation possible. The President directed Secretary Solis to work with the Justice Department to ensure that the government also investigated any potential criminal activity. The Department of Labor’s Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) conducted its investigation under the authority of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (Mine Act), which requires that authorized representatives of the Secretary of Labor carry out investigations in mines for the purpose of obtaining, utilizing, and disseminating information relating to the causes of accidents. This report is the product of that investigation, which included a comprehensive underground examination, 269 individuals interviewed, review of some 88,000 pages of documentary evidence, detailed mapping of the mine, inspection and testing of thousands of pieces of physical evidence, and the commissioning of outside experts to study the disastrous explosion. It describes the events leading up to the UBB explosion, rescue and recovery operations, the investigative process, the physical causes of the explosion, the root cause and contributory causes, and the citations and orders issued for safety and health violations. MSHA and the Department of Labor’s Office of the Solicitor continue to cooperate with the Department of Justice in the criminal investigation of the tragedy. MSHA conducted the underground investigation in coordination with the West Virginia Office of Miners’ Health Safety and Training (WVOMHST), the Governor’s Independent Investigative Panel (GIIP), and PCC/Massey. The United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) participated in the investigation in its capacity as a representative of miners designated pursuant to the Mine Act, as did Moreland & Moreland, l.c. Many witnesses tragically lost their lives on April 5, 2010. In addition, a number of witnesses exercised their rights under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and declined to be interviewed. Despite the unavailability of their testimony, MSHA has determined the likely causes of the explosion.

1

Overview of the UBB Accident Investigation Report’s Findings The 29 miners who perished at UBB died in a massive coal dust explosion that started as a methane ignition. The physical conditions that led to the explosion were the result of a series of basic safety violations at UBB and were entirely preventable. PCC/Massey disregarded the resulting hazards. While violations of particular safety standards led to the conditions that caused the explosion, the unlawful policies and practices implemented by PCC/Massey were the root cause of this tragedy. The evidence accumulated during the investigation demonstrates that PCC/Massey promoted and enforced a workplace culture that valued production over safety, including practices calculated to allow it to conduct mining operations in violation of the law. The investigation also revealed multiple examples of systematic, intentional, and aggressive efforts by PCC/Massey to avoid compliance with safety and health standards, and to thwart detection of that non-compliance by federal and state regulators. Witness testimony revealed that miners were intimidated by UBB management and were told that raising safety concerns would jeopardize their jobs. As a result, no safety or health complaints and no whistleblower disclosures were made to MSHA from miners working in the UBB mine in the approximately four years preceding the explosion. This is despite an extensive record of PCC/Massey safety and health violations at the UBB mine during this period. PCC/Massey established a practice of using staff to relay advance notice of health and safety inspections to mine personnel when federal and state inspectors arrived at the mine. The advance notice allowed PCC/Massey employees to conceal violations from enforcement personnel. PCC’s chief of security was convicted in federal court for lying to MSHA about whether advance notice was a practice at UBB; the evidence at the trial showed that it indeed was a practice and he had directed UBB personnel to provide advance notice of inspectors’ arrival on the mine property. His conviction underscores the extent to which practices designed to hide PCC/Massey safety and health violations were engrained at UBB. PCC/Massey kept two sets of books with respect to safety and health hazards in the UBB mine. The first set was the required examination book mandated by the Mine Act, which was open for review by MSHA and miners and was required to include in it a complete record of all hazards identified by PCC examiners and other company officials. PCC/Massey also maintained a second set of books that reported on production and maintenance, as well as hazards and violations of law. PCC/Massey noted some hazards in this second set of books that it did not record in the required examination books. PCC/Massey did not make this second set of books available to mine employees or inspectors.

2

PCC/Massey allowed conditions in the UBB mine to exist that set the stage for a catastrophic mine explosion. The tragedy at UBB began with a methane ignition that transitioned into a small methane explosion that then set off a massive coal dust explosion. If basic safety measures had been in place that prevented any of these three events, there would have been no loss of life at UBB. PCC/Massey could have prevented the methane ignition and explosion had it maintained its longwall shearer in safe operating condition. A longwall shearer is part of a longwall mining machine and has large rotating cutting drums equipped with bits that cut coal as it moves on a track across the working face. A system of water sprays suppresses dust as well as “hot streaks,” which are smears of metal found on rock when metal is heated to near its melting point from friction caused by the shearer’s bits hitting into layers of rock above or below the coal seam. PCC/Massey operated the shearer at UBB with worn bits and missing water sprays, creating an ignition source for methane on the longwall. Had PCC/Massey followed basic safety practices, the small methane explosion that set off the dust explosion would have been contained or prevented. PCC/Massey did not take proper measures to detect methane concentrations throughout the mine. PCC/Massey’s failure to comply with UBB’s approved ventilation and roof control plans exacerbated the risk of methane accumulation. The law requires adequate ventilation of underground coal mines to prevent unsafe levels of methane and other dangerous gasses, and provide miners with breathable air. PCC/Massey ventilation practices led to erratic changes in air flow and direction. Its failure to install supplemental roof supports as required by UBB’s plan led to a roof fall in an airway that limited airflow, contributing to the accumulation of methane in the area where the explosion originated. Finally, PCC/Massey violated fundamental safety standards by permitting significant amounts of float coal dust, coal dust, and loose coal to accumulate in the mine. This became the fuel for the explosion. Sufficient rock dust, used to make coal dust inert and prevent it from catching fire or fueling an explosion, would have prevented a coal dust explosion from occurring. PCC/Massey did not follow the fundamental safety practice of applying rock dust adequately to eliminate this hazard. PCC/Massey knew or should have known about all of these hazards but failed to take corrective action to prevent a catastrophic accident. For example, UBB’s required examination books showed records of hazards that PCC/Massey did not correct. The examination books also showed that PCC/Massey failed to perform required pre-shift, on-shift, and weekly examinations to find and correct hazards. When the books indicated PCC/Massey examiners did conduct exams, they failed to identify obvious hazards, such as accumulations of loose coal, coal dust, and float coal dust in the area where the explosion occurred.

3

Specific Accident Investigation Conclusions – PCC/Massey’s Management Practices that Led to the Explosion PCC/Massey failed to perform required mine examinations adequately and remedy known hazards and violations of law MSHA regulations require mine operators to examine certain areas of the mine on a weekly basis, as well as before and during each shift, to identify hazardous conditions. MSHA’s accident investigation found that PCC/Massey regularly failed to examine the mine properly for hazards putting miners at risk and directly contributing to the April 5 explosion. At UBB, PCC/Massey examiners often did not travel to areas they were required to inspect or, in some cases, travelled to the areas but did not perform the required inspections and measurements. For example, PCC/Massey conducted no methane examinations on the longwall tailgate, the area of the longwall where the explosion began, in the weeks prior to the explosion. Even when PCC/Massey performed inspections and identified hazards, it frequently did not correct them. Because of these practices, loose coal, coal dust, and float coal dust accumulated to dangerous levels over days, weeks, and months and provided the fuel for the April 5 explosion. PCC/Massey kept two sets of books, thus concealing hazardous conditions During the course of the investigation, MSHA discovered that PCC/Massey kept two sets of books at UBB: one set of production and maintenance books for internal use only, and the required examination books that, under the Mine Act, are open to review by MSHA and miners. MSHA regulations mandate that the required examination books contain a record of all hazards. Enforcement personnel must rely on their accuracy and completeness to guide them in conducting their physical inspections. PCC/Massey often recorded hazards in its internal production and maintenance books, but failed to record the same hazards in the required examination book provided to enforcement personnel to review. Some of the hazards described in the hidden “second set of books” were consistent with conditions that existed at the time of the explosion, including the practice of removing sprays on the longwall shearer. Testimony from miners at UBB revealed they felt pressured by management not to record hazards in the required examination books. Furthermore, even when PCC/Massey recorded hazards in the required examination books – such as belts that needed to be cleaned or rock dusted – it often failed to correct the identified hazards. In addition to undocumented hazards in the required examination books, PCC/Massey failed to report accident data accurately. MSHA’s post-accident audit revealed that, in 2009, UBB had twice as many accidents as the operator reported to MSHA.

4

PCC/Massey intimidated miners to prevent MSHA from receiving evidence of safety and health violations and hazards The Mine Act protects miners if they are fired or subjected to other adverse employment actions because they reported a safety or health hazard. These whistleblower protections give miners a voice in the workplace and allow them to protect themselves when mine operators engage in illegal and dangerous practices. Testimony revealed that UBB’s miners were intimidated to prevent them from exercising their whistleblower rights. Production delays to resolve safety-related issues often were met by UBB officials with threats of retaliation and disciplinary actions. On one occasion when a foreman stopped production to fix ventilation problems, Chris Blanchard, PCC’s president, was overheard saying: “If you don’t start running coal up there, I’m going to bring the whole crew outside and get rid of every one of you.” Witness interviews also revealed that a top company official suspended a section foreman who delayed production for one or two hours to make needed safety corrections. MSHA did not receive a single safety or health complaint relating to underground conditions at UBB for approximately four years preceding the explosion even though MSHA offers a toll-free hotline for miners to make anonymous safety and health complaints. PCC/Massey also had a toll-free number for safety and health complaints, but miners testified that they were reluctant to use it for fear of retaliation. PCC/Massey failed to provide adequate training for workers Records and testimony indicate that PCC/Massey inadequately trained their examiners, foremen and miners in mine health and safety. It failed to provide experienced miner training, especially in the area of hazard recognition; failed to provide task training to those performing new job tasks; and failed to provide required annual refresher training. This lack of training left miners unequipped to identify and correct hazards at UBB. PCC/Massey established a regular practice of giving advance notice of inspections to hide violations and hazards from enforcement personnel Under the Mine Act, it is illegal for mine operators’ employees to give advance notice of an inspection by MSHA enforcement personnel. Despite this statutory prohibition, UBB miners testified that PCC/Massey mine personnel on the surface routinely notified them prior to the arrival of enforcement personnel. Miners and others testified they were instructed by upper management to alert miners underground of the arrival of enforcement personnel so hazardous conditions could be concealed. UBB dispatchers testified they were told to notify miners underground when MSHA inspectors arrived on the property, and if they did not, there would be consequences.

5

Advance notice gave those underground the opportunity to alter conditions and fix or hide hazards immediately prior to enforcement personnel’s arrival on the working section. PCC/Massey also made ventilation changes in the areas where MSHA inspectors planned to travel, concealing actual production conditions from enforcement personnel. On October 26, 2011, Hughie Elbert Stover, PCC’s former head of security for UBB, was found guilty in the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia of a felony count of making false, fictitious and fraudulent statements to MSHA regarding company policy on advance notice. In an interview with the MSHA accident investigation team, Stover testified that Massey had a policy prohibiting security guards from providing advance notice of MSHA inspections; however, the evidence indicated that he had personally directed guards to provide advance notice.

Specific Accident Investigation Conclusions – Physical Causes of the Explosion A small amount of methane, likely liberated from the mine floor, accumulated in the longwall area due to poor ventilation and roof control practices Based on physical evidence, the investigation concluded that methane was likely liberated from floor fractures into the mine atmosphere on April 5, the day of the explosion. The investigation team subsequently identified floor fractures with methane liberation at longwall shields (a system of hydraulic jacks that supports the roof as coal is being mined) near the tailgate, the end of the longwall where the explosion began. This methane liberation occurred because PCC/Massey mined into a fault zone that was a reservoir and conduit for methane. MSHA believes that this is the same fault zone associated with methane inundations at UBB in 2003 and 2004, and a 1997 methane explosion.

PCC/Massey’s failure to comply with its roof control plan allowed methane to accumulate in the tailgate area. UBB’s roof control plan required placement of supplemental supports, in the form of two rows of 8-foot cable bolts or posts, between the primary supports in the longwall tailgate. PCC/Massey installed only one row of these supplemental supports. This lack of roof support contributed to the fall of the tailgate roof, which in turn restricted the airflow leaving the longwall face. The reduced air flow allowed methane to accumulate in the tailgate without being diluted or ventilated from the mine. As a result, an explosive mixture of methane was present in this area. PCC/Massey failed to maintain the UBB longwall shearer, creating an ignition source for accumulated methane MSHA has identified the longwall shearer as the likely source of the ignition of the methane accumulated in the tailgate area. PCC/Massey was using the longwall shearer to mine in the area near the tailgate. Evidence showed that methane likely migrated

6

from behind the longwall shields to the longwall shearer, and that an accumulation of methane developed near the tailgate. Evidence also revealed that the longwall shearer was not properly maintained by PCC/Massey. Two of the cutting bits on the tail drum were worn flat and lost their carbide tips. The dull, worn shearer bits likely created an ignition source by creating hot streaks while cutting sandstone. Well-maintained longwall shearers, which include sharp bits and effective water spray systems, protect against these kinds of ignitions and also control the dust during the mining process. The water sprays create air pressure to move methane away from the area where the shearer is cutting and prevents ignitions by spraying water to suppress hot streaks on the longwall face. At the time of the accident, PCC/Massey’s longwall shearer was cutting through both coal and sandstone with seven water-spray nozzles missing. As a result, the shearer did not have the minimum required water pressure. The ineffective sprays failed to move the methane away from the shearer bits and cool the hot streaks created during the mining process. As a result, methane ignited. The evidence indicated that the flame from the initial methane ignition then ignited a larger accumulation of methane. However, the ignition of the larger body of methane did not happen immediately. Approximately two minutes elapsed between the ignition and the explosion. The electronically recorded event log indicates the shearer was shut off with the remote control just before 3:00 p.m. MSHA has concluded that the tail shearer operator stopped the shearer shortly after the initial ignition, which continued to burn near the longwall tailgate. Realizing that the ignition could not be controlled, the miners in the tailgate area began evacuating. At approximately 3:02 p.m., the flame encountered a larger methane accumulation in the tailgate area, triggering a localized explosion. PCC/Massey allowed coal dust to accumulate throughout UBB, providing a fuel source for a massive explosion The small methane explosion near the tailgate immediately encountered fuel in the form of dangerous accumulations of float coal dust and coal dust, which propagated the explosion beginning in the tailgate entry. The resulting coal dust explosion killed the 29 miners. PCC/Massey records demonstrate that examiners allowed these and other accumulations in the mine to build up over days, weeks, and months. Loose coal, coal dust and float coal dust were abundant in all areas of the mine, including the area affected by the explosion. Many of these accumulations were left from the initial development of this area of the mine, indicating a long-established policy of ignoring basic safety practices. PCC/Massey failed to rock dust the mine adequately to prevent a coal dust explosion and its propagation through the mine If the mine had been rock dusted so that the coal dust had contained sufficient quantities of incombustible content, the localized methane explosion would not have propagated, or expanded, any further. According to testimony and other evidence,

7

PCC/Massey applied grossly inadequate quantities of rock dust. Miners stated that areas were not well dusted, that the walls, roof and floor in areas of the mine were darkcolored – which indicates a lack of rock dust. There is no evidence that during the mining of the longwall, PCC/Massey ever applied rock dust in the tailgate entry -- the entry where the mine’s ventilation system carried coal dust from the mining process. The mine’s rock dusting equipment frequently failed As a result of a systematic failure to properly apply rock dust, the coal dust explosion continued to propagate through the mine, killing miners as far as approximately 5,000 feet from the point of ignition.

Rescue and Recovery Efforts at UBB Intensive rescue activities involving more than 20 rescue teams – including teams from MSHA, PCC/Massey, the WVOMHST, and other mine operators – mobilized and began to search for missing miners soon after the accident occurred on April 5. The presence of combustible gasses in the mine prompted rescue teams to evacuate at least three times during the rescue efforts. On April 9, rescue teams located the last of the victims and determined that none of the 29 miners reported missing had survived. On Tuesday, April 13, the last victim was recovered from the mine. During rescue and recovery efforts, MSHA family liaisons – pursuant to a program established under the Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response (MINER) Act of 2006 – served as the agency’s primary communicators with the families of the missing miners. The liaisons remained with the families continuously from April 5 through April 10. Assistant Secretary Main, Coal Administrator Kevin Stricklin, thenGovernor Manchin and, at times, company representatives, gave regular updates to the families on the search for their loved ones. Specific Accident Investigation Conclusions - Alternate Theories Tested and Found Insufficient The MSHA accident investigation team carefully considered other possible scenarios to explain the events of April 5, 2010, but a lack of supporting evidence disproved these alternative explanations. One theory tested was that a massive inundation of methane caused the explosion. However, the flame path, pressures generated by the explosion, and the limited quantity of methane detected prior to and after the explosion were inconsistent with that theory. In addition, previous methane inundations at UBB in 2003 and 2004 were localized at the point of gas discharging from fractures in the mine floor and gas release would dissipate within a few days. The volume and pressure of gas and the size of the floor fractures were relatively small. Thus, the volume of gas released from the floor was also small. Similarly, the team could find no evidence to support the theory that the explosion was caused by cutting into a gas well or by a seismic event.

8

Specific Accident Investigation Conclusions – Citations and Orders Issued Associated with the issuance of this accident investigation report, MSHA issued 12 citations and orders to PCC/Massey for violations of the Mine Act and its implementing regulations that contributed to the April 5 explosion. MSHA also issued 357 violations of the Mine Act and regulations to PCC/Massey for conditions and practices discovered at UBB that did not directly contribute to the explosion. MSHA designated 9 of these contributory violations as “flagrant.” Flagrant violations, the most serious violations MSHA can issue, are eligible for the highest penalty possible under the Mine Act. The flagrant violations committed by PCC/Massey are:   illegally providing advance notice to miners of MSHA inspections (a violation of Section 103(a) of the Mine Act); failing to properly conduct required examinations and to identify, record, and correct hazards (4 flagrants for violations of 30 CFR sections 75.360, 75.362, 75.363(a), and 75.364); allowing hazardous levels of loose coal, coal dust, and float coal dust to accumulate (violation of 30 CFR section 75.400); failing to adequately apply rock dust to the mine (violation of 30 CFR section 75.403); failing to comply with the approved ventilation plan by operating the shearer with missing and clogged water sprays (violation of 30 CFR section 75.370(a)(1)); and failing to adequately train its miners (violation of 30 CFR part 48.3).

   

PCC/Massey also committed three contributory violations that were not flagrant:   failing to maintain the longwall shearer (worn bits) in safe operating condition (violation of 30 CFR 75.1725(a)); failing to comply with its approved roof control plan in the 1 North Panel tailgate entry, as required by the approved roof control plan (violation of 30 CFR 75.220(a)(1)); and failing to maintain the volume and velocity of the air current in the areas where persons work or travel at a sufficient volume and velocity to dilute, render harmless, and carry away flammable, explosive, noxious, and harmful gases, dusts, smoke, and fumes (violation of 30 CFR 75.321(a)(1)).



9

MSHA also issued two contributory violations to David Stanley Consulting, LLC, a contractor that supplied examiners and other miners to work at the UBB, for its examiner’s failure to properly conduct examinations.

MSHA Internal Review In addition to the accident investigation, a separate internal review is examining MSHA’s actions related to UBB prior to the explosion and during the rescue and recovery operation. The internal review will evaluate the quality of MSHA’s enforcement activities, including any weaknesses, and the adequacy of regulations, policies and procedures. A report and recommendations will be provided to the Assistant Secretary for appropriate action with the aim of better improving the agency’s performance and helping prevent the occurrence of future accidents.

10

MINE MAP

11

GENERAL INFORMATION
On April 5, 2010, at approximately 3:02 p.m., a massive coal dust explosion occurred at Upper Big Branch Mine-South (UBB), resulting in the deaths of 29 miners and injuries to two miners who survived. A list of the victims and injured is provided in Appendix A.

Mine Information
The Upper Big Branch Mine-South (UBB), I.D. No. 46-08436, is an underground bituminous coal mine located approximately one mile west of Montcoal, off State Route 3 in Raleigh County, West Virginia. At the time of the accident, the mine was owned and operated by Performance Coal Company (PCC) of Naoma, West Virginia, a subsidiary of Massey Energy Company (Massey). The mine had opened as the Montcoal Eagle Mine on September 1, 1994, operated by Peabody Coal Company. PCC acquired the mine and began production shortly after October 15, 1994 as Upper Big Branch Mine-South. Alpha Natural Resources acquired PCC and Massey in June, 2011. PCC mined coal at UBB from the Eagle coal seam. The average thickness of the seam was 54 inches, including sandstone partings. PCC achieved an average mining height of approximately 84 inches by mining the immediate roof and floor, predominantly composed of shale and sandstone. In 2009, PCC produced 1,235,462 raw tons of coal. At UBB, PCC utilized a longwall, a method of mining in which a cutting machine known as a “shearer” cuts coal in a long, single slice. Typically, the longwall operated seven days per week and development sections operated five to six days per week. There were two overlapping 10-hour longwall production shifts and a 9-hour maintenance shift. According to company records, PCC employed 186 underground and four surface employees at UBB on the day of the accident. There were also 16 labor contractors working for David Stanley Consultants, LLC. (DSC) and Mountaineer Labor Solutions, LLC (MLS). At the time of the accident, no labor organization represented employees; nor was there a miners’ representative designated under the Mine Act. At the time of the accident, the mine had four sets of drift openings and a fan shaft. Miners generally entered the mine from the Ellis portal or the North or South (known as UBB) portals. Four active sections were producing coal, including the 1 North Longwall Panel, Headgate 22 (HG 22), Tailgate 22 (TG 22), and one advancing room-and-pillar section (known as the “Barrier Section”). A detailed mine map is shown in Appendix B. There was also one deactivated super section located in the southern area of the mine. The approximately 1,000-foot wide, active longwall panel had mined approximately 5,450 feet, with about 1,240 feet remaining in the panel. Previously-mined longwall panels ranged from 3,000 feet to 17,000 feet in length. In the course of this previous mining, a non-fatal ignition or explosion occurred in 1997 on the 2 West Panel, and gas inflow incidents occurred in 2003 on Longwall Panel 16 and in 2004 on Longwall Panel 17. These events will be discussed in subsection “Outburst History at UBB” later in this report.

12

PCC transferred personnel, mining equipment, and supplies throughout the mine using battery-powered mantrips and supply motors. PCC transferred coal from the respective sections to the surface by a series of conveyor belts, which were in turn connected to overland belts. The overland belts carried the coal through adjacent mine workings in the Eagle Seam to the Marfork preparation plant near Packsville, West Virginia. PCC used an Atmospheric Monitoring System (AMS) on the conveyor belts for fire-detection and for individual conveyor belt status reports. An AMS operator monitored the system from the surface. Underground employees used a “leaky feeder” radio system installed at all active sections and along the primary and secondary escapeways for two-way communications. Underground employees would report their locations periodically to the dispatcher for tracking purposes. Underground employees were also tracked using wireless radio frequency identification (RFID) tags and a network of RFID tag readers. At the time of the accident, the tracking system was installed to just inby crosscut 101 of the North Glory Mains.

Management Structure
Testimony indicated that the upper management officials at UBB on April 5, 2010 were:             Christopher L. Blanchard, President Jamie Ferguson, Vice President Wayne Persinger, General Manager Everett Hager, Superintendent - North Gary May, Superintendent - South Terry Moore, Mine Foreman - North Rick Foster, Mine Foreman - South Paul Thompson, Maintenance Manager Jack Roles, Longwall Coordinator Berman Cornett, Safety Director Jim Walker, Safety Director Jason Whitehead, Vice President of Route 3 Operations

In addition to these individuals, PCC maintained a separate list of “Corporate Officers” on April 5, 2010:         Christopher L. Blanchard, President Tammy L. Tomblin, Chief Accounting Officer Jeffrey M. Jarosinski, Treasurer Richard R. Grinnan, Secretary Andrew B. Hampton, Assistant Secretary M. Shane Harvey, Assistant Secretary Phillip C. Monroe, Assistant Secretary Larry E. Palmer, Assistant Secretary

13

Massey also provided significant oversight and involvement at the mine in engineering, production, and safety issues. A list of Massey’s corporate structure as reported to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) can be found in Appendix C. Some of these key officials include: Don L. Blankenship, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Baxter F. Phillips, Jr., President J. Christopher Adkins, Senior Vice President and Chief Operating Officer Mark A. Clemens, Senior Vice President, Group Operations Michael K. Snelling, Vice President, Surface Operations Michael D. Bauersachs, Vice President, Planning Jeffrey M. Gillenwater, Vice President, Human Resources Richard R. Grinnan, Vice President and Corporate Secretary M. Shane Harvey, Vice President and General Counsel Jeffrey M. Jarosinski, Vice President, Treasurer and Chief Compliance Officer John M. Poma, Vice President and Chief Administrative Officer Steve E. Sears, Vice President, Sales and Marketing Eric B. Tolbert, Vice President and Chief Financial Officer David W. Owings, Corporate Controller and Principal Accounting Officer The management officials of DSC (which provided contract labor to UBB) on April 5, 2010 were: Jim Hayhurst, President/Chief Executive Officer John Bevilock, Executive Vice President Jim Gump, Director/Operations & Safety Beth Straton, Regional Manager The management officials of MLS (which provided contract labor to UBB) on April 5, 2010 were: Brian Buzzard, Owner Kim Buzzard, Owner

DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT
Events Preceding the Explosion
The longwall began production at UBB in September 2009, several years earlier than planned, because three longwall panels that were to be mined at the Castle mine were, in fact, not mineable due to thin coal. The longwall began production at UBB in September, 2009 even though the tailgate for 1 North Panel at UBB was not designed for a longwall. Instead, it was planned to be used to access continuous miner panels.

14

Water in the area behind the longwall was a persistent problem at UBB. Water leakage due to subsidence into a flooded area in the overlying Castle mine resulted in accumulations in several areas in the bleeders and, early on in development, on the longwall face. The operator employed pumps to maintain the water depth at a level which would not affect ventilation. What follows is a chronological summary of the movements of miners and mining events just prior to the explosion. While much is now known, some events cannot be detailed with precision; many witnesses to events tragically lost their lives on April 5. Additionally, a number of key management officials exercised their Fifth Amendment rights and declined to talk to MSHA investigators. All personnel who exercised their Fifth Amendment rights can be found in Appendix D. April 4, 2010 was Easter Sunday and UBB was reportedly idle most of the day in observance of the holiday. Preshift examinations for the midnight shift began at approximately 8:00 pm, and no hazards were recorded. At about 11:00 p.m., the UBB midnight maintenance crews began working to prepare the mine for the resumption of production on Monday’s day shift. The midnight shift reported no hazards, unusual conditions or events. Prior to the arrival of the day shift production crews on Monday morning, the preshift examinations for the longwall and two gateroad development sections were called out of the mine between 5:16 a.m. and 5:51 a.m. on April 5, 2010. According to the preshift report for HG 22, two entries required cleaning and rock dusting. No other hazards were reported; however, there was no report that the belt was examined. No hazards were reported for the longwall or TG 22 section. Between 3:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. on April 5, the preshift examinations were conducted on the conveyor belts in the northern part of the mine. The records for those examinations indicated that six of the nine belts examined required rock dusting and five of the belts required cleaning. On April 5, 190 UBB employees and 16 contract miners were working or scheduled to work. The day-shift production crews included miners working on the longwall, HG 22, TG 22, and Barrier sections; the support crews included those on pumping and track maintenance. At times throughout the day, additional managers, examiners and miners entered and exited the mine. The starting times for the day shift production and support crews were staggered. The longwall and HG 22 crews entered the mine at the Ellis Portal at approximately 6:00 a.m. Longwall Section Foreman, Richard “Rick” Lane, had a crew consisting of Rex Mullins, Headgate Operator; Joel Price and Gary Quarles, Jr., Shearer Operators; Dillard Persinger, Shield Operator; and Christopher Bell, Utility. They were accompanied by the longwall maintenance/utility crew, including Charles “Timmy” Davis, Assistant Longwall Coordinator; Grover Skeens, Maintenance Foreman; Nicholas McCroskey, Electrician; Cory Davis and Adam Morgan, red hats (trainees); and Joshua Napper, red hat (contractor trainee).

15

The HG 22 Section Foreman, Edward “Dean” Jones had a crew that consisted of William Griffith and Joe Marcum, Continuous Miner Operators; James “Eddie” Mooney and Ricky Workman, Shuttle Car Operators; Howard “Boone” Payne and Kenneth Chapman, Roof Bolt Operators; Gregory Brock, Electrician; and Ronald Maynor, Scoop Operator. Michael Elswick, Belt Examiner, entered the mine through the Ellis Portal at 6:03 a.m. At 6:36 a.m., Elswick traveled inby the 78 switch, which is located at the mouth of the North Glory Mains. Jeremy Burghduff, Outby Foreman, took his crew, David Farley and Jason Stanley, into the mine from the Ellis Portal at 6:28 a.m. to pump water behind the longwall and to conduct the weekly examination of the area and the preshift examination for the crew that was with him. Both members of Burghduff’s crew were contractors employed by DSC. Stanley was a red hat miner. Burghduff’s assignment included examining and maintaining a series of compressed air pumps behind the 1 North Panel. The Barrier Section Crew (Jack Martin, Section Foreman; Jeremy Rife and Eddie Foster, Continuous Miner Operators; Chris Cadle and Danny Williams, Roof Bolter Operators; Melvin Lynch and Wes Curry, Shuttle Car Operators; and James Bailey, Electrician) entered the mine from the North portals at approximately 6:40 a.m. The TG 22 Section Foreman, Steve Harrah, took his crew into the mine at 6:42 a.m. from the North Portal. This crew included Robert Clark, Continuous Miner Operator; William Lynch and Deward Scott, Shuttle Car Operators; Carl Acord, Timmy Blake, and Jason Atkins, Roof Bolters; Benny Willingham, Scoop Operator; and James K. Woods, Electrician. Ralph Plumley, Track Coordinator, and his crew entered the mine at approximately 7:26 a.m. from the Ellis Portal. Plumley’s crew consisted of Eric Jackson and Tommy Owen Davis, both track workers. The destination of this crew was HG 22, where they were to continue advancing the track into the section. Interviews of the dayshift miners indicated that April 5 was not unusual until the time of the explosion. Mike Kiblinger, Tim Sigmon, and Matt Warden went to the HG 22 mother drive installation area around 9:30 a.m. to move their tools from that location to the new development near the Ellis Portal. Mark Gilbert, John Cox and Jerry Weeks delivered supplies to HG 22 at approximately 11:00 a.m. Scott Halstead started his examination from the longwall headgate at approximately 12:40 p.m. and he walked out of the Ellis Portal at approximately 2:25 p.m. Thomas Sheets and Virgil Bowman installed electric cables at the HG 22 mother drive and left the area at approximately 2:15 p.m. Billy Massey and Bruce Vickers delivered supplies to HG 22 and left the section about 2:15 p.m. None of these individuals indicated that they were aware of any problems or unusual conditions.

16

Billy Massey said that he saw Everett Hager, Mine Superintendent, at HG 22 shortly before 2:00 p.m. Electronic tracking data showed that Hager and Jack Roles, Longwall Coordinator, traveled outby the tag reader at 6 North starter box near 78 Switch at 1:55 p.m. These UBB managers exercised their Fifth Amendment rights and declined to be interviewed. Therefore, their exact routes of travel and activities can not be definitively determined. Toward the end of the day shift, a series of reports were called out of the mine. The evening preshift report for HG 22 indicated one entry that required rock dusting but no other hazards. The maximum reported methane level was 0.3 percent; however, the air quantity was not recorded as required. Although the pre-shift report was called out to Patrick Hilbert, evening shift foreman for HG 22, neither the certified person who performed the pre-shift exam nor the time of the exam was recorded. Steve Harrah called out the TG 22 pre-shift examination at 2:38 p.m. to Brian Collins, the evening shift TG 22 foreman, who recorded the report. The TG 22 examination listed “0 %” methane, 32,360 cubic feet per minute (cfm) air quantity in the last open crosscut (LOC), and no hazards. The longwall pre-shift examination was called out by Rick Lane at 2:40 p.m. and was recorded by Kevin Medley, the oncoming evening shift foreman for the longwall. The longwall pre-shift examination listed 0.0 percent methane, 56,840 cfm air quantity in the intake, and air velocity readings of 776 feet per minute (fpm) at longwall shield 9 and 513 fpm at shield 160, and no hazards. Michael Elswick, fireboss, phoned out the pre-shift report for the conveyor belts at 2:30 p.m. and the report listed that eight of ten belts needed rock dusting and six belts needed cleaning. Normal production was reported for HG 22 and TG 22 during the day shift. However, the longwall was not running for much of the day due to mechanical problems. The first production report was called out at 7:30 a.m. The longwall made two passes and ran until 11:00 a.m. The longwall was down from 11:00 a.m. to about 1:30 p.m. because of a lost “B-Lock” on the ranging arm of the longwall shearer. Rex Mullins called outside at 2:30 p.m. to report that the longwall shearer was at shield 115 and cutting toward the tailgate. Jeremy Burghduff and his pumping crew left the tailgate area of the longwall in their mantrip around 2:30 p.m. and called out for clearance to use the track at 78 switch at 2:36 p.m. Ralph Plumley and his track maintenance crew left the HG 22 section around 2:30 p.m. and called out for track access at 78 switch at 2:42 p.m. Elswick had called his examination out of the mine at 2:30 p.m. and was waiting near the longwall mother drive to catch a ride out of the mine. The TG 22 crew left the section about 2:50 p.m. and at 3:00 p.m. called for track access at 78 switch. The HG 22 crew was in the process of boarding its mantrip at the time of the explosion, while the longwall crew was still in the process of mining coal. Investigation of the longwall shows that it was operating near the tailgate up until a minute or two prior to the explosion. The shearer was shut off by the tailgate side remote control at approximately 3:00 p.m. The pan line was shut down by someone on

17

the longwall face. The headgate operator manually cut off the water to the shearer and manually disconnected the high-voltage power to the shearer. The longwall personnel near the shearer traveled about 400 feet from the tailgate prior to the explosion. The distance between the miners and the shearer indicates that the miners realized that an uncontrollable event was occurring and they were traveling away from that area at the time of the explosion.

Description of the April 5, 2010 Accident
A massive explosion occurred in the northern portion of UBB at approximately 3:02 p.m. At this time, the electrical power went off to the Ellis Portal; this portal’s power was supplied from underground. Phone communications with the longwall, HG 22, and TG 22 sections were disrupted. Witness testimony, various digital records, and postexplosion analyses of the electronic timing devices confirm the timing of the explosion. Individuals who were either in the mine or near the portals about 3:00 p.m. described their observations of the conditions including the magnitude of the explosion. The evening shift longwall crew and the HG 22 crew were boarding mantrips about three crosscuts inside the Ellis Portal. They felt a reversal of the air direction, and subsequently, the air flow from inside the mine increased in intensity to the point where the miners were pelted with dirt and debris, their hard hats were blown off, and some miners were knocked over. Mike Kiblinger, an outby maintenance foreman, who was standing by the Ellis Portal at the time of the explosion, recalled “It was blowing crib blocks out and just like a real strong wind, like a hurricane wind. And… a couple people. It blew them out. They were rolling.” Adam Jenkins, Dispatcher at the UBB office, described the event: …at three o'clock…called me from 78 Break, asked for a road outside… And a couple minutes later that's when it happened. All the dust started— just a white smoke started pouring out the portals, and it sounded like thunder. It was constant. And I didn't know what happened. And Gary May, he said, Oh, Lord,… something's bad happened… That all happened at the same time. That's when all that dust started gushing out here and the COs [AMS] went all crazy all at the same time. It all happened within seconds of each other. So I turned around and the COs started going off, and then the dust started coming out the portals, because you could see it from the window… Greg Clay, Purchasing Agent, witnessed the results of the explosion at the UBB Portals: I was trying to get ahold [sic] of the headgate operator because I was waiting on the three o'clock report. And I guess about three minutes after 3:00, I just heard this bam (indicates noise). I thought the fan had thrown a blade or something because it's making a real bad noise. And I raised

18

up out of my chair…I looked out the window and I could just see rock dust and debris blowing out of the portals. And it just sounded like jet engines at each portal. The air was just gushing out of the portals. Several witnesses testified that mine fans at the UBB Portals stalled from the air pressure. Thomas Sheets, Maintenance Foreman said: …the fan's…sounds like it's going to come off the foundation [fan at UBB Portal]. So I start running towards the fan. John Henline come down and started running towards the fan with me. Dust started coming out the track entry. We got to the fan house. I started to shut the fan down. I didn't know what happened. I just didn't think that quick, but I thought the fan was coming off the foundation, and I don't want the fan blades going. That's quite a mess, and then just in a matter of minutes it was all over. Pressure came down…That was basically it. We knew we had an explosion at this point. John Henline said ‘She's blew up’… At the time of the explosion, a crew that had been setting up a miner section near the Ellis Portal was traveling inby in a mantrip on the way back to the North Portal at the end of their shift. Joshua Williams, Roof Bolter, described the experience: We was coming up the track, and the guy I was bolting with, he said, ‘Man, it's dusty.’ I said, ‘Yeah.’ Then he said, ‘Do you feel a lot of air coming down the track?’ I said, ‘Yeah.’ He said, ‘It wasn't doing that this morning.’ We kept on going, and my ears popped and I couldn't hear nothing. And then that's when we hit air… started pushing our mantrip back. It was throwing blocks, foam. That's when I laid down on the mantrip and threw my jacket over my head and was starting to get my rescuer out because I didn't know what in the world was going on. …It blew our mantrip. It blew it probably five crosscuts [outby]…we rode the track all the way back out to the Ellis Portal, and then we went outside… Several miners near the portals were able to evacuate the mine. Surface personnel began notifying underground personnel to evacuate and initiated the mine’s emergency response plan.

Accident Notification, Mine Evacuation and Initial Emergency Response
Accident Notification The Mine Act and regulations require that a mine operator report a serious accident to MSHA within 15 minutes of the occurrence. This notification is essential so that MSHA can properly assess and respond to the accident. PCC and Massey delayed reporting the accident to MSHA and failed to properly inform MSHA of its magnitude. Chris

19

Blanchard called Jonah Bowles, Safety Director at Massey’s Marfork mine, at 3:27 p.m. and asked him to report this occurrence to MSHA. Bowles called MSHA’s Call Center Hotline at 3:30 p.m. and reported an inundation of carbon monoxide (CO) at UBB. He reported CO concentrations of 50 to 100 ppm and an air reversal on the beltline at the Ellis Portal. He was asked if anyone was trapped or injured and responded “no.” He was also asked if there was a fire or any fatalities, and again responded “no.” He stated that the CO readings might indicate a fire. The MSHA hotline operator called MSHA Coal Mine Safety and Health District Four (D4) at 3:42 p.m. and relayed this accident information. Robert Hardman, D4 Manager, phoned UBB and issued a verbal control Order under Section 103(j) of the Mine Act to David Taraczkozy, UBB Chief Electrician at 4:00 p.m. Mine Evacuation The Barrier Section Crew exited the mine at the North portal at approximately 3:35 p.m. Clifton Earls-Supplyman and Jeremy Woods-Supplyman were removing track at the East Mains area inby the South Portal. They were not informed that an explosion had occurred and exited the mine at about 4:10 p.m. Initial Emergency Response—Arrival of Rescuers and Other Personnel to the Accident Scene At the Ellis Portal, approximately 25-30 minutes after the explosion, Chris Blanchard, another top company official, Jack Roles, Everett Hager, Wayne Persinger, and Patrick Hilbert (all of whom were upper management at UBB, except for Hilbert), took a mantrip into the mine. All of these individuals were bare-faced (i.e. without mine rescue apparatus) and some had Solaris handheld multi-gas detectors. At the Ellis switch, they called out their location and proceeded inby slowly. At crosscut 42, they saw the light from a miner’s cap lamp approaching them. Continuing inby, at about crosscut 47, they encountered Timothy Blake, the source of the light, walking out of the mine. He was wearing his self-contained self rescuer (SCSR). Chris Blanchard asked what had happened and Blake stated that there had been an explosion. Blake said that his crew was inby about 20 crosscuts. Blake told them that he had put SCSRs on everyone he could (he was unable to do so for Deward Scott because it could not be located). During his interview, Blake stated, “So I went around to each man again, felt for a pulse. Everybody had a pulse but one man. I couldn’t find no pulse on him. That’s the man I couldn’t find a rescuer. And I had to leave them. That was the hardest thing I ever done.”

20

Immediately after the dust stopped blowing out of the UBB Portals, Gary May walked into the North Portal intake entry. Rick Foster took a mantrip into the mine. Jim Walker and Berman Cornett, Safety Directors, started walking in the track entry from the North Portal and met Foster at Plumley switch. Foster, Walker, and Cornett continued inby via the mantrip and caught up with Gary May at the Ellis switch at approximately 3:55 p.m. After making the turn onto the Old North Mains track, Rick Foster proceeded inby via the mantrip, followed by Walker, Cornett, and May on foot. Meanwhile, Blanchard, another top company official, Persinger, Hager, and Roles, who were ahead of Foster’s mantrip, continued inby on foot and left Hilbert (an emergency medical technician) with Blake at the mantrip. Persinger, Hager, and Roles carried extra SCSRs with them. Blanchard and another top company official reached the TG 22 mantrip and flagged the others behind them to hurry. Blanchard and another top company official told Roles to go back and get the mantrip that was left with Blake and Hilbert. Persinger opened the SCSR cache, removed SCSRs from the injured miners and put new SCSRs on them. Persinger provided a written statement on April 6, 2010, which was later provided to the accident investigation team, that James Woods was laboring heavily and that he did not detect a pulse on the remaining TG 22 miners. Foster, Cornett, and Walker arrived in another mantrip. Cornett told Foster to call the dispatcher and request several ambulances. Soon afterward, Foster was told to get his mantrip out of the way, so he started out of the mine. The injured miners were loaded into the two remaining mantrips. The first mantrip included Harrah, Woods, Lynch and Acord and was operated by Hilbert. Persinger boarded the first mantrip and worked with Woods who was still responsive. The remaining TG 22 miners were loaded back into their mantrip, which was operated by Everett Hager. All three mantrips traveled out of the mine carrying the victims and rescuers, except for Chris Blanchard and another top company official who proceeded inby on foot. Greg Clay called the Raleigh County 911 Dispatch at 4:22 p.m., requesting several ambulances at UBB. Clay stated they had several injured. Clay said they were in the process of removing the miners from the mine. The Boone County E-911 was notified at 4:26 p.m. about a possible roof cave-in, with possibly ten miners involved. At about 4:30 p.m. units were en-route from the Whitesville Volunteer Fire Department (WVFD). WVFD paramedics and first responders traveled to the Ellis Portal mine site, arriving before the victims were brought outside. As victims were brought out of the mine, the paramedics attempted resuscitation using defibrillators and CPR. Seven of the miners were unresponsive. Blake came out with the first mantrip and refused treatment by the paramedics. When Woods was brought outside he was loaded into an ambulance and transported to the Whitesville High School football field for transport by medical helicopter.

21

Jim Hodges, Boone County Medical Examiner, arrived at approximately 5:45 p.m. and the remaining victims on the mantrip from the TG 22 crew were declared dead. The helicopter arrived at Charleston General with Woods at 5:57 p.m. Blake was later transported via ambulance to Raleigh General Hospital, arriving at 7:55 p.m. Members of Massey’s Southern West Virginia Mine Rescue Team were the first to arrive at the Ellis Portal, arriving between 3:30 and 4:00 p.m. Shortly after 4:00 p.m., Chris Adkins, Senior Vice President of Massey Energy Company, and Elizabeth Chamberlin, Vice President of Safety and Training for Massey Coal Services, arrived by helicopter and traveled to the UBB mine office. Hardman and Michael Dickerson, D4 Staff Assistant and Family Liaison, traveled from the Mount Hope district office to the UBB mine location, arriving at approximately 5:00 p.m. Hardman modified the initial Section 103(j) Order to a Section 103(k) safety Order at 5:20 p.m. Kevin Stricklin, MSHA Administrator for Coal Mine Safety & Health (CMS&H), had landed at Yeager Airport in Charleston, WV (arriving there on other MSHA business), at 4:20 p.m. After he checked his voice mail and learned of the event, he traveled directly to UBB. Stricklin arrived at UBB at approximately 5:30 p.m. and met Hardman near the Ellis Portal. Hardman told Stricklin that there were six confirmed fatalities and approximately 20 missing miners. Hardman also said that a command center for mine rescue was being organized at the UBB Portal because electric power and communications were not functional at the Ellis Portal. Stricklin and Hardman then drove to the UBB portals. The West Virginia Office of Miners’ Health Safety & Training (WVOMHST) was conducting training for its mine rescue teams at Logan, WV on April 5. Steve Snyder, Inspector at Large, received a call from the state homeland security hotline at 3:50 p.m. informing him of the initial incident report for UBB. Snyder then called the Oak Hill WVOMHST office for more information. At 4:45 p.m. Snyder was told that there had been an explosion at UBB and there were confirmed fatalities. The state mine rescue teams and equipment arrived at the Ellis Portal at 6:10 p.m. Virgil Brown, Mine Emergency Unit Specialist, and John Urosek, Chief of Mine Emergency Operations for MSHA, received calls from D4 Assistant District Manager Lincoln Selfe sometime before 4:00 p.m. and 4:15 p.m., respectively, requesting mine rescue and technical support assistance at UBB. Brown was at the Pittsburgh Safety and Health Technology Center (PSHTC). Brown suggested that Selfe notify Jerry Cook, Mike Hicks, Mike Shumate, and other MSHA mine emergency team members from the D4 area. Brown gave instructions to move the MSHA Mine Emergency Command vehicle and Mine Rescue Team truck from the Mine Academy in Beckley, West Virginia to the mine site. The MSHA mine emergency command vehicle arrived at UBB at 6:30 p.m.

22

Bob Hardman, Chris Adkins, and Steve Snyder established a mine rescue command center at the UBB office around 7:00 p.m. Hardman was in charge of the mine rescue operation for MSHA, while Stricklin assisted with the media and families of the victims. Brown and Urosek started mobilizing other members of MSHA’s mine emergency response team and other mine emergency equipment. Brown arrived at the mine at approximately 8:30 p.m. On April 6, 2010, personnel from MSHA’s Directorate of Technical Support including specialists from the Physical and Toxic Agents Division and the Ventilation Division, arrived at the mine at approximately 1:00 a.m. with a portable gas chromatograph. Urosek, who had been at a lead mine in Missouri, arrived at UBB at about 1:30 a.m. The mobile gas laboratory arrived at approximately 3:00 p.m., with additional gas chromatographs.

Rescue Operations
From April 5 to April 9, over 20 mine rescue teams (Appendix E), including those from Massey, other mine operators, MSHA, and WVOMHST, worked around the clock in an attempt to locate and rescue the missing miners. The rescue efforts were prolonged and difficult due to the presence of combustible gases (which required evacuating the teams at times) and the necessity to restore ventilation controls, which the explosion had destroyed. By the end of the day on April 9, rescuers had determined that none of the missing miners survived the explosion. Monday, April 5, 2010 Robert Asbury and Jim Aurednik, Massey mine rescue team members, loaded their mine rescue equipment on a mantrip and started in from the Ellis Portal. About five crosscuts into the mine, Aurednik saw lights coming from inby on the track and reversed the mantrip that he was driving. The lights were from the mantrip driven by Patrick Hilbert bearing the first known victims (see discussion in “Initial Emergency Response”, above). Once outside, Asbury, Aurednik and other members of the mine rescue team removed the victims from the mantrips and, with the Whitesville Fire Department personnel, assisted in providing CPR. At approximately 6:00 p.m., Asbury, Aurednik, and Mark Bolen, another Massey mine rescue team member, loaded their mine rescue equipment on a mantrip and headed back into the mine. They rode to the Ellis Switch, where Asbury and Aurednik then started walking ahead of the mantrip to check for gas and other hazards. At crosscut 78, they had to abandon the mantrip because of debris on the track. About five or six crosscuts inby crosscut 78, they encountered a broken fresh water line that was flooding the area, causing them to turn around and go back to crosscut 42 on the Ellis track to turn off the main water valve. Asbury, Aurednik, and Bolen returned to crosscut 78 and established a fresh air base (FAB) at this location because ventilation controls inby were damaged and blast damage limited further rail travel.

23

Massey mine rescue team members Shane McPherson, Mike Alexander, and Larry Ferguson were sent underground a short time later; they met Asbury, Aurednik, and Bolen at the FAB. The combined team continued to advance communications up the North Glory Mains toward the longwall “mother drive.” The team encountered Chris Blanchard and another top company official walking toward them a few crosscuts inby the FAB. Blanchard and another top company official were escorted back to the FAB. Evidence of activated SCSRs was found in the tailgate entry four crosscuts outby the face and in 1 North Headgate at the mantrip. It is believed these rescuers were worn by Chris Blanchard and another top company official. Because they exercised their Fifth Amendment rights, the route or extent of their travel is unknown. After they finished briefing the mine rescue team on inby conditions and victim locations, another top company official and Blanchard were told to stay at the FAB while mine rescue team members traveled inby, repairing phone lines and doing basic exploration. By 7:05 p.m., a total of nine mine rescue teams from Massey and other coal operations were at the mine. In addition, four WVOMHST and one MSHA mine rescue team were on site. One exploratory drill rig and three bulldozers had been mobilized to assist with the rescue operation. At 7:19 p.m., another top company official and Blanchard called out from a mine phone at the FAB and reported that they had been to the tailgate and almost to the headgate of the longwall, but had to retreat as a result of excessive carbon monoxide levels. They reported three victims in the longwall track entry outby crosscut 15. At 7:40 p.m., Massey’s Knox Creek and East Kentucky mine rescue teams and the Northern and Southern WVOMHST mine rescue teams were briefed by Adkins and Hardman at the mantrip barn on the surface of the mine. The teams then traveled into the mine from the North Portal on two mantrips. These teams were accompanied by MSHA mine rescue team members Fred Wills, Mike Hicks, and Jerry Cook. These teams arrived at the FAB at approximately 8:30 p.m. Both teams helped advance the FAB to crosscut 98, near the longwall mother drive. After advancing the FAB, the Knox Creek team began advancing toward the HG 22 section, through the crossover. Another team began exploring the longwall face and found one victim near the longwall mother drive, four victims along the track entry of the longwall, one victim beside the longwall stage loader, two victims near longwall shield 85 and four victims between longwall shields 103 and 106. The maximum carbon monoxide that this team encountered was 280 ppm; they did not encounter low oxygen levels and they did not see any smoke. This team explored from the longwall headgate toward the longwall tailgate, to shield 125. Meanwhile, the Southern WVOMHST team began exploring the rooms immediately outby the active longwall panel. This team traveled across the North Glory Mains from the FAB and entered the roomed area outby the longwall panel, where it intersected the mains at crosscut 98, to look for missing miners. It advanced inby in entries 3-5 until it encountered the solid longwall block. They encountered extensive soot deposits, carbon monoxide levels of up to 45 ppm, and blown-out stoppings. The team then split

24

up and explored the remaining entries back to the North Glory Mains. Some team members explored a portion of the longwall tailgate entries between crosscuts 30 and 33. They observed that ventilation controls in the tailgate entries were destroyed and the debris was blown outby. After exploring the Panel 1 crossover, the team traveled back to the FAB. This exploration was done bare-faced. The Knox Creek team members traveled inby in the North Glory Mains. At 9:31 p.m., they were at the longwall mother drive in breathable air. At 9:50 p.m. they had advanced within about two crosscuts from the Glory Hole and donned breathing apparatuses due to encountering 50 ppm CO. They advanced to the mouth of HG 22 at 10:10 p.m. The CO levels had increased to 122 ppm with 0.0 percent methane and 20.7 percent oxygen. At 10:40 p.m., the Knox Creek team started back to the FAB due to their apparatuses having low oxygen reserves. They arrived at the FAB at 11:47 p.m. At 9:30 p.m., Jamie Ferguson left the FAB with the East Kentucky mine rescue team to relieve the Knox Creek team and explore toward the HG 22 section. At 11:22 p.m. this team had advanced to crosscut 3 on HG 22 and, while under apparatus, reported 14.7 percent oxygen1, 3.3 percent methane2 and 8,676 ppm CO3. Ferguson reported thick smoke at crosscut 16. At 11:55 p.m. six victims were found in a mantrip just outby crosscut 19. At 12:16 a.m., on April 6, the team started retreating from the section after encountering 3.2 percent oxygen, more than 5.0 percent methane, more than 9,999 ppm CO (over range), and smoke. At 12:45 a.m., on April 6, the command center instructed all teams to evacuate the mine due to explosive levels of methane on the HG 22 section and the presence of smoke, which suggested the presence of fires or hot spots. Records indicate confusion over the number of victims and missing miners from the time of the event until after the mine rescue teams left the mine on Tuesday morning, April 6. Factors that may have contributed to this confusion include the use of the partially installed Pyott-Boone tracking system in lieu of a traditional tag-in, tag-out board, inoperability of the tracking system north of Ellis switch after the explosion, the
Oxygen levels below 19.5% are considered deficient. When levels decrease to a range of 16 to 12%, a person can experience increased heart rate, fatigue, impaired judgment and coordination, nausea and vomiting. When levels decline to 10%, one breath can cause loss of consciousness and quickly result in death. 2 Methane is a colorless, odorless, non-poisonous, and flammable gas, which is explosive between 5% and 15%. According to regulations, when 1% or more of methane is present, the operator is required to cease production and make changes or adjustments to the ventilation system in order to reduce the methane levels to less than 1% prior to resuming production. 3 Carbon Monoxide is a colorless, odorless, poisonous gas, which attaches to the hemoglobin in blood 200 times easier than Oxygen. Carbon Monoxide is also explosive from 12 to 75% (10,000 ppm would equal 1%). Long-term workplace exposure levels to less than 50 ppm averaged over an 8-hour period are considered acceptable. Exposure levels at 100 ppm are considered dangerous to human health. Carbon Monoxide levels between 35 and 400 ppm can result in dizziness and mild to severe headaches with exposure times of eight hours to one hour respectively as the levels increase. Carbon Monoxide exposure can result in death at 1,600 ppm in less than 2 hours, at 3,200 ppm within 30 minutes, at 6,400 ppm in less than 20 minutes, and at 12,800 ppm after 2-3 breaths in less than three minutes.
1

25

use of multiple portals to enter and exit the mine, and Massey’s failure to designate a responsible person (RP) to oversee the evacuation of the mine and the mine rescue effort. At 8:10 p.m., Massey reported seven dead and 19 missing miners. At 12:32 a.m. on April 6, the number of missing miners was thought to have been one on the longwall and four on HG 22. At 1:40 a.m., on April 6, Massey reported 25 dead, two injured and four missing miners. Tuesday, April 6, 2010 All of the mine rescue teams, as well as Blanchard and another top company official, exited the mine by 2:30 a.m. The teams were debriefed and sent to get some rest. Gas monitoring continued at the fans and portals. At 5:50 a.m., MSHA modified the Section 103(k) Order to allow three boreholes to be drilled into the mine to better assess the atmosphere. MSHA Technical Support personnel arrived at UBB about 1:00 a.m. Two boreholes were started and continued to be drilled for the remainder of the day. Wednesday, April 7, 2010 The first borehole (Hole 1A) intersected the mine at 4:00 a.m. at crosscut 35 on HG 22. MSHA modified the Section 103(k) Order at 6:41 a.m. on Wednesday, April 7, to allow installation of a diesel-powered exhaust fan on borehole 1 (BH 1A). MSHA modified the Section 103(k) Order at 4:10 p.m. to allow installation of a similar exhaust fan on borehole 3 (BH 1B) at 4:10 p.m. An exhausting fan was installed on this borehole in an attempt to ventilate the HG 22 methane accumulation. Gas levels from this borehole and from the Bandytown fan were monitored to determine when safe re-entry of the mine would be possible. Re-entry mine rescue plans were developed while waiting for hazardous gas levels to decrease. Thursday, April 8, 2010 After determining gas levels had decreased to an acceptable level, MSHA modified the Section 103(k) Order at 3:50 a.m. to allow implementation of an exploration and recovery plan. At 4:55 a.m., four mine rescue teams entered the mine and traveled by rail to crosscut 78. By 7:51 a.m., teams advanced to crosscut 105 in the North Glory Mains in fresh air. By 9:03 a.m., teams advanced to the longwall mule train. Rescue team advance was slow because phone lines were being installed to ensure that teams could communicate in the event of an emergency. Teams advanced to the longwall stageloader at 9:18 a.m. At 9:29 a.m., an explosive level of combustible gases was detected at borehole BH 1A. All teams were instructed to evacuate the mine due to explosive levels of combustible gases at borehole BH 1A. All of the rescue teams evacuated the mine by 10:55 a.m. Friday, April 9, 2010 At 12:13 a.m., MSHA approved a plan to re-enter the mine for exploration and recovery with two mine rescue teams. The plan objective was to explore the crossover area

26

between TG 22 and HG 22. Two mine rescue teams entered the mine at 12:42 a.m. and traveled by rail to crosscut 78. The teams reached crosscut 78 at 1:23 a.m. and reestablished a FAB. One team stayed at the FAB as backup and one team traveled inby in the longwall track entry arriving at the mule train at 2:43 a.m. The FAB was advanced to the longwall headgate track entry just inby the longwall face. One team stayed at the new FAB and one team started exploring the Panel No. 2 Crossover between TG 22 and HG 22. At 3:36 a.m., the team had advanced approximately four crosscuts inby the FAB and measured 300 ppm carbon monoxide, 20.8 percent oxygen and 0.0 percent methane. The team donned their apparatuses due to the CO level. At 3:42 a.m. the team advanced to the TG 22 refuge alternative. This refuge alternative had not been deployed. The team returned to the FAB to reevaluate its exploration plan. The command center directed a team to continue exploration after the reevaluation was completed. By 4:12 a.m. the team had advanced approximately two crosscuts into the crossover and reported light smoke, 250 ppm carbon monoxide, 20.8 percent oxygen and 0.0 percent methane. The team advanced two more crosscuts into the crossover and encountered more smoke and 940 ppm CO. A fire was suspected in HG 22, and the team was instructed to return to the FAB. At 4:43 a.m., both teams were instructed to evacuate the mine, exiting at 6:12 a.m. At 9:02 a.m., inert gas was injected into borehole BH 1A. At 2:32 p.m., Nitrogen trucks completed pumping into borehole BH 1A and changed to a nitrogen generator at 2:40 p.m. and continued pumping. A quantity of nitrogen equal to approximately twice the volume of the HG 22 mine workings had been injected into BH 1A. At 4:15 p.m., it was then determined safe for mine rescue teams to reenter the mine. At 4:18 p.m., two mine rescue teams entered the mine to explore HG 22 and the longwall. At 4:28 p.m., two additional teams entered the mine. At 4:58 p.m., teams arrived at crosscut 78. At 6:17 p.m., teams arrived at the FAB, located at the longwall headgate track entry just inby the longwall face. At 6:33 p.m., the first team donned their apparatuses while advancing into the crossover. The first team advanced to approximately two crosscuts outby the mouth of HG 22 and measured 282 ppm CO, 18.0 percent oxygen and 0.2 percent methane. At 7:40 p.m., two additional mine rescue teams entered the mine to relieve the initial teams. At 8:01 p.m., the first team started retreating due to low oxygen levels in their apparatuses. At 9:18 p.m., the fourth team went under oxygen. At 10:10 p.m., a victim was found just outby crosscut 22 (three crosscuts inby the mantrip) in the No. 2 entry of HG 22. Another victim was found at crosscut 23 in the same entry at 10:15 p.m. At 10:21 p.m., a third victim was found in the same entry at crosscut 26. At 10:24 p.m., the team reached the HG 22 refuge alternative and found that it had not been deployed, then began retreating back to the FAB. At 10:27 p.m., three mine rescue team members began searching the longwall for the remaining miner. At 10:50 p.m., the team on HG 22 returned to the FAB. At 11:04 p.m., the team on the longwall reported 23 ppm CO, 20.6 percent oxygen and 0.3 percent methane at shield 130 on the longwall. At 11:10 p.m., the team on the longwall reported 0 ppm CO, 20.8 percent oxygen and 0.95 percent methane on the tailgate end.

27

Two additional mine rescue team members were sent from the headgate toward the tailgate along the longwall face to search between shields for the missing miner. At 11:20 p.m., the last victim was found under debris near shield 3 and the rescue efforts ceased. At 11:24 p.m., MSHA and State personnel left the command center to inform the families that they had found the bodies of all missing miners.

Location of the Victims
The 29 victims died in five separate areas: the TG 22 crew was on its way out of the mine on a mantrip, the longwall crew was working along the longwall face, the HG 22 crew was in the process of boarding the mantrip at the end of its shift, a number of miners on the HG side of the longwall were doing maintenance work, and an examiner was waiting at the longwall mother drive. William Lynch, Carl Acord, Benny Willingham, Robert Clark, Jason Atkins, Steven Harrah and Deward Scott were found on the TG 22 mantrip heading out of the mine at crosscut 67. Rex Mullins, Nicholas McCroskey, Richard “Rick” Lane, Grover Skeens, Joel Price, Gary Quarles, Jr., Christopher Bell, and Dillard Persinger were on the longwall face. Ricky Workman, Howard “Boone” Payne, Ronald Maynor, James “Eddie” Mooney, Kenneth Chapman, and William Griffith were found on the mantrip in the HG 22 area. Located inby the HG 22 section but away from the mantrip were Joe Marcum, Gregory Brock, and Edward “Dean” Jones. Cory T. Davis, Joshua Napper, Charles “Timmy” Davis, and Adam Morgan were on the headgate side of the longwall. Michael Elswick was located in the North Glory Mains at the longwall mother drive. Victim locations are depicted in Figure 1.

28

Figure 1: Victim Location Map

.

29

Family Liaisons
Pursuant to the Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response (MINER) Act of 2006 and policies promulgated afterward, MSHA established a family liaison program to be able to effectively communicate information to families of miners who are victims or otherwise unaccounted for during a mine emergency. Mike Dickerson, serving as the lead UBB Family Liaison, traveled to the mine with Hardman and arrived at the Ellis Portal at approximately 5:00 p.m. on the day of the explosion. Charles Thomas, MSHA Deputy Administrator for CMS&H, contacted Norman Page, CMS&H D6 District Manager, at approximately 5:30 p.m. to request two additional family liaisons. Page instructed Kenneth Fleming, CMS&H Inspector, and James Poynter, CMS&H D6 Assistant District Manager, to travel to the mine. A Family Center was established at the company Safety Office at approximately 9:40 p.m. by Dickerson. Fleming and Poynter arrived at approximately 10:30 p.m. and reported to the Command Center for a briefing by Selfe. Dickerson met with Fleming and Poynter and briefed them on the scheduled times of the family briefings and introduced them to the Company Representative. Joseph Main, Assistant Secretary of Labor for Mine Safety and Health, arrived at the mine site at approximately 10:00 a.m. on April 6 and, together with Stricklin and the family liaisons, met with the families of the miners to brief them on the progress of the search for their loved ones. The Family Liaisons remained on duty at the Family Center continuously through Saturday, April 10. They briefed the families every four hours and provided information relayed from the Command Center to the Family Center. The family liaisons maintained contact with the families throughout the rescue/recovery operations and investigation and assisted with many of the family briefings.

Recovery of Victims
Extensive damage caused by the explosion complicated the recovery of the victims. Rail travel was blocked inby crosscut 78 by debris on the track. Many ventilation controls were destroyed inby crosscut 75 of the Old North Parallel Mains. Potentially explosive levels of combustible gases were encountered several times during mine rescue attempts and some areas of the mine had an irrespirable atmosphere. Walking was hazardous because of debris in the mine entries. The area of the mine containing the victims was re-ventilated using temporary ventilation controls to permit the recovery to be conducted bare-faced. The logistics of the recovery were difficult; 22 victims were carried distances of up to 1.5 miles, victims locations were mapped, and forensic evidence was gathered prior to recovery of the victims. Multiple mine rescue teams worked from the time when the last victim was located at 11:20 p.m. on Friday, April 9 until all of the victims were recovered. On Tuesday, April 13, the last victim was removed from the mine at 12:57 a.m. and the last mine rescue team exited the mine at 3:30 a.m.

30

Mine Recovery Operations (April 13 - June 24)
Because the stability of the mine’s atmosphere continued to be a cause for concern, Massey adopted (with MSHA and WVOMHST’s concurrence) an approach for continuing monitoring at all existing sampling locations and drilling additional boreholes to provide monitoring locations in other areas of the mine. Monitoring continued from the North, South and Ellis Portal return entries, the Bandytown bleeder fan, borehole BH 1A, and from other boreholes as they were completed. Several boreholes were drilled, some of which missed the intended mine entry, as shown on Figure 2. Other boreholes were stopped during drilling and never completed. See Appendix F for a description of each borehole drilled post accident at UBB.

31

Figure 2. Map of borehole locations and “hot spots” encountered during recovery exploration

32

On May 27, all parties agreed that the mine atmosphere had stabilized sufficiently to allow re-entry, pending the finalization and sampling of borehole “HG 21-1” near the longwall. Problems arose with HG 21-1, however, when the drill intersected an inactive area of a mine above UBB, causing a delay in the completion of the borehole until June 6. Nonetheless, because of the distance separating the longwall and the portals, exploration of the portal areas began on June 2, with the anticipation that borehole HG 21-1 would be completed prior to any exploration in the longwall area. All parties agreed that the mine atmosphere would continue to be sampled for stability during exploration and recovery work. PCC submitted a plan on June 1, 2010 and MSHA modified the Section 103(k) order on June 2 to allow the mine rescue teams to begin exploration and recovery. The plan required mine rescue teams to enter the North Portal and Ellis Portal and explore the track entries advancing toward each other. The teams explored the mine systematically, identifying hazards, such as ventilation inadequacies, water accumulations, and adverse roof conditions, and corrected these hazards as directed. Another re-entry plan was submitted by PCC on June 7 and MSHA modified the Section 103(k) Order to allow for additional exploration of the mine. This plan allowed for an orderly exploration progressing through the entire mine. A potentially hazardous elevated temperature area (“hot spot”) was found on the mine floor/coal rib interface in crosscut 118, between the No. 4 and No. 5 entry in the North Glory Mains. This hot spot required water to be piped from the surface down borehole 15B so that rescue team members could apply water in sufficient quantities to eliminate the hot spot hazard. Also, two additional hot spots identified by mine rescue teams after the explosion were checked and found to be at ambient mine temperature. Eight other areas in the mine were previously identified as having had elevated temperatures but had subsequently cooled to ambient mine temperatures. Six of these areas were found in Tailgate 1 North between crosscuts 11 and 24. In HG 22 at crosscut 31, the teams encountered a personnel carrier battery that had smoke rising from it. To remove this possible ignition source, team members disconnected (cut) the negative battery lead from the battery charger to the battery to allow the battery to be moved. The battery was submerged in water at that location. Mine exploration teams were not able to advance in Headgate 1 North inby crosscut 39½ or in Tailgate 1 North inby crosscut 87 because these areas were determined to be unsafe for travel. Therefore, no exploration occurred in the area of the mine inby those two points, which included the Bandytown fan shaft and the longwall bleeder dewatering system. Other areas of the mine, including parts of the TG 22 and HG 22 sections, were found to be flooded, requiring dewatering to make them accessible before the investigators could begin their work. On June 24, the mine rescue teams completed exploration of the travelable areas of the mine. The UBB Accident Investigation team began their investigation on April 12, 2010; on June 25, 2010, the team began the underground portion of the investigation.

33

INVESTIGATION OF THE ACCIDENT
MSHA’s accident investigation began on April 12, 2010. MSHA conducted a thorough investigation in the accessible underground areas of the mine affected by the explosion. The investigation included detailed mine mapping and collecting and analyzing evidence. MSHA prepared an investigation protocol in conjunction with WVOMHST to ensure the safety of the underground phase of the investigation; input was solicited from other investigative parties. A copy of the protocol is included in Appendix G.

Involvement with Other Investigations
The accident investigation involved six different investigative entities; MSHA, WVOMHST, PCC, the West Virginia Governor’s Independent Investigation Panel (GIIP), the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) and Moreland & Moreland, l.c., representatives of the miners. MSHA and WVOMHST led the investigation underground, with PCC, GIIP, and UMWA accompanying and assisting them. WVOMHST and GIIP Cooperation with WVOMHST began shortly after MSHA’s accident investigation team assembled on April 12, 2010. MSHA and WVOMHST conducted interviews jointly. The two agencies also evaluated and approved action plans submitted by PCC. This cooperation was necessary to ensure a thorough investigation and the safety of the investigators. MSHA and WVOMHST established office space at the UBB Portals during the underground investigation to facilitate meetings and planning sessions, information sharing, and communication throughout their respective investigations. Additionally, MSHA cooperated with the GIIP, allowing it access to the MSHA/WVOMHST interviews. Miners’ Representatives Miners separately designated both the UMWA and Moreland & Moreland as miners’ representatives under Section 103(f) of the Mine Act. The UMWA began its involvement on April 23, 2010. UMWA representatives participated fully in the underground portion of the investigation. Moreland & Moreland began its involvement in the investigation on August 11, 2010.

Underground Investigation Teams
The underground portion of the investigation did not begin until the end of June because of hazardous conditions in the mine, including elevated CO concentrations, potential hot spots, and inaccessible areas. MSHA, accompanied by WVOMHST, GIIP, UMWA, and company representatives, mobilized several teams to conduct mine dust surveys, mapping, electrical, ventilation, geologic, flames and forces, evidence collection and inspection activities. In addition to the 105 accident investigation personnel involved

34

with the on-site investigation, MSHA also utilized an additional 45 Technical Support personnel to perform testing and technical work and other personnel to guard the three portals during the investigation. Mine Mapping Teams Mine mapping began on June 29 and continued through November 18, 2010. Mapping served to document the mine conditions after the explosion and notate where evidence was found and collected underground. Mapping teams were usually comprised of one or two MSHA personnel, one WVOMHST member, one representative of the mine operator, one miners’ representative, and, at times, one GIIP team member. Each mapping team produced a map for separate, referenced mapping areas. MSHA later compiled individual areas to produce a single composite map included in Appendix H. The mapping team conducted all mapping by the distance and offset method, from spad to spad. If no spad was available, the team used the center of an intersection as a reference point. The teams did not map the rib lines, except where inaccuracies in the base map prevented mapping of the objects. The teams made notations when objects appeared to sustain heat damage from the explosion. All team members signed and dated each completed map. The parties typically made copies of team maps at the conclusion of each shift and distributed them to the other investigation teams. The investigators sent up to ten teams when underground mapping was conducted. Mine Dust Survey MSHA takes a mine dust survey after every underground coal mine explosion to determine coking and the incombustible content of the post-explosion dusts. The test for coking can be used to determine the extent of flame that occurred during the explosion and help investigators to determine the fuel, ignition source, and origin of the explosion. The incombustible content can be used to establish the condition of the mine dust prior to the explosion. Flames and Forces Team MSHA assigned a “flames and forces” team the task of establishing the origin of the explosion, the ignition source, the extent of flame, and the magnitude and direction of primary explosion forces. This team went underground starting July 13, 2010. It consisted of MSHA and WVOMHST personnel, along with GIIP, UMWA and company representatives. Electrical Teams Electrical inspections began on May 13, 2010 on the surface area of the mine. The electrical team inspected all surface equipment located near the portals and the surface substations and checked all cables entering the underground mine to ensure the electrical equipment was properly de-energized and grounded. These activities were completed to ensure that the mine was safe from electrical hazards before beginning

35

the underground accident investigation. A maximum of three electrical teams were used throughout the accident investigation, with two teams normally working inside the explosion area. The teams consisted primarily of personnel from MSHA and WVOMHST, but also included one or two company employees, along with a UMWA representative serving as observers. The first electrical teams went underground on June 28, 2010. One team with an additional MSHA Technical Support engineer worked outside of the explosion zone, re-energizing electrical circuits to pump water, install communication devices, and energize other electrical equipment. The team completed the electrical work outby the explosion zone by the end of October 2010. The electrical portion of the investigation in the explosion zone continued until May 4, 2011. Geology Team MSHA conducted geologic observations between May 2010 and December 2010. MSHA made surface observations where old contour strip mines, as well as the active Progress Pit strip mine, afforded outcrop exposure. MSHA also observed underground geological conditions in portions of the Castle Mine and the Black Knight II Mine. Underground at UBB, there was one geology team composed of MSHA and WVOMHST, with observers from the mine operator and the UMWA. MSHA documented geological conditions in UBB by conducting multiple parallel traverses in various entries of Headgate 1 North and Tailgate 1 North, the Panel 1 and Panel 2 crossover, the HG 22 and TG 22 sections, and the North and West Jarrells Mains. MSHA made several traverses across the longwall face, with detailed observations conducted in the tailgate entry. MSHA also documented geological observations on maps and in photographs, which were further supported by the collection of rock and gas samples. Ventilation Survey On September 28, MSHA personnel started a mine ventilation air quantity and air pressure survey, with participation from representatives from WVOMHST, UMWA and the mine operator. This survey determined post-explosion air velocities in the mine using either vane anemometers with wands in the one-half area traverse method or using the smoke-cloud method with aspirators and chemical smoke tubes. Investigators then calculated air quantities from the determined velocities and corresponding area of the mine entry in which the velocity was determined. Investigators measured air pressure differentials between air courses and across regulators or partial ventilation controls using magnehelic gauges and digital manometers. Investigators also used altimeters which were used to determine the total pressure at specific locations within the mine.

36

Evidence Collection and Testing
During the course of the investigation MSHA obtained about 88,000 pages of documents, 1,028 maps, over 24,000 photos, 18 videos, and more than 1,050 separate pieces of physical evidence. MSHA collected evidence at UBB in accordance with the protocol set forth by MSHA in conjunction with WVOMHST. When available and requested, MSHA provided duplicate samples to all investigation parties (Appendix G). Evidence was tagged, photographed, and removed from mine property, accompanied by a “Chain of Custody” form or an “Itemized Receipt”, as applicable. The MSHA Accident Investigation team provided PCC itemized receipts for evidence removed from the mine. Photography A photographer or group of photographers was frequently present during investigation activities by the accident investigation team. All parties involved during the investigation activities by individual teams were given the opportunity to request additional photographs and examine any evidence prior to its removal from the location. Photos taken were copied per PIL NO. 110-V-08 (Appendix I) which outlines the approved procedure for the copying of digital images from the SD (Secured Digital) card, contained in the camera, to a compact disc or hard drive memory for storage and filing during an accident investigation. MSHA provided a copy of these images to all investigation parties, along with a copy of the signed Photo Log. Evidence Testing MSHA CMS&H Mount Hope and Standard Laboratories The MSHA Mount Hope National Air and Dust Laboratory and the private Standard Laboratories conducted analyses of mine dust surveys collected from the mine to assist investigators in determining the cause and origin of the explosion, the area affected by the flame of the explosion, and the incombustible content of mine dust throughout the sampling area. Each lab processed a total of 1,803 mine dust samples for incombustible content and the presence of coke. As samples were collected, each party accompanying the mine dust survey teams was offered a portion of the same sample collected by MSHA. After the collection team transported samples to the surface, investigators checked each uniquely identified sample against the collection sheet and gave the samples to a member of the evidence collection team, along with a collection data sheet signed by all members of the mine dust survey team. Investigators then transported samples from the mine site directly to the Mount Hope laboratory for the initial analysis, following MSHA’s chain of custody procedures throughout this transfer. The Mount Hope laboratory retained possession of the samples for the duration of the initial analysis test. MSHA stored the remaining portion (except for the small amount consumed during analysis) in a uniquely identified container, locked in a secure room within the laboratory, until investigators transported them to Standard Laboratories for a comparison analysis. A side by side comparison of the results from both laboratories showed that the variation of the results varied only slightly, by an average of only 1.82 percent in the

37

incombustible content (Appendix J). Further evaluation of this data is explained in the subsection “Mine Dust Survey” located in the “Physical Causes of the Accident” portion of the report. Electrical Testing MSHA tested numerous physical pieces of evidence recovered from the mine. On a number of occasions, MSHA arranged for the manufacturer of the equipment to conduct the testing in MSHA’s presence. MSHA invited WVOMHST, GIIP, UMWA, Miners Representative and the mine operator to attend all of this testing. Throughout the testing, MSHA retained custody of the evidence. Joy Manufacturing and Matric Limited Facilities MSHA arranged for the testing of components removed from the longwall equipment with Joy Manufacturing (Joy), the manufacturer of the equipment, at Joy’s facilities. Joy performed tests on the following components:      Joy Network Architecture (JNA) control units Chock Interface Unit (CIU) Automatic Chain Tensioner (ACT) Support Control Centre (SCC) Shearer Remote Controls

Approval and Certification Center (A&CC) Investigators used the MSHA Technical Support Approval and Certification Center (A&CC) for testing of multiple items collected throughout the course of the investigation. A&CC testing included equipment checks against approved drawings, functional testing of equipment and safety systems, data recovery, and evaluation of evidence as potential ignition sources during detailed inspections. Investigators also documented grain size for material collected from spray nozzles in the longwall shearer. State Electric Supply Company Facility The State Electric Supply Company Facility was involved in the testing and data recovery of certain equipment manufactured by Allen-Bradley, including the PLC-5 and SLC 500 Processor Modules, the Panel View Operator Interface, and the Dataliner DL40 electrical equipment recovered from the mine.

38

SMC Electrical Products, Inc. Facility Representatives of SMC Electrical Products used their facility for visual inspection, data recovery and functional testing of the Multilin 239 overcurrent relays, SMC SGF-25 relays, SMC ground fault relay display units, and Multilin SR735 overcurrent relay collected from the longwall track mounted equipment known as the “mule train.” The testing performed by manufacturers’ representatives of these items included visual inspection of the equipment, functional and data recovery. Mine Safety Appliance Company (MSA) Facility Investigators conducted data retrieval activities and a time-drift study of item PE-0118, a MSA Solaris hand-held gas detector, at this facility. The Solaris detector was damaged to the point where testing was not possible at A&CC. The visual inspection of the detector was conducted at A&CC. UBB Mine Site At the UBB mine site, members of the accident investigation team, with assistance of A&CC personnel, conducted data downloads from gas detection equipment used at UBB prior to the accident and during rescue activities. Present during the download procedure were WVOMHST and the mine operator. Miners representatives from the UMWA were afforded the opportunity to participate. MSHA established protocols for downloads of a Solaris gas detector (used at the mine prior to and after the mine explosion) and Industrial Scientific MX6 gas detectors (used during rescue operations) and invited the mine operator and members for each of the investigation parties to attend the downloads. Gas Sampling Investigators collected samples of gas emanating from fractures in the floor from locations on the longwall face and the development sections for chemical and isotopic analyses to determine the source of gas entering the mine. Investigators collected gas using an SKC permissible dust pump, as well as an Industrial Scientific MX6 handheld multi-gas detector with a built-in pump, filling 1-liter Teflon-coated sample bags. In standing water, investigators used a capped length of large-diameter poly-vinyl chloride (PVC) pipe, equipped with a tube fitting, to allow gas to accumulate for sampling. In dry conditions, investigators inserted copper tubes into floor fractures and packed them off with mud and debris to create a seal. Together, with the results of gas analyses obtained at Speed Mining, LLC’s American Eagle Mine, investigators compared the results of gas analyses to samples of methane collected from wells in the vicinity of the mine.

39

Interviews
As noted earlier, MSHA and WVOMHST conducted interviews jointly, usually with the participation of GIIP. The agencies conducted 310 formal interviews before a court reporter, and 38 individuals were called back for additional testimony. To help facilitate the interviews, WVOMHST issued 116 subpoenas; the other witnesses appeared voluntarily. The Mine Act limits MSHA ability to issue subpoenas, only providing for subpoenas should there be public hearings. Nineteen individuals from Massey or PCC who received subpoenas from WVOMHST exercised their right under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution to not testify. MSHA remains willing to interview any of these individuals, even after the release of this report, should any choose to voluntarily share information with the agency. Information from these individuals or others may prove important in better understanding the events leading up to the accident and how it occurred. Such additional evidence could result in MSHA being better informed and could lead MSHA to reexamine findings contained in the report..

PRACTICES AT UBB THAT LED TO THE EXPLOSION
The information in this section is based on testimony and physical evidence obtained during this investigation. In the days, months, and years prior to April 5, 2010, PCC and Massey management set the stage for the explosion by allowing and encouraging mining practices that resulted in violation of federal law. PCC regularly hid hazards present in the mine from MSHA, noting some of them in one set of production and maintenance books, but failing to note them in required examination books that MSHA examined. PCC’s failure to identify and correct the hazards of coal dust accumulations and inadequate rock dusting led to the coal dust explosion on April 5. PCC and Massey inadequately trained their examiners and foremen (and other miners as well), contributing to their failure to identify and correct hazards. In addition, PCC and Massey engineers themselves could not handle the engineering challenges present at UBB and made a series of mistakes that made the mine hazardous. By April 5, an alarming number of accidents had occurred, many unreported to MSHA in violation of law. PCC illegally provided its employees with advance notice of MSHA inspections, severely limiting the effectiveness of the inspections. Additionally, PCC and Massey intimidated miners from voicing complaints, either internally or to MSHA.

Examinations
PCC regularly failed to properly examine the mine for hazards, putting miners at risk and directly leading to the April 5, 2010 explosion. MSHA regulations, codified at 30 CFR §§ 75.360- 75.364, make plain that a mine operator must examine certain areas of the mine on a weekly basis, as well as before and during each shift, for hazardous conditions. The operator must identify, record, and immediately correct the hazards. At UBB, examiners often did not travel to areas they were required to examine, or, in other 40

cases, did travel to the areas but did not perform the required measurements. Examiners also failed to identify hazards when they did perform examinations. In many instances, management officials noted hazards in a production or maintenance record, but failed to record them as required by the Mine Act in the required book. The failure to properly record hazards denied MSHA and miners the opportunity to understand and assess the hazards and ensure that they were corrected before production resumed. Finally, even where examiners did identify and record hazards, the mine operator frequently did not correct them. Because of these practices, accumulations of loose coal, compacted coal, and coal dust built up over weeks and months to dangerous levels and provided the fuel for the April 5 explosion. Similarly, because of the operator’s failure to identify, record and correct the hazard of insufficient application of rock dust, the rock dust that was present in the mine failed to halt the explosion. These are just a few of the hazards that were not corrected and contributed to the April 5 explosion. Failure to Perform Examinations On many occasions, PCC failed to conduct or complete required examinations prior to miners entering the mine or work areas. Several of these failures occurred in the 24hour period prior to the explosion on April 5. For example, during the preshift examination for the midnight shift on April 4, the examiner responsible for examining the longwall face (who had never conducted a longwall preshift prior to April 5) failed to examine the face. The examiner only took an air reading at the intake to the longwall and examined to shield 1. The examiner failed to travel the length of the longwall face to examine for hazardous conditions, test for methane and oxygen deficiency, determine if the air was moving in its proper direction, or take air velocity measurements at shields 9 and 160. The midnight maintenance crew worked on the face as scheduled. An examiner was responsible for examining the longwall tailgate entries on April 5 prior to the start of pumping work in those areas. The examiner permitted his pumping crew, comprising of two contract laborers, to travel with him as he conducted his examination, a practice which is impermissible under the regulations. PCC failed to comply with the requirement that weekly examinations be performed once every seven days. Between December 29, 2009 and March 10, 2010, it was common practice for the examination of the return entry at the Bandytown fan to be conducted every eight to nine days. Examiners routinely did not energize their multi-gas detectors when required during examinations, and the detectors often remained de-energized for extended periods of time during their shift.

41

On the day of the explosion, an examiner was required to perform a weekly examination on the longwall bleeder system. This bleeder was in the area behind the longwall that draws noxious gases and dusts away from the active areas and ultimately exhausts these contaminants through the Bandytown fan. After the explosion, investigators determined that the examiner’s multi-gas detector had not been turned on since March 18, 2010, approximately two weeks prior to the explosion. As a result, during this time period, the examiner could not take adequate air quality measurements. In addition, section foremen failed to keep their multi-gas detectors energized throughout their shifts. The longwall section foreman failed to energize his detector during the first part of the shift, from 8:45 a.m. to 11:08 a.m., on April 5. PCC’s examiners did not perform complete examinations by failing to take air readings required by the mine’s approved ventilation plan. For example, PCC’s weekly examiners did not take air quantity measurements at a required evaluation point in the longwall headgate entries because water had blocked access to the location. Rather than remove the water or establish an alternative measurement point, PCC simply failed to take measurements. Examiners did not take air readings in a number of other locations, including the Ellis Portal return air courses, the longwall section belt, the Ellis Portal belt/track, and measuring points inby the longwall headgate and tailgate. Required examinations of dust control parameters for the longwall shearer were not being performed. Air measurements were not taken at proper locations to determine the actual quantity of air ventilating the longwall face. The air quantity in the longwall belt entry was not being measured. Water sprays, pressure and flow rates, were not being examined as required for each shift. Failure to Identify Obvious Hazards MSHA found hazardous conditions throughout the northern area of the mine (i.e., the area affected by the explosion), including: Accumulations of Loose Coal4, Coal Dust5, and Float Coal Dust6 MSHA investigators found that PCC examiners failed to identify accumulations on the mine floor and against the ribs left from initial mining or roadway spillage, accumulations that had been scooped and placed in piles shown in Figure 3, and accumulations from rib sloughage. Accumulations were found consistently along every single air course. The location and placement of these coal accumulations indicated that they pre-dated

Loose coal is defined as coal fragments larger in size than coal dust, as per 30 CFR 75.400-1(c). Coal dust is defined as particles of coal that can pass through a 20 mesh sieve, as per 30 CFR 75.400-1(a). 6 Float coal dust is defined as coal dust consisting of particles of coal than can pass through a 200 mesh sieve (100 times smaller particles than those passing through a 20 mesh sieve), as per 30 CFR 75.400-1(b). Float coal dust is the most dangerous because it is easily suspended in the mine atmosphere and only requires a thin observable layer to provide the fuel for the propagation of a dust explosion.
4 5

42

the explosion. Miners working in these areas testified these accumulations existed prior to the explosion.

Figure 3. Accumulations of loose coal, coal dust, and float coal dust were measured up to 7 feet wide by 12 feet long by up to 4 feet in depth. These were found consistently along every single air course.

Rock Dust7 The MSHA Accident Investigation Team’s mine dust survey revealed that 90.5 percent of the affected area8 was inadequately rock dusted at the time of the explosion. Testimony indicated that the Longwall Tailgate entries, the crossover between HG 22 and TG 22, and the Glory Hole area were black or needed to be rock dusted. In addition evidence indicates that the Longwall Tailgate entries had not been rock dusted since the longwall went into production in September 2009. (The ”Rock Dusting”
Rock dust is defined as pulverized limestone, dolomite, gypsum, anhydrite, shale, adobe, or other inert material, preferably light colored, 100 percent of which will pass through a sieve having 20 meshes per linear inch and 70 percent or more of which will pass through a sieve having 200 meshes per linear inch, as per 30 CFR. Rock dust must be continuously applied in order to neutralize float coal dust, which inherently occurs during the mining process. 8The “affected area” is the area of the mine that was exposed to flame as indicated in Appendix Z.
7

43

section discusses in more detail PCC’s inadequate rock dusting practices). Only the belt examination books listed inadequate rock dusting as a hazard; the other examination books from the working sections did not. Inadequate Roof Support PCC’s roof control plan required two rows of posts or two 8’ cable bolts in the No. 7 entry in the longwall tailgate as supplemental support. This requirement was intended to maintain adequate roof support in that entry. PCC only installed one row of posts in the entry as shown in Figure 4. Both the single row of posts and the resulting roof control issues were obvious; examiners testified that they did not like to travel in that entry due to the bad top. PCC never recorded the hazard in any of its examination books. Poor roof conditions led to a roof fall in the No. 7 entry, which likely restricted air flow coming off the longwall face, and allowed methane to accumulate prior to the explosion. The investigation indicated that this fall was present prior to the explosion; blackened dust from the explosion was present on the fall and could only have occurred after the explosion.

Figure 4. Photograph of Tailgate 1 North No. 7 entry showing only one row of posts installed. The approved roof control plan required two rows of 8’ cable bolts or posts.

44

Failure to Record Hazards PCC engaged in a practice of failing to record all hazards in books required to be made available to MSHA and any interested persons. Several witnesses testified that they felt pressured by mine management not to record hazards in the required examination books. PCC instead recorded certain hazards in its internal production and maintenance reports. These reports were prepared by shift or section foremen and provided to PCC upper management (including Massey Energy Company officials for the production reports). Some of the hazardous conditions described in this “second set” of books relate to conditions that existed at the time of the explosion. For example, Figure 5, which is an entry in a PCC maintenance book from March 1, 2010, indicated that eight sprays were removed from both the head and tail drum and the shearer was operated in that manner for the remainder of the shift. This information was not recorded in the required examination book.

45

Figure 5 . Excerpt from PCC Maintenance Report dated 3/1/2010.

46

Below is a list, separated by working section, of some of the hazards that were recorded in the production reports but were not recorded in the required examination records that were made available to MSHA. (Also see Figures 6 and 7, which follow.) HG 22:       “230 minutes [down time], intake air going in wrong direction off old intake.” January 7, 2010, day shift. “Lost air in face return had very little pull to it. Found return stopping out. Had to build back.” January 11, 2010, day shift. “Adverse roof conditions.” February 12, 2010, evening shift. “At 24 break between 1-2 top broke up 2’, 3’, 4’, 6 ½’ spot bolted with cable bolts. Adverse roof conditions 1-3.” February 16, 2010, day shift. “Adverse roof conditions 1-3. Bolting ribs.” (Production Report Noted: down 101 minutes-roof conditions). February 18, 2010, day shift. “No air lob [last open break]. Went to glory hole fixed problem where air was leaking, put curtains across return overcast+ fly pads going to old intake, found 5 stoppings with holes in them, finish stopping on return side + plaster.” February 23, 2010, day shift. “120 minutes [down time] holes in intake to get air to the section.” March 1, 2010, evening shift. “Inspector had section down low air. Shut down by inspector not enough air in lob only. Section down for low air.” March 2, 2010, day shift. “25 min reventelating [sic] to get methane out of # 3 1.5 % reduce to .30” down 60 minutes.” March 2, 2010, evening shift. “Lob [last open break] low air in it. Found problem outby double door open.” March 11, 2010, day shift. “Low air on lob. Doors outby going to back to HG 22 tail open 7:008:00. Adverse roof conditions coal streaks four? 5’ up.” March 16, 2010, day shift

 

  

47

“Low Air in LOB. Doors outby going to HG22 Tail open 7:00-8:10…Adverse Roof condition their coal streak four ?5’ up. Falling out to it in #1 2.”

Figure 6. Comparison of HG 22 on-shift report and production report dated 3/16/10.

48

“25 min Reventelating to get methane out of #3 1.5% Reduce to .30”

Figure 7. Comparison of HG 22 on-shift and production report dated 3/2/10.

49

TG 22:  “Air coming up belt had to build airlock # 2 had about 24” of water for about 100 feet.” March 16, 2010, dayshift. Headgate 1 North (Longwall):  “Shot at Ellis punch out, set CO’s off.” September 30, 2009, evening shift.  “Had a fall from #1 shield to about 15 foot outby crusher. Had to build cribs down by s/l and into LOB also the rock was in crusher and back to head was about 10 feet high 16 foot wide, crew had to drill and shoot rock up to 4 times to get to run. It took 45 minutes each time we had to drill and shoot. 180 minutes to drill and shoot.” December 4, 2009, evening shift.  “No production took in 13 hp pump and put at supply doors, Both pumps on face were down. Had to put new discharge lines on both due to shields being pulled in and gob smashed both lines. Water was approx 8” from top of shields.” January 3, 2010, evening shift.  “No production, 4 North belt tail went down while coming underground at 43 br, we went over to the belt head, and saw a lot of smoke, we got the water hose and started putting water on tail roller, I left 4 men at tail piece, I took 4 men to longwall to fix pump in swag.” January 10, 2010, evening shift.  “Water gets bad cutting from head back to 115 while pump is running while cutting.” January 18, 2010, evening shift.  Maintenance report “the tip sprays that need to be every 20 shields, most are not working.” March 6, 2010, “A” crew, Failure to Correct Hazards PCC engaged in a practice of failing to correct recorded hazards. For example, belt examination records repeatedly indicated that the belts needed to be cleaned and/or dusted. From March 5, 2010 through April 5, 2010, examiners recorded, but did not correct, the following hazardous conditions for the six conveyor belts where the explosion propagated:  HG 22 #1 belt - 15 consecutive shifts reflect the belt needed cleaning and dusting with no corrective action taken. Of 90 producing shifts, 83 percent of the shifts reflect the belt needed cleaning and 96 percent of the shifts reflect the belt needed dusting.

50











TG 22 #1 belt - 24 consecutive shifts are recorded needed cleaning and 18 shifts needed dusted, with no corrective action taken. Of 73 producing shifts, 92 percent of the shifts reflect the belt needed cleaning and 99 percent of the shifts reflect the belt needed dusting. TG 22 #2 belt - 14 consecutive shifts are recorded needed cleaning and 18 shifts needed dusted with no corrective action taken. Of 54 producing shifts, 48 percent of the shifts reflect the belt needed cleaning and 78 percent of the shifts reflect the belt needed dusting. North #6 belt - six consecutive shifts are recorded needed cleaning and 15 shifts needed dusted with no corrective action. Of 90 producing shifts, 100 percent of the shifts reflect the belt needed cleaning and 86 percent of the shifts reflect the belt needed dusting. North #7 belt - 3 consecutive shifts are recorded needed cleaning and 21 shifts needed dusted with no corrective action taken. Of 90 producing shifts, 36 percent of the shifts reflect the belt needed cleaning and 97 percent of the shifts reflect the belt needed to be dusting. Longwall Belt - six consecutive shifts are recorded needed cleaning and 15 shifts needed dusted without any corrective action taken. Of 89 producing shifts, 67 percent of the shifts reflect the belt needed cleaning and 83 percent of the shifts reflect the belt needed dusting.

During the underground investigation, MSHA identified accumulations in over 50 locations along the conveyor belts. These accumulations were allowed to pile up below and around the belt and belt structure, and along portions of ribs that were not cleaned up during initial development. Examples of this are shown in Figures 8 and 9. The size and number of these accumulations demonstrate that the hazards existed for a long period of time.

51

Figure 8. Accumulations of loose coal with the top of the pile flattened due to rubbing the moving belt.

52

Figure 9. Accumulations of loose coal built up to the point that the belt roller is turning in the accumulations.

Another example taken from production reports demonstrated poor roof conditions:    January 5, 2010: “return #1 entry off of 2 section, bad top, cut down both ribs and breaking around bolts, 54-55 bk.” January 23, 2010: “bad top in return going out Bandytown at 53-55 bk, is cut down both ribs and busted up in the middle and falling out.” February 23, 2010: “bad top in return next to overcast, spad no. 23960, going out old 2 section and 1 section return.”

53

These records indicate PCC’s failure to take corrective action. Examiners testified that the repetition of the hazards in the books was based on a failure to correct the hazards, rather than a failure to record corrective action. In addition, the examination record book from January 5, 2010 to March 31, 2010 for airways inby Ellis switch documents more than 75 separate instances of hazardous conditions. Only six hazardous conditions were recorded as corrected. The documented hazards ranged from adverse roof conditions to the presence of rock and material in the travelways.

Inadequate Training
MSHA found widespread deficiencies in PCC’s efforts to comply with its approved training plan. The training plan, approved March 29, 2007 pursuant to 30 C.F.R. § 48.3(a), described several training programs, including those for experienced miner training, task training, and annual refresher training. MSHA interviewed miners and reviewed various PCC and contractor training functions that included plans, classes, curriculum materials, and records. MSHA reviewed employee training files covering the two-year period from April 5, 2008 to April 5, 2010, compiled from employee and contractor labor employee lists, for compliance with Parts 48A and 48B of the approved training plan. PCC failed to provide any training records for 30 miners as required by 30 C.F.R. §48.6, including PCC President Chris Blanchard and another top company official. Based on the information available, MSHA found that 112 miners either did not receive experienced miner training or received incomplete experienced miner training; 44 miners did not receive task training before performing the task as mobile equipment operators or performing other new job tasks; and 21 miners did not receive annual refresher training. In addition, 22 miners received experienced miner training from individuals who were not MSHA-approved instructors. Nine different individuals certified these miners’ training records despite not being MSHA-approved instructors. PCC was aware of many of these deficiencies because Massey Coal Services, a subsidiary of Massey Energy Company, performed an audit in September 2009 and identified a number of training deficiencies in PCC’s efforts to comply with its approved training plan. These deficiencies included PCC’s failure to provide experienced miner training and task training to a number of individuals, including several miners who worked on the longwall. As of April 5, 2010, PCC had failed to correct or address most of these deficiencies and Massey Coal Services had failed to take any steps to ensure that PCC corrected the deficiencies. Experienced Miner Training Training records and interview testimony indicated that 112 miners either did not receive experienced miner training or received incomplete experienced miner training. The miners who failed to receive experienced miner training received hazard training only or

54

no training; this group of miners included members of the longwall crew that were transferred to UBB from Logan’s Fork in 2009. All miners received Massey Initial Training (MIT) when they started working for PCC. On May 5, 2010, MSHA observed the MIT program conducted at the Marfork Coal Company (Marfork) training center. The training lasted approximately three hours and was predominantly related to Massey policies. After the MIT program, the instructor completed a MSHA Form 5000-23 (record of training) for individuals in the training session as having received the experienced miner training. When interviewed, the instructor stated that prior to April 5, the courses of instruction consisted mostly of Massey policy. The MIT program covered only one subject (self-rescue and respiratory devices) of the 12 subjects listed in their approved training plan and required in 30 CFR Section 48.6(b). The MIT program ignored 11 subjects:            Introduction to work environment Mandatory health and safety standards Authority and responsibility of supervisors and miners’ representatives Entering and leaving the mine; transportation; communication Mine map; escapeways; emergency evacuation; barricading Roof or ground control and ventilation plans Hazard recognition Prevention of accidents Emergency medical procedures Health Health and safety aspects of the tasks to which the experienced miner is assigned

The MIT program deferred to the individual operator (i.e. PCC) to complete the other requirements of experienced miner training, including the introduction to the work environment. It was determined that 112 of these employees did not receive this training as required. MSHA determined that PCC’s failure to train its miners in hazard recognition contributed to the conditions which were involved in the explosion on April 5. The miners’ lack of training in hazard recognition was corroborated by the existence of extensive accumulations of loose coal, coal dust, and float coal dust which went unidentified and uncorrected prior to the explosion. In addition, testimony and underground observations corroborated that miners were not aware of the requirements of the roof control and ventilation plans. Many miners had no knowledge of the 1997 explosion, which involved an ignition of gas in the gob near the tailgate side of the longwall face behind the shields in the 2 West Longwall panel, nor of the 2003 and 2004 methane feeders, all of which shared characteristics with the April 5, 2010 explosion. Knowledge of past accidents is a required part of training and is a crucial part of accident prevention.

55

Task Training Training records and interview testimony indicated that 44 miners did not receive task training before performing the task as mobile equipment operators or performing other new job tasks, including those related to performing preshift, on-shift, and weekly examinations, working on the rock dusting crew, and working on the longwall during production shifts. PCC’s failure to train its miners in a number of these tasks contributed to the conditions which were involved in the explosion on April 5. A number of preshift and belt examiners testified that PCC never trained them how to perform such examinations, which means they did not receive training on specific hazard recognition and roof control and ventilation plans. PCC did not train a number of rock dusting crew members on the amount of rock dust which must be applied to a given area. PCC did not provide task training to certain individuals on the longwall crew on the operation and maintenance of the longwall shearing machine. Annual Refresher Training Training records and interview testimony indicated that 21 miners did not receive annual refresher training over the past two years. In 2009, three miners did not receive annual refresher training, while in 2010. Eighteen miners did not receive annual refresher training. PCC conducted its annual refresher training in March, 2010. Many hazardous conditions and practices which existed prior to the annual refresher training persisted up until the time of the explosion and contributed to the explosion. Other Training Deficiencies PCC’s training records and miner testimony indicated additional deficiencies:  Under 30 C.F.R. § 48.9, mine operators must retain copies of training certificates for various lengths of time. PCC failed to provide any training records for 30 miners, including PCC President Chris Blanchard and another top company official. Based on PCC’s failure to provide these training records, it is unclear whether these 30 miners received any of the required training. Under 30 C.F.R. §48.3(g), certain training courses “shall be conducted by MSHA approved instructors.” 23 miners received experienced miner training from individuals who were not MSHA-approved instructors; nine different individuals certified these miners’ training records despite not being MSHA-approved instructors. Ten members of management were designated as “responsible persons” as of April 5, 2010, but there were no records to indicate they had received the training required by Section 75.1501(a)(2). PCC provided the names of six individuals who had received training for the examination and sampling of seals, as required by Section 75.338. The mine







56

seal examination record books, covering the dates from June 29, 2009 through April 5, 2010, showed that 17 individuals signed the books indicating they had examined seals. The training records showed that only two of the 17 employees received the training. One of the individuals had not received the annual training under Section 75.338 which was due in January 2010.  PCC identified five employees that operated the AMS frequently. AMS operators are required by Section 75.351(q)(2) to travel to all working sections underground every six months in order to retain familiarity with the underground mining system at their operations. During an interview, one of the five employees stated that he had not been to a production section in three years. PCC stated “all members are qualified AMS operators as the AMS system and its operation are specifically covered during annual refresher training.” The operator did not have sufficient time allotted in the annual refresher training or the equipment necessary to train the AMS personnel.



Contractor Training Issues David Stanley Consultants, LLC (DSC), Contractor ID YBV MSHA approved training plans for DSC, covering Part 48, Subpart A, Subpart B, Part 75, and Part 77, on July 28, 2006. MSHA interviewed certain DSC employees and also reviewed employee training records covering the two-year period from April 5, 2008 to April 5, 2010, for compliance, identifying numerous deficiencies. These deficiencies were included in the deficiencies listed above. On June 15, 2010, MSHA observed a training session conducted at the Marfork training center by James Gump, Director of Operations and Safety for DSC. The attendees were going to work at various Massey Energy Company mines for DSC. Gump provided training by using an outline which did not cover the course materials required by Section 48.6 (training of experienced miners), as specified in DSC’s approved training plan. The instructor did not have available for review the mine ventilation plans, roof control plans, clean-up and rock-dusting plans, mine maps, mine transportation and communications, or health and safety of the task to which the new miner would be assigned or other required course material. Nonetheless, the instructor completed a Form 5000-23 for each attendee indicating they received experienced miner training, even though they did not receive complete training. Mountaineer Labor Solutions, LLC (MLS), Contractor ID T025 MSHA approved training plans for MLS, covering 30 CFR Part 48 and §§ 75.160 and 77.107, on January 23, 2008. MSHA interviewed certain MLS employees and also reviewed employee training records covering the two-year period from April 5, 2008 to April 5, 2010, for compliance, identifying numerous deficiencies. These deficiencies were included in the deficiencies listed above.

57

The records, certified by Brian Buzzard, owner of MLS, indicated that experienced miner training had been conducted. MSHA determined that Buzzard had no training material on escapeway maps, ventilation plans, roof control plans, first aid manuals or first aid equipment. Buzzard did not have training models for the SR-100 SCSR or other course material for training experienced miners, as required by Section 48.6 and stipulated in the MLS approved training plan.

Engineering Issues
Interviews with Massey engineers reflected their confusion and unfamiliarity with the mine. PCC utilized engineering services from a Massey-affiliated engineering facility known as “Route 3 Engineering.” These services included surveying, mapping, and mine design. Engineers included Chief Engineer Paul McCombs, UBB Resident Engineer Eric Lilly, Matthew Walker, Heath Lilly, and Raymond Brainard. A number of Route 3 engineers testified that they had limited mining experience and rarely went underground at UBB. The licensed engineer who certified mine maps was more familiar with tax issues and long term planning for Massey, rather than the specific underground conditions of the mines in question. Route 3 engineers submitted 13 proposed UBB ventilation plan revisions that were denied by MSHA D4 between September 11, 2009 and April 5, 2010. In connection with these denials, MSHA identified fundamental deficiencies in plans and on maps such as missing regulators, missing stoppings, missing air directions, missing air quantities, and other regulatory deficiencies. A more detailed description of the plans submitted can be found in the sections entitled “Recent Revision to the Approved Plan and Map” and “Disapproved Revision to the Ventilation Plan and Map” under Ventilation Plan later in the report. The number of revisions and disapprovals are an indication of the lack of planning and inadequate engineering practices employed by this operator. Engineers testified that they did not know who was in charge of ventilation at UBB. When interviewed, Walker stated that there was not a specific person responsible. Without a clearly specified person responsible, ventilation changes were made without planning and foresight.

Intimidation of Miners
The Mine Act grants the right to request an immediate inspection when they have reasonable grounds to believe that a violation of the Mine Act, a mandatory health or safety standard, or an imminent danger exists. MSHA encourages miners (or their representatives) to do so via a toll-free hotline (1-800-746-1553) or on MSHA’s Web page under Online Tools (Report a Hazardous Condition) MSHA Hazard Complaint. They may also report hazardous condition complaints directly to an MSHA inspector. Despite the recognition by many miners of hazards throughout UBB, no one had made a complaint to MSHA since

58

June 8, 2006. MSHA did not receive any complaint related to underground hazards at UBB prior to the accident. Miners were routinely intimidated by Massey and PCC managers who created a culture in which production trumped all other concerns. Foremen were required to regularly report their production status to PCC and Massey management, as well as “downtime” reports for when production stopped. Because of this culture, miners testified that they were reluctant to make a safety complaint to their superiors, or pursue a complaint beyond merely mentioning it to their foreman. Miners did not alert MSHA of hazards prior to April 5, 2010. Even though miners knew of safety problems at the mine, they did not make complaints or report the safety problems because they believed they might lose their jobs as a result. A scoop operator testified that miners “know not to say anything because they know they'll probably get fired by the bosses.” He noted that even with air problems they were having, “you felt like you couldn't really say anything, because you know if you did, you'd probably be fired.” A shuttle car operator testified that his boss instructed him not to speak to MSHA inspectors. A foreman testified that Massey retaliated against miners who made complaints by assigning them to the hoot owl shift or to a mine with low coal. A purchasing agent testified that mine management would threaten to fire foreman when they called out and reported that they were down because of insufficient ventilation, “He would say we was stupid, that the guys are stupid, call up there and fire them. He wanted them in the coal in a few minutes.” The purchasing agent further testified when asked about managements’ attitude when unusual problems such as water shutting down the longwall for a couple of weeks, “…tell them guys to get the coal, we got to get running. It got to the point where I’d reach for the phone---we got caller ID. I’d reach for the phone and my hand would shake. ….I was at the end of my rope almost.” Similarly, another UBB miner, testified: “…they (miners) were scared if they took the time to ventilate that way it should be, whether they would be or not, they were scared they’d be fire or gotten rid of or taken off of that job and put on something that might not be as good for them as working on the face.” He further stated, “…you knew that you better go ahead and mine the coal or --- the atmosphere around Massey was, you know, you just keep your mouth shut and do it if you want to keep your job.” Massey established a toll-free number for miners to internally make safety and health complaints. However, some miners testified that they were reluctant to use this phone number because they feared retaliation.
 

59

In addition, testimony established that upper management at PCC threatened foremen and miners who took time to make needed safety corrections. An employee testified that upper management threatened to fire crews when they stopped production and that Massey CEO Don Blankenship himself pressured management to immediately resume production. A foreman testified that he heard Mine Superintendent Everett Hager yell at victim Edward “Dean” Jones, a Section Foreman on HG 22, who had stopped production to fix ventilation problems. Hager relayed that President Chris Blanchard stated that “if you don't start running coal up there, I'm going to bring the whole crew outside and get rid of every one of you.” Another foreman testified that Hager threatened to fire him for stopping production and working on ventilation. These were not idle threats. Miner testimony indicated that a top company official suspended a section foreman, who had delayed production for an hour or two to patch up leaking stoppings so that the minimum air quantity in the approved ventilation plan was available on the continuous miner section. Another foreman testified, miners who tried “to do the right thing” were “usually the people that [got] kicked in the teeth for it.” This culture of intimidation deprived MSHA of miners’ voices. Under the Mine Act, miners play an important role in identifying hazards. The Code of Federal Regulations (30 CFR) calls for all hazards to be recorded in a book available for inspection at the surface. Section 105(c) of the Mine Act specifically recognizes the potential for a mine operator to discourage the reporting of hazards and protects miners from discrimination when they report an alleged hazard. Under the Mine Act, miners may refuse to work in unsafe or unhealthy conditions and may withdraw themselves from the mine for not having had required health and safety training.

Advance Notice of Inspections
Section 103(a) of the Mine Act provides that no advance notice of an inspection shall be provided to any person. Despite this statutory prohibition, many miners testified that PCC or Massey personnel on the surface routinely notified them prior to the arrival of inspectors. A large number of UBB miners testified that they knew in advance when inspectors were in the mine because of communication from the surface. A UBB security guard testified that he had been instructed to call and alert personnel at the mine once MSHA inspectors were on the property. One dispatcher testified that the guard shack alerted him “every time” inspectors came on the property. Dispatchers testified that they regularly called foremen and miners on the radio or mine phone to alert them of MSHA inspectors’ presence. Several dispatchers stated that upper management had instructed them to give advance notice of inspectors to miners; if a dispatcher failed to do so, there would be consequences. A dispatcher characterized giving advance notice as simply part of the dispatcher’s “job.”

60

A former belt construction worker testified, “When they hit the bridge at Mont Coal, the security guard would come up through the repeater, tell the mine manager that they was coming, then the calls went out through the sections to be ready to make sure you were legal, rock dust, whatever. It was every time that anybody was coming to that mines.” PCC would also make ventilation changes in advance of the inspector’s arrival on the section, redirecting air and sending it to the section where the inspector was headed. A foreman testified that mine managers would call out for more air on the section where the inspector was headed, although miners only had a short time to make changes and the work was sometimes “chaos.” An examiner testified that PCC would send miners to adjust regulators and direct air to the section where the inspector headed, even though this reduced air in other parts of the mine where miners were working. Miners testified that they noticed more air on their section before the arrival of the inspector. A shuttle car operator testified that his crew would hang curtains more tightly and make sure they had air in the face. This advance notice gave foremen and miners the opportunity to alter conditions and fix hazards prior to MSHA’s arrival on the section. If they were unable to correct hazards, miners testified, the foreman would shut down the working section. As a result, the MSHA inspector could not observe safety problems during production. Because of PCC’s practice of providing advance inspection notice, inspectors seldom saw the way the mine actually was operated. Advance notice limited the effectiveness of MSHA’s inspection efforts at UBB. On October 26, 2011, Hughie Elbert Stover, PCC’s former head of security, was found guilty by a jury sitting in the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia of a felony count of making false, fictitious and fraudulent statements to MSHA. Stover had falsely testified in his interview with the MSHA accident investigation team that UBB had a policy prohibiting security guards from providing "advance notice" of MSHA inspections; however, evidence indicated that he himself had directed guards to provide such advance notice. He was also found guilty of a second felony count of obstructing justice by ordering a miner to dispose of documents wanted in the accident investigation.

Mine Accident Incidence Rate
Accident rates for the period between 2006 and 2009 are summarized in Table 1, and compared to the national rate for all underground, bituminous coal mines. MSHA audited these accident records and determined that the accident rate for UBB was significantly higher than had been reported by PCC, as shown in Table 1. Table 2 documents the enforcement actions taken by MSHA from 2006 through 2010, based on information contained in MSHA’s Data Retrieval System. In addition, PCC and Massey’s underreporting of accident data denied MSHA the opportunity to properly investigate and assess accidents and hazards at the mine.

61

Table 1. Accident Incident Rates after Audits

Non-Fatal Days Lost (NFDL) Calendar Year UBB Prior to Audit 5.55 2.41 6.07 5.81 4.16 UBB After Audit 5.55 2.89 11.50 10.24 5.82 National 4.79 4.74 4.26 4.04 3.58

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Table 2. Citations, Orders, and Safeguards Issued at UBB.

Calendar Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010*

103(k) Orders 2 0 2 1 0

104(a) Citations 148 269 189 460 117

104(d)(1) Citations 1 0 1 1 0

104(b) Orders 4 1 0 4 1

104(d)(1) Orders 11 0 1 1 0

104(d)(2) Orders 5 0 3 48 6

104(g)(1) 0 0 1 1 0

107(a) 2 1 0 1 0

314(b) 0 0 1 0 0

* - Through April 5, 2010 prior to the explosion Inspection History (1/1/09 to 4/5/10) Regular Inspection (E01) MSHA conducts four quarterly inspections at underground coal mines each year, with the fiscal year beginning with quarter 1 in October and ending with quarter 4 starting in July. As has been noted, the advance notice given of inspections, coupled with PCC and Massey’s intimidation of miners, hampered MSHA’s effectiveness in conducting its inspections. Nonetheless, the number of violations issued to UBB and the number of hours that MSHA inspectors had to spend at UBB (inspecting, citing violations, and ensuring that violations were abated) trended upward in the five quarters leading up to

62

April 5, 2010 as indicated in Table 3. MSHA issued more orders under Section 104(d) of the Act (“unwarrantable failure” violations, which indicate higher negligence and gravity than some other types of citations) at UBB than at any other coal mine in the country in fiscal year 2009. Enforcement actions issued during regular inspections (E01) pursuant to Section 103(a) of the Mine Act for the time period from the second quarter of 2009 through the third quarter of 2010, are listed by quarter and summarized in Table 3. The data is sourced from MSHA’s Mine Data Retrieval System.
Table 3. Regular Inspection History at UBB. E01 Event No. FY Inspection Quarter No. of Citations No. of Orders MMU Time (hours) Outby Time (hours) Surface Writing Time (hours) 34.25 45.25 62.75 30.25 42.50 3.00 Surface Time (hours) Total Hours at Mine

4119932 4119936 4119293 6288652 6286108 6284327

2009-2 2009-3 2009-4 2010-1 2010-2 2010-3

91* 119* 149* 58* 101* 5

1* 16* 23* 9* 7* 1

67.50 90.75 129.25 151.25 91.00 4.00

127.75 175.75 196.00 206.75 174.50 1.50

36.00 52.00 140.75 104.00 111.75 11.75

265.50 363.75 528.75 492.25 419.75 20.25

* - Vacated issuances are not included in the Data Retrieval System (DRS) reports; subsequent to the DRS report, there was one citation or order vacated each of these five quarters (three 104(a) citations and two 104(d)(2) orders.

Tables K-1 and K-2 in Appendix K detail the violations issued during 2009 and 2010 at UBB. During this period, there were 49 violations of 30 CFR 75 subpart E (75.400’s), relating to combustible materials and inadequate rock dusting, conditions which ultimately played a role in propagating the coal dust explosion. Spot Inspections (E02) Spot inspections are based on the provision of Section 103(i) of the Mine Act, which states that:

63

Whenever the Secretary finds that a coal or other mine liberates excessive quantities of methane or other explosive gases during its operations, or that a methane or other gas ignition or explosion has occurred in such mine which resulted in death or serious injury at any time during the previous five years, or that there exists in such mine some other especially hazardous condition, he shall provide a minimum of one spot inspection by his authorized representative of all or part of such mine during every five working days at irregular intervals. UBB was placed on a 10-day spot inspection cycle on July 15, 2009. On April 2, 2010, the mine was placed on a 5-day spot inspection schedule because the mine liberated over one million cubic feet of methane within a 24-hour period. Table 4 provides the quarterly spot inspection history from January 1, 2009 to April 5, 2010.
Table 4. Spot Inspection History for UBB.

FY Inspection Quarter 2009-2 2009-3 2009-4 2010-1 2010-2 2010-3 Total Longwall Citation History

E02 103(i) spot inspections 6 6 9 10 9 0 40

Citations Issued 12 12 6 3 8 0 41

Orders Issued 0 0 5 1 0 0 0

The active longwall at the time of the accident was at the 1 North Panel, which was activated in September 2009. Table 5 provides a summary of enforcement actions for the longwall panel.

64

Table 5. Types and Number of Enforcement Actions for 1 North Panel between September 1, 2009 and April 5, 2010

Type of Enforcement Action 104(a) non-S&S citation 104(a) S&S citation 104(b) order 104(d)(2) order Total

No. Issued 23 6 1 6 36

PHYSICAL CAUSES OF THE ACCIDENT
Methane was Allowed to Accumulate on the Tailgate End of the Longwall
An explosive mixture of gases was allowed to accumulate in the vicinity of the shearer which was located at the tailgate end of the longwall. There were several failures that allowed this mixture to exist. The air current at the tailgate end of the longwall and in the T-split was inadequate to dilute and render harmless, and carry away additional methane when the floor feeder occurred. The mine not only had a history of floor gas outbursts on the longwall face, including events that occurred in 2003 and 2004, but also experienced an explosion on the face and in the adjoining tailgate in 1997, which management failed to consider. A detailed discussion of these events is provided in the section entitled, “Outburst History at UBB”, below. Examiners were unable to conduct examinations as required in the longwall tailgate entry (No. 7 entry) of the 1 North Tailgate because the operator failed to ensure that this entry was properly supported. The failure to properly support this entry is also important because it affected the ventilation such that it was not sufficient to dilute and render harmless, and carry away explosive, noxious and harmful gases, dusts, smokes and fumes.

The Explosion Began as a Methane Ignition that Originated Near the Tailgate and Transitioned into a Coal Dust Explosion
The investigation team determined that the explosion was a methane ignition, which led to a methane explosion and then transitioned into a coal dust explosion. The methane ignition resulted in a fire that could not be controlled by the miners at the shearer, forcing their evacuation. The fire likely burned behind the shields for up to two minutes

65

before entering the T-split of No. 7 Entry in the Tailgate. Upon entering this area, the fire came into contact with an explosive mixture of methane. The resulting methane explosion propagated through the first outby crosscut before the methane was consumed. However, the methane explosion suspended and ignited float coal dust and coal dust, and the propagation of the coal dust explosion commenced. The flame zone from the coal dust explosion was extensive. If all the flame throughout the workings had resulted from the ignition of methane, then the explosion pressures would have exceeded the constant volume explosion pressure of about 120 psi in all areas of the explosion zone, which they did not9. This indicates that the explosion was the result of coal dust propagation and not of methane alone. The team carefully considered other possibilities, such as an explosion fueled only by methane, an inundation from a gas well, or a seismic event, but ruled them out due to lack of supporting evidence for these theories. The results of the team’s mine dust survey, the explosion pressures observed in the mine, a review of the limited amounts of methane detected prior to and after the accident, testimony from interviews, and examination records all indicate that the explosion resulted from a methane ignition/explosion transitioning into a coal dust explosion. The first step in determining what kind of explosion occurred is to understand where the explosion traveled and the “footprint” it left. Investigators determined that the flame associated with the explosion traveled throughout the northern section of the mine. A mine map showing the extent of flame, along with the incombustible contents and the quantity of coke in the mine dusts at each sampled location underground is contained in Appendix Z. Based upon the flame path, investigators concluded that the level of methane necessary to extend flames into those areas would have resulted in pressures that would have caused far more damage than was actually observed. A methane inundation originating near the tailgate also would have extended flame into more areas than it did (for example, across the longwall face, which suffered only limited heating during the accident). Finally, there was only a limited quantity of methane detected preand post-explosion, which was not consistent with a massive inundation of methane. The Methane Explosion Originated in the Tailgate Entry Near the Longwall Face The investigation team, along with independent experts, analyzed mine dust samples, looking for coking to determine where flames traveled; the impacts of heating on objects; and pressures, calculated by using affected objects as data points and running finite element computer models to determine the path of the explosion. This evidence pinpoints where the flame traveled. MSHA’s flames and forces team conducted an extensive examination of the underground areas affected by the explosion. The team also conducted work outby the Ellis Switch, as well as in all inby areas, including the 1 North Panel crossover entries.

9

NIOSH research has indicated that a constant volume explosion pressure of 120 psi can be exceeded with the ignition of methane accumulations that are more than 165 feet in length.

66

The flames and forces team considered all available evidence, including the direction of primary explosion forces, the location of victims and mining machinery after the explosion, the deposition of dust, the effects of the explosion on materials and equipment, the extent of flame, and the direction and magnitude of all explosion forces. The origin of the explosion was determined to be located at the intersection of the active longwall face and the No. 7 entry of Tailgate 1 North. This location is just inby crosscut 48. The mine map included in a subsequent section of this report addresses the direction of the primary forces and the origin of the explosion. The Extent of the Explosion is Consistent with that of a Coal Dust Explosion Mine Dust Survey The investigative team took 1,803 mine dust samples as part of its mine dust survey underground. Investigators sent all 1,803 samples to MSHA’s Mount Hope National Air and Dust Laboratory, which conducted an Alcohol Coke Test on the samples to determine the degree of coking. The exceptionally large number of mine dust samples containing coke, along with the magnitude of explosion forces, is indicative of a coal dust explosion rather than an explosion fueled entirely by methane. All 1,803 samples were sent to MSHA’s Mount Hope National Air and Dust Laboratory, where the incombustible content and degree of coking were determined. The incombustible content provides an indication of the pre-explosion conditions in the affected area of the mine, while the coking indicates the area affected by the flame of the explosion. A mine dust survey was performed in the area affected by the explosion. Of the 1353 samples collected in the affected area, 90.5 percent were non-compliant. Analysis results indicate that 1,412 (1,105 in intake and 307 in return entries) out of 1,803 (78 percent) samples were not compliant with incombustible requirements in place at the time of the explosion. Analysis results indicate that 924 (684 in intake and 240 in return entries) of 1,137 (81 percent) band samples were not compliant. Mine dust samples were taken in return entries of nine sampling areas. The average incombustible content in all nine areas was less than 80 percent, with a range from 43.9 percent to 63.2 percent. The return entries in these nine sampling areas were rock dusted inadequately. Mine dust samples were taken in intake entries of seventeen sampling areas. Sampling areas 1 through 6 showed average incombustible contents exceeding 65 percent, with a range from 68.6 percent to 79.9 percent. Sampling areas 7 through 17 showed average incombustible contents of less than 65 percent, with a range from 46.2 percent to 58.3 percent. The intake entries in these 11 sampling areas were rock dusted inadequately.

67

Taken in context with physical evidence observed and collected underground, the Alcohol Coke Test also indicated the extent of the flame. The flame engulfed the Tailgate 1 North, entered the Headgate 1 North, turning both inby and outby. It also entered HG 22 (via the crossover entries) and turned both left and right. The flame that turned left was consumed in HG 22; the flame that turned right entered the North Glory Mains, the Glory Hole Mains, the North Jarrells Mains, and the West Jarrells Mains. A full discussion of the extent of the flame is included under the subsection “Flame Travel” later in the report. The Pressures and Flame Generated by the Explosion The flame extent and the pressures generated by the explosion are consistent with a coal dust explosion not a massive methane explosion. For a methane explosion to have covered the area where flame passed at UBB, it would have generated pressures far in excess of what was observed and calculated for this explosion. MSHA estimated that the explosive accumulation of methane that was eventually ignited contained approximately 300 cubic feet of methane. When diluted with air to 10 percent, this volume of methane would form an explosive volume of 3,000 cubic feet. Importantly, the flame of an explosion generally involves a volume that is approximately five times the volume of the initial methane accumulation. The flame from this initial methane explosion affected a volume of about 15,000 cubic feet, or a linear distance of approximately 140 feet, based on the dimension of the mine openings where the ignition occurred. The methane explosion propagated away from the longwall face. With a flame speed of approximately 300 feet per second, the methane explosion would have extinguished in about ½-second while generating a maximum pressure of about 4 pounds per square inch (psi). The flame zone that actually occurred at UBB, however, was far greater than 15,000 cubic feet; it contained a volume of about 31 million cubic feet. This flame zone can easily be achieved in a coal dust explosion that generates limited pressure. To cover 31 million cubic feet of the mine from a methane-only explosion, considering a flame extension of five times, the initial explosive methane accumulation would have to have been about 6,200,000 cubic feet. This volume of methane would have completely filled nearly 52,000 linear feet of entry. The ignition of such a volume of methane in an underground mine could have resulted in a detonation with possible explosion pressures exceeding 600 psi, many times greater than what was calculated at UBB. The ignition of such a large hypothesized accumulation of methane would have resulted in explosion forces that greatly exceed forces that actually occurred underground.

68

The investigation team also concluded that the absence of flame on the longwall indicated that the explosion was not a methane-only explosion. On April 5, 2010, underground activities proceeded until the time of the explosion. At the time of the explosion, the HG 22 crew was boarding a mantrip to exit the mine at the end of their shift. The TG 22 crew left their section and traveled to just outby 78 switch. The crew at the longwall was not finished with their shift, as they changed out at the face about an hour later, around 4:00 p.m. During the investigation, 18 mine dust samples were taken from various shields across the longwall face. These samples were all subjected to the Alcohol Coke Test (to be explained in greater detail later in this report). The results indicate that flame did not travel across the longwall face. The evidence of lack of flame along the face indicates that neither suspended coal dust nor explosive quantities of methane existed across the face. It is expected that any inundation of significant volumes of methane at the shearer would result in methane accumulations, both in the tailgate entries and on the tailgate side of the longwall. There Was Only Limited Detection of Methane Underground Prior to the Accident and During the Rescue Investigators also ruled out a massive methane inundation based on the relatively modest levels of methane liberated, according to pre- and post-explosion measurements. Records of examinations that occurred in the shifts prior to the accident do not indicate that significant methane was present in the active workings. A post-explosion evaluation of methane detectors does not indicate that methane was present in significant concentrations in the active workings immediately prior to the accident. The methane monitors on the tail of the longwall and on the shearer did not de-energize electrical power, which would have occurred at 2 percent methane. Information collected from the handheld gas detector located at shield 83 did not record elevated methane levels prior to the explosion. Handheld gas detectors carried by Chris Blanchard and another top company official, two hours after the explosion, recorded a maximum methane level of only 0.3 percent at approximately two crosscuts of the longwall face in the tailgate entry. Additionally, on April 5, a rescue team member advanced to shield 120 on the longwall face. He did not report any sound emanating from the longwall face or the tailgate entry which would have indicated a large volume of gas release. Nor did he report elevated levels of methane along the longwall until he reached shield 120, where he reported 2.0 percent methane. At this time the airflow was disrupted severely from the explosion, and a large-volume gas release would have contaminated the face and tailgate of the longwall. Taken together, these facts indicate that the magnitude of the gas release was likely in the order of hundreds of cubic feet per minute, rather than a massive inundation.

69

The autopsy reports show that methane was not found in any examined body tissue for 22 of the victims. Of the 7 victims who did have methane in some tissue, two were on the longwall and five were on or near the mantrip in HG 22. The methane found in these victims is most likely due to decomposition given the fact that their bodies were recovered from the mine more than five days after death. The methane found in the body tissue cannot be used to quantify accurately the amount or concentration of methane that was breathed or for how long. The lack of methane in the remaining 22 victims suggests that methane was not present at any of their locations at the time of the accident. Analysis of Methane Liberation at the Bandytown Fan Measurements at the Bandytown fan indicated higher liberation of methane postaccident than what was recorded during pre-accident mining. Investigators determined that likely came from floor fractures, as well as a product of combustion generated by the explosion itself. The volume of methane liberated from a coal mine is dependent on several factors including gas reservoir characteristics of the coal seam and the surrounding strata, type of mining, rate of mining, depth of overburden, and the existence of geologic structures. Methane can be released into a mine during the cutting of coal, through mining-induced fractures, and through pre-existing fractures and joints in the coal, roof and floor strata. The liberation rate may vary, depending on conditions encountered and the rate in which coal is being extracted. There may be several different sources from which the gas enters the mine. Some of these sources include coal seams, gas bearing shale and sandstone formations, and adjacent abandoned or active mines. The concentrations of hydrocarbons and other gaseous components can vary, dependent on the source. Generally, a coal seam contains gas composed mostly of methane with trace amounts of other hydrocarbons and is referred to as coalbed methane. The coal seam is the source and reservoir of coalbed methane. Rock strata, such as shale, may contain gas composed of methane with higher concentrations of the heavier hydrocarbons than coalbed methane. A combination of these gases is commonly referred to as natural gas. The rock stratum may be a reservoir and/or source of natural gas. Sealed and worked-out areas in mines may contain gas mixtures other than coalbed methane.

70

Pre-Accident Methane Liberation During each MSHA quarterly inspection of the mine, inspectors collected air samples in all of the return entries where air exited the mine and in each of the working section return entry(s). Air samples were analyzed by MSHA’s Mount Hope National Air and Dust Laboratory located in Mount Hope, West Virginia. Air quantities were measured to determine the total daily quantity of methane liberated from the mine and each working section. Table 6 shows the total methane liberation rate for the two quarters preceding the accident. The samples collected as part of the 2nd quarterly inspection revealed the total methane liberation rate from the mine was 741 cfm, consisting of 681 cfm from the Bandytown shaft and approximately 60 cfm from the remaining portion of the mine.
Table 6. Methane liberation in Q1 and Q2 2010 for various mine areas. Location Methane Liberation Methane Liberation FY 10 Qtr. 1 FY 10 Qtr. 2 East Mains 10,217 cfd 11,212 cfd North Portal 0 75,246 cfd South Portal 0 0 Bandytown Fan 1,155,583 cfd 981,052 cfd Bandytown Air Quantity 448,200 cfm Total CH4 Liberation (cfd) 1,165,800 cfd Total CH4 Liberation (cfm) 809 cfm *cubic feet per day (cfd), cubic feet per minute (cfm) 374,893 cfm 1,067,510 cfd 741 cfm

The results of MSHA’s September 26, 2010 ventilation study revealed a balanced airflow quantity at the Bandytown fan of 297,000 cfm. The pre-accident airflow quantity at the Bandytown fan was determined to be approximately 301,000 cfm. It was concluded, based on the ventilation study, that the air quantity was approximately 301,000 cfm at the time the air samples were collected during the previous quarterly inspection. Adjusting the methane liberation rate to the lesser air quantity resulted in a determination that the methane liberation from the Bandytown fan was approximately 547 cfm. In January, 2010, MMU-040 was mining in the Panel No. 1 Crossover and on January 13, the methane liberation for MMU-040 was determined to be 5.0 cfm. On March 2, 2010, MMU-040 began developing the “new” TG 22 and on March 7, the methane liberation was determined to be109 cfm. Therefore, the methane liberation rate exiting Bandytown fan would have been approximately 651 cfm, but could have been more if the liberation rate from HG 22 or the longwall had increased. As discussed earlier, the methane detector used by the examiner responsible for examining the bleeder system had not been turned on since March 18, 2010. Methane concentrations prior to the accident may have increased undetected from March 18, 2010 to the time of the explosion because of the examiner’s failure to measure methane in the bleeder system after that date. Gas released from floor fractures contained small amounts of hydrogen, which would have registered as carbon monoxide on the examiner’s detector. Detecting this mixture may have provided another means of early detection if an adequate and complete examination had been performed.

71

Post-Accident Methane Liberation The first reported measurements of gas concentrations at Bandytown fan were at 5:30 p.m. on the day of the explosion. These concentrations were measured with a handheld multigas detector and reportedly indicated 18.3 percent oxygen, 2.3 percent methane and 7,000 ppm carbon monoxide. Tests performed on the same model of the instrument revealed that a catalytic diffusion sensor (methane) measured all combustible gases in an atmosphere that was mixed with carbon monoxide, hydrogen, and methane. Investigators concluded that the methane and carbon monoxide concentrations indicated by the detector were elevated inaccurately due to crosssensitivity issues on the carbon monoxide and combustible sensors. Carbon monoxide and hydrogen are combustible gases and were measured by the sensor; tests revealed that the carbon monoxide electrochemical sensor was influenced by hydrogen. The carbon monoxide electrochemical sensor on the handheld multi-gas detector used cannot distinguish between carbon monoxide and hydrogen. Beginning at 8:30 p.m. on April 5, 2010, air samples were collected regularly at the Bandytown fan for analysis using a gas chromatograph, which is not susceptible to the cross-sensitivity of gases. Figure 10 contains a graph depicting methane liberation rate versus carbon monoxide concentrations for samples collected from Bandytown fan from April 5 – 30, 2010. Sample results indicated that the total volume of methane that exited at the Bandytown fan at 8:30 p.m. was about 1,250 cfm. The methane liberation rate declined to 890 cfm by 5:00 a.m. on April 6, 2010.

72

Figure 10: Methane Liberation Rate versus Carbon Monoxide Concentrations for Samples Collected from Bandytown fan from April 5 – 30, 2010

73

A single sample, collected at 6:40 a.m. on April 6, 2010 and analyzed by the gas chromatograph, indicated an increase in methane, ethane and carbon dioxide while carbon monoxide, hydrogen, acetylene, and ethylene decreased slightly. Analysis of air samples collected after the explosion indicated normal declining trends. The apparent short-lived change in the concentrations of methane, ethane and carbon dioxide could not be explained conclusively. From April 8 to April 27, the total methane liberation declined to a rate of 288 cfm. In fact, by April 13, most of the gases produced from the explosion were removed from the mine as indicated by low concentrations of fire gases, such as carbon monoxide and hydrogen. MSHA relied on the normal methane liberation (651 cfm) that was calculated for the 2nd quarter inspection and measurements collected on TG 22 in March, 2010. MSHA further assumed that the minimum liberation rate exhausted through the Bandytown fan was that which occurred during the steady post-explosion condition, which was reached on April 27, 2010 (288 cfm). After the explosion on April 5, the methane liberation rate from the active workings was higher than the liberation rate during normal mining. Following the explosion, all gases in the mine atmosphere inby Ellis switch were removed from the mine through the Bandytown fan. The removed gases included normal methane liberation from the active workings, methane from the mined out portion of the longwall panel, methane expelled from seal sets 8 through 15, methane and other gases produced as a result of the explosion and gases released from floor fractures on the longwall. Information was not available to quantify the contributions to the total excess methane from the individual sources. Figures 11 and 12 show graphical depictions of methane liberation rates from the Bandytown fan, based on information collected beginning 8:30 p.m. on April 5, 2010. The curve represents the total methane exhausted from the Bandytown fan from 8:30 p.m. on April 5, 2010 to April 30, 2010. The blue shaded area shown on Figure 11 represents the amount of methane exhausted as compared to the pre-explosion methane liberation. This represents the minimum amount of excess methane exiting Bandytown fan during the sampling period after the explosion. Figure 12 depicts the excess methane exhausted as compared to the post explosion steady-state methane liberation. This represents the maximum amount of methane exiting Bandytown fan during the sampling period after the explosion. Because the rate at which methane liberation from mining declines to the steady state non-mining rate is unknown, the actual amount of excess methane removed from the mine post-explosion would be between the two amounts shown on the graphs.

74

Figure 11. Graph of methane that was exhausted through the Bandytown fan for the period between April 5 and April 30, 2010. The area shaded in blue represents methane in excess of pre-explosion liberation levels.

75

Figure 12. Graph of methane that was exhausted through the Bandytown fan for the period between April 5 and April 30, 2010. The area shaded in blue represents post-explosion methane versus steady state liberation levels.

76

Source of Gas Measured at the Bandytown Fan The gas measured at the Bandytown fan likely came from floor fractures, as well as from the explosion itself. A portion of the excess methane measured at the Bandytown fan was likely to have been emitted from floor fractures, in which a gas shale formation was the source, especially since fractures were found on the longwall in the area of shields 160 and 170. (These fractures, and the geological conditions which created them, will be discussed in the next section.) Shale matrix permeability is extremely low and gas production typically requires natural or hydraulically induced fractures. Reservoir pressure is sub-normal, typically ranging from 1,000 to 2,000 psi. An abundant volume of gas could exist as gas in shale formations, but a small volume may exist as free gas in a naturally occurring fracture system. The amount of free gas available is dependant on the extent of the fracture system, which is associated with geologic structures. The liberation rate from the fracture depends on the volume and pressure of the gas in the fracture system and on the size of the opening where the gas was released. The liberation rate can vary in magnitude from tens to thousands of cubic feet per minute of methane. Turbulence created by gas flowing through a small opening generates sound. Previous high volume gas releases from floor fractures in the 2003 and 2004 inundations resulted in loud noises that have been described as sounding like a “jet engine.” Prior methane inundations at UBB and other mines operating in the Eagle seam resulted in mining disruptions. Generally, the affected area would be localized at the point of gas discharging from the floor fracture, and the gas release would dissipate within a few days. The volume and pressure of gas contained in the fracture system and the size of the floor fractures were relatively small, which limited the volume of gas that was released into the mine. Another source of methane measured at the Bandytown fan was the explosion itself. Research has shown that methane is a product of combustion that can occur during a coal dust explosion. The formation of products of combustion is typically related to the concentration and type of fuel that is ignited The critical concentration of coal that would be entirely consumed during a combustion reaction without producing methane is 0.123 ounces per cubic foot. When igniting suspended concentrations of coal dust at 2 ounces per cubic foot, over 1 percent methane can result as a product of combustion. It is likely that similar coal dust concentrations were ignited throughout the explosion zone. Consequently, significant quantities of methane were likely produced in this manner. The Explosion Was not Caused by Cutting into a Gas Well The investigation team considered the hypothesis that one of the working sections mined into a gas well, but ruled this out for lack of supporting evidence. Investigators reviewed several sources of data to identify any gas wells not included on PCC’s official mine map. The team reviewed the WVGES “Oil and Gas Wells of West Virginia”

77

website, which graphically displays known locations of gas wells, and compared it to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) topographic map. Investigators also searched the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection’s (WVDEP) “Oil and Gas Well Information” website to obtain additional information about known gas wells. The WVDEP and WVGES systems and the mine map did record all wells indicated on the USGS topographic map. The investigation team also conducted several traverses in the field to confirm the absence of wells above the faces of the 1 North Panel longwall, HG 22 and TG 22, and the West Jarrells Mains. The investigation team found no evidence of well structures, pipes, or drill pads above the faces of the 1 North Panel or development sections. The investigation team met with members of Equitable Gas, along with a representative of WVOMHST, regarding the gas well (API 005-00810, shown on the mine map as Well No. 7645) isolated by a barrier on the North Jarrells Mains. The well was of interest because of its close proximity to the underground workings and the observation that, according to production records maintained by the WVDEP, the well displayed an apparent significant increase in flow rate beginning in the summer of 2008. Prior to 2008, the well exhibited a fairly consistent flow of approximately 200-500 thousand cubic feet of gas (mcfg). No production was reported for February through March of 2008. Beginning in July 2008, production records indicated a radical increase of over 1,200 mcfg, a rate that was maintained through most of 2009, with a gradual decrease toward the end of the year. Company personnel indicated that the metering device on the well was found to be nonfunctional in early 2008. Company personnel indicated that the meter had been replaced in the winter of 2008 after which time a much higher production rate was being recorded. The change in recorded gas volume from the well was due to faulty equipment. The investigation team also met with representatives of EXCO-North Coast Energy Eastern, the current controllers of natural gas resources on property corresponding to the HG 22 and 1 North Panel areas. Maps at EXCO-North Coast Energy Eastern’s Maben, WV office did not show any additional gas wells, besides those already identified by review of information available from Equitable Gas, the WVDEP, or the WVGES. As a result of this investigation, the team ruled out an existing gas well as the source of the methane/natural gas.

78

A Seismic Event Did not Cause the Explosion The investigation team considered the hypothesis that a seismic event triggered the explosion. Based on data supplied by the USGS, two rare seismic events occurred in southern West Virginia in the weeks preceding the UBB explosion. Because they occurred prior to the explosion and many miles from the mine, the investigation team ruled them out as playing any role in these events. The first was a 2.9 Richter Scale magnitude event that occurred on March 27, 2010 in Logan County, approximately 27 miles away from UBB. The shallow depth and location in a historically bump-prone area of West Virginia suggests that the seismic event represents a coal pillar bump, rather than an earthquake. The investigation team’s review of old mine maps, downloaded from the WVGES, identified an old mine with extensive pillared works within one mile of the plotted location of the seismic event. The extensive pillared works in the abandoned mine surrounded large, square barrier-style pillars that may have experienced rapid failure after decades of degradation to reach a critical size. The second seismic event occurred on April 4, 2010 in Braxton County, approximately 60 miles from the face of the 1 North Panel. Despite the seemingly close temporal relation between the April 4 seismic event (5:19 a.m.), and the April 5 explosion (3:02 p.m.), the 60-mile interval and 34-hour time difference does not support any recognizable relationship between the two events (Appendix M). Seismographs monitored by the WVDEP’s Office of Explosives and Blasting recorded surface blasting shots conducted on April 5, 2010 (Appendix N). The locations of surface blasts were plotted in a GIS, using coordinates provided by the WVDEP Office of Explosives and Blasting along with the times of surface blasting. Four surface blasts were recorded, approximately 2 ½ miles from the face of the 1 North Panel, but the earliest was over one hour after the 3:02 p.m. time of the explosion. The Geochemistry of Natural Gas and Coal Bed Methane As discussed above, investigators concluded that the explosion was a natural gas/methane ignition and explosion which transitioned into a coal dust explosion, rather than an explosion solely fueled by natural gas/methane. Investigators also concluded that the methane that triggered the initial ignition and explosion derived from natural gas, rather than coal bed methane. The information below describes how investigators determined that the source of the explosive mixture came from floor feeders on the longwall face. MSHA collected gas samples from four locations: UBB, Speed Mining LLC’s American Eagle Mine, and gas wells producing from the Greenbrier Formation and Marcellus Shale within seven miles of the 1 North Panel. The hydrocarbon content and stable isotope ratios were compared and plotted on discrimination diagrams to determine the sources of gas entering the UBB mine (Appendix O).

79

MSHA collected gas samples at different times from floor feeders located behind the shield pontoons on the longwall face at shields 160 and 170. The immediate vicinity of the floor feeders was characterized by a distinctive smell similar to that noted at the American Eagle Mine. Investigators registered high values of methane and carbon monoxide. The samples were characterized by gas content of 40.61% (90.15% normalized to 100% hydrocarbons) methane, 2.7% (5.99%) ethane and 1.21% (2.68%) propane, as well as 0.135% (0.3%) and 0.188% (0.41%) iso-butane and n-butane, respectively; 0.04% (0.08%) and 0.0202% (0.04%) iso-pentane and n-pentane, respectively, and; 0.018% (0.04%) hydrocarbons, including or heavier than hexane. The sample also contained 0.279% hydrogen and no carbon monoxide; however, a hand-held methane detector indicated the presence of several hundred parts per million of carbon monoxide. Although subsequent analyses indicated that no carbon monoxide is actually present in any of the samples, a carbon monoxide reading of several hundred parts per million may be a proxy for hydrogen, which the handheld detector is incapable of discerning from other fire gases. These samples are chemically and isotopically very similar to those collected from the American Eagle Mine and are representative of organic shale-derived thermogenic gas, rather than biogenic gas derived from coal. MSHA collected samples from small feeders emanating from the floor, throughout the HG 22 and TG 22 sections. Analytical results indicate a different kind of gas than that sampled at longwall shields 160 and 170 or at the American Eagle Mine. In contrast to those samples, which contained significant ethane and other heavier hydrocarbons, the HG 22 and TG 22 samples were characterized by methane content of 75-78 percent, with only 0.01-0.02 percent ethane and insignificant or non-detectable contents of C2+ hydrocarbons. Furthermore, the samples contained no hydrogen and during the sampling process, the handheld gas detector indicated no carbon monoxide.

Methane Accumulations that Led to the Explosion
As covered in the previous section, MSHA investigators concluded that the most likely scenario initially involved a methane ignition. The ignition source was located at the shearer. This section explores how the methane likely entered the mine and how PCC and Massey’s failure to abide by the roof control plan likely contributed to the methane accumulation that led to the initial methane explosion. PCC’s mining progressed into a geological fault zone that was a reservoir and conduit for methane. Indications of this fault zone prior to April 5, 2010 include methane outbursts at the mine in 2003 and 2004, a methane explosion in 1997, and problematic ground conditions. When mining progressed into the fault zone beneath deep overburden, existing fractures in the zone dilated and released previously trapped methane. On April 5, 2010, gas was released from the fault zone as a floor feeder near the back of the shields, characterized by a flow rate of several hundred cubic feet per minute. The intersected expression of the fault zone conduit was represented by a series of

80

fractures between shields 160 through 171, on the tailgate side of the face, where the longwall shearer was operating at the time of the explosion. During the investigation of the longwall, investigators found that methane was emanating from these fractures. Investigators concluded that these fractures supplied the methane that started the April 5 explosion. This methane likely migrated a short distance into the tailgate entry, where it accumulated. PCC’s roof control practices contributed to the accident, by failing to adequately support the tailgate entry as required by the roof control plan. PCC failed to either set two rows of posts or install two 8’ cable bolts down the tailgate entry. Prior to the explosion, the roof of the tailgate entry caved inby the face, restricting the airway through the next inby crosscut, referred to in ventilation terms as the T-split. This failure to install required support contributed to a roof fall in the tailgate entry behind the shields that allowed methane from the floor feeder to accumulate. The tailgate roof fall inby the face restricted airflow to the extent that it was not possible to dilute the additional gas inflow behind shields 160 through 171. On April 5, a small portion of this gas volume ignited, most likely on the fringe of a gas body, providing the initial explosive energy to suspend float coal dust in the tailgate entries that allowed transition to a coal dust explosion. Geological Background Geology and Previous Mining Near the 1 North Panel, the Eagle seam is a single coal bed 26-40 inches in thickness that is sometimes separated into two benches by a several-inch-thick sandstone parting. Although the coal seam is considered to be 4 ½ feet, actual mining height is approximately seven feet. The seam is overlain by brown-to-black shale or mediumgrained, white sandstone where the shale is absent. Where shale is present in the immediate roof, bedding-parallel faults are sometimes present. In other areas, beddingparallel movement is indicated by pinched-off teardrops of sandstone entrained in coal, as well as by small thrust faults that disrupt the sandstone binder. Coal cleat (naturally occurring parallel planes) is commonly indistinct although it is roughly parallel to the locally dominant joint orientations of N 70-80° E and N 10° W. Uncommon joint orientations of roughly N 45° E and N 35-55° W are also present but are localized to restricted zones. The mine floor is generally hard and consists of a 3 to 10-inch thick layer of mediumgrained white sandstone. Floor heave is generally widespread and is characterized by slabs of sandstone cantilevered up to define jagged brows with several inches of offset, forming rootless cracks that bottom out in more easily deformed mudstone and sandy shale (Figure 13). Less commonly, floor heave is localized along structural geologic zones of weakness defined by joints, pot-outs, and slickensides.

81

Figure 13. Cantilevered slab of floor sandstone forms broken brow with rootless, open aperture fracture. This style of floor heave is typical throughout Tailgate 1 North, the Panel 1 crossover and adjacent rooms, TG 22, and HG 22.

The UBB workings are variably overlain by up to six mined coal seams. The Eagle seam is separated by an interburden that ranges between 8-20 feet from the approximately two-foot thick Lower (Little) Eagle seam. In the 1 North Panel, the Little Eagle seam is 10 feet below the Eagle seam at the Panel No. 1 crossover. Core holes in the crossover area indicate a strata sequence comprised of 0.5-2.4 feet of gray shale, 5.5-5.7 feet of gray sandstone and finally 2.5-4.2 feet of gray sandy shale progressing downward from the base of the Eagle seam. The face of the 1 North Panel is beneath approximately 1,075 feet of overburden at midface, with maximum overburden of 1,275 feet encountered near the start-up room at the back of the panel. Review of mine map overlays indicates that a remnant pillar configuration is present above the southern quarter of the current position of the longwall face, characterized by two rows of pillars flanked by gob represented by split pillars in the Powellton seam (determined to be the No. 2 Gas seam by the West Virginia Geologic and Economic Survey (WVGES)), 170 feet above. Three thick layers of massive sandstone, each 20-30 feet, are present between the Eagle and Powellton seams, although floor heave and roof potting in UBB can often be correlated to remnant pillars surrounded by gob in the overlying Powellton seam. Additionally, there are several other mined coal seams above; see Figure 14 below.

82

Figure 14. Stratigraphic column of coal seams present above the 1 North Panel longwall face. Note that WVGES names are offset, beginning with the Powellton.

Outburst History at UBB As a result of a gas outburst from a 240-foot long floor fracture at mid-face of Longwall Panel 17, MSHA conducted a ground control evaluation at UBB in 2004 (MSHA Technical Support, Roof Control Division Memorandum 04AA34, dated March 4, 2004). Formation of the fracture was associated with floor heave that tilted the shearer away from the coal face, a loud thump commonly associated with failure of sandstone in the roof (according to mine personnel), and longwall shields that were taking weight and yielding at mid-face. A gob/solid boundary in pillared works of the overlying Powellton seam was located directly over the outburst area. The overburden depth at the outburst site was 1,155 feet. 83

In the 2004 outburst, the shearer had been down for 20 minutes prior to the event and the face was idle. MSHA inspection notes on February 8, 2004 documented that the measured intake air to the longwall was 72,000 cubic feet per minute (cfm). The measured velocity at shields 17 and 160 was 340 feet per minute (fpm) and 210 fpm, respectively. On June 28, 2004, the measured intake air to the longwall was 79,040 cfm, according to inspection notes. The measured velocity at shields 17 and 160 was 542 fpm and 375 fpm, respectively. MSHA concluded, in June 28, 2004 notes, that the ventilation plan required minimum intake air quantity of 60,000 cfm and a velocity at shields 17 and 160 of 300 fpm and 175 fpm, respectively. Mine personnel reported that a similar event had occurred on July 3, 2003 on the adjacent, previously mined Longwall Panel 16 at an overburden depth of 1,175 feet. Witnesses described this outburst as a high pressure event with voluminous gas released, comparable to the sound of a jet engine. MSHA indicated, in January 29, 2003 inspection notes that the measured intake air to the longwall was 70,297 cfm in the last open crosscut (LOC) and 45,798 cfm in the conveyor belt entry. UBB’s senior mining engineer in 2004 concluded that at overburden depths exceeding 1,100 feet, especially beneath barrier pillars in the overlying Powellton seam, sufficient stress might be transmitted to the longwall shields at mid-face, where stress is already theoretically highest, to fracture a critical interburden thickness of 12 feet between the Eagle and Lower Eagle (Little Eagle) coal seams, thereby releasing the methane outburst. The longwall coordinator in 2004 also reported that shield monitoring data indicated the shields in the center of the face went into yield just prior to the event. An MSHA CMS&H D4 accident investigation report indicated that an explosion occurred in January 1997 in the 2 West Longwall Panel, which was the first longwall panel of the first longwall district. MSHA determined that the event involved an ignition of gas in the gob on the tailgate side of the face behind the shields. Witnesses reported hearing what they thought was a roof fall behind the shields, followed by a bright red glow and smoke coming from behind the shields. Other witnesses reported seeing an arcing flash in the gob behind the shields after the apparent roof fall. Witnesses also reported that the caving or falling material sounded much more intense than usual. The longwall foreman at the beginning of the shift measured 450 fpm air velocity at shield 17 and 345 fpm at shield 160. In discussions with MSHA during the 2004 investigation, the mine’s senior mining engineer indicated that degasification wells were planned for the next longwall panel (Panel 18) in an attempt to bleed off any gas prior to encroachment of the longwall face. The mine had already constructed interburden thickness maps between the Eagle and Lower Eagle seams, and had constructed a structure contour map for the surface of the Lower Eagle seam, in an attempt to identify structural highs beneath which gas may have accumulated. Subsequent to that investigation, members of the Roof Control and Ventilation Divisions of MSHA Technical Support attended a meeting with UBB and D4 personnel to discuss additional outburst mitigation measures. During the current accident investigation, it was determined that the mine did not have a degasification

84

plan and the measures discussed in 2004 had not been implemented. However, the mine map indicates that Panel 18 was terminated short of its intended length. This termination coincides with a projected (imaginary) diagonal line connecting the 2003 and 2004 outburst locations. Eagle Seam Outbursts MSHA D4 personnel indicated to MSHA investigators that the only other known example of methane inundation reported in the Eagle seam, besides UBB, occurred in the Horse Creek Eagle Mine, located approximately six miles southeast of UBB. Witnesses interviewed during the 2004 UBB investigation also reported that floor bursts had occurred at the Harris No. 1 Mine. An engineer from Harris No.1 Mine indicated to investigators that the floor was prone to fracturing and releasing varying volumes of gas in conditions of higher overburden, although he stated that voluminous, high pressure “jet engine” style outbursts had not occurred. During the course of the UBB accident investigation, several gas floor feeder events occurred at Speed Mining, LLC’s American Eagle Mine in the same seam, located 15 miles north-northeast of UBB; MSHA investigated these events. UBB has a Geological Fault Zone, which Serves as a Conduit for Methane Description of the Fault Zone The investigation team concluded that a fault zone trends N 40° W across UBB, and dips 30° to the northeast (Figure 15). This is based on: 1) the locations of gas outbursts or explosions in 1997, 2003, and 2004, discussed above; 2) underground observations conducted at UBB in the 18 Headgate during the 2004 investigation; 3) extensive underground observations conducted between July 2010 and October 2010; 4) the face positions of Longwall Panels 11 and 12 when they were terminated; 5) observations of structural features in the overlying Powellton (Castle Mine) and Coalburg (Black Knight II Mine) seams; and 6) observations of structural features on the surface. To understand the conditions associated with the initial gas release, it is also critical to understand the interplay between the fault zone, the depth of overburden, and the redistribution of stress caused by longwall mining. The fault zone passes through the 2003 and 2004 gas outburst locations and the 1997 explosion, and projects through the face of the 1 North Panel, TG 22 development section, and West Jarrells Mains, as well as intersecting the HG 22 development section. This indicates a strike (compass bearing of geological feature) length of at least 4.5 miles. Mapping on the surface and in mines above the Eagle Seam indicates that the fault zone extends from the Eagle seam to the ground surface. The fault zone is interpreted to represent a ramp-and-flat system, in which the fault rides along the surfaces of weak strata such as coal before periodically cutting up across more competent layers. Individual structures within the fault zone include drag folds, bedding plane faults, reverse faults, and overturned anticlines (A-shaped geological folds) that exhibit a strike of N 40° W in or directly above the coal seams. Zones of vertical

85

jointing, which also strike N 40° W, are present in thick sandstone layers that overlie the coal seams. The zone also localizes linear pot-outs in the roof and zones of floor heave (Figure 16). Investigators interpret the fault zone to represent a conduit for methane migration into the Eagle seam from a reservoir that was ultimately sourced in organic-rich Devonian shale. PCC and Massey stopped several longwall panels along the projected fault zone. Another factor (discussed further below) in the release of methane appears to be the overburden present above the fault zone. While other panels mined through the fault zone without experiencing a methane outburst, those panels encountered overburden depths much less than 1,000 feet within the fault zone. The panels that experienced methane outbursts encountered overburden values of over 1,150 feet. It appears that several longwall panels, including Longwall Panels 11, 12, and 18 and Longwall Panels 16 and 17, were terminated in the vicinity where the projection of the fault zone intersected the 2,000-foot topographic contour. This corresponds to between 1,125 and 1,200 feet of overburden, depending on seam elevation (Figure 17).

86

Figure 15. Upper Big Branch Mine with projected fault zone, and locations of joints (green, blue), slickensides (red), and floor burst locations (purple) used to constrain the location and trend of the fault zone.

87

Figure 16. Detailed mapping in Tailgate 1 North, showing trend of floor heave (orange), joints (heavy black lines), pot-outs (green hatch), rib sloughing (jagged lines), and slickensides (red lines) projecting into the longwall shield 160-171 gas feeder zone. Heavy red, dashed lines indicate individual fault zone projections. Blue arrow symbols represent floor feeders inby longwall face.

88

Figure 17. Panels in which outbursts or explosions occurred are highlighted in red and lie along projected fault zone. Several panels were terminated upon intersecting the fault zone. Panels that encountered overburden of only 660-755 feet appear to have crossed the fault zone without incident, suggesting a critical overburden depth of 1,150 feet related to stress.

89

The Role of Overburden and Stresses in Opening the Fractures MSHA investigators explored whether overburden and stresses were a determinative factor in causing the outbursts. The evidence indicated that stress alone did not cause the outbursts, but did play a role in dilating the fractures along a fault zone. Nor did stresses cause a fracture to extend all the way down to the Little Eagle seam (the seam below the Eagle seam). Rather, mining into the fault zone beneath a critical depth threshold, corresponding to a stress value, represents the necessary condition to dilate the fractures in the fault zone and release the trapped methane into the mine. Overburden Stress MSHA investigators contracted an independent expert, Professor Keith Heasley of West Virginia University, to perform a LaModel (boundary element model) analysis of UBB to assess the effect of multiple seam interaction and overburden stress on mine stability and to assess whether a critical stress threshold might be associated with gas outbursts. Dr. Heasley’s model was used to assess the in-situ (in place) stress on the Eagle seam prior to mining to identify any high-stress areas and to assess any correlation between high stress areas and floor gas outbursts. Figure 18 represents a map of in-situ stress on the Eagle seam, including the vertical stress derived from the weight of overlying rock combined with stress associated with multiple seam interaction with the overlying Powellton seam mining. Although there appears to be a loose correlation between insitu stress exceeding 1,200 pounds per square inch (psi) and the locations of the 2003 and 2004 gas feeder events, they are not associated with the highest stress values of 1,800 psi or greater. At the time of the April 5 explosion, the longwall face was beneath a narrow swath of greater-than-1,200 psi stress associated with two rows of remnant pillars flanked by gob or thin, split pillars. Therefore, the documented outburst locations do not correspond to the highest stresses (1,800 psi), and therefore, do not appear to be entirely stressdriven.

90

Figure 18. Map of in-situ stress on the Eagle seam, incorporating stress attributable to overburden and multiple seam interactions with the Powellton seam. White stars indicate locations of gas outbursts, with heavy black line on 1 North Panel (label), representing April 5, 2010 face position. Bright yellow patches represent 1,800 psi, with subsequent colors spaced at 200 psi intervals.

91

The Mine Floor and the Little Eagle Seam The accident investigation team constructed cross sections of longwall panels where face ignitions or gas outbursts occurred previously, for analysis using the Phase2 twodimensional finite element modeling program. This approach differs from the boundary element model in that it is capable of incorporating geologic structures and can model the effects of mining in the floor. In contrast, the boundary element model calculated pre-mining stresses on the Eagle Seam as a result of depth and overlying mining configurations. Although there is insufficient information available to constrain all input parameters, investigators used the finite element models conceptually to visualize stress distributions associated with longwall mining beneath remnant barriers and weakened geologic zones. The models were also used in a semi-quantitative way to assess whether sufficient mining-related stress could be generated to cause failure of the approximately 10-foot interburden between the Eagle and Little Eagle coal seams, and the depth to which stability of the rock mass might be affected. The models indicated that sufficient compressive stresses are not generated by mining to cause failure of the 8-10 feet of strata between the Eagle and Little Eagle seams. Thus, the interpretation following the 2004 event that high stress was driving the shields into the floor at mid-face and causing the rock to fail does not appear to have been correct. The models did, however, indicate that rock strength in the intervening strata is commonly reduced to failure virtually everywhere along the panel as the face advances. Therefore, if it were assumed that the source of the gas were the Little Eagle seam, and that stress was the only controlling factor, gas outbursts should occur continuously as the intervening strata is fractured. This is not the case, because the outbursts are rare events that occur at specific locations. The models suggest that passage of the longwall face can be expected to impart stresses of several thousand psi to the strata several feet beneath the longwall face. The stresses can also be expected to routinely reach the Little Eagle seam below. As the longwall face passes, the gob floor is expected to be subjected to tensile stress as confinement is removed. Passage of the longwall face is expected to disturb both vertical and shallowly dipping joints for significant depths below the Little Eagle seam. Because some modeled panels had low strength factors at virtually every face position, outbursts cannot be explained solely in terms of stress acting on continuously lateral strata. The Role of the Fault Zone Having a low strength factor in the interburden (the interval of rock between the Eagle and Little Eagle seams), thus, did not by itself explain the outbursts. Investigators examined the role of the fault zone in generating outbursts.

92

Investigators simulated the fault zone with a 100-foot thick zone, consisting of vertical joints, that dips 30° across the stratigraphic sequence (rock layers), resulting in an intercept width of 200 feet for each layer of strata (Figure 19). This configuration matches closely the geological observations, i.e. intact rock hosting widely spaced joints or other geological structures within the shallowly dipping fault zone. Simulated vertical joints were spaced 20 feet apart within the 30° dipping zone and given a friction angle of 28°, with no tensile strength or cohesion. Joint ends were specified as being open at excavation boundaries. Areas outside the fault zone did not incorporate joints, and when the simulated longwall face position was 250 feet inby the April 5, 2010 position, strength factors less than one extend only a calculated five feet into the floor, approximately halfway to the Little Eagle seam (Figure 20 and 21). When the longwall face had reached its April 5, 2010 position, such that the 30°- dipping fault zone was cantilevered over the face, zones of tension extend a predicted 25 feet into the floor along joint zones, and a zone of strength factors less than one extends 15 feet into the floor. This fully encompasses the Little Eagle seam and intervening interburden to the Eagle seam, with the zone extending beneath the Little Eagle seam for a short depth. Thus, investigators concluded that the most likely explanation for the failure mechanism associated with the gas inflow at shields 160-171 is that mining into the fault zone beneath the two rows of remnant barriers at over 1,000 feet of depth resulted in a unique overlap of factors that caused the development of tension zones along preexisting geologic structures for a calculated 25 feet into the floor.

93

Figure 19. Stratigraphy in Rocscience showing incorporation of 30° dipping fault zone that is comprised of vertical joints spaced 20 feet apart for 1 North Panel cross section.

94

face

Figure 20. Distribution of strength factors when 1 North Panel longwall face is 250 feet inby the April 5, 2010 face position, outside the projected fault zone. Strength factors less than one are calculated to extend only five feet into the floor beneath the face.

95

face

Figure 21. Distribution of strength factors when the 1 North Panel longwall face is at its April 5, 2010 position. Zones of tension are developed along joints below the Little Eagle seam, with large swath of strength factors less than one extending 25 feet into the floor, which encompasses the Little Eagle seam and underlying strata.

96

Methane Likely Migrated from Behind the Shields to the Shearer During the investigation of the longwall, methane was found to be emanating from the mine floor in several locations near the tailgate end of the longwall face between shields 160-171. As discussed later in the report, methane was present at the longwall shearer, where the initial methane ignition occurred. (It was also present at Tailgate 1 North, where the localized methane explosion occurred; this will also be considered later). MSHA investigators devised a test to observe the path the gas may have traveled as it was being released into the ventilating air stream. This test aided investigators in conceptualizing how a plume of gas from a point source behind the shields might enter the airstream and travel into the tailgate. The test also helped to assess how the plume would interact with the methane sensors mounted on the longwall shearer and tailgate drive. The conditions on the longwall at the time of the test were different than in the moments prior to the explosion. Full details related to the ventilation system on April 5, 2010 are not presently known, as discussed elsewhere in this report. Additionally, the airflow volume and velocity crossing the face was different than reported in company examination books and the information called out of the mine for the record books. Despite these limitations, however, the test is a useful way to visualize how air might have traveled in the shield walkway, behind or through the shields, and in the tailgate. The test involved releasing chemical smoke near the location of the fractures in the mine floor, and tracking the path the smoke traveled. Figure 22 shows the shearer, methane sensors, and shield locations. Investigators used video equipment to document the results of the tests on the longwall face and in the tailgate entry.

97

Figure 22. Diagram of UBB longwall face, showing locations of methane sensors mounted on the shearer and on the tailgate drive.

The first series of tests consisted of releasing smoke on the longwall face, with video equipment in the tailgate entry recording the path of the smoke. Investigators first released smoke behind shield 160. The smoke traveled downwind behind the shields until it reached an area where the gob had fallen tight against the shields, near shield 164. The smoke migrated from behind the shields out into the walkway and panline. The smoke moved downwind in the air current, traveling over the shearer, tailgate drive, and the methane monitor sensors. Investigators released smoke behind shield 170, first in light amounts and then in heavy amounts. In both tests, the smoke traveled behind the shields to shield 173. At shield 173, a portion of the smoke traveled behind the shields and out into the tailgate entry. The rest of the smoke came out of the shields into the walkway. The smoke traveled toward the tail and over the shearer, toward the tailgate drum. The smoke did not pass over either of the methane monitor sensors. Smoke was observed traveling over the tailgate drum of the shearer and into the tailgate entry. Smoke was also observed entering the back of the canopy on shield 176. The smoke traveled through the canopy toward the face. It exited the canopy through a hole near the shield tip. Tests were also performed by releasing smoke in the walkway at shield 176. This smoke also traveled into the tailgate entry and across the tailgate drum of the shearer. Smoke was then released behind shield 170 and the path of the smoke was recorded. Again, the smoke traveled across the shearer without passing over either of the methane sensors.

98

Although these tests cannot determine conclusively what happened on the day of the accident, the observations indicate that there may have been air flow paths by which gas, entrained in the air stream, migrated to the longwall shearer and did not encounter either of the two methane sensors mounted on the longwall shearer and tailgate drive. A Roof Fall in Tailgate 1 North Restricted Airflow, Likely Allowing Methane to Accumulate The roof control plan in effect at the time of the accident includes a number of diagrams that refer to roof bolting or support, indicating that the tailgate entry of the longwall panel was required to have either two rows of 8’ cable bolts, or two rows of wood posts or hydraulic jacks installed between primary supports for a distance of 1,000 feet outby the face. However, underground observations revealed that two rows of cable bolts had not been installed in the Tailgate 1 North (also known as Tailgate 21) and that only a single row of posts was installed along the solid block of coal. The failure to install appropriate tailgate support is significant because observations indicate that crosscut 49, the next crosscut inby the face, had already caved-in prior to the face reaching crosscut 48 and before the explosion based on debris on the fall rubble (Figure 23). PCC’s failure to install either two rows of posts or two rows of eight foot cable bolts for support restricted the airflow in the tailgate entry inby the longwall face and contributed to the inability to adequately ventilate the tailgate area, which is discussed in the next section.

Figure 23. Caved roof in tailgate entry, as viewed in crosscut 49, which represents the next crosscut inby the face. Coatings of soot on the fallen rubble, juxtaposed against small pieces of freshly fallen, white sandstone, indicate that the intersection had caved prior to the explosion.

99

MSHA’s Ventilation Surveys and Analysis To explore the ventilation of the mine, MSHA investigators considered underground observations, interviews, and documents, including submitted plans, maps, record books, production reports, company ventilation studies, fan charts, and MSHA inspector notes. Higher level company officials, who should have had detailed knowledge of the ventilation system, declined to be interviewed and exercised their Fifth Amendment rights. It should also be noted that both Headgate 1 North from inby crosscut 39, as well as Tailgate 1 North from inby approximately crosscut 80, were inaccessible to the Bandytown fan because of deteriorated ground conditions. Although air readings based on company examination books are given in the following discussion, multiple inconsistencies and deficiencies were found in the books in a number of areas, including air measurements and quantities. As stated earlier, ventilation controls for the area inby 78 switch were almost completely destroyed by the explosion. As a result, mine rescue teams had to reestablish ventilation prior to recovering the victims. The teams built framed mine brattice checks across the 7 Tailgate 1 North entries between crosscuts 11 and 12, the three connecting entries at the intersection of the intake rooms to the North Glory Mains, and across the Headgate 1 North entries to better direct air into HG 22, TG 22, West and North Jarrells Mains. Additionally, check curtains were constructed in the HG 22 section, TG 22 section, North Jarrells Mains and West Jarrells Mains to establish a ventilation circuit to ventilate the inby portion of these areas. Those controls were in place during the investigation. Ventilation controls were also damaged outby 78 switch to the Ellis Portal. Some of those controls were repaired prior to the ventilation survey. Other small changes were made in the mine to the UBB/Lower Big Branch (LBB) area, changes which were taken into account for their impact on the system’s ventilation. Considering the existing mine’s ventilation system, the inaccessible areas in the Headgate 1 North and Tailgate 1 North toward Bandytown fan, and the unlikelihood that the ventilation system would be restored to pre-explosion conditions, MSHA investigators conducted an in-mine ventilation survey. On September 9, 2010, preliminary information was gathered on the Bandytown, North, and South fans in anticipation of conducting a ventilation survey. On September 28, a mine ventilation air quantity and air pressure survey was started at the mine by MSHA personnel. A total of 33 teams collected information over a ten-day period. Representatives from WVOMHST, the company, and UMWA representatives of the miners participated in the investigation. Investigators determined air velocities in the mine using vane anemometers with wands in the one-half area traverse method or using the smoke-cloud method with aspirators and chemical smoke tubes. Investigators measured mine opening dimensions to determine the area. Investigators then calculated air quantities from the measured velocities and corresponding calculated area of the mine entry in which the velocity was

100

measured. Investigators measured air pressure differentials between air courses and across regulators or partial ventilation controls using magnehelic gauges and digital manometers. The fan air quantities were based upon underground anemometer measurements in the mine. Investigators used Wallace & Tiernan altimeters to determine the total pressure at specific locations within the mine ventilation system. MSHA compiled and balanced this information to provide a computer model of the mine ventilation system, suitable for developing computer mine ventilation simulations. Overview of the Mine Ventilation System The mine had four sets of portals and a shaft, described briefly below:  The North Portal consisted of five drifts. There was one blowing fan intake drift, two air drifts with track in one (air exiting) and two return drifts. The South Portal consisted of five drifts. There was one blowing fan intake drift, one intake drift with a stopping in place, two track haulage air drifts (air exiting), and one return drift. The Silo Portal consisted of four drift openings. There were two return drifts and two air drifts with belt in one. Air exited at all locations. The Ellis Portal consisted of five drift openings. There was one return drift, three air drifts with track in one and belt in another, and one intake drift. Air was actually exiting through the belt/track drift entries, according to witness testimony. The Bandytown return shaft was a 16-foot diameter shaft with an exhausting fan.



 



There was a 10-foot diameter coal transfer shaft, known as the Glory Hole, which connected UBB and the Castle Mine. This shaft was no longer in service at the time of the accident. It was abandoned and had been partially filled with coal and debris. Its effect on ventilation between the two mines was negligible. UBB was ventilated with two blowing fans and one exhausting main mine fan. The North Portal blowing fan was a Joy, Model Number 12065D, Serial No. MF4110, tenfoot axial vane fan. The fan was operated with a 1,000-horsepower, 4160 volt, 900 revolutions per minute (rpm) motor. Figure 24 is a copy of the North fan chart which was on the fan pressure recorder when the explosion occurred and shows the fan was operating at about 4.8 inches of water gauge (in. w.g.).

101

Figure 24. Chart for North Fan, showing pressure spike at time of explosion.

102

The South Portal blowing fan was an Industrial Welding Buffalo, six-foot diameter axial vane fan. The fan was operated with a 200 horsepower, 480 volt, 1,200 rpm motor. Figure 25 is a copy of the South fan chart which was on the fan pressure recorder when the explosion occurred and shows the fan was operating at about 1.4 in. w.g.

Figure 25. Chart for South Fan, showing pressure spike at time of explosion.

103

The Bandytown exhausting fan was a Robinson, Model Number DA-97AF1029-116, Serial No. 208-167, eight-foot centrifugal fan. The fan was operated with a 2,000 horsepower, 4160 volt, 890 rpm motor. Figure 26 is a copy of the Bandytown fan chart, which was on the fan pressure recorder when the explosion occurred and shows the fan was operating at about 5.5 in. w.g.

Figure 26. Chart for Bandytown fan showing pressure spike at the time of the explosion.

Although the fan charts shown in Figures 24 to 26 were not aligned correctly on the pressure recorder to correspond with actual time, each fan chart shows the pressure spike from the explosion. The North fan recorded a spike of over 9 in. w.g. over its normal pressure of 4.8 in. w.g. The South fan recorded a spike of 2 in. w.g. over its normal pressure of 1.4 in. w.g. The Bandytown fan spike went downward off the chart because this fan was exhausting and the pressure spike was positive. The magnitude of the spike cannot be determined but it was greater than the fan operating pressure. Several small variations in fan pressure were noted on the Bandytown fan chart following the explosion, although persons who were underground during that time reported no additional explosions. The North area hosted the longwall and two continuous mining sections. The southern, UBB/LBB portion of the mine, which hosted one active and one inactive continuous

104

mining section, was ventilated by the North and South blowing fans. The North fan provided the majority of intake air to the Ellis switch area. However, the Bandytown exhaust fan provided most of the ventilating pressure for the affected area. Near the Ellis switch intersection, the air was joined by air from the Ellis Portal. The intake from the North fan was regulated at this point, to assure the intake of air at Ellis Portal. This marked the transition from the blowing system of the North and South fans, to the exhausting system of the North area. The South fan had almost no influence over the North area. Airflow in a separate air course to ventilate seals (intake and return air courses), on the South side of Old North Mains in the North area, was induced by the blowing ventilation system. The air from this split exited the mine at the North Portal. Prior to the explosion, all of the air from the area inby 78 switch exited from Bandytown fan. Longwall Development Sections The HG 22 and TG 22 sections were developed with three entries, ventilating each of the sections with a single split of air. The preshift examination record book for the HG 22 section (MMU 029-0), at 3:20 a.m. on the day of the accident, indicated that the quantity of air measured in the last open crosscut was 18,848 cfm. The preshift examination record book for the TG 22 section (MMU 040-0), at 2:10 p.m. on the day of the accident, indicated that the quantity of air measured in the last open crosscut was 32,360 cfm. Weekly air measurements recorded by the mine examiner for TG 22 were considerably higher; a measurement of 61,310 cfm was recorded on March 30, 2010. The reason for this inconsistency is unknown. 1 North Panel The 1 North Longwall section (MMU 050-0) was ventilated with three entries on the headgate side. A majority of witnesses indicated that prior to the accident, the belt air was being directed to the longwall face, and although no air quantity measurements were recorded for the belt entry, testimony indicated that the belt air quantity was approximately 10,000 cfm. The preshift examination record book for the day of the accident indicated a measured quantity of 56,840 cfm and face velocities of 776 fpm at shield 9 and 513 fpm at shield 160. It is likely that the recorded longwall preshift quantity measurements indicate only the intake air portion of the total air that ventilated the longwall face. The tailgate consisted of seven entries near the face location. Two of these entries were a main return from the longwall development sections. The tailgate air courses consisted of five entries, all of which were ventilated with air that had ventilated the belt entries.

105

The longwall panel being mined was directly in front of the bleeder fan. It would be highly unlikely that airflow across the longwall face would have been disrupted by minor changes to the system. Barrier Section The active continuous mining section in the South (LBB area) of the mine was called the Barrier Section (MMU 062-0). A section foreman’s testimony indicated that the section had changed from a dual-split ventilation system to a single-split ventilation system three to four weeks prior to April 5, 2010. Portal Section This deactivated section (MMUs 066-0 and 067-0) was put in a non-producing status on March 30, 2010. Reconstruction of Ventilation Prior to the Accident Ventilation controls for the area inby 78 switch were almost completely destroyed in the explosion. In order to determine the location of the ventilation controls, and the air flow direction, the investigation team used the mine maps, stopping remnants and debris determined by mine mapping, as well as witness testimony. Although ventilation control locations were verified underground where possible, determination of the control type was often not possible. A map based on the available information depicts the area inby 78 switch as it was believed to be prior to the accident, and shows ventilation controls, and airflow directional arrows with recorded quantities where available, and when the measurement location could be determined (Appendix P). The in-mine survey determined an air quantity of approximately 297,000 cfm reported to Bandytown fan. Records indicated that the fan had not been altered since the explosion and was not affected by the explosion. The operating point for the fan was determined from the underground measurements, and the pressure indicated on the fan chart during the pre-survey (6.45 in. w.g.). The pressure taken from the fan recording chart during the survey was compared with the fan pressure recorded on the chart prior to the explosion (Figure 26). The operating point was plotted on a fan performance curve for Bandytown fan. A curve was drawn through the operating point and the pre-explosion pressure was used to determine the quantity at the fan prior to the explosion. The fan performance curve is shown in Figure 27.

106

Figure 27. Graph of air volume versus fan static pressure, defining the Bandytown fan’s performance curve.

The measurement recorded in the record book for Bandytown fan was approximately 400,000 cfm. The air quantity reporting to Bandytown fan during the survey was measured several times by the respective investigation teams as described in the underground mapping protocols, using careful area measurements, individually calibrated anemometers with wands, and the one-half area traverse method. This method is more accurate than typical day-to-day air quantity measurement methods used by mine personnel. After constructing a computer model of the mine’s surveyed ventilation system, a simulation was developed to recreate the ventilation system employed at the mine prior to the explosion. An average friction factor was developed from measurements in North Mains and Old North Mains, in the area of the Nos. 4 and 5 belts. A stopping leakage resistance was obtained from the literature for “average stoppings.” Average mine entry dimensions of 7 ft. by 19 ft. was assumed. The air course and ventilation control location were determined from mine maps, stopping remnants, debris, and testimony. The opening sizes of some regulators were assumed due to lack of information. The accuracy of the simulation is imperfect, because of the limited information, as discussed in the report section entitled “Examinations,” and because of the destruction of the

107

ventilation controls in the affected area. Nevertheless, simulations gave insight into the expected effects of changes to the system. The simulation of the mine prior to the explosion indicated that the HG 22 section was ventilated with 26,700 cfm in the return, TG 22 was ventilated with 63,600 cfm in the return and the longwall had an intake face quantity of 67,700 cfm. The model indicates quantities close to those believed to exist prior to the explosion. While the quantities are not exact, the model should reflect the general effect of major changes. Several variations of the simulation were constructed in order to explore the effects of changes to the system. A simulation was made of the effect of leaving open the equipment doors near 78 switch. The results from the simulation indicated that there would not have been a significant effect on the longwall and TG 22 section air quantities and a small increase in air quantity (approximately 7 percent) in HG 22 from the change. Simulations with equipment doors at HG 22 open likewise did not significantly affect the longwall quantity. An examination of the ventilation system indicated a change that would have a large effect on the face quantity would be leaving the Tailgate 1 North equipment doors open. The results of the simulation indicated that the face quantity would have been approximately cut in half while over 150,000 cfm short circuited directly to the fan. However, the fan pressure dropped over 2 in. w.g. in that simulation. If this scenario had occurred, the resulting fan pressure change would have been recorded on the fan pressure chart. No such change was observed on the fan pressure chart. Similarly, a simulation was made with the Tailgate 1 North equipment doors half open. The longwall face air would have cut by approximately a third and the fan pressure decreased by 1.5 in. w.g. Again, no such change was observed on the fan pressure chart. A simulation was made to examine the effect of constructing the longwall headgate regulating doors. The simulation results indicated that the longwall quantity decreased approximately 19,000 cfm and HG 22 increased approximately 5,000 cfm. The preshift examination record books indicated that the longwall quantity decreased approximately 18,000 cfm and HG 22 increased approximately 4,000 cfm. The “T-split” During the ventilation survey, investigators determined that the air at the tailgate end of the longwall to be splitting both inby and outby the longwall face in the tailgate entry. This is commonly referred to as the T-split. The two crosscuts adjacent to the pillared area inby the face were found to have a total of 5,100 cfm exiting. This was with the face quantity at less than half of what was reported prior to the explosion. The flow as reported by examiners on the face would have increased the quantity of air at the T-split above 5,100 cfm.

108

It is important to have a functioning T-split because the air moving inby the face clears the area inby the longwall tail of contaminants and encourages airflow through and behind the last several shields, back away from the face. The solid gob shield plate size affected the overall air flow into the tailgate entry and gob. While the T-split was likely adequate during normal mining, investigators concluded that it did not provide enough airflow to safely dilute the amount of methane released prior to the localized methane explosion. Investigators also concluded that the origin of the localized methane explosion was in the T-split area at the longwall tailgate. Additional support in the tailgate, resulting in a greater air quantity in the T-split inby the face, would have provided increased dilution capacity for a methane influx prior to the localized methane explosion. Typically, roof support is installed in the tailgate entry to maintain an open area to provide a flow path back from the face to the bleeder entries. In the case of UBB, the plan called for two rows of floor to roof supports or two 8’ cable bolts. As noted earlier, it was observed that no cable bolts and only one row of propsetters (supports) was installed. The additional supports would have aided in keeping an airflow path open behind from the face, creating a larger air quantity in the T-split.

The Methane Ignited at the Shearer, then Created a Methane Explosion in Tailgate 1 North
An ignition source must contain sufficient temperature or energy to ignite methane. Methane can be ignited by a minimum ignition temperature of approximately 1,000º F . For comparison, this is the temperature where components in an electric circuit may begin to glow. In addition, the minimum ignition energy for methane is 0.3 millijoule. MSHA determined that the cutting bits on the tail drum of the longwall shearer likely generated hot streaks on the sandstone roof or floor. These hot streaks can exceed the ignition temperature of methane. Investigators concluded that this was the most likely ignition source. MSHA also examined potential ignition sources deriving from faulty or non-permissible electrical equipment, and other physical items, but ruled them out as an ignition source after testing hundreds of items. MSHA also found that other sources (such as a roof fall or friction generated by the pan line) were not likely ignition sources. This ignition of methane did not begin to propagate immediately. The flame from the ignition burned near the longwall tailgate for a short period of time, approximately two minutes. The methane ignition then triggered a localized methane explosion in the Tailgate 1 North.

109

Frictional Ignition from the Longwall Shearer Once the methane reached the shearer on April 5, the poorly maintained longwall shearer likely caused an ignition. The shearer was cutting into sandstone at both the roof and the floor and the mineral content of the sandstone posed a high potential for a frictional ignition. Two of the cutting bits on the tail drum had worn flat and had lost their carbide tips. The conditions of these bits thus had a high incendive potential. The abrasion of the cutting bits striking the sandstone likely created hot streaks. Additionally, the “last line of defense” against an ignition, the water spray system, was effectively absent because seven water sprays were missing from the tailgate drum of the shearer. A maintenance report (Figure 5) from March 1, 2010 indicates that sprays were intentionally removed in order to flush the tail drum of sediment from poorly filtered river water and other debris. Subsequent testing by MSHA revealed that with the seven sprays missing, the water pressure on the remaining sprays dropped to 0 psi and the water spray system was unable to cool the cutting bits and surrounding rock surfaces and push methane away from the shearer bits. The Sandstone Had a High Potential for Frictional Ignition Underground observations indicated that the tail drum was cutting sandstone in the roof and floor, while the head drum was cutting sandstone in the floor. Accordingly, MSHA collected samples of the roof and floor from the tailgate side of the 1 North Panel face for petrographic analyses (Appendix Q). Based on the mineral contents determined by thin section petrography, the samples were plotted on the diagram below for comparison with the incendivity index developed for rocks in Australian coal mines (Figure 28). The sandstone that the longwall shearer was cutting into on April 5 had a high potential for frictional ignition. The layers of coarse siltstone, which contain high mica content, plot in Category 1, indicating a low potential for frictional ignition. In contrast, the sandstone plots in Category 4 indicating a high potential for frictional ignition. The floor sandstone very nearly plots in the Category 5 zone, because of its high quartz content. Compared to the sample collected from the roof, the floor sample contains much greater quartz, and is characterized by a much greater degree of grain interlocking. Rocks with an incendivity index of 4-5 were shown in tests to have a high potential for frictional ignition, for rock-on-rock and metal-on-rock ignitions.

110

Figure 28. Diagram showing relation of UBB roof (red crosses) and floor (blue diamond) sandstone (SS) and siltstone (ss) to contour lines of incendivity index.

Cutting Bits can Generate “Hot Streaks” In the laboratory, frictional ignitions have been initiated by metal-on-rock and rock-onrock contact. To initiate a methane explosion, a minimum of time, temperature, and surface area of a source are required in order to heat the necessary minimum volume of gas to a sufficient temperature. Experiments involving metal-on-rock friction have shown that combustible concentrations of methane can be ignited by “hot streaks,” which are smears of metal found on rock where the metal has been heated near its melting point. Sandstone, which the longwall crew was mining at the time of the explosion, generates hot streaks. In addition, experiments have revealed that bit surface area is significantly related to the incendive potential of a hot streak. Large wear flats on the cutting bits are more likely to cause an ignition, especially when the carbide tip has worn off and as little as 3 mm of the steel shank has been abraded away (Figure 29).

111

Figure 29. Relation between bit wear, in centimeters, and the number of cuts required to induce a frictional ignition, from Kissell et al. (2007).

During the underground investigation, MSHA found that at least two cutting bits on the tail drum showed signs of excessive wear, including total erosion of the carbide tip and a large wear flat developed in the steel shank. One such bit is shown in Figure 30. Bits with large wear flats worn down to the steel shank striking quartz-rich sandstone, which is characterized by a high incendive potential, represents the most likely source of the initial methane ignition. While only a few bits were worn to the steel shank, one worn bit can provide an ignition source.

112

Figure 30. 1 North Panel tailgate drum, showing configuration of water sprays used in the pick-point flushing system. Note that sprays are directed toward the front of the bits, one missing water spray, and two bits exhibiting extreme wear.

The Water Spray System Failed to Prevent the Ignition One of the purposes of a longwall shearer water spray system is to reduce the likelihood of a frictional ignition. Water sprays can reduce the likelihood of frictional ignitions by cooling the cutting bits and/or the surrounding rock surface, and by pushing methane away from the cutting surface of the bits. The shearer drums on the 1 North Longwall Panel were equipped with a pick-point water spray flushing system, which uses nozzles mounted in the bit blocks or in blocks immediately in front of the bits to direct water at the bit-coal interface (Figure 30). This wets the coal prior to cutting (it also functions to suppress dust that would be discharged into the mine atmosphere). MSHA D4 approved the Ventilation Plan for the MMU 050-0 (longwall mining unit) on June 15, 2009. The plan stipulated that water must be applied to the longwall shearer, the stage loader area, and the shield canopy tips during active operations. A fourth stipulation required shield washing on a weekly basis in order to prevent accumulations of coal dust. Information relating to the stage loader area and the shields can be found in the “Other Plans” Section below. The plan required that 109 functioning Conflow 650 2801 CC Staplelock drum sprays (full cone type) on the longwall shearer. A minimum operating pressure of 90 psi was required at the spray block. At the 90 psi pressure each spray would have a flow rate of approximately 0.82 gallons per minute (gpm) or a total flow rate of 89 gpm at the shearer. The plan required each shearer drum to have

113

43 sprays. In addition each ranging arm had to have three sprays. two body spray (sawtooth) blocks, with two sprays on the first block and six sprays on the second block, and one rack spray on the tailgate side. River water supplied the shearer methane and dust control water system. PCC pumped this water into two 100,000 gallon holding tanks on the surface, above the Silo Portal. PCC then routed the water through the mine, utilizing a 6 to 8-inch diameter waterline to the mule train of the longwall section. Appendix R shows the location of the waterline supplying the mule train. A 4-inch diameter flexible hose was connected to the 6-inch water line that connected to four Rosedale strainers. PCC boosted the water supply through a Sunflo P3000 pump, located on the mule train. There were two 2-inch diameter flexible hoses extended inby from the pump to the stageloader area, where the lines split to supply water to the shearer, conveyor couplings, motor cooling water, and shield water. PCC supplied the shearer via 1,200 feet of 2-inch diameter flexible hose, connected from a valve bank between the stageloader and headgate box. There were at least four different types of sprays on the shearer, which resulted in three different spray patterns. There were three types on the drums and ranging arms, and at least nine different models of water sprays, representing three different water spray patterns and eight different flow rates in the longwall supply area. Several sprays on the shearer showed signs of excessive wear, and at least three from the tailgate side of the shearer showed signs of being mechanically altered by enlarging the outlet orifice. MSHA investigators set up a test, with PCC’s assistance, to recreate the functioning water system on the longwall shearer at the time of the explosion. Because of damage to the waterlines in the explosion zone and the need for electrical power on the longwall, investigators could not use the original water system for testing purposes. A pressure gauge was utilized at the inlet side of the filter assembly; gauges were placed across each filter assembly to provide an indication of when the filters needed to be changed, and a pressure gauge was placed at the shearer inlet. Two flow meters were used to verify water flow to the shearer. In preparation for the water test at the shearer on December 20, 2010, PCC provided MSHA with the water spray configuration used on the longwall at the time of the explosion. The distribution of nozzle locations indicated that 112 Flow Technologies 791C sprays, with a 3/32” orifice diameter, were being used on the longwall shearer, with 43 each on the headgate and tailgate drums of the shearer, ten on the headgate and tailgate ranging arms, and three on one block, located on both the headgate and tailgate sides. A total of 27 BD-5 sprays were used on the shearer, with ten each on the second body block of both the headgate and tailgate sides, three pan sprays on the headgate and tailgate sides of the shearer, and one rack spray on the tailgate side of shearer. PCC investigators reported that the average operating pressure at the sprays was 125 psi, and that the flow rate for the 791C (3/32”) sprays at this operating pressure was 1.58 gpm, with a 1.76 gpm flow rate for a BD-5 sprays at the given pressure. PCC reported that their average flow was 224.30 gpm. PCC contends that they used sprays that exceeded methane and dust control plan requirements.

114

When MSHA investigators restored water to the shearer to test the water sprays, they found a different configuration than described in the plan or by PCC investigators. MSHA discovered that seven sprays were missing from the tail drum of the longwall shearer. Testing on December 20, 2010 revealed that, when seven sprays were missing, the remaining sprays on the tail drum could not maintain the pressure that was required in the approved ventilation plan. In fact, the water gauge on the tailgate drum read 0 psi throughout the test. The majority of the water on the tailgate drum simply discharged out of the openings on the bottom half of the drum where water sprays had been removed. When six of the seven missing sprays were replaced, operable pressure as required by the approved plan was restored to the tail drum once the pressure coming into the shearer reached approximately 186 psi. On April 5, the removal of seven sprays similarly would have caused the water pressure to be removed from the remaining sprays. The water sprays were most likely missing from the tail drum at the time of the explosion. MSHA determined that it is highly unlikely that the explosion forces were responsible for displacing the sprays because of the design of the sprays (which are attached by staple locks) and because of the magnitude and direction of the forces. Instead, the most likely explanation is that PCC employees had removed the water sprays sometime prior to the ignition at the shearer in order to flush the tail drum. PCC experienced clogging problems with water sprays due to the use of poorly filtered river water. This is evident in PCC records, as shown in Figure 5. Mine personnel removed sprays in an attempt to flush out the drum, as confirmed by company records and in interviews. More detailed information concerning the Methane/Dust Suppression plan, and the water spray configuration in particular, may be found in the section, “Other PCC Plans.” Analysis of Sediment in Filter Baskets and Spray Nozzles The results of sediment analyses, documented in Appendix S, indicate that the longwall shearer’s tailgate drum was being operated with missing water sprays. Measurements of the size and type of sediment found in water line filters and shearer nozzles reveal that rock chips were falling out of the roof into open nozzle ports as the drum was cutting. These rock chips were too large and angular to have come from the river water supply or even passed through filters in the water line. A cement-like paste that clogged the insides of many spray nozzles was composed of clay and coal, generated from pulverizing rock with dull bits. This paste was in place prior to the introduction of ruststained water during testing after the accident. Thus, the tailgate drum was being operated with dull bits while cutting hard sandstone, with missing and clogged water sprays.

115

Other Ignition Sources MSHA also addressed several other potential ignition sources, either ruling them out conclusively or finding that they were much less likely to be sources than frictional ignition from the longwall shearer. Roof Falls (Frictional Ignition) Some explosions have been attributed to roof falls. MSHA could not rule this ignition source out since roof falls inby the longwall face could have occurred immediately before the explosion in either the longwall tailgate or behind the tailgate shields. The 1997 explosion at this mine on the longwall tailgate was attributed to a roof fall. Roof falls can ignite explosive methane-air mixtures by heat and releasing energy. During roof falls, rocks rub against each other and produce heat. Explosive methane-air mixtures have been ignited by rubbing friction between shale-sandstone, sandstonemetal, and shale-metal in Bureau of Mines laboratory tests. However, this frictional heat rarely reaches temperatures that will ignite methane in an underground coal mine. In addition, this mine had sandstone bed(s) in the roof which contain quartz crystals. Crystals in rocks may produce electric charges on parts of their surface when they are compressed in certain directions. The release of this energy during roof falls is called a piezoelectric discharge. The greater the quartz content, crystal size and bond strength, the greater the potential for incendiary sparks which can ignite methane. However, because of the deficiencies found with the tailgate shearer drum it is most likely that the ignition was caused by the shearer cutting sandstone rather than a roof fall behind the shields. Pan Line (Frictional Ignition) Frictional ignitions from pan lines have been documented. However, these have occurred much less frequently than ignitions from shearers. The pan line conveyor represents a much less likely source of ignition than the longwall shearer. MSHA believes that it is much more likely that the poorly maintained longwall shearer cutting sandstone and repeatedly generating hot streaks provided the ignition source. Smoking Articles Smoking articles, which would have provided a potential ignition source, were not discovered in the underground portions of the mine during the investigation.

116

Electrical Ignition Sources MSHA eliminated the following electrical ignition sources (see Appendix T - original report section - for a complete discussion of these eliminated electrical ignition sources): An Executive Summary of all electrical equipment tested at MSHA’s Approval and Certification Center can be found in Appendices U-1 through U-15. Lightning - Vaisala’s National Lightning Detection Network showed no lightning strikes within a ten mile radius of the mine site between 10:09:42 a.m. and 7:07:02 p.m. (See Vaisala Report 258028 in Appendix V). Welding and Cutting - There was no evidence of welding or cutting being performed at the time of the explosion, and no cutting equipment was found in the area of the longwall face. Shearer Electrical Components - The electrical components on the shearer included explosion-proof enclosures (motors, main controller enclosure, shearer power cable connection enclosure, and solenoid valve enclosure), a methane monitoring system with warning light enclosure, various intrinsically safe circuits, components and sensors, and all associated cables. MSHA examined these components and performed tests and found no evidence that any of the components were the ignition source. Shearer Remote Control Transmitter - Shearer functions were controlled by two operators with handheld radio remote transmitters (Appendix U-1), designated by the JNA control system as left- and right-hand stations. The right-hand transmitter was a Matric Limited, Model TX1, Remote Control Transmitter, MSHA Approval No. 9B-220-0, and was found at shield 100. After testing was conducted at the manufacturer’s facility and at A&CC, MSHA found no evidence that the right-hand transmitter could have been the ignition source. The left-hand remote control transmitter was never found, but there was no indication that it was not functioning properly. The last record on the JNA event log prior to the explosion showed that the right-hand transmitter caused the shearer to stop. Automatic Chain Tensioning System - A Joy Automatic Chain Tensioning System (ACTS) was installed at the tailgate area of the face to automatically control the face conveyor chain tension. The ACTS components included: an explosion-proof controller enclosure, a connection enclosure for the intrinsically safe circuits (referred to as a “marshalling box”), and various intrinsically safe transducers, sensors, display beacon, and solenoids. MSHA examined this system and performed tests of these components and found no evidence that any of the components were the ignition source. Tail Conveyor Drive Motor - MSHA examined and performed testing of the motor and found no evidence that it was the ignition source.

117

Electrical Cables along the Longwall Face - Electrical cables along the longwall face were located either in the cable handling system of the panline or hung along the longwall shields. MSHA examined and performed tests of the cables and found no evidence that any of the components were the ignition source. Lighting System Components - MSHA examined these components and performed tests of these components and found no evidence that any of the components were the ignition source. (See Appendix U-2) Electrohydraulic Shield System - The Joy MS40 electrohydraulic system, consisting of a Master Supply Unit (MSU) and a Support Control Centre (SCC) at the headgate, controlled the movement of the shields. This system also included various other components (Appendix U-3). MSHA examined and performed tests of these components and found no evidence that any of the components were the ignition source. Comtrol Communication System - The Comtrol longwall face communication/conveyor lock-out system consisted of Longwall Loudmouth Model LM115 phones positioned at the headgate area and typically, every eighth shield. Investigators noted that some phones were not in their original positions (i.e. mounted on shields). The phone at shield 173, the last in the system, was missing, as was the phone at shield 117. At least four phones were missing on the headgate side of the longwall. Electrical investigators that have traveled the face area did not observe any components or cables that showed signs of being an electrical ignition source. MSHA examined and performed tests of the Comtrol system and found no evidence that any of the components were the ignition source. (See Appendix U-4) Multi-Gas Detector - A MSA Solaris multi-gas detector (Exhibit No. B-15-B), carried by Richard Lane, Longwall Section Foreman, was retrieved from mid-face for examination and testing at A&CC. Testing determined that it was in working order. Downloaded data indicated that the device was energized at the time of the explosion and continued operating for several hours thereafter. MSHA tested the detector and found no evidence that the detector was the ignition source. (See Appendix U-5) Tracking Tags - MSHA tested all of the tracking tags that belonged to victims on the longwall face and found no evidence that any of the tags were the ignition source. (See Appendix U-6) Cap Lamps - Many intact cap lamps and components were retrieved. 33 individual items were subjected to further examination and testing at A&CC (Appendix U-7). MSHA examined and performed tests of these cap lamps and found no evidence that any of the cap lamps were the ignition source.

118

Air-Purifying Helmet Components - UBB’s Methane and Dust Control Plan provided that all members in the face would be offered the use of Air Stream helmets, but required examiners to use respirators on the return side of the longwall shearer for an extended period of time. On April 5, miners on the longwall panel were using these helmets. Seven components from the air purifying helmets including four batteries, a portion of a battery case, and pieces of the helmet and cable were retrieved for further examination and testing at A&CC (Appendix U-8). MSHA examined and performed tests of these components and found no evidence that any of the components were the ignition source. Watches and Calculators - Several non-permissible electrical items, including six watches and two calculators, were recovered from the longwall face and subjected to examination at A&CC. These items were all disassembled and inspected (Appendix U-9). MSHA examined all of these items and found no evidence that any of the items were the ignition source. Methane Monitor Sensors - Two permissible methane monitor sensors were retrieved from the longwall tailgate area and sent to A&CC for analysis and testing. MSHA examined and performed tests of these components and found no evidence that any of the components were the ignition source. (See Appendix U-10) The Ignition on the Longwall Shearer For a description of the Mine Electrical System at UBB see Appendix W. The information in this section describes the events that took place immediately after the tailgate shearer drum ignited a localized methane mixture when the shearer cut into the tailgate entry. These activities indicate that there was a short period of time between this ignition and when the flames from this ignition encountered a larger body of methane resulting in a methane explosion which ultimately suspended float coal dust in the tailgate entries and transitioned into a massive coal dust explosion. The Longwall Crew Stopped the Shearer and Left the Area At about 3:00 p.m. on April 5, the tail shearer operator shut off the shearer using his remote control, and the longwall crew working near the shearer started moving away from the shearer toward the headgate. A longwall crew member, who was on the headgate side of the longwall, then opened the visible disconnect de-energizing the power to the longwall shearer and shut off the water to the longwall face. About 3:02 p.m., the explosion propagated through the northern part of the mine, killing the 29 miners, including the longwall crew, and injuring two on the TG 22 crew. Investigation interviews with longwall crews from different shifts and underground observations indicate that the longwall crew’s actions at approximately 3:00 p.m. were atypical. The condition of the longwall shearer after the accident, with the shearer turned off by remote, the visible disconnect switch open, and the water shut off at the

119

headgate, demonstrates that the longwall crew was reacting to an event at the shearer. In addition, during this two-minute gap, the ignition made its way back to an accumulation of methane in the tailgate entries inby the longwall face, where it caused a localized methane explosion. The Tail Shearer Operator Remotely Shut Off the Shearer Investigators removed the JNA computer control system from the shearer and took it to Joy Mining Machinery’s facility in Franklin, PA, where the electronically recorded event log was examined. Evaluation of the event log revealed that the shearer was shut off by an e-stop command from the handheld remote control of the tail shearer operator between 2:59:32 and 2:59:38 p.m. (Appendix X-JNA Event Log and Fault Codes). Analysis of additional items removed from the mine indicated that power in the mine was lost at approximately 3:02 p.m. (Appendix Y-DVR Evaluation Report), from damage inflicted upon the high voltage cables by the explosive forces. The shearer’s on-board controls were set to the position that required both operators to be at the machine for it to run. MSHA concluded that both operators were at the shearer when the tail side operator shut off the shearer between 2:59:32 and 2:59:38 p.m. with an e-stop command from the handheld remote control. Four victims, the two shearer operators, the jack setter, and the utility man, were found between shields 103 and 106, approximately 400 feet from the shearer toward the headgate. The Longwall Crew Manually Opened the Visible Disconnect Switch The power cable extending from the longwall starter to the shearer was provided with a manually operated visible disconnect switch installed in an explosion-proof enclosure just outby the headgate controller. After the accident, investigators found the disconnect switch in the open and grounded position. With the switch in the open and grounded position, power was not being provided to the shearer. This disconnect had to be in the closed position for the shearer to operate. The handle that operated the disconnect switch was located on the exterior of the explosion-proof enclosure. A mechanical push-button rod prevented the handle from being operated when the disconnect was closed. In order to rotate the handle and open the disconnect switch, this push-button had to be depressed and held. Depressing the push-button also opened an electrical interlock switch inside the enclosure that caused the 4,160 Vac vacuum contactor in the longwall starter to open thereby de-energizing the shearer cable. When tested during the investigation, the mechanical and electrical components of the disconnect switch functioned properly. The explosion covered the longwall equipment, including the visible disconnect, in a layer of dust. This residue on the push-button and handle of the shearer disconnect switch was undisturbed, indicating that the disconnect had not been operated after the explosion.

120

Given that the visible disconnect was found open, indicating that the shearer was deenergized, and that the visible disconnect had not been disturbed after the explosion, MSHA determined that the forces generated by the explosion did not cause the shearer disconnect switch to open. MSHA also determined that a longwall crew member, who was on the headgate side of the longwall, manually opened the shearer visible disconnect switch during the period of time between the shearer being shut off with the remote control and the coal dust explosion. MSHA eliminated other possibilities before arriving at these determinations. A possible reason given in testimony for opening the visible disconnect switch was to set bits on the shearer. The tail drum of the shearer had just cut out of the coal block into the tailgate entry at shield 176. The tail drum was still against the roof and had not been lowered to cut out the mine floor. The head drum was against the bottom, with the cowl blade positioned on the headgate side of the drum. Neither drum was located such that bits could be set. Therefore, setting bits was ruled out as the reason for the visible disconnect switch to be open. Additionally, repair to a damaged shearer cable was ruled out as the reason for the visible disconnect switch being open as testing proved that the cable was not damaged. The Water Was Shut Off at the Headgate The cooling and dust suppression water for the shearer was controlled at the headgate end of the face. There was no water shutoff valve installed onboard the shearer. Two 2-inch water lines from the pump car at the mule train entered a manifold near the headgate controller. Each line had a ball valve installed on it before it entered the manifold. Both water lines’ valves were found in the closed position. The valves and manifold were covered in a layer of undisturbed, explosion-related dust, indicating the valves were turned off prior to the explosion. In the closed position, these valves are consistent with the shearer and face conveyor being off. Several miners stated during interviews that during normal operations, when the face conveyor shut down, it was standard practice to close these valves to shut off the water. The Longwall Crew Working Near the Shearer Left the Shearer Because of an Abnormal Event The investigators concluded that the most likely reason the four victims evacuated the area of the shearer was because they saw or heard an abnormal event and could not control it. In this case, the abnormal event was most likely the initial methane ignition on the tail drum of the shearer.

121

MSHA eliminated other possibilities before arriving at this conclusion. Testimony indicated that one reason for these employees to leave the shearer was because of shift change. The day shift and evening shift crews normally “hot seated,” meaning that the day shift crew stayed on the face until the evening shift crew arrived on the section. At the time of the explosion, the evening shift longwall crew was boarding a mantrip at the Ellis Portal for travel into the mine. Because it was not time for the day shift crew to leave the face, investigators ruled out shift change as the reason for leaving the shearer. Another reason personnel might have left the shearer was because of a mechanical or electrical breakdown. An analysis of event logs stored electronically on the shearer and at the longwall starter did not indicate any electrical faults in the shearer circuits. Therefore, investigators ruled out an electrical problem. Because no obvious mechanical failures were observed when the shearer was inspected, investigators also ruled out a mechanical breakdown. To address the possibility that personnel could have left the tailgate because of encountering methane, investigators removed the methane monitor components on the longwall shearer, the methane sensor near the tailgate end of the face, and the methane monitor components in the headgate controller for testing at MSHA’s Approval and Certification Center (Appendix U-10). The two methane monitor systems functioned properly. The shearer’s JNA event log listed no methane monitor faults on the shearer for the period covered in the log, from March 30, 2010, to the time of the explosion. An analysis of the stored data on Programmable Logic Controls (PLCs) in the headgate controller (PLC Appendix U-15) and the longwall starter did not indicate that the tailgate methane monitor shut down the longwall prior to the explosion. After the ignition occurred at the shearer, a fire likely followed small accumulations of methane and burned behind the shields. The flame from this fire eventually came into contact with the accumulation of methane in the # 7 entry of TG 1 North inby the longwall. MSHA estimated that the explosive accumulation of methane that was ignited contained approximately 300 cubic feet of methane. Research has shown that the ignition of as little as 13 cubic feet of methane is sufficient to suspend and ignite coal dust. When diluted with air to 10 percent, this 300 cubic feet of methane would form an explosive volume of 3,000 cubic feet. It is feasible that two minutes passed during this burning process. The flame generated by the ignition of this 3,000 cubic feet of methane-air mixture extended approximately 140 feet (15,000 cubic feet) to just outby the stopping in crosscut 48.

The Localized Methane Explosion Transitioned into a Coal Dust Explosion, Caused by Dangerous Coal Accumulations and Inadequate Rock Dusting
The methane explosion on the tailgate, discussed in the previous section, almost instantaneously gave rise to a massive coal dust explosion which swept through the mine. 122

The initial flame extended in the tailgate from just inby the longwall face, to just outby the stopping in crosscut 48. The flame and force of the localized methane explosion suspended and ignited coal dust prior to the flame from the localized methane explosion being extinguished. If float coal dust had not accumulated and the mine dust had contained sufficient quantities of incombustible content, the localized methane explosion would not have propagated any further. However, float coal dust accumulated and the incombustible content of the mine dust was insufficient and as a result, coal dust was ignited. The incombustible content of the mine dust is discussed in the subsection “Mine Dust Survey” earlier in the report. Once the coal dust was ignited, the flame generated a shock wave that placed additional mine dust into suspension. The mine dust sampling provides evidence of the extent of the flame and indicates where coking was present. Coal dust and float coal dust provided the fuel for the propagation of the explosion. Extensive sampling and analysis by MSHA, substantiated by witness testimony and company documents, revealed that rock dusting was inadequate. Coking in Mine Dust and Visual Observation Led Investigators to Determine the Path of the Flame Flame Travel Flame is produced during an explosion when an ignition source of sufficient temperature or energy ignites a suspended fuel within its explosive range. Immediately after ignition, a fireball typically develops and rapidly begins heating the mine atmosphere. Within seconds, a flame front begins propagating through the suspended fuel. The propagating flame continues to heat the mine atmosphere, resulting in a rapid expansion of the mine atmosphere. The expansion of the mine atmosphere creates a force, known as a shock wave, which continues to travel ahead of the flame. The magnitude of the shock wave is typically determined by the speed of the propagating flame. The faster the flame travels, the higher the pressures from the shock wave become. Flame speeds as high as 5,000 feet per second have been measured in experimental explosions. The flame of an explosion will continue to propagate as long as there is sufficient fuel, heat, and oxygen. In addition, the fuel must remain suspended and the explosion must remain confined. If any of these five conditions is lost, then the flame of the explosion will extinguish. For example, if confinement is lost, the air speed will begin to decelerate. A coal dust explosion will generally die out if the air speed is less than 150 feet per second. Additionally, the explosion flame and shock wave generally result in overpressures which cause the destruction of mine ventilation controls and damage to mining equipment, the suspension of mine dust from the roof, ribs, and floor, and the formation of various products of combustion such as carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, hydrogen, etc.

123

MSHA determined the extent of flame travel primarily through an evaluation of the samples taken during a post-explosion mine dust survey. MSHA also evaluated additional evidence including observations of the post-explosion condition of various combustible materials, the results of testing additional samples of mine dust, and a review of the autopsy results, (Appendix Z). MSHA divided the underground workings into 22 separate sampling areas, as shown on the mine map in Appendix L. Sampling locations, on 500-foot centers in areas outby crosscut 67 of Old North Mains and 100-foot centers in areas inby crosscut 67, were designated on a mine map for each area. Sampling on 100-foot centers has been shown to offset any dust transport that may have occurred during an explosion. MSHA determined that the force of the explosion in outby areas was minimal and that dust transport was negligible. MSHA identified 2,207 locations for band sampling. A band sample is taken around the entire perimeter of any point location, including the roof, both ribs, and the floor. If an area was too wet or inaccessible due to hazardous conditions, MSHA did not take a sample. Of the 2,207 intended locations, MSHA took samples at 1,803 locations because actual mine conditions at 404 locations were either too wet or otherwise inaccessible for sampling. MSHA did not take samples from any previously wet locations in the event that significant drying occurred prior to the end of the underground investigation. MSHA took band samples at 1,132 of the 1,803 locations, or 62.8 percent of all sampled locations. In areas where an entire band was not possible to collect, MSHA sampled as much of the band as was possible. For example, if the floor was too wet, MSHA still took a sample from the roof and ribs. MSHA marked each sample to indicate what portion of a complete band was taken. Whenever MSHA took a full mine dust band sample, MSHA mixed and separated the sample into quarters, each of which was representative of the mine dust at that location. MSHA placed one quarter in a sealed plastic bag with a tag identifying the sampling location. MSHA offered each of the other three quarters of the sample to representatives from WVOMHST, UMWA, and Massey traveling with MSHA’s Mine Dust Sampling team. MSHA sent all 1,803 samples to MSHA’s Mount Hope National Air and Dust Laboratory (Mount Hope), which determined the incombustible content and degree of coking. The incombustible content provides an indication of the pre-explosion conditions in the affected area of the mine, while the coking indicates the area affected by the flame of the explosion.

124

Mount Hope subjected each of the 1,803 mine dust samples to the Alcohol Coke Test. This test determines the quantity of coke in each sample. Coking of coal occurs as the coal is subjected to heat for a period of time. The temperature required for coking to commence varies with the rank of coal, but is on the order of 700º F. Flame temperatures during an explosion can be nearly 1800º F, however the flame may only be at each location for approximately 45 milliseconds. The amount of coking that occurs is related directly to the exposure temperature and the duration of that temperature. When objects are exposed to flame for a sufficient duration of time, heat is transferred and produces coking. However, even within the area affected by the flame, coking of the coal does not occur at all locations. Research on alcohol coke testing indicates that coke is found whenever coal particles are dispersed into a flame, and therefore the presence of coke is a good indication of flame travel. Coke, as measured by the Alcohol Coke Test, is found after explosions at an incombustible content of up to 80 percent. The Alcohol Coke Test indicates the quantity of coke in each sample as either none, trace, small, large, or extra-large. Large and extra-large quantities of coke are indicative of flame. The results of the Alcohol Coke Test are shown on the mine map in Appendix Z and in Table 7 for the 1,803 mine dust samples collected. The results of the coke analysis on all mine dust samples showed that 85.5 percent of all mine dust samples taken displayed evidence of coking. The results of the coke analysis on only band samples showed that 86.5 percent displayed evidence of coking.

125

Table 7. Amount of Coke in Samples taken During Mine Dust Survey Intake Entries Sampling Area 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 Total: None 15 11 15 8 76 96 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 228 Trace 0 0 0 0 22 48 43 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 3 0 119 Small 0 0 0 0 15 4 129 4 2 0 4 20 4 3 9 17 1 212 Large 0 0 0 0 3 0 115 44 116 60 73 8 61 25 16 202 68 791 X-Large 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 8 5 53 2 0 17 43 0 5 9 145 None 15 15 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 33 Trace 0 4 0 3 8 1 0 0 0 16 Return Entries Small 0 15 4 5 6 2 0 0 1 33 Large 0 5 18 0 32 8 2 55 34 154 X-Large 0 0 0 0 20 0 0 52 0 72

126

In addition, MSHA sent 29 mine dust samples to the NIOSH facility in Morgantown, West Virginia for the samples to be placed under a Scanning Electron Microscope to identify presence or lack of coke in each sample. MSHA chose these 29 samples because of their underground locations near the perimeter of the flame zone and because the Alcohol Coke Test indicated large or extra-large quantities of coke in each of the selected samples. The results of the examination proved definitively that coke was present in each of the 29 samples. MSHA determined that the coal dust explosion began approximately at the intersection of crosscut 48 and entry No. 6 in Tailgate 1 North. Explosion forces were generated by the flame in all directions, including back across the longwall face. Evidence indicates that approximately 14 psi traveled back to the longwall tailgate from the coal dust explosion. Explosion damage indicates that the coal dust explosion initially propagated inby in entries 5 and 6 and outby in entries 5, 6, and 7. Eventually, all entries and crosscuts in Tailgate 1 North from as far inby as crosscut 77 exhibited evidence of flame. The flame traveled inby at about 1,000 feet per second (fps) while generating a pressure exceeding 18 psi. While underground, investigators were unable to take mine dust samples any farther inby in the Tailgate 1 North entries and, consequently, could not determine the extent of flame in those inby entries. However MSHA’s Mine Emergency Operations Group lowered a camera into the mine at two inby locations, through borehole BH A, located in the No. 1 entry at 94 crosscut of Headgate 1 North, and also down the Bandytown fan shaft. Observations made with the camera indicated that the flame of the explosion most likely did not propagate to either of these locations. Flame propagated outby from crosscut 48 and involved all entries and crosscuts of Tailgate 1 North, outby to the Old North Mains. The flame also propagated to crosscut 67 in Old North Mains in entries 1, 2, and 3. The explosion flame traveled outby at the same time as it was traveling inby in the tailgate entries. Flame initially traveled outby in the tailgate entries at about 600 fps, generating a pressure of nearly 6 psi. Several hundred feet before reaching the crossover entries, additional coal dust became involved and flame speeds accelerated to over 1,000 fps in all tailgate entries. As the flame continued outby in the tailgate entries, eventually it propagated to the locations where the tailgate intersects the North Glory Mains. The flame speed dropped dramatically at this intersection due to the additional entries and the increased incombustibles in the mine dust. The flame extinguished in this direction about 11 crosscuts outby the tailgate entries. As the flame propagated outby in the Tailgate 1 North entries, it turned 90º to the left and entered the crossover between Tailgate 1 North and Headgate 1 North. All entries and crosscuts of the crossover were engulfed in flame, including the entries and crosscuts that turn 90º and head towards and into the North Glory Mains entries. Flame propagation did not occur along the length of the North Glory Mains but small pockets of flame extinguished as they projected a short distance into the North Glory Mains. From the crossover entries, the explosion flame propagated into Headgate 1 North and turned both inby and outby. The outby portion propagated towards and into the North

127

Glory Mains. The inby portion propagated inby as far as crosscut 32. MSHA was unable to take mine dust samples any further inby in the Headgate 1 North entries and, consequently, could not determine the extent of flame in those inby entries. As flame entered Headgate 1 North, the destructive pressures propagated inby with a flame speed of about 1,200 fps, generating over 20 psi, as indicated by damage to several monorail sections. Although flame did not enter the longwall face, pressures ranging from 7 to 14 psi did travel along the longwall from the headgate. The flame of the coal dust explosion also traveled toward the face of the TG 22. As the coal dust explosion propagated into TG 22, explosion pressures increased to near 20 psi. Just before entering TG 22, the flame also turned 90º right and entered the crossover entries between TG 22 and HG 22. Initially, the flame resulted in large and extra-large deposits of coke. However, as the flame continued through the crossover entries, coke was not produced. MSHA believes that the flame increased in speed as it continued through these crossover entries. Increased flame speeds decreased the duration of the flame at these locations and coke formation was not possible. This increase in speed could likely be attributed to the increased fineness of the coal dust and the lack of sufficient rock dust through these entries. The flame slowed as it turned into crosscuts. Mine dust samples taken in the crosscuts of the crossover entries included large and extra-large quantities of coke, indicating flame travel. The flame entered HG 22 at the mouth of the section and turned 90º left and right. The portion of the flame that turned left traveled into HG 22 and propagated to the faces. The flame propagated into HG 22 at speeds approaching 1,500 fps generating a pressure of approximately 25 psi. Additional coal dust caused increases in the flame speed and pressure. Calculations have shown that explosion pressures were on the order of 52 to 65 psi. Pressure piling occurred as the flame and forces continued to push against the dead end of HG 22. This resulted in a reflected overpressure traveling outby that could have reached a maximum pressure of 105 psi. The flame consumed available oxygen in HG 22 and, after reaching the faces, was unable to propagate outby as it extinguished from the lack of oxygen. The flame that turned right traveled outby to near crosscut 115 in the North Glory Mains, into all entries and crosscuts of the Glory Hole Mains, and turned again and propagated into all entries and crosscuts of the North Jarrells Mains, and all entries and crosscuts in West Jarrells Mains. Pressures throughout these areas averaged about 20 psi with flame speeds of over 1,000 fps. The flame of the explosion extinguishged at the dead ends of West Jarrells mains due to lack of sufficient oxygen for continued propagation. A mine map showing the direction of the primary explosion forces is contained in Appendix L.

128

Accumulations of Coal Dust and Float Coal Dust As noted in the examinations section, MSHA identified extensive and obvious accumulations of coal dust and float coal dust throughout its underground investigation. The coal dust and float coal dust provided the initial fuel for the coal dust explosion. Coal dust and float coal dust along the flame path continued to fuel the explosion. MSHA sent several teams underground to travel each air course in order to take representative measurements of the accumulations. MSHA’s measurements were consistent with their initial determination that the accumulations were extensive and obvious. The accumulations were found consistently along travelways, belt conveyors, intake air courses and return air courses inby crosscut 54. Many of these accumulations were left from the initial mining process. Section roadway spillage, feeder piles, and coal along the ribs was not cleaned up as normal mining continued. In addition, their location and placement indicated that they had pre-dated the explosion, i.e., that the accumulations were not the result of explosion forces. Testimony corroborated the presence of many of these accumulations pre-explosion, especially in the belt entries. Proximate Analysis and Explosibility of the Coal The coal at UBB was explosive. In order to verify the explosibility of the coal, MSHA removed separate channel samples from near the headgate and the tailgate of the active longwall. MSHA sent the samples to Standard Laboratories, Inc. in Freeburg, Illinois, which subjected the samples to a Proximate Analysis. The Proximate Analysis determines the moisture, ash, volatile content, and fixed carbon of each sample. The volatile content can be used to identify the rank of the coal. The volatile content and the fixed carbon can be used to calculate the volatile ratio of the coal. The moisture and ash can be used to determine the amount of rock dust necessary to reach incombustible contents of 65 percent and 80 percent. In addition, the British thermal units (Btu) and sulfur contents of each sample were determined. The results of Proximate Analysis testing on the as-received sample from the headgate revealed the following: moisture = 1.77%, ash = 7.98%, volatile content = 32.77%, and fixed carbon = 57.48%. The headgate sample had a Btu content of 13,890 and a sulfur content of 0.83%. The results of Proximate Analysis testing on the as-received sample from the tailgate revealed the following: moisture = 2.23%, ash = 6.82%, volatile content = 32.81%, and fixed carbon = 58.13%. The tailgate sample had a Btu content of 14,010 and a sulfur content of 0.88%. The results of the Proximate Analysis identify this coal as a high volatile bituminous coal which is highly explosive. The results of testing are contained in Appendix AA. The volatile ratio of the coal is a value independent of any inherent or added incombustible. The volatile ratio is calculated by dividing the volatile content of the coal by the summation of the volatile content and the fixed carbon. Any coal with a volatile ratio of 0.12 or less is defined as an anthracite coal and is not explosive. It has been

129

established that all U. S. coals having a volatile ratio in excess of 0.12 are considered to present an explosion hazard. Bituminous coal is defined as any coal with a volatile ratio greater than 0.12. Bituminous coal is subject to all the requirements of the § 75.400, including the incombustibility requirements contained in § 75.403. The volatile ratio of the headgate sample was calculated to be 0.36 and the volatile ratio of the tailgate sample was calculated to be 0.36. Rock Dusting The use of rock dust to limit explosions in underground coal mines was pioneered by the U.S. Bureau of Mines in the 1920’s. Rock dust in coal mines is defined in 30 CFR Subpart A, § 75.2 as follows: Pulverized limestone, dolomite, gypsum, anhydrite, shale, adobe, or other inert material, preferably light colored, 100 percent of which will pass through a sieve having 20 meshes per linear inch and 70 percent or more of which will pass through a sieve having 200 meshes per linear inch; the particles of which when wetted and dried will not cohere to form a cake, which will not be dispersed into separate particles by a light blast of air; and which does not contain more than 5 percent combustible matter or more than a total of 4 percent free and combined silica (SiO2), or, where the Secretary finds that such silica concentrations are not available, which does not contain more than 5 percent of free and combined silica. This definition has been in place for decades and was the requirement for rock dust composition on April 5, 2010. The initial research supporting the rock dust particle size effects on coal dust explosion propagation was performed in 1933 and reported in Bureau of Mines Bulletin 369. Rock dust, an inert material, is intended to prevent explosions. The mechanism by which this is accomplished is that, when dispersed in sufficient quantities, inert material will quench explosion flame, partly through absorption of heat and radiant energy, and partly by hindering diffusion of oxygen and gases into and from the burning coal particles. The effectiveness of an inert dust in inhibiting ignition or explosion of a combustible dust increases with decrease in particle size of the inert dust. As a result, a lesser percentage of fine inert dust is required than for coarse inert dust. Small-scale laboratory tests, conducted by NIOSH, showed that the larger the rock dust particle size, the more rock dust is required to inert and prevent a coal dust explosion from propagating. It has been shown in various small chamber tests that by reducing the size of the rock dust particles, the surface area of the rock dust increases and promotes greater radiant heat absorption, thereby improving the prevention of underground coal dust explosions. At UBB, four methods were used to apply rock dust: hand dusting, a scoop-mounted slinger duster, a rail-mounted duster, and trickle dusters.

130

Hand dusting from 40-pound bags was used for the initial application of rock dust during advance on continuous miner sections, and was also used for some supplemental applications. Scoop-mounted slinger dusters, using bulk bags and 40-pound bags, were used for supplemental dust applications. A rail-mounted duster was used inconsistently to dust the track and belt entries in the outby areas of the mine. The dual pod, rail-mounted duster had a capacity of approximately 1.6 tons of bulk rock dust. Trickle dusters, which had capacities of 200-280 pounds of rock dust, were used at some belt transfer points. Bulk rock dust was stored in two bins near the UBB Portals. Miners stated that areas were not well dusted, areas were dark, and the only areas that were regularly dusted were track and belt entries. An examiner stated that the crossover between HG 22 and TG 22 was never dusted. The scoop-mounted slinger duster on HG 22 was found 18 crosscuts outby the face in the return entry. Other miners described the color underground as gray to black. In addition, several witnesses said that the tailgate of the longwall needed rock dusting. There is no evidence or testimony from the interviews to indicate that any additional rock dust was applied in the longwall tailgate after the longwall started retreating. Few had been trained on what adequate rock dust quantities should be. Finally, PCC never sampled its’ mine to determine compliance with the rock dust regulations. At UBB, a rail-mounted duster was used to dust the track and belt entries. Hoses were used to convey the rock dust to the belt entries. Because the longwall and development sections were approximately 5 miles from the bulk rock dust bins at the UBB Portals, the time to get a load of rock dust and transport it into the active mining areas limited the bulk duster to approximately one trip per night. Simply moving one of the bulk rock dust bins to the Ellis Portal would have decreased the time to reload the rail-mounted duster. Installing a rock dust borehole near the active production sections switch would have further reduced the reload time for the rail-mounted duster. A single rock dust crew, consisting of a motor operator and a helper, was responsible for bulk dusting the track and belts of the entire mine. The crew of the rail-mounted duster would often perform other outby work, including setting timbers, building stoppings, or supplying a section. The rock dust equipment frequently failed. The rail-mounted duster was over 20 years old, hoses frequently clogged and multiple breakdowns took days or weeks to complete. The hoot owl crew was often without the duster altogether or spent hours trying to unclog hoses to keep dusting during their shift. The crew also had limited time to dust assigned areas of the mine, often only completing about 10 breaks of area, about 1000 feet, in a mine covering more than 7 miles. The crew and the rail-mounted duster had to be off the track and outside before the day shift production crew arrived. The complications with equipment maintenance, the distance to travel to load and unload the duster, and the time limits on use of the track often left only three hours for the dust crew to apply dust. A notebook kept by the crew (Appendix AB) summed up problems with an entry two weeks prior to the explosion: “No ride. No help. No spotter… I’m set up to fail here.”

131

A UBB miner testified: We never rock dusted. I mean, very seldom…I growed up in a Massey affiliated mine and I thought it was like that everywhere. I mean, until you can see a difference, you don't have something to compare it to… Despite the evidence that some miners were unaware of what a properly rock-dusted mine looked like, other miners were aware and were concerned about the lack of rock dust. Included in the latter group were examiners who repeatedly reported the lack of dust on reports up to the time of the explosion. The belt examination that was phoned out of UBB immediately prior to the explosion showed that eight of ten conveyor belts that were examined required rock dusting (Appendix AC). Belt examination reports for March 15, 2010 through the time of the explosion show that belts requiring rock dusting were listed 443 times but rock dust was shown as being applied only 58 times (Appendix AD). The belt examiners’ report for March, 2010 showed consistent, hazardous conditions concerning belts that required additional rock dusting. Some belts showed as high as 90 consecutive shifts when the examiner reported additional dust was needed. From December 28, 2009 to April 5, 2010, 291 belt exams were recorded for the longwall belt. On ten occasions, the record indicated “Idle belts,” leaving 281 examination records. Of these recorded examinations, 96 percent (270) had a hazard recorded. Of the 281 recorded examinations, 86 percent (244) indicated that the belt entry needed at least spot dusting. Rock dust purchase orders, provided by PCC as Bates Stamped documents PCCMSHA 00060740 to 00060846 and PCC-MSHA 00068810 to 00069433, show that between October 26, 2009 and March 8, 2010, no bulk dust was purchased at this mine, even though production increased at this time. In September, 2009 and October, 2009, 648 tons of rock dust was purchased. During the following four months, a total of only 520 tons was purchased. In March, 2010, there was a slight increase in the amount of dust purchased. In the course of its investigation of the accident, MSHA sampled rock dust from three separate bags of rock dust located at UBB. The tests determined that this rock dust was not compliant with 30 CFR 50.2, which requires that 70 percent of the rock dust particles must pass through a 200-mesh sieve. A few of these rock dust samples fell significantly short of the 70 percent requirement. MSHA is investigating whether the manner of storing the rock dust affects its quality. MSHA subsequently tested other samples obtained directly from the manufacturer of the rock dust, the Limestone Dust Corporation of Bluefield, Virginia. Some of these samples were compliant with 30 CFR 50.2; others were marginally below the 70 percent requirement for a 200-mesh sieve, although not to the degree noted in the rock dust sampled from UBB.

132

It is MSHA’s conclusion that the non-compliant nature of the rock dust did not contribute to the explosion at UBB. Based on MSHA’s investigation, MSHA determined that there was almost no rock dust in the tailgate entry of the longwall. Had there been rockdust present in sufficient quantities in this area, MSHA believes that the methane explosion would not have propagated into the resulting coal dust explosion.

OTHER PCC PLANS
Mine operators, including PCC, are required to develop and follow various plans in accordance with the MINER Act and applicable standards to ensure the safety and health of the miners. Those include ventilation, roof control, and emergency response – which covers communications and tracking. Additionally, PCC met the criteria to require compliance with atmospheric monitoring system standards. Plans must address the conditions and mining methods at a specific mine to protect the health and safety of the miners.

Ventilation Plan
The Approved Plan in Effect April 5, 2010 In addition to the information provided above, the approved ventilation plan included four general statements; three of which address maintenance and examination of the bleeder system:    The roof in the bleeder entries and at the bleeder evaluation points shall be supported in accordance with the approved roof control plan. Accumulations of water will be controlled primarily by natural drainage supplemented by pumping to prevent accumulations of water from affecting the bleeder ventilation system. The effectiveness of the bleeder system shall be determined by the methane and oxygen content, the direction of airflow, and quantity at the bleeder evaluation points located as shown typically on the drawings or as previously approved on the mine ventilation map submitted under 30 CFR § 75.372.

The fourth statement addresses the installation of mechanized mining equipment:  During installation and removal of mechanized equipment, 9,000 cfm will be maintained at the last open crosscut of the section being set up or abandoned and at the intake end of a pillar line. Ventilation controls will consist of permanent stoppings, check curtains and brattice material, as necessary, to maintain the required ventilating current. The system of installing controls will be similar to those on face sketches.

133

These statements show PCC’s knowledge and recognition of unique conditions and issues to be addressed at UBB. Five regulatory compliance statements are contained in the ventilation plan:  § 75.371(g),(m) – Volume of air required in last open crosscut – Permanent stoppings will be maintained up to, but not including, the third connecting crosscut outby the working face. In order to insure that adequate ventilation is maintained, a minimum of 13,500 cfm in the last open crosscut will be provided when the last open crosscut is three crosscuts inby the permanent stopping. A minimum of 9,000 cfm will be maintained with one or two open crosscuts. § 75.371(x) – A description of the bleeder system to be used, including its design (see § 75.334) – Blowing ventilation with outcrop punch-outs or ventilation holes and cut-throughs into mains on the back end of panels or rooms is proposed for the bleeder system evaluation for this mine. Typical bleeder designs are attached [in the plan]. Existing bleeder systems are shown on the § 75.372 mine ventilation map. § 75.371(z) – Weekly examinations – Non-Pillared, Worked Out Areas – In addition to the requirements of § 75.364(a)(1), measurements of methane, oxygen, air quantity, and air direction will be made in the last open crosscut or in the immediate return outby the last permanent stopping in each panel or mains. § 75.371(hh) – Ambient Level of Carbon Monoxide – The ambient level of carbon monoxide in all areas where carbon monoxide sensors are installed is 0 ppm. This ambient level is determined using a handheld, calibrated CO detector. Current settings are 5 ppm and 10 ppm, respectively, for alert and alarm levels. CO monitors will be spaced at maximum 2,000 foot spacing. § 75.371(uu), (vv), and (ww) – Diesel Equipment – At this time, there is no diesel equipment in service at this mine.









The plan further stipulates how belt air will be monitored as it is fed through a regulator: 1. Belt Air – Where intake air is regulated into the belt, it will have a CO monitor upwind on the intake side and another one will be installed both inby and outby in the belt air course. The regulator feeding the air from the intake into the belt air course will have the capability of being adjusted remotely from outby the regulator in the intake and also outby in the belt air course. This is considered point feed. At this time, there is no point feed in the mine. A revision will be submitted and approved before adding a point feed.

134

Recent Revisions to the Approved Ventilation Plan and Map From September 11, 2009 until April 5, 2010, UBB submitted 38 revisions (referred to by UBB as addendums) to the ventilation plan, of which 18 were approved and two seal completions were acknowledged. There were 13 revisions to the ventilation plan and map that were disapproved, five revisions to the plan and map pending approval and one which was withdrawn. The December 23, 2009 revision described how belt air would be used on the longwall, with the operator stating that within 30 days, a long term plan would be submitted to show how belt air would be coursed outby, away from the longwall while more intake air courses would be opened up. This was submitted after the company was unable to implement the December 18, 2009 approval, referring to a company submission showing the belt air coursing outby, away from the longwall. Prior to the installation of the Bandytown fan, the Headgate 1 North and Tailgate 1 North development sections were ventilated with the North fan. The ventilation of these sections was reported to be poor, and likely represented the extent of the effectiveness of the North fan. The ventilation history of this area is presented below, based on a review of the approved ventilation changes and other applicable records, beginning with the inception of the longwall section. The longwall dust control plan, approved on June 15, 2009, required “40,000 cfm volume of air intake to longwall,” with minimum face velocities of 400 fpm at shield 9 and 250 fpm at shield 160. The dust control plan required 15,000 cfm for the MMU-029 (HG 22) and MMU-040 (TG 22) sections in the last open crosscut.  Addendum B4-A56, approved August 6, 2009. This was a three-phase plan. Phase 1 concerned the activation of Bandytown fan and development of the north longwall district. The plan proposed a quantity of 300,000 cfm for Bandytown fan. Phase 2 plan concerned the start-up of the 1 North Longwall Panel. The longwall tailgate outby the face was ventilated with belt/track air. This phase also established the measurement points (MP) and evaluation check points (EP) for the longwall. The Panel 2 crossover unit was proposed to be ventilated by a return, directed to the Bandytown shaft and separated from the worked-out longwall area along Headgate 1 North. This unit became HG 22 at a later date. The Panel 1 crossover was ventilated by return air, isolated from the worked-out longwall area, along Tailgate 1 North to Bandytown fan. This return later became the main return for the development sections. The approved plan showed the longwall using belt air. The map included as part of Phase 2 included a 30,000 cfm minimum air quantity for the longwall. This would have superseded the minimum quantity in the dust control plan. Phase 3 depicted projections for developing 2 North (HG 22) and 3 North. The plan also included four typical face ventilation sketches, showing the ventilation of the longwall face and the MP and EP locations.

135

During an inspection conducted while the plan was being implemented, multiple ventilation citations were issued. Phase 1 had been completed with the activation of the Bandytown fan. On September 1, 2009, as the longwall ventilation system was being adjusted to meet the approved Phase 2 plan requirements, MSHA inspectors found airflow across the longwall face to be traveling in the wrong direction (tailgate to headgate). MSHA identified that other ventilation controls needed to be constructed and controls had been constructed that were not approved by the Phase 2 plan. While these ventilation revisions were in progress, miners not necessary to make these changes were in the mine producing coal on other continuous mining sections and performing other nonrelated work. Miners were withdrawn from the mine and the appropriate violations were issued.  B4-A61, approved September 4, 2009. Doors were installed in Tailgate 1 North between crosscuts 9 and 11. This was designed to regulate intake airflow entering Tailgate 1 North entries from the belt/track air course in the Old North Mains. B4-A62, approved September 4, 2009. Intake regulators were installed at the overcasts over Ellis Mains near Ellis switch. These regulators were designed to cause air to travel inby in the intake and belt/track entries at Ellis Portal. B4-A65, approved September 18, 2009. Regulators were installed in Tailgate 1 North between crosscuts 33 and 34 in No’s. 4 and 5 entry. This was designed to regulate intake airflow entering Tailgate 1 North entries from the belt/track air course in the Old North Mains. B6-A6, approved November 13, 2009. The plan depicted the beginning of HG 22 (Headgate 2 North). Mine record books indicated the HG 22 section started on or about November 30, 2009. B6-A13, approved December 18, 2009. Ground control failure damaged the stoppings in Headgate 1 North separating the return from the worked-out area. This plan depicted the HG 22 return air course, directed outby in the North Glory Mains and through Panel 1 crossover to Tailgate 1 North. At that time, the conveyor belt from the Panel 2 crossover was dumping on the longwall conveyor belt. The longwall intake expanded to two entries inby the Panel 2 crossover conveyor belt. Inby the longwall face, the No. 3 entry became common with the air that ventilated the worked-out area of the longwall. The plan established the location of air pumps and stated that water was not roofed to impede ventilation or travel. The plan also depicted a regulator to course intake belt air into the Panel 1 crossover return. This was intended to reverse the belt air direction away from the









136

longwall face. A continuous mining section (MMU 040-0) was depicted mining rooms off the Panel 1 crossover.  B6-A7, approved December 23, 2009. This plan was approved following a failed attempt to implement the B6-A13 plan, approved December 18, 2009, to reverse the direction of the air in the longwall belt entry. This plan depicted the longwall belt air splitting near crosscut 25, with air travelling to the longwall face and outby. B6-A14, approved January 5, 2010. This plan depicted the mining of pillars to install a belt drive to enable the HG 22 belt to transfer coal onto the 7 North conveyor belt. B6-A16, approved January 20, 2010. This plan depicted the reversal of the HG 22 intake to bring intake air around North Jarrells and West Jarrells Mains to HG 22 and direct the air to Headgate 1 North. B6-A15, approved January 22, 2010. This plan depicted new projections shown for the development of TG 22. The route of the HG 22 return changed to the Panel 2 crossover. The HG 22 intake route was changed to North Glory Mains. At this point, the intake air course split and went to HG 22 and TG 22, returned from HG 22 and TG 22, then joined and split again, with return air going inby at Headgate 1 North and outby in Headgate 1 North to the Panel 1 crossover, and out the isolated return to Bandytown fan. The TG 22 conveyor belt is depicted dumping coal on the Panel 2 crossover conveyor belt, which then dumped onto the HG 22 conveyor belt. Mining on TG 22 began about March 2, 2010. B6-A25, approved March 11, 2010. This revision was submitted in response to a closure order, issued on March 9, 2010 for not following the plan approved for the longwall. The longwall tailgate air was travelling in the wrong direction. The plan depicted ventilation controls to ensure previously approved airflow direction. B6-A26, approved March 22, 2010. This revision depicted a revised, typical longwall face sketch to be utilized after the longwall had passed the Panel 2 crossover. The face sketch showed the longwall belt air direction going outby and noted that the stoppings separating the travelable return from the longwall gob air would be kept intact.











Disapproved Revisions to the Ventilation Plan and Map There were 13 revisions to the ventilation plan and map that were disapproved, five revisions to the plan and map pending approval and one which was withdrawn. On November 20, 2009, MSHA disapproved a revision to the plan that proposed to dump

137

belt air from the longwall into the return after the Panel 1 crossover was cut through and completed. It also proposed to dump intake air into the longwall belt air course at crosscut 13. MSHA disapproved this proposal because the company was proposing a point-feed at crosscut 13, without addressing the requirements of 30 CFR §§ 75.350(c) and (d). On December 4, 2009 a proposed revision to the map was disapproved. This revision would have modified ventilation controls, so pillars could be mined to install a new longwall belt was disapproved because of deficiencies on the submitted map, and due to the potential for return air to contaminate the belt air course. On the same day, MSHA disapproved another revision to the map. This revision proposed to reroute the return off the HG 22 section, down the left side of North Glory Mains, crossing overcasts on Headgate 1 North and up the Tailgate 1 North isolated return (not a part of the longwall ventilation air courses); change the No. 3 entry of the Headgate 1 North to a return air course common with the worked out area inby the location of the longwall; convert the No. 3 entry of Headgate 1 North to an additional intake air course common with the existing primary escapeway outby the longwall face; and revised face sketches for both longwall gate road development and the longwall face. MSHA disapproved this proposal because of deficiencies on the map, including ventilation controls that conflict with plan revisions approved previously (September 4, 2009, October 29, 2009, and November 13, 2009), roof falls that impeded travel and eliminated the potential for compliance with 30 CFR § 75.384 for the second longwall panel were not shown, nor addressed; water accumulations within the active areas and within adjacent areas were not shown; a means for compliance with § 75.334(c) was not provided, actual air readings were not provided (production had been ongoing since September 2009); belt air from the development section was shown to be ventilating the longwall face; and belt air from the No. 1 entry of the Headgate 1 North did not meet the requirements of the newly promulgated regulation (December 2008). In addition the submittal did not clarify how the return stopping line shown on the longwall face sketch was to be traveled or maintained. The submittal lacked adequate details addressing whether the air courses were to become common or if the return stopping line was to be reconstructed. The submittal also did not indicate whether the measuring points (MP) shown on the face sketch must be checked for proper air direction. The gate road development face sketch (3-entry) contained a statement, “number of entries may vary provided the ventilation scheme does not change,” which was inappropriate for the projections and system shown on the attached maps in the disapproval letter. On December 9, 2009, MSHA disapproved a revision to the map that proposed to route the travelable return air course from the active HG 22 section into a common entry with the section mining rooms off of the Panel No. 1 crossover (MMU 040-0); make the No. 3 headgate entry a common intake air course with the existing primary escapeway; provide dewatering information; and project a future gateroad. MSHA disapproved this proposal because, among other deficiencies, it did not indicate that an isolated, tailgate

138

entry would be available or re-established for the second longwall panel, and statements with the ventilation scheme provided did not comply with the existing base plan, and ignored the requirements of 30 CFR §§§ 75.334, 75.384, and 75.364. The December 9, 2009 disapproval letter also addressed the company’s request that the August 6, 2009 approval be honored with respect to ventilation with belt air. The disapproval letter reminded the company that a request was made to the company by D4, for a ventilation revision subsequent to new belt air regulations on August 6, 2009, and the current longwall plan was approved to allow additional time to develop and submit a plan. As of the December 9, 2009 disapproval letter, this request was not answered. The disapproval letter further reminded the company that an additional request was sent on November 20, 2009, which also had not been addressed, and subsequently, another written notice was provided on December 4, 2009, which also resulted in no additional information provided to justify the continued use of belt air. In all the company was provided with a verbal request on August 6, 2009, and written requests on November 20, 2009 and December 4, 2009, in addition to the request made in the December 9, 2009 disapproval. In each case the company failed to submit justification for use of belt air on the longwall face.

Methane/Dust Control Section of the Ventilation Plan
The ventilation plan contained a general dust control section for the mine that addressed the use of water to control dust along conveyor belts, transfer points and haulageways. It also addressed the use of ventilation to course dust to the return, and stated that 3M brand dust and mist respirators would be available upon request. The approved ventilation plan for each MMU within the mine had an approved methane and dust control plan that was site-specific. The ventilation plan also addressed the belt lines and specifically identified the Designated Areas (DAs), their sampling status, and the methods of dust control to be used at each location. The Designated Area (DA) methane and dust control plan, part of the approved ventilation plan for the belt lines was approved January 22, 2010, and contained details regarding the use of water to control respirable dust and methane along the belt lines at each DA specified in the approved plan. The plan specified the location and sampling status at each DA and how respirable dust would be controlled. Provisions of the approved ventilation plan for the control of methane and dust on the longwall are discussed below. Additional information on mechanized mining units utilized in continuous miner sections MMU 0400, MMU 029-0, and MMU 062-0 is contained in Appendix AE.

139

MMU 050-0 (Longwall Shearer) Plan Requirements The approved methane and dust control plan had the following ventilation requirements:
Volume of Air at Intake to Longwall Required Velocity at Shield #9 Required Velocity at Shield #160

40,000 cfm 400 LFM 250 LFM

An addendum on a map later reduced the minimum volume of air in the intake to the longwall to 30,000 cfm. The approved methane and dust control plan had the following water spray requirements at the shearer:
Minimum Operating Pressure at the Spray Block Type of Water Spray Total Number of Sprays on the Shearer Sprays at Headgate Drum Sprays at Headgate Ranging Arm Sprays at 1st Headgate Body Block Sprays at 2nd Headgate Body Block Sprays at Tailgate Drum Sprays at Tailgate Ranging Arm Sprays at 1st Tailgate Body Block Sprays at 2nd Tailgate Body Block Sprays at Tailgate Rack Spray

90 psi Conflow Staplelock 650 2801CC or equivalent 109 43 3 2 6 43 3 2 6 1

140

The approved methane and dust control plan had the following water spray requirements at the stage loader and crusher:
Minimum Operating Pressure at the Spray Block Type of Water Spray Total Number of Sprays on the Stageloader / Crusher Sprays at Headgate Motor Sprays at Crusher Intake Sprays at Crusher Exit Sprays at Crusher Sprays at Stageloader Exit

60 psi Unspecified 14 3 3 3 3 2

The approved plan contained a schematic that showed the typical longwall face ventilation, and contained the following safety precautions and can be found in Appendix AF.

141

Water Spray Configuration in Use as Reported by Massey Energy On 12-3-2010 investigators from Massey Energy reported that the following configuration was in use on the longwall:
Type of Water Spray Operating Pressure at the Spray Block Total Number of Sprays on the Shearer 125 psi 139 Flow Technologies 791C Staplelock Spray 3/32" orifice Full Cone Flow Technologies 791C Staplelock Spray 3/32" orifice Full Cone Flow Technologies 791C Staplelock Spray 3/32" orifice Full Cone BD-5 Brass Hollow Cone Spray BD-5 Brass Hollow Cone Spray Flow Technologies 791C Staplelock Spray 3/32" orifice Full Cone Flow Technologies 791C Staplelock Spray 3/32" orifice Full Cone Flow Technologies 791C Staplelock Spray 3/32" orifice Full Cone BD-5 Brass Hollow Cone Spray BD-5 Brass Hollow Cone Spray BD-5 Brass Hollow Cone Spray

Sprays at Headgate Drum

43

Sprays at Headgate Ranging Arm

10

Sprays at 1st Headgate Body Block

3

Sprays at 2nd Headgate Body Block

10

Headgate Pan Sprays

3

Sprays at Tailgate Drum

43

Sprays at Tailgate Ranging Arm

10

Sprays at 1st Tailgate Body Block

3

Sprays at 2nd Tailgate Body Block

10

Sprays at Tailgate Rack Spray

1

Tailgate Pan Sprays

3

This information was collected in preparation for the water test at the shearer on December 20, 2010.

142

Water Test – Compliance with the Ventilation Plan Tables 8 and 9 show the results of the water spray test that was conducted on December 20, 2010. Table 8 shows the number, type and conditions of the sprays on the longwall shearer, while Table 9 shows the water pressures that were measured at certain spray locations.

143

Table 8. Number, Type and Conditions of the Sprays found on the UBB Longwall Shearer Type of Water Spray Total Number of Sprays on the Shearer 157 Various Flow Technologies 791C Staplelock Spray 3/32" orifice Various Flow Technologies 791C Staplelock Spray 3/32" orifice Various Flow Technologies 791C Staplelock Spray 3/32" orifice BD-5 Brass Hollow Cone Spray BD-5 Brass Hollow Cone Spray BD-5 Brass Hollow Cone Spray Various Flow Technologies 791C Staplelock Spray 3/32" orifice Various Flow Technologies 791C Staplelock Spray 3/32" orifice Various Flow Technologies 791C Staplelock Spray 3/32" orifice BD-5 Brass Hollow Cone Spray BD-5 Brass Hollow Cone Spray BD-5 Brass Hollow Cone Spray 6 clogged Condition of Sprays

Sprays at Headgate Drum

45

9 clogged

Sprays at Headgate Ranging Arm

10

6 clogged 1 missing inlet insert

Sprays at 1st Headgate Body Block

3

Sprays at 2nd Headgate Body Block Headgate Pan Sprays

10

8 clogged

4

2 clogged

Headgate Rack Sprays

3

Sprays at Tailgate Drum

45

15 clogged 9 missing inlet inserts 7 missing (open port on shearer) 7 clogged 4 missing inlet insert 1 hollow cone insert

Sprays at Tailgate Ranging Arm

10

Sprays at 1st Tailgate Body Block

3

Block is missing open 1/2" hose discharging

Sprays at 2nd Tailgate Body Block

10

4 clogged

Sprays at Tailgate Rack Spray

6

Tailgate Pan Sprays

8

144

Table 9. Water Pressures Measured on the UBB Longwall Shearer Water Test Data from 12-20-2010 Pressure Gauge at Spray Position #6 on Tailgate Drum PSI on Tailgate Drum 0 0 0 0 0 Pressure Gauge at Spray Position #14 on Tailgate Drum PSI on Tailgate Drum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Pressure Gauge at Spray Position #14 on Tailgate Drum Six of the Seven Missing Sprays replaced on Tailgate Drum PSI on Tailgate Drum 58 95 100 100 120 Pressure Gauge at Spray Position #14 on Tailgate Drum Six Sprays for Previous Test are Removed Seven Clogged Sprays are Replaced PSI on Tailgate Drum 0 0 0 0 0

PSI coming into shearer 50 100 150 200 250

PSI coming into shearer 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450

PSI coming into shearer 100 200 300 400 450

PSI coming into shearer 100 200 300 400 450

145

Difference in Water Nozzles Used by the Operator on the Shearer The BD-5 sprays as well as the hollow cone and jet Staplelock sprays were not approved for use on the shearer. The operator used a FT 791C Staplelock drum spray with a full cone pattern and a 3/32” orifice (although several 1/16” orifice sprays were found). The approved methane and dust control plan required a Conflow 650 2801 CC or equivalent (this is a full cone spray with a 1/16” orifice). There are differences in the inlet for these full cone sprays. The inlet pieces for the 2801 CC and 2801 DC are identical. Table 10 summarizes the differences between the spray inlets made by the manufacturers. This information was obtained from the respective manufacturers during interviews and from design drawings.
Table 10. Summary of Differences between Spray Inlets Manufactured by Flow Technologies and Conflow.

FT Middle Hole Diameter Angled Side Holes Diameter Angle of Side Holes 0.0393” 0.0468” 67º

Conflow 0.032” 0.078” 35º

% Difference 20.5% 50% 62.7%

The larger middle hole caused a much courser water droplet to be discharged from the Flow Technologies spray which made it less efficient for dust suppression. In addition, the 1/16” full cone Staplelock spray had a 30º spray angle at the outlet orifice, while the 3/32” full cone Staplelock spray had a 45º spray angle at the outlet orifice. This caused the 3/32” spray to have a greater overspray that contributed to turbulence around the shearer and potentially pushed dust into the walkway. The 3/32” full cone spray had a larger water droplet size which made it less likely to wet the surface being cut adequately and collect dust out of the air. A more in-depth discussion on the specifications of the water sprays can be found in Appendix AG. Shield Tips The ventilation plan required water sprays (does not specify a type) on the underside of the shield tips every 20 shields that were manually activated as the longwall passed. The plan did not specify the type of water sprays, shield numbers where sprays were located or minimum operating pressure, and did not provide sufficient technical information about the water sprays. MSHA investigators found that these sprays were brass hollow cone sprays and that many of these sprays were damaged or missing.

146

Stageloader/Crusher MSHA investigators found both Staplelock sprays and brass hollow cone sprays in use in the stage loader. The plan did not specify a spray type at this location and only specified a minimum psi (60). UBB Clean-up Program UBB’s clean-up program for coal dust accumulations pursuant to 30 CFR § 75.400-2 consisted of only three items:    Load cut of coal; Bolt cut of coal; Clean and dust cut of coal; Rock dust within 40’ of face, and; Equipment cleaned on weekly preventative maintenance program and as needed.

The plan does not address several significant issues that would be considered as standard inclusions in most clean-up plans, such as clean-up of section roadway spillage, spillage at the feeder, general housekeeping around the section power center, clean-up and dusting along belt conveyer systems and entries, and rib sloughage after initial mining, and trash collection and disposal.

Lung Disease from Coal Mine ventilation and water sprays are intended both to control explosion potential and to reduce the risk of lung diseases from respirable coal dust, commonly known as Black Lung. Black lung refers to a number of lung diseases such as coal workers’ pneumoconiosis (CWP), emphysema, and chronic bronchitis, caused by inhalation of coal mine dust. The risk of developing the disease depends on the quantity—the intensity and duration—of dust inhaled. When the Mine Act was originally passed in 1969, the U.S. Congress established standards to reduce dust exposure in an effort to eliminate black lung. The State of West Virginia, Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Chief Medical Examiner performed autopsies on all 29 victims. The Medical Examiner indicated that most of the victims had evidence of varying degrees of black lung in the form of CWP, emphysema, and fibrosis. A number of these miners had a substantial amount or all of their experience at UBB.

147

NIOSH research has determined that coal miners continue to be at risk of disease when the current dust limit is followed. Nonetheless, the UBB lung autopsy findings are very troubling. The incidence of disease found in these miners clearly demonstrates that dust control practices at UBB and other mines where these miners worked did not provide adequate protection against black lung.

Roof Control Plan
The roof control plan in effect at the time of the accident was dated October 21, 2009, received by D4 on October 27, 2009, and was approved on December 23, 2009. The portion of the plan outlining the required support for Headgate 1 North and Tailgate 1 North is included in Appendix AH. The operator failed to design for the extensive occurrence of multiple seam mining conditions, overburden depths exceeding 1,100 feet, and floor heave during development of the 1 North Panel gateroads. The operator did not include pillar design or stability analyses in the roof control plan despite the presence of extensive overlying workings in the reserve area and widespread falls of ground that occurred after mining beneath Powellton seam gateroads. If a stability analysis had been conducted, the Analysis of Multiple Seam Stability (AMSS) program would have indicated that the multiple seam interactions were expected to generate degraded ground conditions and therefore, supplemental support would be required. The operator did not consider the methane outbursts in 2003 and 2004 nor did they implement the precautions discussed with Technical Support at two different meetings in 2004, as described previously in the “Outburst History at UBB” section. These measures, as previously presented, included the construction of a geologic hazard map to predict possible outburst areas, and the related drilling of degasification holes in the identified target areas to release gas prior to mining. During discussion with the mine’s senior engineer, Technical Support indicated that a zone of geological weakness appeared to extend southeast through the 2003 and 2004 outburst locations, and that it would be prudent to anticipate encountering a similar event on the next subsequent longwall panel. The mine map indicates that the panel in question was stopped short where it intersected the trend indicated by Technical Support, suggesting that mine management might have been aware of the element of predictability of outbursts in this reserve. However, there appears to have been no attempt to alter the stop position of the 1 North Panel, which mined into the northwestern extension of the projected zone. Technical Support recommended additional precautions in 2004, during a meeting with company officials and CMS&H District 4 personnel, pertaining to the need for increased ventilation on the longwall face and in the longwall bleeder. Those recommendations were not heeded, since the longwall face quantities were actually decreased on the 1 North Panel compared to the previous district where the outbursts occurred. Pages 2-3 of the approved roof control plan state that tailgate pillars will be designed with 80-foot crosscut centers and that pillars on development and retreat sections will be designed in accordance with the latest edition of Analysis of Retreat Mining Pillar

148

Stability (ARMPS). The ARMPS program was not an appropriate tool to evaluate the stability of current or future gateroads, which should be evaluated using the Analysis of Longwall Pillar Stability (ALPS) program. In addition, PCC should have used AMSS due to the presence of overlying mine workings and the possibility of multiple seam stress interactions to evaluate gateroad pillar stability. More details with respect to stability analyses are included in Appendix AI. Roof control issues in Headgate and Tailgate 1 North are listed below. Headgate 1 North The headgate was developed as a three-entry gateroad, beginning in November 2008, utilizing 100-foot crosscut centers, with 95-foot centers from the No. 1 to No. 2 Entry, and 105-foot centers from the No. 2 to No. 3 Entry. Prior to this, the development had begun from the North Glory Mains as a 5-entry section in July 2008. The 1 North Panel was the first to be developed beneath Powellton seam longwalls since May 2005, at the end of the previous district when Panel 20 crossed diagonally beneath a 500-foot wide longwall panel. Maximum overburden, based on comparison with structure contours for the Eagle seam provided by the company and a standard USGS topographic map, is 1,290 feet. Headgate 1 North passes beneath several gateroads in the Powellton seam, located 170 feet above. This represents a gob/solid boundary between crosscuts 60-65, with gateroads between mined-out longwall panels, interpreted to represent remnant pillars farther west. For purposes of AMSS analyses, the 4-entry gateroads in the Powellton seam are treated as a single barrier, the width of which is measured to the outside ribs of the outside pillars, a distance of 160 feet. A long barrier between adjacent room-and-pillar workings may represent a remnant pillar configuration near crosscut 45, particularly if the floor has been softened in the Powellton seam or if pillar extraction has been performed. An AMSS analysis for Headgate 1 North, dated December 14, 2009, was conducted by D4 personnel following deterioration of the headgate. The analysis indicated that the Pillar Stability Factor for tailgate loading essentially met the NIOSH recommended value of 1.13, utilizing a gob/solid boundary beneath the Powellton seam longwall panels and assuming 990 feet of overburden. The MSHA AI Team reviewed the analysis and conducted its own analysis for purposes of comparison. Based on field visits to the Powellton seam and the Eagle seam in this area, the MSHA AI Team analysis used different values for seam height than indicated in the D4 analysis. The D4 analysis appears to address the vicinity of crosscut 60-65, beneath the gob/solid boundary represented by a longwall in the overlying Powellton seam. Based on the D4 analysis seam height of five feet, the design of Headgate 1 North appears to meet the NIOSH recommended value of 1.13. However, field experience indicates that a more realistic value of seam height is seven feet, which substantially reduces the Pillar Stability Factor to 0.82 for tailgate loading conditions and no longer meets the NIOSH recommended value. MSHA’s analysis indicates that for the gateroad design to meet the NIOSH recommended Pillar Stability Factor of 1.13, the pillars would have to be increased to

149

125-foot crosscut and entry centers, compared to the current 100-foot crosscut and 95to 105-foot entry centers. Although the gateroads were subjected only to headgate loading conditions, an AMSS analysis conducted by MSHA indicates that it should have been apparent that the gateroad design was not robust enough to meet the recommended stability factors beneath the deepest overburden in combination with Powellton gateroad crossings. MSHA represented the Powellton gateroad crossings as remnant pillars 160 feet wide, surrounded by adjacent longwall gob 620 feet in width at 1,290 feet of overburden. This resulted in Pillar Stability Factors under headgate loading conditions of only 0.93 (0.52 for tailgate loading conditions). This does not meet the NIOSH recommended value of 1.13, and generates a “condition yellow” warning (A major interaction should be considered likely, unless a pattern of supplemental roof support, such as cable bolts or equivalent is installed; rib instability is also likely) for development, and a “condition red” warning (A major interaction should be considered likely, even if a pattern of supplemental roof support is installed; it may be desirable to avoid the area entirely) for tailgate loading. In the vicinity of crosscut 45, Headgate 1 North passed beneath an 80foot barrier between two room-and-pillar sections, at 1,260 feet of overburden. The AMSS calculated Pillar Stability Factor for the headgate is only 0.93, following the interpretation that the pillars in the Powellton seam are no longer carrying load, either due to floor softening from water, or undersized pillars that have crushed out, or were retreat mined. The value of 0.93 does not meet the NIOSH recommended value of 1.13. Inspector notes and witness testimony established that a massive water inundation occurred on the 1 North Panel on November 16, 2009 and forced the panel to be shut down for nearly two weeks while water was pumped out. Based on review of mine maps, the longwall was between Headgate 1 North crosscuts 52-61 during that period, with the face located at crosscut 55 in mid-November. This area is significant in that it occurs beneath the transition in the overlying Powellton seam from a series of longwall panels to room-and-pillar workings, separated by a 220-foot wide barrier. At best, the transition represents a gob/solid boundary and, if the room-and-pillar workings were retreat mined or if mine floor softening prevented pillar remnants from carrying any load, at worst it represents a wide barrier between two gobs. Overburden in this area is up to 1,180 feet. Thus, it is plausible that differential subsidence above the 1 North Panel occurred beneath the barrier, causing joints or fractures to open sufficiently to allow water and air communication between the Eagle and Powellton seams. Notations in the longwall production report indicate that a roof fall, 10 feet high and 16 feet wide, occurred in the headgate entry itself, extending from shield 1 outby to the stage loader, on December 4, 2009, when the face was between crosscuts 51-52 beneath the same gob/solid transition zone. This roof fall was not reported until December 5, 2009 and included inaccurate information. MSHA was unable to evaluate the roof fall because the longwall had advanced and the area was unsafe at the time MSHA was notified. The roof fall was reported to MSHA as falling out between the bolts. Witness testimony also indicated that floor heave had been encountered during development of the Headgate 1 North. Although the ARMPS Pillar Stability Factor exceeded the value

150

recommended by NIOSH for development loading conditions, AMSS predicted a “condition yellow” warning (“A major interaction should be considered likely, unless a pattern of supplemental roof support, such as cable bolts or equivalent, is installed; rib instability is also likely”). Subsequent longwall mining validated the predicted AMSS results when significant floor heave and rib sloughing damaged ventilation controls, and ground conditions became unsuitable for use as a tailgate to the next planned longwall panel. At the time of the underground investigation, the headgate had degraded to the point that it was considered inaccessible. Tailgate 1 North Tailgate 1 North was developed using seven entries with 100-foot crosscut and 80-foot entry center spacing, resulting in 80 x 60-foot rectangular pillars. It should be noted that because the 1 North Panel was the first panel in the new longwall district, the tailgate would never be subjected to actual tailgate loading, and instead would be subjected to only headgate loading conditions. However, according to witness testimony and review of the 2008 Annual Ventilation Map, dated January 15, 2009, what became the Tailgate 1 North Panel was developed originally as a 7-entry submains configuration, a nonstandard gateroad design. Mine management subsequently elected to use this configuration as a longwall tailgate when the longwall equipment was forced to return earlier than expected from the Castle Mine after encountering adverse geological conditions. The 7-entry submains configuration began development from the North Glory Mains in January 2008 and continued until October 2008 when the two left-hand entries were dropped. The development continued as a 5-entry submains configuration by December 2008. Stability analysis using AMSS indicates that beneath the remnant pillar configuration of overlying Powellton seam gateroads flanked by 620-foot wide longwall gobs and at depths approaching 1,200 feet, such as was encountered during the November 2009 water inundation, the 5-entry Tailgate 1 North is characterized by a Pillar Stability Factor of only 0.95, which does not meet the NIOSH recommended value of 1.13. At the longwall face position at the time of the explosion, the Pillar Stability Factor of 1.11 was slightly less than the recommended value of 1.13 for the tailgate beneath 970 feet of overburden and a remnant pillar configuration in the overlying Powellton seam. If Tailgate 1 North had been used as a submains and not been subjected to longwall abutment stresses, the Pillar Stability Factors would have exceeded the values recommended by NIOSH, even when subjected to the worst combination of overburden depth and multiple seam interaction. However, underground observations by MSHA indicated that extensive floor heave and roof degradation occurred in the 5-entry and 7-entry portions of the Tailgate 1 North, both inby and outby the longwall face. This degradation became progressively worse over time. Floor heave extended from the tailgate entry itself across the section to the No. 1 Entry, the farthest away from longwall side abutment stress.

151

Emergency Response Plan (ERP)
The MINER Act of 2006 requires all mine operators to develop Emergency Response Plan (ERP)s. The ERP in effect on April 5, 2010 was approved on January 25, 2010. The ERP defines how the company will respond to mine emergencies that occur at the mine. The approved ERP addressed the following sections: Training The ERP required the operator to train miners within 30 days of approval on the provisions of the plan. The approved ERP provided scenarios in which miners on the section and outby areas were to be provide instruction on assembling, evacuation, and donning a SCSR. Mine Communication and Tracking Mine operators are required to provide a post-accident communication system between underground personnel and surface personnel, via a wireless two-way medium and an electronic tracking system, which permits surface personnel to determine the location of any persons trapped underground. Operators were required by the Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response (MINER) Act to submit plans by June 15, 2009 to address this requirement. If the fully wireless provisions cannot be adopted, the MINER Act requires that ERP’s set forth an alternative means of compliance that approximates, “as closely as possible, the degree of functional utility and safety protection provided by the wireless two-way medium and tracking system.” The operator submitted an ERP plan on October 9, 2009. This plan stated that a leaky feeder (radio) system was already installed in the mine to provide a wireless means of communication. It also stated that a tracking system was in the process of being installed. This plan was approved on January 25, 2009. According to witness testimony, installation of the leaky feeder communication system began on or about October 6, 2009. The system consisted of a coaxial distributed antenna system from which radio frequencies could be transmitted and received. Within range of the coaxial cable, miners could communicate with Ultra-High Frequency (UHF) radios. The tracking system utilized a “tracking tag” transmitter worn by miners, which sent signals to a “tag reader” repeater. When a tracking tag signal was received by the tag reader, it re-transmitted this signal across the leaky feeder system, back to the surface. Miners had to be in range of the tag reader before any signals were transmitted to the surface. The operator had a computer system that recorded when a miner’s tracking tag signal was received. When a miner left the tag reader’s coverage area, the last known time the miner was located or traveling by the tag reader could be seen in the computers’ tag reader database.

152

As of April 5, 2010, the communication and tracking system was partially completed. The leaky feeder system was approximately 1,250 feet from the face of the HG 22 section, and approximately 750 feet from the TG 22 section. The leaky feeder was installed in the belt entry to the stageloader, and in the track entry to the mule train of the longwall section. The last tag reader for the tracking system was installed at the Mother Drive of the longwall conveyor. This tag reader is approximately 2,700 feet from the longwall face, 3,700 feet from the face of TG 22, and 7,000 feet from the face of HG 22. After the explosion, mine rescue personnel could not determine the number of miners underground until 1:40 a.m. on April 6, when the correct number of miners underground were reported. The ERP requires PCC to manually track miners in locations where the tracking system is inoperative, but in this case, miners were not tracked properly, a sufficient number of tag readers were not installed, and existing tag readers were not maintained. 27 tag readers were inoperative prior to the explosion and no tag readers were working inby the South Portal area. In addition, not all employees who went into the mine were entered in the computer database, the tracking system did not have an identifiable number entered into the computer that matched the miner’s belt tag, and miners were going underground without taking an assigned tracking tag. Other deficiencies identified regarding the operator’s compliance with the communications and tracking requirements of the approved ERP included:    Leaky feeder amplifiers that were blowing fuses, causing the system to be ineffective for providing adequate post-accident communications; and, Several tag readers in the database that were not storing data properly. The readers were displaying data from a previously selected reader; and The difficulty of determining the number of miners using only the tracking system’s computer screen.

Testimony provided by mine employees indicates that the operator did not utilize sufficient resources on a daily basis to provide an adequate post-accident communication and tracking system. Two mine employees were assigned to install the system, while performing other duties. Appendix AJ describes in greater detail the communication and tracking system.

153

Mine Emergency Evacuation and Firefighting Program of Instruction (MEEFP) The Mine Emergency Evacuation and Firefighting Program (MEEFP) is designed to instruct miners in the procedures for mine emergencies that present an imminent danger to miners from fire, explosions, and inundations, and to evacuate all miners not required for a mine emergency response (Appendix AK). 30 CFR §§ 75.1502 and 75.1504 in an operator’s program require quarterly drills to be performed. Training drills dealing with emergencies including fires, water inundation, gas inundation, and explosions must be performed on a quarterly basis. The records for the five quarters preceding the explosion on April 5, 2010, show that no explosion drill training was conducted. MSHA reviewed the operator’s approved plans, records, and testimony, and identified deficiencies in the operator’s MEEFP. Emergency drill records provided by PCC for the five quarters preceding the explosion revealed that PCC failed to conduct emergency evacuation training in all required topics for all required miners. Atmospheric Monitoring System (AMS) The requirements for the AMS are set forth in 30 CFR §§ 75.350, 75.351, and 75.352. The company was required to fulfill these requirements because the mine utilized belt air to ventilate the longwall working section prior to the explosion. The operator’s AMS consisted of hardware and software capable of measuring atmospheric parameters, such as CO. Atmospheric measurements were transmitted from the underground mine to two surface computers. The system was primarily comprised of CO sensors along the belt conveyor system. These sensors were programmed to alarm if the CO level reached 10 ppm. An AMS operator was required to be stationed on the surface, where alarms would be registered. The AMS operator should have been trained in accordance with 30 CFR § 75.351(q), to understand the system, and it has the primary responsibility to respond to emergencies. MSHA reviewed the computer system’s event log data, mine maps, and CO monitoring devices in the explosion area. Appendix AJ provides details of the system design, layout, and event data. Damage to several CO sensors was observed along belt entries in the explosion area. The AMS cable was severed at crosscut 89 of the North Glory Mains. According to the computer system’s event log, the first occurrence of an alarm on April 5 was for a communication failure that occurred at 3:08:01 p.m. (computer system time). It was determined after the explosion that the computer’s clock was fast. Time drift analysis was conducted on the Pyott-Boone system resulting in unexplainable results. Details of these analyses are included in Appendix AJ. The AMS event log showed no signs of a fire underground prior to the explosion. According to the event log, approximately 26 minutes prior to the explosion, CO sensor 1.51 at Ellis 5 Head Drive alarmed and cleared quickly. This was considered a “nuisance alarm” and occurred commonly at this mine.

154

All CO sensors, belt monitors, and other system components inby crosscut 81 of the North Glory Mains went into communication failure immediately after the explosion. Several sensors, from crosscut 81 outby, went into alarm, starting at the 6 North belt starter CO sensor 1.95, and progressing outby to the 4 North CO sensor 1.82. These sensors were showing varying concentrations of CO for approximately 15 minutes after the explosion, until all the CO sensors in the North section of the mine stopped communicating. The communication failure was possibly due to either the loss of backup power from the uninterruptible power supplies, or a loss of data signal. Several deficiencies were discovered with PCC’s AMS compliance requirements during the investigation. These deficiencies include: 1. CO sensor spacing was not maintained at 1,000-foot intervals on the HG 22 section, as required. The conveyor belt was approximately 3,750 feet in length. There was only one sensor provided between the HG 22 head drive sensor 1.103 and the section CO sensor 1.53. 2. The CO sensor map was not up-to-date. Sensors were not always shown on the map, and some were shown at incorrect locations. Directions of air flow were shown in the wrong direction compared to other mine maps. 3. AMS operators did not take the correct actions when alarms were received on the surface. Operators failed to have miners removed from underground on three different occasions, when two consecutive alarms occurred. 4. AMS operators did not always record actions taken to correct system malfunctions or failures. 5. Many of the CO sensors were not being calibrated every 31 days. PCC did not indicate that each sensor was being calibrated in the handwritten record book, but instead would indicate that a particular belt’s CO sensors were calibrated. The AMS computer’s data showed that PCC failed to calibrate some of the CO sensors along belt flights. During the last required 31-day calibration, PCC recorded that the 4 North and 5 North conveyor belts’ CO sensors were calibrated. In contrast, the computer log showed that six CO sensors were not calibrated on these two conveyor belts. 6. Not all of the AMS operators at the mine were trained adequately. 7. According to the event log, many nuisance alarms were not being addressed by PCC. 8. CO sensors located at the 6 North drive and the 5 North tailpiece were not positioned correctly. 155

Refuge Alternatives Three refuge alternatives were located in the northern portion of the mine (see Appendix H). These three units were Strata Portable Fresh Air Bay units that included inflatable tents. Although the mine rescue efforts after the explosion were, in part, based on the hope that survivors had managed to reach these refuge alternatives and utilize the life-support functions of the units, none of the refuge alternatives were deployed. Personnel from A&CC, along with representatives from WVOMHST, GIIP and PCC, inspected these refuge chambers on March 31, 2011. All three units were successfully deployed and appeared to be fully functional. Details of this investigation and photos of the refuge alternatives are shown in Appendix AL. Self Contained Self Rescuers NIOSH Testing The Self Contained Self Rescuers (SCSR) used at UBB were manufactured by CSE, Model Number SR-100. NIOSH researchers in Bruceton, Pennsylvania tested a number of SCSRs which MSHA recovered from various underground areas of UBB during the rescue and recovery operations and the accident investigation. The testing included visual inspections, functional tests, and disassembly. Some of the units endured obvious damage from the explosion and, accordingly, were only visually inspected. All of the remaining SCSRs passed the functional tests except for one, PE39-a, which showed problems with its actuator bottle. Disassembly of this unit revealed a manufacturing defect near the “O” ring seal which allowed air to slip around the seal. NIOSH researchers determined that this condition did not diminish the unit’s ability to generate oxygen and that the unit would have functioned as required. Upon disassembly of the rest of the SCSRs, NIOSH researchers determined that the defect was anomalous and had only affected PE-39-a. In sum, all units performed as expected with no problems. Disassembly of the units also involved visual examinations of the units’ chemical beds. Based on these examinations, NIOSH researchers were able to determine which units had been used (i.e., whether oxygen had been consumed) as well as the extent to which the units had been used (i.e., how much oxygen had been consumed. (Appendix AM)

156

SCSRs apparently used by Blanchard and another top company official During its investigation, MSHA found six deployed SCSRs in various locations in the area affected by the explosion. MSHA later determined that Blanchard and another top company official most likely deployed and used these SCSRs during their exploration activities following the explosion. The investigation team was unable to determine the purpose or extent of their travels as both individuals exercised their rights under the Fifth Amendment and declined to be interviewed by MSHA.

ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
The Accident Investigation Team performed an analysis to determine the root cause and other significant factors that contributed to the accident. Eliminating these causes would have prevented the loss of 29 lives and the two significant injuries resulting from the explosion at UBB. Root Cause: Performance Coal Company (PCC) and Massey management engaged in practices and procedures that resulted in non-compliance with the Mine Act and regulations. PCC/Massey engaged in intimidation of miners; had a policy of illegal advance notice of MSHA inspections; did not comply with their own training plan; and intentionally failed to maintain required books recording hazards known to the company. PCC and Massey’s actions reflected a pervasive culture that valued production over safety creating a significant threat to the safety and health of UBB miners and contractors. Specifically:  Miners were routinely intimidated by PCC and Massey managers. They did not report safety problems at the mine because of fear of retaliation. They were also discouraged from listing hazards in the required examination records and correcting them. MSHA cannot be in every mine every day, and it relies on miners to report hazardous conditions in the mine. PCC and Massey’s actions deprived miners of the right to participate in their own safety. PCC and Massey established a practice of providing advance notice to those on the surface and underground when enforcement personnel were at the mine. Mine security personnel were instructed to notify the mine personnel when inspectors arrived on mine property. Mine personnel then informed persons underground that an inspector was present at the mine. This advance notice gave those underground the opportunity to alter conditions and fix hazards prior to the inspector’s arrival on the section. Advance notice resulted in limited rock dusting and ventilation changes in areas where inspectors were expected to travel. At time foremen shut down the working section before the inspector arrived. PCC and Massey kept two sets of books. They were aware of hazards and noted them in a production or maintenance record but in many instances failed to record them as required in the official examination book. Had these hazards





157

been recorded as required in the official book, inspectors and miners would have had the opportunity to understand and assess the hazards and ensure they were corrected. The investigation team also recognizes that other contributory factors, detailed below, played a significant role in the accident at UBB. These factors further reflect the disregard for miners’ safety and for the obligation to comply with the Mine Act and regulations. Had these resulting contributory factors not existed, the explosion would have been averted. The new mine operator will need to develop and implement a comprehensive corrective action plan to address all of these issues. Contributory Factor: PCC and Massey did not comply with the approved training plan; many miners did not receive training in hazard recognition, prevention of accidents, roof control, ventilation and other mining plans, and the training required in new work tasks. The lack of training was corroborated by the conditions in the mine, which led to the explosion. Contributory Factor: PCC and Massey did not perform adequate pre-shift, on-shift, and weekly examinations. Mine examiners did not identify numerous existing hazardous conditions throughout the mine. Several air courses had not been examined in the proper time frame or were not being examined at all. Examiners and section foremen did not energize their multi-gas detectors when required and the detectors often remained de-energized for extended periods of time. As a result, examiners could not and did not take adequate air quality measurements and often recorded false measurements in the examination records. In addition, examinations were not being consistently performed in the tailgate entry near the longwall face. Finally, on-shift respirable dust parameter checks were not being performed as required on the longwall section, and tests for methane were not consistently being made at 20 minute intervals on the longwall when the shearer was operating. Contributory Factor: PCC and Massey did not correct or post hazardous conditions immediately. Numerous reported hazardous conditions remained uncorrected. For example, belt examination records regularly indicated the need for cleaning and/or rock dusting on several consecutive shifts without any corrective actions being taken. Contributory Factor: PCC and Massey did not maintain the longwall shearer in safe operating condition. At least two worn bits were present on the face ring of the tail drum of the shearer. Both of these bits were clearly missing their carbide tips. Contributory Factor: PCC and Massey did not comply with the approved ventilation plan. The tailgate end drum of the longwall shearer was being operated with missing and clogged water sprays. Seven sprays were missing. As a result of the missing sprays, no pressure could be measured on the shearer tailgate drum. Contributory Factor: PCC and Massey did not maintain the volume and velocity of the air current at a sufficient volume and velocity to dilute, render harmless, and carry away

158

flammable, explosive, noxious, and harmful gases, dusts, smoke, and fumes, in the areas where persons worked or traveled. Contributory Factor: PCC and Massey did not comply with the approved roof control plan. The required supplemental roof support in the tailgate entry of the longwall was not installed. The failure to maintain the required tailgate support contributed to the inability to properly ventilate the explosive mixture of gas that accumulated in the tailgate. Contributory Factor: PCC and Massey did not rock dust the mine adequately. A mine dust survey was performed in the area affected by the explosion. Of the 1353 samples collected in the flame zone, 90.5 percent were non-compliant. Contributory Factor: PCC and Massey failed to ensure that accumulations of loose coal, coal dust, and float coal dust were cleaned up and removed from the mine. Corrective Actions: This mine has been under a Section 103(k) order since April 5, 2010, and has been the subject of an ongoing investigation. Massey Energy no longer owns and operates the mine at UBB. The new corporate owner must take the actions necessary to prevent unsafe and unhealthful conditions in its mines. MSHA will require the operator to take appropriate actions to address the root cause and each of the contributory factors. A commitment to health and safety must extend to all management members and corporate officials and be monitored and enforced at the highest levels. Those that instill and condone a dangerous culture must be held accountable for their actions or inactions.

159

CONCLUSION
The tragic deaths of 29 miners and serious injuries to two others at Upper Big Branch were entirely preventable. PCC and Massey routinely ignored obvious safety hazards and let conditions develop that allowed a small methane ignition to propagate into a massive coal dust explosion. MSHA's investigation revealed that the dangerous conditions existing at UBB were the result of PCC and Massey's practices and procedures that resulted in non-compliance with the Mine Act and regulations. This included intimidating miners to discourage them from reporting hazards or stopping production to make needed corrections; routinely giving advance notice of inspections; failing to train miners adequately; and not recording hazards in required examination books. Along with these practices, PCC and Massey failed to take other safety precautions that would have prevented the explosion from occurring. They did not conduct examinations properly, did not correct hazards, and did not maintain the longwall shearer in the correct working condition. In addition, PCC and Massey failed to comply with the approved ventilation and roof control plans, inadequately applied rock dust and did not clean up extensive amounts of loose coal, coal dust and float coal dust accumulations. MSHA concluded that the explosion at UBB originated as a methane ignition that led to a methane explosion and then transitioned into a massive coal dust explosion. It most likely started with an initial methane ignition caused by the cutting bits on the tail drum of the longwall shearer, which likely generated hot streaks on the sandstone roof or Hoor. The ·flame from the initial ignition then ignited an accumulation of methane. It encountered this methane because of PCC's poor roof control practices, which restricted the airway through the next inby crosscut, thereby allowing methane to accumulate. Once a localized methane explosion occurred, it encountered fuel in the form of coal dust and float coal dust beginning in the tailgate entries that were inadequately rock dusted. Examiners had allowed these and other accumulations at other locations in the mine to build up over days, weeks, and months. If float coal dust had not accumulated and the mine dust had contained sufficient quantities of incombustible content, the localized methane explosion would not have propagated any further. PCC did not apply adequate quantities of rock dust in the affected area; as a result, the coal dust and float coal dust allowed the localized methane explosion to propagate into a massive coal dust explosion that quickly spread throughout the northern section of the mine. The explosion res ted in the worst mining disaster in the United States in the last 40 years.

Kevin G. Stricklin Administrator for Coal Mine Safety and Health

Date

160

ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
A 103(k) order was issued to ensure the safety of all persons until an investigation was completed and the area and equipment deemed safe. Twelve violations that were deemed to have contributed to the accident were issued to PCC. Of this number, nine were designated as flagrant violations. Two additional contributory citations were issued to DSC. Other violations deemed not to have contributed to the cause or severity of the accident were cited separately and are not addressed in this report. Control Order No. 4642503 under Section 103(k) of the Mine Act An accident occurred at this operation on 4/5/2010 at approximately 3:27 p.m. This order is being issued, under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 Section 103(j), to prevent destruction of any evidence which would assist in investigating the cause or causes of the accident. It prohibits all activity in the underground areas of the mine except to rescue and recover miners. The initial order is modified to reflect that MSHA is now proceeding under the authority of Section 103(k) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977. This Section 103(k) Order is intended to protect the safety of all persons on-site, including those involved in rescue and recovery operations or investigation of the accident. The mine operator shall obtain prior approval from an Authorized Representative of the Secretary for all action to recover and/or restore operations in the affected area. Additionally, the mine operator is reminded of its existing obligations to prevent the destruction of evidence that would aid in investigating the cause or causes of the accident. 104(a) Citation No. 8431853, Section 103(a) of the Mine Act, S&S, Reckless Disregard Section 103(a) of the Mine Act states that: "Authorized representatives of the Secretary… shall make frequent inspections and investigations in coal or other mines each year…" and that "In carrying out the requirements of this subsection, no advance notice of an inspection shall be provided to any person…". The mine operator has failed to comply with this section of the Mine Act. Testimony given by both management and hourly employees during the accident investigation indicates that the mine had a regular practice of notifying persons underground that an inspector was present on the surface. Underground employees would regularly cease production to correct hazards prior to the possible arrival of the inspectors. This advance notice prevented MSHA inspectors from observing the actual conditions to which miners were being exposed. Unannounced inspections are a key part of MSHA's effort to identify unsafe and unhealthy conditions in mines. By providing advance notice of inspections, the mine operator has interfered with inspectors in their attempts to inspect the mine and has shown a reckless disregard for the health and safety of their miners.

161

This violation of the Mine Act contributed to the death of 29 miners in that MSHA was denied the opportunity to develop additional guidelines, discover hazards, and make inspections of the actual conditions at the mine. This citation is being issued to the following entities as a unitary operator: Performance Coal Company, Massey Coal Services, Inc., A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc., and Massey Energy Company. 104(d)(2) Order No. 8250014, 30 CFR §75.220(a)(1), S&S, High Negligence The operator failed to comply with the approved roof control plan, in the 1 North Panel tailgate entry. Page 19 of the plan stipulates that in longwall development entries of initial longwall panels, “the Tailgate Entry will have supplemental support in the form of two rows of 8’ (foot) cable bolts or posts installed between primary support. This supplemental support shall be maintained 1000 feet outby the longwall face at all times.” The operator failed to install the required supplemental supports in the tailgate entry adjacent to the 1 North longwall panel. The operator failed to install cable bolts and only installed one row of posts in the tailgate entry. Required tailgate support is significant because observations indicate that crosscut 49, (the first crosscut inby the face) had already caved prior to the face reaching crosscut 48, (the crosscut outby the face) as evidenced by observations of soot, coal dust and debris on the fall rubble. Roof failure in crosscut 49 restricted airflow from traveling inby from the face. The failure to maintain the required tailgate support contributed to the inability to properly ventilate the explosive mixture of gas accumulation in the tailgate and contributed to the explosion that occurred on 4-5-2010 that resulted in the deaths of 29 miners. The failure to maintain the required supports in the tailgate entry also prevented safe access for mine examiners from conducting required examinations in those entries. The failure to maintain the required supports in the tailgate entry also prevented examiners from conducting required examinations in those entries. The installation of one row of posts rather than the required two rows would have been very evident to weekly examiners, Longwall preshift and on-shift examiners and the Longwall Coordinator. Testimony revealed that examiners were instructed that one row of supports was sufficient in the tailgate entry. The operator has engaged in aggravated conduct constituting more than ordinary negligence. This is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory standard. This citation is being issued to the following entities as a unitary operator: Performance Coal Company, Massey Coal Services, Inc., A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc. and Massey Energy Company.

162

104(a) Citation No. 8227560, 30 CFR §75.321(a)(1), S&S, Moderate Negligence The operator has failed to maintain the volume and velocity of the air current in the areas where persons work or travel to dilute, render harmless, and carry away flammable, explosive, noxious, and harmful gases, dusts, smoke, and fumes. The air current at the Longwall tail (Tailgate 1 North, crosscut 48) was not sufficient to dilute, and render harmless, and carry away flammable, explosive, noxious and harmful gases, dusts, smoke, and fumes. An explosive mixture of gases was allowed to accumulate in the vicinity of the shearer which was located at the tailgate end of the longwall. An ignition of this mixture resulted in a mine explosion on 4/5/2010 and propagated throughout areas of the mine including the longwall, HG 22, and TG 22 sections. This explosion resulted in the deaths of 29 miners, disabling injuries to one miner, and serious injuries to another miner. In addition to the occurrence of the explosion, the following facts establish that the air current at the tailgate end of the longwall was inadequate: The mine has a history of methane incidents on prior longwall panels. These incidents put the operator on notice for methane hazards on the longwall face. These incidents include: - A methane ignition / explosion that occurred on 1/4/1997 at No. 2 West Longwall. - A methane outburst that occurred on 16 Longwall panel in July of 2003. - Another methane outburst occurred on 17 Longwall panel on 2/18/2004. These incidents all occurred in a fault zone and while mining with an overburden in the excess of 1,000 feet. The accident on 4/5/2010 occurred in this same fault zone. This mine was on a 103 (i) spot inspection due to the methane liberation. The operator failed to implement / follow the recommendations of MSHA’s geologist and Ventilation technical support group following the 2004 outburst. These recommendations included: - Increasing airflow along the longwall face (the plan at the time required a minimum of 60,000 cfm). - Degasification wells for the subsequent longwall panels in an effort to bleed of gas prior to encroachment of the longwall face. - Construct a hazard map that showed areas with 1,100 feet of overburden and less than 13 feet of interburden between the eagle and lover eagle seams. Additionally this map should show the projected structural zone identified in headgate 18, and overmined areas.

163

The operator’s failure to maintain a sufficient volume and velocity to dilute, render harmless, and carry away flammable, explosive, noxious, and harmful gases, dusts, smoke, and fumes contributed to the deaths of 29 miners. This citation is being issued to the following entities as a unitary operator: Performance Coal Company, Massey Coal Services, Inc., A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc., and Massey Energy Company.

104(d)(2) Order No. 8431838, 30 CFR §75.360, S&S, Reckless Disregard The operator has engaged in a practice of failing to conduct adequate preshift examinations in the north area of the mine where an explosion occurred on April 5, 2010 which resulted in 29 fatalities and serious injuries to two miners. The inadequate examinations occurred from 1.1.2010 up to the date of the explosion. The practice includes violations of the following subsections of 75.360: (a)(1) Miner testimony obtained during the accident investigation indicates that miners entered the mine prior to the completion of the preshift examinations. An agent of the operator, Jeremy Burghduff, failed to conduct a preshift examination prior to two miners on the pumping crew entering the work area for at least 19 shifts from 03.18.2010 through 04.05.2010. Testimony indicates that the two miners traveled with Mr. Burghduff while he conducted the preshift examination. In addition, data downloaded from Burghduff's Solaris multi-gas detector reveals that the detector had not been turned on from 03.18.2010 until after the mine explosion on 04.05.2010. With his detector turned off, Burghduff was unable to test for methane or oxygen deficiency as required. Another agent of the operator, John Skaggs, performed an inadequate preshift examination of the longwall on 4.4.2010 for the oncoming midnight maintenance shift. According to testimony, the examination consisted of examining the stage loader area. The examiner failed to examine the entire length of the longwall face, where miners were scheduled to and did work during the oncoming shift, and did not include the required air measurements. Testimony indicates that examiners routinely failed to examine the tailgate entry of the longwall section. (b) Over many shifts, several different examiners failed to adequately examine the areas along the travelways from the North Portal to/and including the three working sections: headgate 22, tailgate 22 and the longwall. The examiners failed to identify very obvious hazardous conditions throughout the examined areas. For example, accumulations of loose coal, coal dust, and float coal dust are present in the entries and crosscuts throughout these areas. Additionally, entry widths exceeded the required widths of the approved roof control plan in 16 locations. (c)(2) The operator regularly failed to accurately measure the air quantity in the intake entries at the intake end of the longwall immediately outby the face.

164

(g) Preshift exam records for headgate 22 (03.25.2010), tailgate 22 (03.22.2010) and the longwall (03.10.2010) were not verified by the person conducting the examinations. The operator recorded hazardous conditions in its internal production and maintenance reports while failing to record the same hazards in its preshift examination records. This practice prevented MSHA, WVMSH&T, miners, and oncoming foremen from knowing of hazardous conditions and taking preventative measures. In the alternative, the operator failed to comply with 30 C.F.R. 75.363(b). The failure to identify, record and correct hazards in one area of the mine can result in injury or loss of life in another part of the mine, due to the confined nature of the underground mining environment. The operator’s practice of failing to conduct adequate preshift examinations, as well as the operator’s practice of failing to conduct adequate weekly and on-shift examinations (as cited in 8431855 and 8227550), exposed miners to ongoing hazards. This practice of failing to conduct adequate preshift examinations and to identify and correct obvious hazardous conditions contributed to the explosion on April 5, 2010 and the resulting 29 deaths, disabling injuries to one miner, and serious injuries to another miner. The operator engaged in aggravated conduct constituting more than ordinary negligence. This violation is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory standard. This citation is being issued to the following entities as a unitary operator: Performance Coal Company, Massey Coal Services, Inc., A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc. and Massey Energy Company. 104(d)(2) Order No. 8227550, 30 CFR §75.362, S&S, Reckless Disregard The operator has engaged in a practice of failing to conduct adequate onshift examinations in the north area of the mine where an explosion occurred on April 5, 2010 which resulted in 29 fatalities and serious injuries to two miners. The inadequate examinations occurred from October, 2009 up to the date of the explosion. The practice includes violations of the following subsections of 75.362: (a)(1) The operator failed to identify obvious accumulations of loose coal, coal dust, and float coal dust that were present in various locations in the entries and crosscuts of the travelways for HG 22, TG 22, and Longwall sections and on the sections. These hazardous conditions existed over several shifts and should have been observed, recorded and corrected by examiners. (a)(2) The operator engaged in a practice of failing to conduct adequate onshift examinations of the longwall equipment within one hour of the shift change or before production began to ensure compliance with the respirable dust control parameters.

165

Numerous deficiencies on the longwall equipment existed as cited in Order No. 8227558 and Citation No. 8227552. (d) The operator had a practice of failing to test for methane at 20 minute intervals during the operation of the shearer. On the day of the explosion six (6) 20 minute tests for methane were not conducted. The failure to identify and correct hazards in one area of the mine can result in injury or loss of life in another part of the mine, due to the confined nature of the underground mining environment. The operator's practice of failing to conduct adequate onshift examinations, as well as the operator's practice of failing to conduct adequate preshift and weekly examinations, exposed miners to ongoing hazards. This practice of failing to conduct adequate onshift examinations and to identify and correct obvious hazardous conditions contributed to the explosion on April 5, 2010 and the resulting 29 deaths, disabling injuries to one miner, and serious injuries to another miner. The operator has engaged in aggravated conduct constituting more than ordinary negligence. This is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory standard. This citation is being issued to the following entities as a unitary operator: Performance Coal Company, Massey Coal Services, Inc., A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc., and Massey Energy Company. 104(d)(2) Order No. 4900578, 30 CFR §75.363(a), S&S, Reckless Disregard The operator failed to immediately correct or post with conspicuous "Danger" signs hazardous conditions observed and recorded during the on-shift examinations of the belt conveyor systems in the north area of the mine (the area affected by the explosion on 4.5.2010). From 03.01.2010 through 04.05.2010, the operator's on-shift examination records identified approximately 982 hazardous conditions. Of these hazardous conditions, approximately 937 were listed as accumulations of coal and/or lack of rock dusting. The preshift and onshift records do not indicate that the corrective actions required to address the listed accumulations were taken. Although some corrective actions were listed, most instances where cleaning and dusting was listed as being needed do not indicate that the required corrective actions were adequately performed. The operator’s failure to immediately correct these hazardous conditions contributed to the death of 29 miners, disabling injuries to one miner, and serious injuries to another miner. Witness statements indicated that the belts were in need of cleaning and additional rock dusting. Investigators observed accumulations of combustible materials in the form of loose and compacted coal throughout the area affected by the explosion. Laboratory Analysis of the rock dust spot survey conducted by MSHA in the affected area after the April 5, 2010 explosion indicated significant non-compliance. The

166

explosion propagated throughout this area where records show cleaning and rock dusting was needed but was not performed. The operator engaged in aggravated conduct constituting more than ordinary negligence. This violation is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory standard. This citation is being issued to the following entities as a unitary operator: Performance Coal Company, Massey Coal Services, Inc., A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc., and Massey Energy Company. 104(d)(2) Order No. 8431855, 30 CFR §75.364, S&S, Reckless Disregard The operator has engaged in a practice of failing to conduct adequate weekly examinations in the north area of the mine where an explosion occurred on April 5, 2010 which resulted in 29 fatalities. The inadequate weekly examinations occurred from January 1, 2010 up to the date of the explosion. Weekly examinations of this area conducted during this period failed to identify and correct obvious hazardous conditions, including accumulations of combustible materials, and failed to effectively evaluate the performance of the mine’s ventilation system. The practice includes violations of the following subsections of 75.364 that occurred between 01.01.2010 and 04.05.2010: Subsection 75.364(a) has been violated as follows: 1. Between 01.01.2010 through 04.05.2010, records show that the required weekly examinations of worked-out locations exceeded the required 7 days; 2. Evaluation Point (EP)-LW 1 (air entering Headgate 1 North to assure the headgate of the Longwall is ventilated) was last examined on 03.10.2010. An entry in the record for 03.16.2010 reflects that this EP is blocked with water and records do not indicate it was examined/or could be examined since that date; 3. Data downloaded from one examiner’s multi-gas detector indicates that the detector had not been turned on since 03.18.2010. Records indicate this examiner conducted numerous examinations at Bandytown fan, EP-LW 3 (where air exits Headgate 1 North), and EP-TG 1 (where air exits Tailgate 1 North) with his detector turned off; 4. There is no record of EP 65 (return of TG 22 entering Headgate 1 North) ever having been examined; 5. One of the five required air readings (#3 entry) for the EP-LW 2 (Tailgate 1 North) was never taken; 6. No air quality measurements were taken at MP A (intake side of Longwall at Headgate 1 North) and MP B (Longwall tail side of Tailgate 1 North); 7. Air Quantity measurements were not taken at Monitoring Point (MP) B since 03.20.2010. Subsection 75.364(b) has been violated as follows:

167

1. The intake split from the West Jarrells Mains to the return off HG 22, and the intake split traveling through old #2 section and crossover, located outby the Longwall, was not traveled; 2. The return split in the crossover between HG 22 and TG 22 was not traveled since 03.13.2010; 3. The intake split, #7 entry of Tailgate 1 North was not traveled since its plan approval on 03.11.2010. Subsection 75.364(c) has been violated as follows: 1. Air quantity measurements were not taken for 13 intake air splits; 2. Air quality and quantity measurements were not taken for five return air splits. Subsection 75.364(d) has been violated as follows: 1. The Operator has failed to immediately correct very obvious hazardous conditions that are present throughout ten air courses and two bleeders in the North area of the mine that existed prior to the mine explosion on 04.05.2010. Very obvious hazards of loose coal, coal dust, and float coal dust are present in numerous locations throughout the entries and crosscuts of the air courses that are required to be examined weekly. The explosion which occurred on 04.05.2010 propagated throughout these ten air courses and two bleeders. These areas that the explosion propagated through include intake and return air courses required to be traveled by the weekly examiner. This fire and explosion hazard was obvious to the most casual observer. 2. The Operator has failed to immediately correct areas where entry widths exceeded 21 feet for a distance of more than 5 feet, in 17 locations throughout various areas traveled by the weekly examiner. 3. Since 01.01.2010, hazardous conditions were listed in the weekly examination reports with no corrective action listed. Some of these same hazards were recorded for several consecutive weeks with no corrective action shown. For example, water accumulations in the longwall bleeders were recorded for eight consecutive weeks with no correction action noted. Subsection 75.364(f) has been violated as follows: The entry in the weekly examination record book on 03.16.2010 reflects that EP-LW1 was blocked by water and could not be examined. Although the entire mine could not be examined, persons continued to enter the mine and produce coal until the explosion on 04.05.2010. Subsection 75.364(h) has been violated as follows: The Operator failed to record hazardous conditions, their locations, corrective action taken, results and locations of air quality and quantity measurements at various times and various locations. The failure to identify and correct hazards in one area of the mine can result in injury or loss of life in another part of the mine, due to the confined nature of the underground mining environment. The operator’s practice of failing to conduct adequate weekly examinations, as well as the operator’s practice of failing to conduct adequate preshift

168

and on-shift examinations (as cited in 8431838 and 8227550), exposed miners to ongoing hazards. This practice of failing to conduct adequate weekly examinations and to identify and correct obvious hazardous conditions contributed to the explosion on April 5, 2010 and the resulting 29 deaths, disabling injuries to one miner, and serious injuries to another miner. The operator has engaged in aggravated conduct, constituting more than ordinary negligence. This is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory standard. This citation is being issued to the following entities as a unitary operator: Performance Coal Company, Massey Coal Services, Inc., A. T. Massey Coal Company, Inc., and Massey Energy Company. 104(d)(2) Order No. 8226115, 30 CFR §75.400, S&S, Reckless Disregard Loose coal, coal dust and float coal dust, was allowed to accumulate in active workings and on rock dusted surfaces. These accumulations of combustible materials existed throughout the following active workings inby survey spad station 19430: Old North Mains, Tailgate 1 North, Headgate 1 North, North Glory Mains, the Long Wall Face, Tail Gate 22 development section, Head Gate 22 development section, Jarrells Mains and the areas known as the Longwall cross over's. Accumulations ranged from a thin observable layer of float coal dust on belt structures, cribs and various other types of stationary equipment to as much as four feet deep in travelways. The accumulations extended up to the entire entry width and extended as much as 120 feet in length. Many of these accumulations were created during the initial development stages of the mining process. Observations of the cited accumulations are consistent with belt examination records and testimony provided by several miners. A mine explosion occurred on April 5, 2010 originating on the tailgate of the Longwall and propagating through these areas of the mine inby survey spad 19430. These accumulations of combustible material contributed to the deaths of 29 miners and the disabling injuries of one miner and the serious injuries to another. The cited accumulations were obvious, extensive and existed for an extended period of time. The conditions were evident to mine management due to the hundreds of weekly, preshift and onshift examinations that had been conducted by examiners and countersigned by upper management during the time the area was developed from March of 2005 to April 5, 2010. These conditions would be obvious to the most casual observer and would have been recorded by any prudent and diligent examiner. Based on the history of 75.400 violations and this mine being previously placed on a potential pattern of violations, the operator had been placed on notice that greater attention to compliance with 75.400 was needed. The lack of appropriate action to address this ongoing problem establishes that the operator has engaged in a practice of violating 75.400. This is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory standard.

169

This citation is being issued to the following entities as a unitary operator: Performance Coal Company, Massey Coal Services, Inc., A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc., and Massey Energy Company. 104(d)(2) Order No. 8226116, 30 CFR §75.403, S&S, Reckless Disregard The operator has failed to adequately apply and maintain rock dust in such quantities that the incombustible content of the combined coal dust, rock dust, and other dust are not less than 65 per centum in intake air courses or 80 per centum in return air courses. Following a mine explosion on 04.05.2010 a mine dust survey was conducted by MSHA to determine the incombustible content of the combined coal dust, rock dust, and other dust in the mine. These survey samples provided a depiction of the pre-explosion incombustible content in the affected areas of the mine. MSHA divided the underground workings into 22 separate sampling areas beginning at survey spad 22382 along the Ellis Track entry and survey spad 7301 along the North Mains and extending inby to the deepest accessible portions of the mine affected by the explosion. Areas 18, 20, 21 and 22 inby the Longwall face were not accessible due to adverse roof conditions. Sampling locations were designated on a mine map for each area. Those locations were spaced every 500 feet in areas outby crosscut 67 of Old North Mains and approximately every 100 feet in areas inby crosscut 67. Sampling on 100-foot centers has been shown to offset any dust transport that may have occurred during an explosion. MSHA identified 2,207 locations for band sampling. If an area was too wet or inaccessible due to hazardous conditions, MSHA did not take a sample. Of the 2,207 intended sampling locations, MSHA took samples at 1,803 locations because actual mine conditions dictated that 404 locations were either too wet or otherwise inaccessible for sampling. MSHA sent all 1,803 samples for analysis to determine their incombustible content. Of the 1803 samples collected 1412 of the samples were non-compliant (78.31 percent). Of the 22 sampling areas designated by MSHA, flame propagated through 12 of these areas (area 5 at crosscut 67 and extending inby, and areas 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 19). Flame propagation could not be determined in areas 18, 20, 21 and 22 due to inability to collect samples. The flame propagation through these areas directly contributed to the deaths of 29 miners. The results of the 1353 mine dust samples collected by MSHA within the area encompassed by flame propagation (determined by the extent of coking found in the dust samples collected) show that the operator failed to adequately apply and maintain rock dust on the top, floor, and ribs of this underground coal mine. Of the 1353 total samples collected from the flame propagation area, 1225 were non-compliant (90.5 percent). The failure by the operator to adequately rock dust these areas of the mine allowed a coal dust explosion to propagate, resulting in the deaths of 29 miners and injuries to others. The operator has engaged in aggravated conduct and more than ordinary negligence by failing to adequately rock dust and maintain the incombustible content in these areas of the underground coal mine to control dangerously volatile

170

accumulations of combustible material. This is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory standard. This order is being issued to the following entities as a unitary operator: Performance Coal Company, Massey Coal Services, Inc., A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc., and Massey Energy Company. 104(a) Citation No. 8227549, 30 CFR §75.1725(a), S&S, Moderate Negligence The operator has failed to maintain the JOY 7LS Longwall Shearer in safe operating condition. At least two worn bits were found on the outby bit ring on the drum. Both bits were clearly missing the carbide tip. These bits had noticeably large wear flats on them. An explosion occurred at this mine on 4/5/2010 that resulted in 29 fatalities. The most likely ignition source was the longwall shearer bits striking rock. Studies have shown that worn bits pose a significant ignition potential. This can occur when the steel shank of the bit strikes sandstone with a high quartz content and produces a hot molten streak. Studies have also shown that a well maintained tungsten carbide tip, when used with the proper attack and tip angles to prevent the steel shank from coming into contact with the sandstone, will greatly reduce the odds of a frictional ignition. Frictional heat from the worn bits striking rock is the most likely source of the ignition for the April 5, 2010 explosion. The failure to maintain the shearer in safe operating condition contributed to the deaths of 29 miners. This citation is being issued to the following entities as a unitary operator: Performance Coal Company, Massey Coal Services, Inc., A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc., and Massey Energy Company. 104(d)(2) Order No. 8256726, 30 CFR §48.3, S&S, Reckless Disregard The mine operator failed to comply with the approved training plan in effect at the mine prior to April 5, 2010. The approved training plan, dated March 29, 2007, required training to be provided in several training programs, including experienced miner training, task training, and annual refresher training. The operator’s failures included: 1). Approximately 112 miners either did not receive experienced miner training or received incomplete experienced miner training. 2). Approximately 42 miners did not receive task training before performing the task as mobile equipment operators or performing other new job tasks. 3). Approximately 21 miners did not receive annual refresher training.

171

4). Approximately 22 miners received experienced miner training from individuals who were not MSHA-approved instructors. Nine different individuals certified these miners’ training records despite not being MSHA-approved instructors. Company audits conducted in September 2009 and October 2009 identified many of these failures, which put the operator on notice of its compliance problems. As of April 5, 2010, the operator had failed to correct or address most of these failures. Due to the operator's failure to comply with the mine's approved training plan, many miners did not receive training in hazard recognition, prevention of accidents, and the mine’s roof control and ventilation plans (including the mine’s methane and dust control plan for the longwall water spray system). The operator also failed to provide task training to many of its examiners, its rock dusting crew, and several miners who operated and maintained the longwall shearer. The underground conditions at the mine, including the extensive accumulations of loose coal, coal dust, and float coal dust, the lack of adequate rock dusting, and the poor condition of the longwall shearer, were present in part because of the operator’s failure to provide adequate training on identifying and correcting these hazardous conditions. These conditions contributed to the deaths of 29 miners on April 5, 2010. This citation is being issued to the following entities as a unitary operator: Performance Coal Company, Massey Coal Services, Inc., A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc., and Massey Energy Company. 104(d)(2) Order No. 8227558, 30 CFR §75.370(a)(1), S&S, Reckless Disregard The mine operator failed to follow the approved ventilation plan in effect at the mine on April 5, 2010. The operator failed to comply with the methane and dust control plan portion of the approved ventilation plan approved on June 15, 2009 for the 050-0 MMU. The approved methane and dust control portion of the ventilation plan requires that the JOY 7LS Longwall shearer be equipped with 109 water sprays, with 43 water sprays on each drum. The plan further specified that these sprays operate at a minimum of 90 psi at each spray block. Evidence obtained during the investigation of an explosion accident revealed that the shearer was being operated with missing and clogged water sprays. Seven sprays on the tailgate drum were missing. As a result of the missing sprays, the pressure at the remaining sprays was significantly reduced below the 90 psi requirement. One function of the water sprays is to prevent a potential ignition source from frictional heat generated by the shearer bits striking rock. Such frictional heat from bits striking rock is the most likely source of the ignition for the April 5, 2010 explosion. The failure to comply with this plan requirement contributed to the deaths of 29 miners.

172

Operating the shearer with the missing sprays would have been obvious to casual observation. Testimony and company records indicate that operating the shearer with missing sprays was a practice at the mine. The operator has engaged in aggravated conduct constituting more than ordinary negligence. This is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory standard. Standard 75.370(a) (1) was cited 33 times in two years at mine 4608436 (33 to the operator, 0 to a contractor). This citation is being issued to the following entities as a unitary operator: Performance Coal Company, Massey Coal Services, Inc., A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc., and Massey Energy Company. 104(a) Citation No. 4900615, 30 CFR, §75.363(a), S&S, Moderate Negligence An employee of David Stanley Consultants LLC has failed to immediately correct or post with conspicuous "Danger" signs hazardous conditions observed and recorded during the examinations of the belt conveyor systems in the North area of the mine (the area of the mine affected by an explosion on 04.05.2010). From 03.05.2010 through 04.05.2010, David Stanley Consultants (YBV) employee William Campbell conducted 83 examinations along the conveyor belts affected by explosion. The record reflects that these conveyor belts needed rock dusting and/or cleaning. These hazardous conditions were almost never shown to be fully corrected or posted with conspicuous danger signs. David Stanley Consultants LCC's failure to immediately correct these hazardous conditions contributed to the death of 29 miners, disabling injuries to one miner, and serious injuries to another miner. Witness statements indicated that the belts were in need of cleaning and additional rock dusting. Investigators observed accumulations of combustible materials in the form of loose coal and compacted coal throughout the areas affected by the explosion. Laboratory Analysis of the rock dust spot survey conducted by MSHA in the affected areas after the April 5, 2010 explosion indicate significant non-compliance. The explosion propagated throughout areas where records show cleaning and rock dusting was needed but was not performed. This citation is being issued to the following entities as a unitary operator: Performance Coal Company, Massey Coal Services, Inc., A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc., and Massey Energy Company. 104(d)(1) Citation No. 8431839, 30 CFR, §75.360, S&S, High Negligence An employee of David Stanley Consultants LLC has failed to conduct adequate preshift examinations in the North area of the mine where an explosion occurred on April 5, 2010 which resulted in 29 fatalities and serious injuries to two miners. This employee of David Stanley Consultants performed inadequate preshift examinations for several months prior to the explosion.

173

The inadequate examinations include violations of the following subsections of 75.360: (b) Over many shifts, the employee of David Stanley Consultants failed to adequately examine the areas along the travelways from the Ellis Portal to the three working sections: headgate 22, tailgate 22, and the longwall. The examiner failed to identify very obvious hazardous conditions throughout the examined areas. For example, accumulation of loose coal, coal dust, and float coal dust were present in the entries and crosscuts throughout these areas. Additionally, entry widths exceeded the required widths of the approved roof control plan in at least 16 locations. (g) The examiner conducted preshift examinations on the tailgate 22 section, headgate 22 section, intake rooms off the North Mains and Glory Hole Mains, and travelways/track entries. For these locations, the examiner repeatedly failed to record the results of the required air quality checks. The failure to identify, record and correct hazards in one area of the mine can result in injury or loss of life in another part of the mine, due to the confined nature of the underground mining environment. The contractor’s failure to conduct adequate preshift examinations exposed miners to ongoing hazards. This failure to conduct adequate preshift examinations and to identify and correct obvious hazardous conditions contributed to the explosion on April 5, 2010 and the resulting 29 deaths, disabling injuries to one miner, and serious injuries to another miner. The contractor engaged in aggravated conduct constituting more than ordinary negligence. This violation is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory standard.

174

APPENDIX A LIST OF DECEASED AND INJURED MINERS

Appendix A
Deceased Miners Name Carl C. Acord Jason M. Atkins Christopher L. Bell, Sr. Gregory S. Brock Kenneth A. Chapman Robert E. Clark Charles T. Davis Cory T. Davis Michael L. Elswick William I. Griffith Steven J. Harrah Edward D. Jones Richard K. Lane William R. Lynch Joe Marcum Ronald L. Maynor Nicolas D. McCroskey James E. Mooney Adam K. Morgan Rex L. Mullins Joshua S. Napper Howard D. Payne Dillard E. Persinger Joel R. Price Gary W. Quarles, Jr. Deward A. Scott Grover D. Skeens Benny R. Willingham Ricky L. Workman Age 52 25 33 47 53 41 51 20 56 54 40 50 45 59 57 31 26 51 21 50 26 53 32 55 33 58 57 61 31 Injured Miners Timothy Blake James K. Woods 56 54 Roof Bolter Operator Electrician Position Roof Bolter Operator Roof Bolter Operator Longwall Utility Electrician Roof Bolter Operator Continuous Miner Operator Longwall Foreman Underground Apprentice Beltman/Fireboss Continuous Miner Operator Assistant Mine Foreman Assistant Mine Foreman Longwall Foreman Shuttle Car Operator Continuous Miner Operator Scoop Operator Electrician Shuttle Car Operator Underground Apprentice Headgate Operator Underground Apprentice Roof Bolter Operator Shield Operator Shearer Operator Shearer Operator Shuttle Car Operator Maintenance Foreman Roof Bolter Operator Shuttle Car Operator

APPENDIX C LIST OF MASSEY’S CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND EMPLOYEES

ALPHA APPALACHIA HOLDINGS, INC.- 10-K- 20100301 -FORM

Page I of 179

UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20549

FORMlO-K
(Mark One) IRl ANNUAL REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 For the fiscal year ended December 31, 2009 OR

0

TRANSITION REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACTOF1934 For the transition period from to Commission File No. 001-07775

MASSEY ENERGY COMPANY
(Exact name of registrant as specified in its charter)

Delaware (State or other jurisdiction of incorporation or organization) 4 North 4th Street, Richmond, Virginia (Address of principal executive offices)

95-0740960 (I.R.S. Employer Identification Number) 23219 (Zip Code)

Registrant's telephone number, including area code: (804) 788-1800 Securities registered pursuant to Section 12(b) of the Act: Title of each class Common Stock, $0.625 par value Name of each exchange on which registered New York Stock Exchange

Securities registered pursuant to Section 12(g) of the Act: None Indicate by cheCk mark if the registrant is a well-known seasoned issuer, as defined in Rule 405 of the Securities Act. Yes 0 No D Indicate by check mark ifthe registrant is not required to file reports pursuant to Section 13 or Section 15(d) of the Act. Yes D No 0 Indicate by check mark whether the registrant (I) has filed all reports required to be filed by Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 during the preceding 12 months (or for such shorter period that the registrant was required to file No D such reports), and (2) has been subject to such filing requirements for the past 90 days. Yes 0 Indicate by check mark whether the registrant has submitted electronically and posted on its corporate Web site, if any, every Interactive Data File required to be submitted and posted pursuant to Rule 405 of Regulation S-T (§ 232.405 of this chapter) during the preceding 12 months (or for such shorter period that the registrant was required to submit and post such files). Yes 0 NoD Indicate by check mark if disclosure of delinquent filers pursuant to Item 405 of Regulation S-K (§229.405 of this chapter) is not contained herein, and will not be contained, to the best of registrant's knowledge, in definitive proxy or information statements incorporated by reference in Part III of this Form 10-K or any amendment to this Form 10-K. D Indicate by check mark whether the registrant is a large accelerated filer, an accelerated filer, a non-accelerated filer or a smaller reporting company. See the definitions of "large accelerated filer," "accelerated filer" "non-accelerated filer" and "smaller reporting company" in Rule 12b-2 ofthe Exchange Act (Check One): Large accelerated filer 0 Accelerated filer D Non-accelerated filer 0 Smaller reporting company D (Do not check if a smaller reporting company) No Indicate by check mark whether the registrant is a shell company (as defined in Rule 12b-2 of the Exchange Act). Yes D

0

ALPHA APPALACHIA HOLDINGS, INC.- 10-K- 20100301- DIRECTORS_AND_O... Page 1 of4

Item 10. Directors, Executive Officers and Corporate Governance Executive Officers of the Registrant

Don L. Blankenship, Age 59
Mr. Blankenship has been a director since 1996. He has been Chairman and Chief Executive Officer since November 2000 and also held the position of President from November 2000 nntil November 2008. He has been Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc., our wholly owned and sole, direct operating subsidiary, since 1992 and served as its President from 1992 until November 2008. Mr. Blankenship was formerly President and Chief Operating Officer from 1990 to 1991 and President of our subsidiary, Massey Coal Services, Inc., from 1989 to 1991. He joined our · · · · · · · · · · subsidia Raw] Sales & Pro Chamber of Commerce.

Baxter F. Phillips, Jr., Age 63
Mr. Phillips has been a director since 2007. He has been President since November 2008. Mr. Phillips previously served as Executive Vice President and Chief Administrative Officer from November 2004 to November 2008, as Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer from September 2003 to November 2004 and as Vice President and Treasurer from 2000 to August 2003. Mr. Phillips joined us in 1981 and has also served in the roles of Corporate Treasurer, Manager of Export Sales and Corporate Human Resources Manager, among others.

J. Christopher Adkins, Age 46
Mr. Adkins has been Senior Vice President and Chief Operating Officer since July 2003. Mr. Adkins joined our subsidiary, Raw] Sales & Processing Co., in 1985 to work in underground mining. Since that time, he has served as section foreman, plant supervisor, President and Vice President of several subsidiaries, President of our Eagle Energy subsidiary, Director of Production of Massey Coal Services, Inc. and Vice President of Underground Production.

Mark A. Clemens, Age 43
Mr. Clemens has been Senior Vice President, Group Operations since July 2007. From January 2003 to July 2007, Mr. Clemens was President of Massey Coal Services, Inc. Mr. Clemens was formerly President of Independence Coal Company, Inc., one of our operating subsidiaries, from 2000 through December 2002 and our Corporate Controller from 1997 to 1999. Mr. Clemens has held a number of other accounting positions and has been with us since 1989.

Michael K. Snelling, Age 53
Mr. Snelling has been Vice President, Surface Operations of our subsidiary, Massey Coal Services, Inc. since June 2005. Mr. Snelling was formerly Director of Surface Mining of Massey Coal Services, Inc. from July 2003 until May 2005. Mr. Snelling joined us in 2000 and has served us in a variety of capacities, including President of our subsidiary, Nicholas Energy Co. Prior to joining us, Mr. Snelling held various positions in the coal industry including engineer, production

supervisor, plant supervisor, general foreman, manager of contract mining, superintendent, mine manager and vice president of operations.
Michael D. Bauersachs, Age 45
Mr. Bauersachs has been Vice President, Planning since May 2005. Mr. Bauersachs joined us in 1998, and served as Director of Acquisitions from 1998 until2005. Prior to joining us, Mr. Bauersachs held various positions with Zeigler Coal Holding Company and Arch Mineral Corporation.

Jeffrey M Gillenwater, Age 45
Mr. Gillenwater has been Vice President, Human Resources since January 2009. In October 1999, Mr. Gillenwater became Director of Human Resources at our Massey Coal Services, Inc. subsidiary, and held the position of Director of External Affairs & Administration from October 2002 until January 2009. Prior to October 2002 he held the position of

Human Resources Manager at several of our subSidiaries.
95

ALPHA APPALACHIA HOLDINGS, INC.- 10-K- 20100301- DIRECTORS_AND_O...

Page 2 of4

Richard R. Grinnan, Age 4 I

Mr. Grinnan has been Vice President and Corporate Secretary since May 2006. He served as Senior Corporate Counsel from July 2004 until May 2006. Prior to joining us, Mr. Grinnan was a corporate and securities attorney at the Jaw fum of McGuire Woods LLP in Richmond, Virginia from August 2000 until July 2004.
M Shane Harvey, Age 40

Mr. Harvey has been Vice President and General Counsel since January 2008. He served as Vice President and Assistant General Counsel from November 2006 until January 2008 and as Corporate Counsel and Senior Corporate Counsel fromAri · · ···, ey PLLC in Charleston, West Virginia from May 1994 until April 2000.
Jeffrey M Jarosinski, Age 50
Mr. Jarosinski was appointed Vice President, Treasurer and Chief Compliance Officer in February 2009. Prior to that he served as Vice President, Finance since 1998 and Chief Compliance Officer since December 2002. From 1998 through December 2002, Mr. Jarosinski was Chief Financial Officer. Mr. Jarosinski was formerly Vice President, Taxation from 1997 to 1998 and Assistant Vice President, Taxation from 1993 to 1997. Mr. Jarosinskijoined us in 1988.

John M Poma, Age 45

Mr. Poma has been Vice President and Chief Administrative Officer since January 2009. Mr. Poma previously served as Vice President, Human Resources from April 2003 to January 2009. Mr. Poma served as Corporate Counsel from 1996 until 2000 and as Senior Corporate Counsel from 2000 through March 2003. Prior to joining us in 1996, Mr. Poma was an employment attorney with the law firms of Midkiff & Hiner in Richmond, Virginia and Jenkins, Fenstermaker, Krieger, Kayes & Farrell in Huntington, West Virginia.
St(!)le E. Sears, Age 61

Mr. Sears has been Vice President, Sales and Marketing, and President of our subsidiary Massey Coal Sales Company, Inc. since December 2008. Mr. Sears served as President of Massey Industrial and Utility Sales, a division of Massey Coal Sales Company, Inc., from December 2006 to December 2008. Mr. Sears has held various positions within the sales department. He joined us in !981.
Eric B. Tolbert, Age 42
Mr. Tolbert has been Vice President and Chief Financial Officer since November 2004. Mr. Tolbert served as Corporate Controller from 1999 to 2004. He joined us in 1992 as a financial analyst and subsequently served as Director of Financial Reporting. Prior to joining us, Mr. Tolbert worked for the public accounting firm Arthur Andersen from 1990 to 1992.

David W. Owings, Age 36
Mr. Owings has been Corporate Controller and principal accounting officer since November 2004. Mr. Owings previously served as Manager of Financial Reporting since joining us in 200 I. Prior to joining us, Mr. Owings worked at Ernst & Young LLP, the Company's independent registered public accounting fum, serving as a manager from January 2001 through September 2001 and as a senior auditor from October 1998 through January 2001 in the Assurance and Advisory Business Services group.

The following information is incorporated by reference from our defmitive proxy statement pursuant to Regulation 14A, which will be filed not later than 120 days after the close of Massey's fiscal year ended December 31, 2009: Information regarding the directors required by this item is found under the heading Election ofDirectors . Information regarding our Audit Conunittee required by this item is found under the heading Committees of the Board. 96

ALPHA APPALACHIA HOLDINGS, INC.- 10-K- 20100301- DIRECTORS_AND_O...

Page 3 of4

ALPHA APPALACHIA HOLDINGS, INC.- 10-K- 20100301- DIRECTORS_AND_O...

Page 4 of4

Infonnation regarding Section 16(a) Beneficial Ownership Reporting Compliance required by this item is found under the heading Section 16(a) Beneficial Ownership Reporting Compliance . Infonnation regarding our Code of Ethics required by this item is found under the heading Code ofEthics . Because Common Stock is listed on the NYSE, our chief executive officer is required to make, and he has made, an annual certification to the NYSE stating that he was not aware of any violation by us of the corporate governance listing standards of the NYSE. Our chief executive officer made his armual certification to that effect to the NYSE as of May 21, 2009. In addition, we have filed, as exhibits to this annual report on Fonn 10-K, the certifications of our principal executive officer and principal fmancial officer required under Section 302 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of2002 to be filed with the SEC regarding the uali of our ublic disc los

APPENDIX D LIST OF PERSONNEL WHO EXERCISED THEIR FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS

Appendix D List of Personnel who Exercised their Fifth Amendment Rights
Adkins, Chris Asbury, Rob Blanchard, Chris Blankenship, Don Chamberlin, Elizabeth Clay, Greg* Ferguson, Jamie Frampton, Gary Foster, Rick Hager, Everett Lilly, Eric May, Gary McCombs, Paul Moore, Terry Nicolau, Rick** Persinger, Wayne Roles, Jack Ross, Bill Whitehead, Jason *Participated in one interview prior to asserting his Fifth Amendment rights when requested to come in for second interview. **Initially asserted his Fifth Amendment rights then agreed to a voluntary interview at a later date.

APPENDIX E MINE RESCUE PERSONNEL AND TEAMS RESPONDING

Appendix E Mine Rescue Personnel and Teams Responding
The following teams participated in the UBB rescue and recovery. This list does not include members of the State or Federal teams or members of Task Force One. While not individually identified, their valuable contribution is appreciated. Brooks Run Mining Company Brooks Run North Chris Ray Pat Chapman Teddy Sharp Jeff Bennett Rock Springs Rock Springs - Gold Dave Cook Thomas Marcum Dennis Horn Rock Springs Rock Springs - Blue Greg Stepp Paul Messer Elmer Perry Kingston Resources Kingston - White Daniel Bragg George Smith Matt Price Kingston Resources Kingston - Red Phillip Saunders John Crump Ernie Watkins Larry Helmick Shawn Tinchell Nick Huddleston Oscar Hughes, Jr. Jason Stone Gary Brooks Ryan Haga Greg Fernett David Birchfield Jarrod Birchfield Neil Stepp Stan Wonnell Jarrod Cisco Eric Varney Mark Jerasonek Mike McGinnis Greg Spaulding Johnny Brown Mark Lovins Zendil Nichols Leslie Clutter Kevin Bennett Curt Clevinger Steve Dawson Bobby Clutter Brad Cable Pete Tanner

Cobra Natural Resources Cobra Doug Blankenship Paul McCloud Terry Lambert James Murray Chuck Childress Brad Birchfield Roosevelt Payne Todd Collins Otto Bryant Burns Diamond

Brooks Run Mining Company Brooks Run South Ken Perdue Joe Wyatt James Greer Travis Grimmett Garreth Hubbard David Booth Darnell Baker Ronald Vance Rages Matney

Wolf Run Mining Company Wolf Run - Blue Al Schoonover Kermitt Melvin Craig Zirkle Everette Kalbough George Brooks Marty Conrad Brian Wachob

Wolf Run Mining Company Wolf Run - White Joe Runyon Mike DeLauder Brad Shoulders Travis Anderson Brandon Triplett Jeff Kelley Chris Chisolm Shon Sublett Scott Boylen

ICG Knott County, LLC Hazard - Flint Ridge - Blue Ron Hughes Charles Smith Jimmy Adams Joe Tussey George Gilbert John Collins Randy Feltner Tony Osborne Lathan McIntosh Tony Pennington Scott Thompson

ICG Knott County, LLC Knott County, LLC - White Clark Meade William Sloan Rick Sturgill David McGuire Daniel Boggs Brandon Tackett Marty Mitchell John Swiney Steven Johnson

ICG Beckley, LLC Beckley - Black George Gibson Mike Gosnell ICG Beckley, LLC Beckley - Gold Raymond Coleman Ron Barr Jeff Varney Richie Henderson Federal #2 John Sabo Tyler Peddicord Bert Matheney Gary McHenry Southern Appalachia David Blankenship Steve B. Southern Joe Runyon Chris Green Magnum Michael Balser Randy Boggs Robert Samuel Goodyear Aaron Price Frank Foster Justin Billups Breton Crouse Daniel R. Hudson Shawn Smith Harvey Ferrell Terreal Blankenship Greg Fillinger Travis Lett Thad Williams Terry Hudson Kermit Rex Osborne Matt Green Travis Miller Kevin Wriston Greg Lukacs Jim Richey Tim Fleeman Harry McGinnis Richard Matheney Justin Scott John Toothman Mark Gouzd James Griswold Roy Smith John Lucas Kevin Burnette Zach Bowman Gary Patterson Eddie Persinger Jamie McClaugherty Mike Robinson Rodney Smith

Cumberland Resources Corporation Black Mountain Resources Kentucky - Blue Ronnie Biggerstaff Randy Watts Eddie Spangler Don Walker Kevin Harris Donnie Thomas Jack Quillen Raymond Sturgill Tim Turner

Kentucky - White Jason Brown Reno Johnson Tom Asbury Roger Gilliam David Patterson Tim Kiser Tony Lloyd

Cumberland Resources Corporation Cumberland Resources Virginia - Maroon Andy Anunson Robbie Middleton Billy Sluss Virginia - Black Travis Mullins Casey Mooneyham Chad Lane Tommy Asbury Jesse Moore Shane Gibson Vernon Brian Keith Adam Phillips Larry Hall Johnny Dishner Kevin Baldwin David Arnold James Ramey

Southern Pocahontas 1 and 2 Dewayne Blankenship Don Cook Eric Lowery Raymond Simpson Eddie Toler Mountaineer 1 and 2 J. Dale Adkins Logan Griffin George Lawson John Parsons Burge Speilman Michael Travis Dave Boggs William Holcomb Jason McKinney Bryan Petrosky Tony Shields Cary Fitzwater Mike Hutchinson Robbie Ortiz Nathan Sharp Christopher Stewart Miles Blankenship Johnny Goodman Jonathan Mounts Jamie Sloan Randy Wright Donnie Coleman Pat Graham Sampy Owens Jordan Smith

Massey Southern WV 1 and 2 Rob Asbury Mike Alexander Jason Castle Casey Campbell Mark Bolen Jamie Ferguson Chris Adkins Jim Aurednik James Thomas Scotty Kinder Charles Kingery Clinton Craddock John Click Shane McPherson Larry Ferguson Tommy Dove Duane Thaxton Jeremy McClung Elizabeth Chamberlin

Sidney Coal Company, Inc. Massey East Kentucky Charlie Conn Matt Owens Jimmy Stanley Mike Plumley John Ball Scotty Ernest John Reed Paul Adkins Steve Miller Tim Adkins

Knox Creek Coal Corporation Massey Knox Creek Mark Jackson Chris Wilson Matt Gates Other Activities Mike Vaught John Gallick Perry Whitely Joe Pugh Ed Rudder Allen Dupree Chris Presley Jeff Ellis Randy McMillion Brian Keaton Mark Schuerger Don King Dave Elswick Lanny Hart Brad Hawkins Daniel Orr

APPENDIX F UBB BOREHOLES

APPENDIX F UBB BOREHOLES

Appendix F
UBB Boreholes
Borehole Name 1A 1B 1B (Redrilled) 1C 1C 2A 2B 2C 2D 4/7/10 4/17/10 4/7/2010 4/11/10 4/11/10 5/21/2010 4/23/10 4/21/2010 5/26/10 4/20/2010 HG 22 HG 22 West Jarrells Mains West Jarrells Mains Abandoned Abandoned 161 161 95 1,151 1,255 100 900 Date Borehole Started 4/06/10 4/06/10 4/22/10 Date Borehole Stopped 4/07/10 4/08/10 4/28/10 Location Crosscut Depth

HG 22 HG 22 HG 22

35 Missed 35

1,099 1094 1100

West Jarrells Abandoned Mains North Jarrells Mains HG 22 HG 22 North Jarrells Mains TG 22 Headgate 1 North Headgate 1 North 155

5B 10A 15B

4/08/10 4/08/10 4/16/2010

4/10/2010 4/09/10 4/22/10

Abandoned Missed 142

1,005 1,130 1,259

8A HG 21-1 HG 21-2

4/29/2010

5/07/10 6/06/10

5 34 78

1,251 ~1,160 1,290

4/28/2010

5/04/10

APPENDIX G ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PROTOCOLS

Performance Coal Company Upper Big Branch Mine-South Accident Investigation
U.S. Department of Labor Mine Safety and Health Administration 1301 Airport Road Beaver, West Virginia 25813-9426 State of West Virginia Office of Miners’ Health Safety and Training 1615 Washington Street, East Charleston, West Virginia 25311-2126

Upper Big Branch Mine – South – Accident Investigation Protocols The underground portion of the investigation being conducted at Upper Big Branch Mine – South of the April 5, 2010 explosion accident will be conducted pursuant to the following investigation protocols. The parties involved in the underground portion of the investigation include: The Department of Labor, Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA); the State of West Virginia, Office of Miners’ Health, Safety and Training (OMHS&T); the State of West Virginia Governor’s Independent Investigation Panel (GIIP); Performance Coal Company, including Massey Energy and any of its related entities (the Company); and duly recognized representatives of the miners of the Upper Big Branch Mine, including the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA). General Protocols 1. The underground investigation will consist of the following teams: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. Five Mapping Teams; Ten Mine Dust Survey Teams; Three Electrical Teams; Three Photography Teams; One Flames and Forces Team; One Geologic Mapping Team; One Evidence Gathering Team.

MSHA and OMHS&T may add additional teams as necessary. 2. Each investigation team will consist of at least one MSHA representative and at least one OMHS&T representative. One Company representative, one GIIP representative, and one miner’s representative may accompany each team. Additional members may accompany the team at the discretion of the MSHA and OMHS&T representative(s). 3. The members of each team will remain together at all times while inside the mine.

4. Prior to traveling underground each day, specific assignments will be given to each team by MSHA’s Accident Investigation Team, in consultation with the OMHS&T team. 5. The members of each team may take notes during the investigation.

Mapping Protocols 6. One map only shall be produced by each Mapping Team for each area of the mine. All team members shall sign and date the map when completed. It is anticipated that copies will be made at the conclusion of each shift. They will be distributed to each investigation team. 7. The originals will be retained by MSHA. Mine Dust Survey Protocols 8. For purposes of the mine dust survey, the underground workings in or near the area affected by the explosion have been partitioned into 22 separate sections. Each of the Mine Dust Survey Teams will be assigned one or more of these sections of the mine to take MSHA compliant mine dust samples. 9. All 22 section locations are marked on a single map that is included in the packages provided to each Mine Dust Survey Team. The provided package also contains one or more individual section maps that are applicable to each individual Mine Dust Survey Team. The section maps clearly indicate the sample locations where that particular team is responsible for taking samples. 10. Only MSHA representatives will take samples. MSHA anticipates that on many occasions, it will obtain excess materials in its samples; in such cases, it will share this excess with the parties so that they may perform their own tests should they so desire. Samples are to be taken at each location near to the center of the pillar. In the event that water, 11. debris, or other obstruction prevents an acceptable sample from being taken at the center of the pillar, it is acceptable to relocate the sample to within 20 feet of the original location on either side of the centerline of the pillar. This provides for a length of 40 feet along each pillar in which an acceptable sample can be obtained. The MSHA and OMHS&T representative(s) will decide where to precisely take each sample. Sample tags shall be filled out at each sample location. The tag must indicate the sample location 12. and the type of sample taken. 13. If no acceptable sample can be obtained within the 40 feet length, a sample tag shall still be completed that includes the location identification. Also, the reason for no sample shall be designated on the tag. 14. If any Mine Dust Survey Team completes the sampling requirements for their assigned section or sections, then they can provide assistance to any other Team that has not yet completed their sampling. 15. 16. Sampling bags and tags will be provided to each Team. Evidence is not to be disturbed during the sampling process.

17. Samples are to be taken out of the mine at the end of the shift. All samples are to be transferred to the custody of MSHA’s investigators on the Evidence Gathering Team. The Evidence Gathering Team will store all samples in a secure location. Electrical Protocols 18. The primary purpose of the Electrical Teams will be to analyze circuits and equipment in proximity to the point of origin in order to identify potential ignition sources. 19. Machine mounted methane monitors from all working sections will be tested in place and/or taken into custody by MSHA for further testing. 20. Electrical equipment and circuits not in proximity to the point of origin will be examined by MSHA and OMHS&T electrical specialists to collect evidence and to assess compliance with the requirements of 30 CFR and state law. Photography Protocols 21. No photographs other than the official team photographs will be taken by any party. Only MSHA or OMHS&T representatives will take photographs for each team. 22. The MSHA and OMHS&T persons on each Photography Team are responsible for determining which photographs to take. GIIP, Company, and Miner’s Representatives may request additional photographs. MSHA and OMHS&T will make good faith efforts to take these requested photographs. 23. A Photography Team will specifically photograph evidence to be removed from the mine for investigative purposes. The MSHA representative(s) on this Photography Team will also act as the MSHA representative(s) on the Evidence Collection and Testing Team. 24. When requested, a Photography Team will travel with the Flames and Forces Team and will take photographs of any item designated by the MSHA or OMHS&T representatives on the Flames and Forces Team. 25. A Photography Team will be responsible for taking photographs of damage to ventilation controls, equipment, and other items of interest in the extended area affected by explosion forces, as determined by the Accident Investigation Team. From the time that any Photography Team enters the mine, methane will be continuously 26. monitored at their location. In the event that the methane concentration reaches 1% or greater, all camera equipment will be moved to a location with less than 1% methane and all photography work will cease until the methane concentration is reduced to less than 1%. 27. All photographs will be retained by MSHA. While underground, GIIP, Company, and Miner’s Representatives Photography Team members may spend a reasonable time reviewing photographs taken on the digital screen after they are taken. MSHA anticipates providing GIIP, the Company, and Miner’s Representatives copies of each photograph on a disk (or via similar method) at the conclusion of

each shift. Should this not be feasible on particular occasions, MSHA will provide copies within 24 or 48 hours after they have been taken.

Flames and Forces Protocols

28.

The primary purpose of the Flames and Forces Team is to: a. Determine the extent of flame; b. Determine the magnitude and direction of the primary forces; c. Determine the location of the origin of the explosion; d. Determine the fuel consumed in the explosion; and e. Assist in identifying the source of ignition. Geological Mapping Protocols

29. Locations for photographs will be annotated on the map, and a Photography Team will accompany the Geologic Mapping Team upon completion of the geologic mapping to collect photographs in annotated areas. Photograph collection will be at the direction of the MSHA and OMHS&T geologic mapping team member. 30. Geologic mapping will be performed by the MSHA and/or OMHS&T representative. One map only shall be produced by the Geological Mapping Team for each area of the mine. All team members shall sign and date the map when completed. It is anticipated that copies will be made at the conclusion of each shift. They will be distributed to each investigation team. 31. Individual members on the Geological Mapping Team are responsible for their own notes regarding observations and interpretations of geologic or stress features, which may be kept separate from the map. Evidence Gathering Protocols 32. Evidence will be identified by MSHA and OMHS&T investigators and tagged with reflective markers, if necessary. 33. Only the Evidence Gathering Team will gather evidence. Other teams may identify and flag evidence for referral to the Evidence Gathering Team. 34. After a Photography Team photographs the designated evidence, the Evidence Gathering Team will place the evidence in containers to be removed from the mine. 35. All evidence tagged, photographed, and removed from the mine property will require Chain of Custody sheets to be completed. 36. Upon removal from the underground areas of the mine, evidence will be placed in a secure location on the surface area of the mine for transport to storage or testing facilities.

37. MSHA and OMHS&T shall maintain custody and control over the items they have received or taken at all times unless release of the items is necessary for the purpose of allowing testing by an outside laboratory. In such an event, MSHA and OMHS&T shall agree on the best means to ensure that adequate custody is maintained. Except as set out below, MSHA and OMHS&T shall also protect and preserve the items in their custody in the same condition as when the items were received from the Company. 38. While at any MSHA or OMHS&T facility, each and every item shall be kept secure and access shall be limited to only those persons necessary to conduct tests and examinations of the items. 39. All parties will be notified within 48 hours (or another reasonable time frame if not possible) of any tests to be conducted on evidence, the locations and dates where evidence testing is to occur, and any other relevant information, and given an opportunity to attend the testing. The parties will be provided with testing protocols relating to the particular evidence at issue prior to the testing whenever possible, and will be given an opportunity to provide input into the testing procedures to be followed. This provision shall not apply to testing on rock dust samples. 40. Should MSHA or the OMHS&T so request, the Company will maintain control and custody over any item returned to it pursuant to the same conditions listed above for a period of time to be specified by MSHA or the OMHS&T. 41. Team members shall consult with each other prior to the removal of physical evidence. MSHA or OMHS&T shall map the area prior to the removal of physical evidence.

APPENDIX H POST-ACCIDENT MAPPING TEAM MAP CAN BE FOUND IN THE BACK OF THE BINDER

APPENDIX I PIL NO. 110-V-8 PROCEDURES FOR COPYING PHOTOGRAPHS

EFFECTIVE DATE: 07/13/2010

EXPIRATION DATE: 03/31/2012

PROCEDURE INSTRUCTION LETTER NO. I10-V-08 FROM: KEVIN G. STRICKLIN Charles Thomas for Administrator for Coal Mine Safety and Health

NEAL H. MERRIFIELD Acting Administrator for Metal and Nonmetal Mine Safety and Health THOMAS KESSLER Thomas Kessler Acting Director for Educational Policy and Development LINDA F. ZEILER John Faini for Acting Director of Technical Support SUBJECT: Use of Digital Cameras and the Storage and Preservation of Digital Images

Scope This Procedure Instruction Letter (PIL) is intended for Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) personnel who conduct inspections or investigations and maintain inspection or investigation documentation. This PIL replaces PIL No. 109-V-2, issued June 5, 2009. Purpose This PIL provides guidance and instructions to MSHA personnel who use digital cameras during their inspections or investigations and maintain digital images, including photographs and videos, taken during inspections or investigations as part of their documentation. Procedure Instructions Authorizing the Use of Digital Cameras -- In addition to other forms of documentation, digital images of violations and accident scenes are of great assistance in documenting violations or other conditions during an inspection or investigation.

2 Digital images and/or videos can significantly contribute to resolving differences of opinion between mine operators and MSHA personnel. The digital images and/or videos should accurately and effectively depict conditions or objects present during the investigation or inspection and subsequent abatement. This information can be invaluable during informal discussions and safety and health conferences. Such images may also expedite judicial proceedings by providing a pictorial illustration of a violation and its abatement/termination or an accident scene. Accordingly, the use of digital cameras is encouraged, and cameras should be used whenever practical subject to the following restrictions: 1. Underground coal mines and gassy underground metal and nonmetal mines where permissible equipment is required. Only cameras approved by MSHA's Approval and Certification Center (A&CC), when available, shall be used. Until then, the possession or use of cameras inby the last open crosscut, or within 150 feet of pillar workings or longwall face, or the use of cameras in return entries, or bleeder entries is prohibited unless approved by the District Manager. 2. Gilsonite mines. The possession or use of cameras is prohibited. 3. Explosives storage magazines, loaded explosives vehicles, and explosives loading areas. The possession or use of cameras is prohibited within 25 feet. Note - This prohibition does not include facilities, magazines, or vehicles storing Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil (ANFO). 4. Flammable material storage or use areas and areas of coal handling facilities which are Class I or Class II Hazardous Locations (explosive dusts or gasses) as outlined in the National Electrical Code. The use of cameras is prohibited. Taking Digital Photographs and Images -- Digital photographs must clearly and accurately depict the nature of the violation or condition. Where appropriate, photographs of abatement or termination measures should also be taken. Before photographs are taken, ensure that the camera is set to the correct date and time. If the camera has audio capability, it should be turned off so that voices are not recorded, unless all persons are explicitly notified that their statements are being recorded. To be most effective, a violation or condition should be captured with both an "up close" shot and a distance shot to provide perspective and points of view. The photograph should depict a miner's potential for exposure to the hazard or violation of the standard. As a rule of thumb, no more than two or three good photographs are necessary to illustrate a violation and its resolution. Too many photographs can become an administrative burden.

3 When taking a video recording, begin at a distance and "zoom in" to provide greater detail of particular features. When panning an area, move the camera slowly enough to permit viewers to observe relevant details and attempt to minimize camera movement. Additional, digital memory cards may be needed to assure sufficient storage capacity if both videos and photographs are taken. If others in the inspection/investigation party are taking photographs, the identity of the individual and his/her affiliation should be recorded in the inspection/investigation notes. At no time should MSHA personnel put themselves or others at risk or ask miners to reenact practices in order to obtain photographs. MSHA personnel should not photograph conditions that pose an imminent danger before taking actions necessary to prevent miners from being exposed to the hazard. Preserving Digital Photographs and Images – All photographs taken during an inspection or investigation must be retained. Images from digital photographs should be saved to a CD or DVD in the same file format (normally JPEG with moderate compression) and at the same resolution as they were originally captured by the camera. Once the digital images are effectively and reliably stored on a CD or DVD, the images may be deleted from the camera’s digital memory card. Original digital images should not be modified or edited. Even when photographs are produced, the digital images should be stored on a CD or DVD and the CD or DVD must be maintained in the mine inspection/investigation file or as part of the inspection report. Inspectors may be called to testify to the chain of custody when the pictures are introduced during a hearing. Therefore, for each digital image, the inspection/ investigation notes or the Photo Mounting Worksheet (MSHA Form 4000-125) should document: (a) the person who took the photograph when more than one inspector/investigator was involved in the inspection/investigation; (b) the date and time the photograph was taken; (c) the location of the condition or object; (d) a brief description of image(s) captured; and (e) the person who transferred the digital image to the CD or DVD. All enforcement actions, inspector notes, and digital images associated with an inspection or an investigation should be provided to the Office of the Solicitor or a Conference and Litigation Representative (CLR) once a matter has been referred to the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission or any other judicial body. Background MSHA policies concerning the use of cameras traditionally have been developed by individual MSHA District Offices or incorporated into PILs that generally address the collection and preservation of information during an inspection or an investigation. However, as the cost of cameras has decreased and digital photography permits images

4 to be more easily and effectively captured and stored, MSHA recognizes the importance of guidance and instruction specific to the use of digital cameras and to the storage/preservation of digital images. Authority Sections 103(a) and 110(h) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, as amended, 30 U.S.C. § 876. Filing Instructions This instruction letter should be filed behind the tab marked "Procedure Instruction Letters" in the binder for Program Policy Handbooks and Procedure Instruction Letters. Issuing Office and Contact Persons Metal and Nonmetal Mine Safety and Health Chief, Safety and Health Division Marvin Lichtenfels, (202) 693-9606 E-mail address: lichtenfels.marvin@dol.gov Coal Mine Safety and Health Chief, Safety Division Stephen Gigliotti, (202) 693-9479 E-mail address: gigliotti.stephen@dol.gov Directorate of Educational Policy and Development Deputy Director Thomas Kessler, (202) 693-9585 E-mail address: kessler.thomas@dol.gov Directorate of Technical Support Chief, Electrical Safety Division, ACC Kenneth Porter, (304) 547-2030 E-mail address: porter.kenneth@dol.gov Distribution Program Policy Manual Holders Coal Mine Safety and Health Personnel Metal and Nonmetal Mine Safety and Health Personnel Educational Policy and Development Personnel Technical Support Personnel Special Assessment Personnel Underground and Surface Mine Operators Independent Contractors

APPENDIX J MINE DUST RESULTS

UPPER BIG BRANCH EXPLOSION INVESTIGATION
MSHA Analysis of Mine Rock Dust Samples- July 2010

Page 1 of 50

Page 2 of 50

Page 3 of 50

Page 4 of 50

Page 5 of 50

Page 6 of 50

Page 7 of 50

Page 8 of 50

Page 9 of 50

Page 10 of 50

Page 11 of 50

Page 12 of 50

Page 13 of 50

Page 14 of 50

Page 15 of 50

Page 16 of 50

Page 17 of 50

Page 18 of 50

Page 19 of 50

Page 20 of 50

Page 21 of 50

Page 22 of 50

Page 23 of 50

Page 24 of 50

Page 25 of 50

Page 26 of 50

Page 27 of 50

Page 28 of 50

Page 29 of 50

Page 30 of 50

Page 31 of 50

Page 32 of 50

Page 33 of 50

Page 34 of 50

Page 35 of 50

Page 36 of 50

Page 37 of 50

Page 38 of 50

Page 39 of 50

Page 40 o( 50

Page 41 of 50

Page 42 of 50

Page 43 of 50

Page 44 of 50

Page 45 of 50

Page 46 of 50

Page 47 of 50

Page 48 of 50

Page 49 of 50

Page 50 of 50

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTii ADMINISTRATION

P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618} 539-5836

PITISBURGH, PA 15236 ATTN' MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 1 of 59 Date: 11115/2010 8:43:52 AM

Lab No.

Customer ID#t

Customer 10#2

Alcohol Coking

Percent .Moisture

Percent Residue

Percent Incombustible

Team 1 -July 13, 20 I0 - 5N PARALLEL MAINS 201002333-001

873039 873040 873041 873042 873043 873044 873045 873046 873047 873048 873049 873050 873051 873052 873053 873054 873055 873056 873057 873058
873059

6A20X 6A21 6A22 6A23 6A24 6B20 6B20X 6B21 6B22 6B23 6B24 6B25 6B26 6Cl7 6Cl8 6Cl9 6C20X 6C21 6C22 6C23 6C24 6C25 6C26 6C27 6Dl7 6Dl8 6Dl9 6D20 6D20X 6D21 6D22

TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE
TRACE

1.42 1.44 1.26
1.40 1.32

63.15 68.52 60.15 57.25 57.08 63.99 58.09 56.90
54.20

64.57 69.96 61.41 58.65 58.40
65.37

201002333-002 201002333-003 20 I 002333-004 201002333-005 201002333-006 201002333-007 201002333-008 201002333-009 201002333-010 201002333-011
201002333-012

1.38 1.44 1.34 1.36 1.28 1.30 1.46 1.42 2.26 1.24
1.76 1.54

59.53 58.24 55.56 66.53 61.18
61.48

65.25 59.88
60.02

201002333-013 201002333-014 201002333-015 201002333-016 201002333-017 201002333-018 201002333-019 201002333-020 201002333-021 201002333-022
201002333-023 201002333-024

54.43 51.57 66.51 58.93 64.70
51.49

55.85 53.83
67.75

60.69 66.24
52.85

1.36 1.44
1.38

52.38 53.17 53.52
50.54 58.47

53.82 54.55
54.84

1.32 1.34 1.32 1.26 1.67 1.30 1.54 1.24 1.12 1.34 1.32

873060 873061
873062

51.88 59.79 61.44 61.13 60.89 67.58 58.96 70.99 59.93 66.00

60.18 59.46 59.59 66.04 57.72 69.87 58.59 64.68

201002333-025 201002333-026 201002333-027 201002333-028 201002333-029 201002333-030 201002333-031

873063 873064
873065

873066 873067 873068 873069

TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE

RespectfullySubmitted, ~~ @~

Imay not be reproduced except in full, without the written approval of Standard Laboratories, Inc. Invalid if altered

~::J~~~~~~:~~~~~-~~~=~~~:f:s~~;~,~~!~J~·:·~~~~~;~~~~":c~~:~:~-~~~~~~:;:~~s~~~:~;~~~·::~:~;~~~-i!~~~~b~~~~:~~-~;-;~:~;i~~i~;~~~~~~f:~~~~~~~~:·~;i:~l~~--" ""I

"""-·--····-·"""""······························"·········"······-·-·---··---------·---·-·-·--·---·-·-·-·-·-··--··-·-·"·-·-·-·-··""""""""·--·----·--·--·---·----·--·-----·-· ·······-·-····-····················································-·"·""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""•···-··-·-·-·----·-·-

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618) 539-5836

PITISBURGH, PA 15236 ATIN: MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 2 of 59 Date: 11115/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No. 201002333-032 20 I 002333-033 201002333-034 201002333-035 201002333-036 201002333-037 201002333-038 201002333-039

Customer ID#1 873070 873071 873072 873073 873074 873075 873076 873077

Customer ID#2 6023 6D24 6025 6026 6027 6EI7 6E22 6E23

Alcohol Coking TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE NONE TRACE TRACE

Percent Moisture 1.26 1.36 1.44 1.36 1.50 1.08 1.66 1.76

Percent Residue 60.75 54.36 53.49 55.81 47.70 74.80 64.86 56.41

Percent Incombustible 62.01 55.72 54.93 57.17 49.20 75.88 66.52 58.17

Team 2- July 13, 2010- 5 NORTH SECTION 20 I 002434-001 201002434-002 201002434-003 201002434-004 20 I 002434-005 201002434-006 201002434-007 201002434-008 201002434-009 201002434-010 201002434-011 20 I 002434-012 201002434-013 201002434-014 201002434-015 201002434-016 201002434-017 201002434-018 20 I 002434-019 20 I 002434-020 201002434-021 201002434-022 20 I 002434-023 873078 873079 873080 873081 873082 873083 873084 873085 873086 873087 873088 873089 873090 873091 873092 873093 873094 873095 873096 873097 873098 873099 873100 5A21X 5A22 5820 5B21 5B21X 5822 5823 5C20 5C21 5C21X 5C22 5C23 5020 5D21 5D22 5023 5E20 5E21 5E21X 5E22 5E23 5F21X 5F22 TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE SMALL SMALL TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE SMALL TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE 1RACE TRACE NONE 1.12 1.59 1.40 1.36 1.48 1.76 1.72 1.40 1.46 1.32 1.50 1.56 1.20 1.26 1.26 1.32 0.84 0.90 1.20 0.90 1.12 1.56 0.56 73.95 57.65 63.21 62.23 54.02 50.50 46.15 58.79 54.13 67.73 59.86 47.78 68.41 70.71 60.83 57.76 76.12 75.41 66.45 76.01 73.30 66.23 85.69 75.07 59.24 64.61 63.59 55.50 52.26 47.87 60.19 55.59 69.05 61.36 49.34 69.61 71.97 62.09 59.08 76.96 76.31 67.65 76.91 74.42 67.79 86.25

Respectfully Submitted, ~ot!! @~

l

!::;r~;~~~~;:i'~i~~~~~n~:~fr~~~:~-~~;t~~~~~-l~-~!f~~f~r~~~:~e~::~:~-~~~;~~~hr:~~:s~~~:nc~~~::~;~-:~:~~:~~b~~-:~;~~~--~-;~~f~:\~~~~l!~~~{-~~~~J~~~~~~:-~fi:~~-~~---·····
may
·--·-------------------------·----·--·------··----------------------------·-·-··--·--·---··-····-·-·---·--·--------------,---""""""'""'""'""'"""""""""""""""-----------------,--------·----····-·······--··--··--··-····--·--··-·--·--··--·--·--·--····-·--·--··-··--·----··--·--·--·--··---···--·--·--·····---··--·-·---···--·"""'""'""'"

not be reproduced except in lul , without the writ en approval of Standard Laboratories, Inc. Invalid if altered

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION

P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618) 539-5836

PITISBURGH, PA 15236 ATTN: MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 3 of 59 Date: ll/15/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No.

Customer ID#l 873101

Customer ID#2

Alcohol Coking

Percent Moisture

Percent Residue

Percent Incombustible

201002434-024
201002434-025

5F23 5G21 5G22 5G23

NONE TRACE TRACE TRACE

0.74 1.30 1.44
1.36

81.08 74.01 69.44 68.55

81.82
75.31

873102 873103 873104

201002434-026 201002434-027

70.88 69.91

Team 3- July 13,2010- HG 1 NORTH

201002438-001 201002438-002 201002438-003
201002438-004

873105
873106

13Al

SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE
SMALL

1.20

66.26 55.23
52.12

67.46 56.63 53.72 55.06 50.37 45.77 50.03 45.02 49.99 50.65 47.05 49.08 42.91 43.56
52.74

13A2 13A3 13A4 13A5 13A6
13A7

1.40 1.60 1.34 1.62
1.90

873107 873108 873109 873110 873111 873112 873113 873114 873115 873116 873117
873118

53.72
48.75

201002438-005 201002438-006 201002438-007 201002438-008 201002438-009 201002438-010 201002438-0 II
201002438-012 201002438-013

43.87 48.32 43.23 48.17 48.80 45.33 47.42 40.93 41.80 51.08 48.80 44.82
56.74

1.71 1.79
1.82

13A8 13B2
13B3

1.85 1.72 1.66 1.98 1.76
1.66

13B4 13B5 13B6 13B7 13B8 13B9 13C3 13C4 13C4X
13C5

SMALL SMALL
SMALL

201002438-014
201002438-015

873119 873120 873121 873122 873123 873124
873125

SMALL SMALL
SMALL

201002438-016 20 I 002438-017 201002438-018 201002438-019 201002438-020 201002438-021 201002438-022 201002438-023 201002438-024 201002438-025 201002438-{)26
201002438-027

1.78 1.71
1.45

50.58 46.53 58.19 48.15 47.81 41.40 52.73 60.52 67.73 56.59 40.34 48.75

SMALL TRACE
SMALL SMALL

1.74 1.79 1.84 1.65
1.61

46.41 46.02
39.56

13C5X 13C6 13C7 13C8 13C9 1307 1308

873126 873127 873128 873129 873130 873131

SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL
SMALL

51.08 58.91 66.57 55.03 38.68
47.11

1.16 1.56 1.66 1.64

SMALL

RespectfullySubmitted, ~~ @~

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618)
539~5836

PITTSBURGH, PA 15236 ATTNo MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 4 of 59
Date: ll/15/2010 8:43:53 AM

Alcohol
Lab No. 201002438-028 201002438-029 201002438-030 201002438-031

Customer ID# l
873132
873133 873134 873135

Customer ID#2
1309 13E7 13E8 13E9

Coking SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL

Percent Moisture
1.28 1.74 !.84 !.46

Percent Residue

Percent Incombustible
6!.77 27.04 36.96 50.39

60.49 25.30 35.12 48.93

Team4 -July 13,2010- SECTION 17 TG 1 NORTII 201002474-001 201002474-002 201002474-003 201002474-004 201002474-005 201002474-006 201002474-007 201002474-008 201002474-009 201002474-010 201002474-011 201002474-012 201002474-013 201002474-014 201002474-015 201002474-016 201002474-017 201002474-018 201002474-019 201002474-020 201002474-021 201002474-022 201002474-023 201002474-024 201002474-025 201002474-026 201002474-027 873136 873137 873138 873139 17A23 l7A24 17A25 17A26 17A27 LARGE
LARGE

2.07 1.96 2.28 2.06 1.94 2.05 1.94 2.44 2.08 2.16 1.38 1.42 1.62 !.59 1.38 1.44 1.36 1.58 1.62 1.74 1.62
1.72

45.88 46.27 47.92 49.72 47.92 46.81 42.60 41.27 48.74 48.71 63.27 65.03 60.53 57.80 63.91 57.82 55.24 47.03 53.28 52.20 55.57 43.92 52.07 50.87 51.10 50.83 44.84

47.95 48.23 50.20 51.78 49.86 48.86 44.54 43.71 50.82 50.87 64.65 66.45 62.15 59.39 65.29 59.26 56.60 48.61 54.90 53.94 57.19 45.64 53.72 52.33 52.74 52.73 46.50

LARGE LARGE LARGE X LARGE

873140
873141 873142 873143 873144 873145 873146 873147 873148 873149 873150 873151 873152 873153 873154 873155

17823
17824 17B25 17B26 17827 17C23 17C24 17C25 17C26

X LARGE
LARGE LARGE

X LARGE
LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL LARGE LARGE LARGE SMALL SMALL SMALL LARGE SMALL SMALL

l7C27
17022

17023
17024 17025

17026
17027 17E22

873156
873157 873158 873159 873160 873161 873162

17E23
17E24 17E25 17E26 17E27

1.65 1.46 !.64 1.90 1.66

RespectfullySubmitted, ~ott! t:t/~

[may not be reproduced except in ful , without the writ en approval of Standard Laboratori_____________________ es, Inc. Invalid if altered ________________________
............................ ________________________________________________________ ....................

~:~~~;:~~s~~;ft;~~~~-~;~~=~j~~~f;;~ff~~~~-!~~-~::~~~n:a;~~bc~~l~~~~e~~~~~~:;~~e=~~~i:f~~:f~~~;~-:~~~~~:oy~~:~;~~-~;~~f~:~~~~;~~~~~~~~~:e~~-~~~~~~:·~;~;1~~-~e··-···
,

1

___ ...................................................................................................................................................................................... - .........

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618) 539-5836

PTITSBURGH, PA 15236 ATTN' MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 5 of 59 Date: 11/15/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No. 201002474-028 201002474-029 201002474-030 201002474-031

Customer ID#l 873163 873164 873165 873166

Customer ID#2

Alcohol Coking LARGE SMALL LARGE LARGE

Percent
Moisture 1.88

Percent Residue
48.38 35.27 48.07 41.26

Percent

Incombustible
50.26 36.82 49.95 42.98

17F24
17F25 17F26 17F27

1.55
1.88 1.72

Team 5- July 13,2010-7 NORTH
201002475-001 201002475-002 201002475-003 201002475-004 201002475-005 201002475-006 201002475-007 201002475-008 201002475-009 201002475-010 201002475-011 201002475-012 201002475-013 201002475-014 201002475-015 201002475-016 201002475-017 201002475-018 201002475-019 201002475-020 201002475-021 201002475-022 201002475-023 873167 873168 873169 873170 873171 873172 873173 873174 873175 873176 873177 873178 873179 873180 873181 873182 873183 873184 873185 873186 873187 873188 873189 7A50 7A50X 7B50X 7B51 7B52 7B53 7B54 7B55 7C51 7C52 7C53 7C54 7C55 SMALL SMALL SMALL 1.86 1.95 1.80 1.66 1.38 1.56 1.46 1.42 1.38
1.16

40.55 40.20 48.38 43.56 51.28 51.02 67.09 67.62 52.26 61.41

42.41 42.15 50.18 45.22 52.66 52.58 68.55 69.04 53.64 62.57 63.10 67.56 59.70 67.40 56.97 71.58 57.91 68.90 64.36 72.61 56.94 90.29 85.66

SMALL
SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL TRACE TRACE SMALL TRACE TRACE TRACE SMALL SMALL LARGE TRACE TRACE SMALL SMALL

1.34 1.12 1.30 1.06 1.34 0.90

61.76
66.44 58.40 66.34 55.63 70.68 56.22 67.72 62.70 70.71 51.65 89.67 83.71

7D50X
7D51 7D52

7053
7E50 7E50X 7E51 7E52 7F50 7F51

1.69
1.18 1.66 1.90 5.29 0.62 1.95

Team 6- July 13,2010-6 NORTH
201002478-00 I 20 I 002478-002 201002478-003 873190 873191 873192 7B5X 7B6 7C5 TRACE TRACE TRACE 1.50 1.30 1.16 50.03 55.52 56.90 51.53 56.82 58.06

Respectfully Submitted, ~LW~
The analysiS, op1n1ons or mterpretatmns con tamed In th1s report have bean prepared at the clients d1rectmn, are based upon observalions of matenal prov1ded by the client and express the best judgment of Standard laboratories, Inc. Standard laboratories, Inc. makes no other representahon or warranty, expressed or Implied, regarding this report. This Certificate of Analysis may not be reproduced except in full, without the written approval of Standard laboratories, Inc. Invalid if altered

......._ ,....., .._·---.------,----------,.......,....., _____________ .............. .....

,---.-~ ~--·····

__

............------.- .

-----~~------,--------------,

i
!

1 ----·---·-·-·-·,····-··--·----... ·--·-~---------·--·-···················--·---··-·-----·-------·---·······-······-····--·-~------- ................................- . - - - · - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - · - - - - - - - · - - _ _ _ j

i

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618) 539-5836

PmSBURGH, PA 15236 ATTN• MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 6 of 59
Date: 11115/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No.
201002478-004 201002478-005 201002478-006 201002478-007 201002478-008 201002478-009 201002478-010 201002478-011 201002478-012 201002478-013 201002478-014 201002478-015 201002478-016 201002478-017 201002478-018 201002478-019 201002478-020

Customer ID#l
873193 873194 873195 873196

Customer 10#2 7C5X 7C6 7D3 7D4 7D5

Alcohol Coking TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE NONE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE NONE NONE TRACE TRACE

Percent
Moisture 1.12 1.16 0.82

Percent Residue
65.61 62.85 82.95 66.19 64.28 63.31 67.59 89.76 87.09 71.97 69.78 67.11 68.86 64.65 67.37 66.47 62.31

Percent Incombustible
66.73 64.01 83.77 67.35 65.56 64.61 68.69 90.82 87.73 72.97 70.86 68.31 69.92 65.93 68.51 67.69 63.71

1.16
1.28 1.30 1.10 1.06 0.64 1.00 1.08 1.20 1.06

873197
873198 873199 873200 873201 873202 873203 873204 873205 873206 873207 873208 873209

7D5X
7D6 7EI 7E2 7E3 7E4 7E5 7E6 7FI 7F2 7F3 7F4

1.28
1.14 1.22 1.40

Team 7- July 13,2010-8 NORTII MAINS
201002479-001 201002479-002 20 I 002479-003 20 I 002479-004 201002479-005 201002479-006 20 I 002479-007 20 I 002479-008 201002479-009 201002479-010 201002479-011 201002479-012 201002479-013 201002479-014 873210 873211 873212 873213 873214 873215 873216 873217 873218 873219 873220 873221 873222 873223 9AI 9A2 9A2X 9A3 9A4 9BI 9B2 TRACE SMALL LARGE SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL 1.59 1.84 2.19 1.70 1.68 2.00 1.40 1.88 1.56 1.20 1.28 1.56 2.10 1.93 61.74 43.40 46.21 46.55 45.26 47.38 54.87 43.71 47.37 59.08 52.68 54.20 42.13 46.03 63.33 45.24 48.40 48.25 46.94 49.38 56.27 45.59 48.93 60.28 53.96 55.76 44.23 47.96

9B2X
9B3 9B4 9CI 9C2 9C2X 9C3

SMALL
SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL

SMALL

Respectfully Submitted, ~oL! @~

~

best judgment of Standard laboratories, Inc. Standard laboratories, Inc. makes no other representation or warranty, expressed or implied, regarding this report. This Certificate of Analysis i may not be reproduced except in ful!, without the written approval of Standard laboratories, Inc. Invalid if altered ! "'"""---------·-"""""'""""'"""""""·---·----------------.-.. " ..........................." " ' " " " " " " " " ' " " - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - .. ----"""'""'""""""'""'""""--·"·-----------------,.-"""""'"""""'"""""""""""""'"""""""""----""-""""""'""""---------------"----"""""""-"""""'""""'""""""""""""""""""""""'"'"""'"'"""'""""''

-h~. ~-~-~iY~~-~·:··~p·;~r~;;-s-;;~-inierpretau-;~·s·-~;;-~·;-~i-~~;;··i-~thi;-;eport-have-bean-p;~p~-;-~ct··~~-~h~"Ciient;-sdirection~-~re·;;~~~d·;:;po;-obs~~ation;-;iffiateriar-p;.o~rdedbY!he-clie-nt-;.d-;~;~;~"ihe----·1

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618) 539-5836

PITTSBURGH, PA 15236 ATTN' MARK WESOWWSKI

Page: 7 of 59 Date: 11/15/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No. 201002479-015 2010024 79-016 201002479-017 201002479-018 201002479-019 201002479-020 201002479-021 201002479-022 201002479-023 201002479-024 201002479-025 2010024 79-026 201002479-027

Customer ID#l 873224 873225 873226 873227 873228 873229 873230 873231 873232 873233 873234 873235 873236

Customer ID#2 9C4 901 9D2 9D2X 9D3 9D4 9El 9E2 9E2X 9E4 9E5 9F4 9F5

Alcohol Coking SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL TRACE SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL

Percent Moisture 1.50 1.85 1.92 2.22 1.68 1.46 2.24 1.73 2.24 2.18 2.17 2.14 2.16

Percent Residue 45.64 55.20 43.72 39.78 46.57 42.93 40.13 64.95 48.21 42.89 37.64 42.71 44.55

Percent Incombustible 47.14 57.05 45.64 42.00 48.25 44.39 42.37 66.68 50.45 45.07 39.81 44.85 46.71

Team 8- July 13,2010- SECT. 10 8N MAINS 201002480-001 201002480-002 201002480-003 201002480-004 201002480-005 201002480-006 201002480-007 201002480-008 201002480-009 201002480-010 201002480-011 201002480-012 201002480-013 20 l 002480-014 201002480-015 201002480-016 201002480-017 201002480-018 873237 873238 873239 873240 873241 873242 873243 873244 873245 873246 873247 873248 873249 873250 873251 873252 873253 873254 lOA! lOA IX IOA2 10A3 lOB! lOBI X 1082 !OB3 lOCI !OCIO lOCI OX !OC!I lOC1X JODI !OD!O IODlOX !ODll !OD!X LARGE LARGE LARGE SMALL LARGE LARGE LARGE SMALL X LARGE LARGE SMALL LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE 2.12 2.08 2.41 1.88 2.28 2.29 2.00 2.02 2.62 2.16 2.00 1.86 2.28 2.45 2.07 2.14 1.80 1.94 47.59 44.65 44.64 40.23 45.34 42.68 50.60 42.88 49.81 42.35 40.50 39.72 38.80 42.23 41.95 40.35 56.45 46.16 49.71 46.73 47.05 42.11 47.62 44.97 52.60 44.90 52.43 44.51 42.50 41.58 41.08 44.68 44.02 42.49 58.25 48.10

RespectfullySubmitted, ~~ @~

~

-------------

.....

--------------

. ······-----------

..... ··---------------················----------------

he analysis, opinions or interpretations contained in !his report have been prepared at the client's direction, are based upon observations of material provided by the client and express the est judgment of Standard Laboratories, Inc. Standard Laboratories. Inc. makes no other representation or warranty. expressed or implied, regarding this report. This Certificate of Analysis · may not be reproduced e);cepl in full, without the written approval of Standard Laboratories, Inc. Invalid if altered

--

..

.. .... . .. . . .. ......... .. .. .. . ......

··········--···-···------··-·-,···......... ........- ...·-------··-········............----·---·-·----.,............................... __________ .,....... ..................
., .,

----··------···-··--···-··-,·~-··--·-"""""""""""""""""""""'""""""""""'""'"""""""""""""'""""""-"'"'"

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618) 539-5836

PITISBURGH, P A 15236 ATTN' MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 8 of 59
Date: 11115/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No. 201002480-019 201002480-020 201002480-021 201002480-022 201002480-023 20 I 002480-()24

Customer ID#I 873255 873256 873257 873258 873259 873260 873261 873262 873263 873264 873265 873266 873267 873268 873269 873270 873271

Customer ID#2
JOEl

Alcohol Coking LARGE LARGE

Percent Moisture 1.98 2.30 2.54 2.10 2.16 1.96 2.26 2.00 1.97 2.07 2.16 2.27

Percent Residue
35.74 36.99 40.91 43.66 36.11 38.19 38.68 37.70 38.99 36.06 38.17 38.53 42.59 40.33 46.91 43.22 40.35 39.24 41.06 37.95 38.44 42.01 41.82 46.04

Percent Incombustible
37.72 39.29 43.45 45.76 38.27 40.15 40.94 39.70 40.96 38.13 40.33 40.80 44.46 42.75 49.23 45.64 42.73 41.28 42.92 40.09 40.54 43.85 44.16 47.96

IOE10 10EIOX 10Ell 10EIX
IOE2

X LARGE
SMALL SMALL

SMALL SMALL
SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL LARGE LARGE SMALL LARGE LARGE SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL LARGE LARGE X LARGE X LARGE

201002480-025
201002480-026 201002480-027 201002480-028 20 I 002480-029 20 I 002480-030 201002480-031 20 I 002480-032 201002480-033 201002480-034 201002480-035 201002480-036 201002480-037 20 I 002480-038 201002480-039 201002480-040 20 I 002480-041 201002480-042

IOE3 IOE4

10E5
IOE6

lOE7
tOES IOE9 I OFI IOFIO

1.87
2.42 2.32 2.42 2.38

10F11
IOF2 10F3 IOF4 10F5 10F6 IOF7 10F8 10F9

873272
873273 873274 873275 873276 873277 873278

2.04
1.86 2.14 2.10 1.84 2.34 1.92

Team9 -July 13,2010 -CUTOUTBETWEENHG IN ANDTG IN
201002481-001 201002481-002 201002481-003 201002481-004 201002481-005 201002481-006 201002481-007 873279 873280 873281 873282 873283 873284 873285 14A10 14A2 14A3
SMALL

1.52 2.40 2.73 2.66 2.25 2.41 2.42

46.32

47.84 45.20 40.57 42.63 48.58 43.87 47.98

X LARGE X LARGE

42.80 37.84
39.97 46.33

l4A4
14A5 14A6 14A6X

X LARGE
X LARGE X LARGE

41.46
45.56

X LARGE

Respectfully Submitted, ~~ .ft1~

f

The·an;;:iYSiS~-O.pin.ions-ar-Tnie.;:p~~t;ti~.-~5-~~~-~~~;.,_-,_.~n-this. repo_rt_ha~-eb.·;~~-p~~pa;edat the. ,_liefl~S-di;e-;-t~;;~;-~---~_-~_····b·;·;;d-;:;-.po.,;.;,.-.bserva ti0n_s_Ofmate.ri.9·r-Pr'o~d9.dbY-lh·;·.~lii~t-an-d~;;;lffisS-the------1. ..
best judgmenl of Slandard laboratories, Inc. Standard laboratories. Inc. makes no other representation or warranty, expressed or implied, regarding this report. Th1s Certificate of Analysis

!

~-~-~--~-~-~-~~-r:~:.~.~-~~:~~~ in fu~~ ~~:-~.~-~~-:~: -~~~~~~-a_P~ova~~~~~~~~~:.~-~-~~~?.~-~-s~-~~:~nvalid if all:~~~- __ ............ -· _______________________________________ j

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTI-l ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618) 539·5836

PmSBURGH, PA 15236 ATIN: MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 9 of 59 Date: 11/15/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No. 201002481-008 20 I 002481-009 201002481-010 201002481-011 201002481-012 201002481-013 201002481·014 201002481-015 201002481-016 201002481-017 201002481-018 201002481·019 201002481-020 201002481-021 201002481-022 201002481-023 201002481-024 201 002481·025 201002481-026 201002481-027 201002481-028 20 I 002481-029 201002481-030 201002481-031

Customer ID# I 873286 873287 873288 873289 873290 873291 873292 873293 873294 873295 873296 873297 873298 873299 873300 873301 873302 873303 873304 873305 873306 873307 873308 873309

Customer ID#2 14A7 14A8 14A9 14Bl 14B10 14B2 14B3 14B4 14B5 14B6 14B6X 14B7 14B8 14B9 14C10 14C9 14010 14D9 14E10 14E9 14FIO 14F9 14GIO 14G9

Alcohol Coking X LARGE LARGE LARGE X LARGE SMALL X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL TRACE SMALL TRACE SMALL TRACE TRACE

Percent Moisture 2.10 1.88 2.01 2.29 1.71 2.73 2.92 2.67 2.24 2.27 2.16 2.09 1.84 1.93 1.68 1.84 1.87 1.90 1.68 1.74 0.96 1.32 1.18 1.42

Percent Residue 43.46 44.65 41.77 45.82 44.79 44.21 43.28 46.77 51.76 45.03 48.32 45.09 44.20 40.26 45.84 45.29 44.41 44.86 42.69 46.36 60.79 47.23 51.58 44.62

Percent Incombustible 45.56 46.53 43.78 48.11 46.50 46.94 46.20 49.44 54.00 47.30 50.48 47.18 46.04 42.19 47.52 47.13 46.28 46.76 44.37 48.10 61.75 48.55 52.76 46.04

Team 10 -July 13,2010- SECTION 16 TG 201002529-00 I 201002529-002 201002529-003 201002529-004 201002529-005 201002529-006 20 I 002529·007 873310 873311 873312 873313 873314 873315 873316 16AI 16A2 16A3 16A4 16A5 16A6 16A7 TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE SMALL 1.46 1.57 1.92 1.36 1.48 1.58 1.50 54.60 53.31 49.30 52.22 44.82 38.67 47.33 56.06 54.88 51.22 53.58 46.30 40.25 48.83

Respectfully Submitted,

~at! @~

[!:::f:~~~~~Ofti~~:-~;~~~=~~~~~ffs~-ff;';~~~l~~=-~~~;~r~~~~:;~::~:~-~e~;~~~~~J~es:i~~!i;~~~~:l~~;~!~~~~~~b~~~nf;:~e~~--~-;~~f~~-~;~Jf;~~~~-~~~-~seJ~~fJ~~:·~~~-~~~e·"·" " ] not___be reproduced except in ful , without the writ en approval of Standard Laboratories, Inc. Invalid if altered _______________ ______________ -- -----may
'"'"'"'"-'"

"_"

,,

........ """""'"'"""'----·-------------------·--·------........,_"'"'

,

_____ ................ """·----------------------.. -------,----- .. --., .... -

... ..

................................................... _,_,, ............ - ........ ..

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618) 539-5836

PITTSBURGH, PA 15236 ATTN: MARK WESOLOWSKl

Page: I 0 of 59
Date: 11/15/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No. 20 I 002529-008 20 I 002529-009 20 I 002529-010 201002529-011 20 I 002529-012 201002529-013 201002529-014 201002529-015 20 I 002529-016 20 I 002529-017 201002529-018 201002529-019 201002529-020 201002529-021 201002529-022 20 I 002529-023 201002529-024 201002529-025 201002529-026 201002529-027 20 I 002529-028 201002529-029 201002529-030

Customer ID#l
873317 873318 873319 873320 873321 873322 873323 873324 873325 873326 873327 873328 873329 873330 873331 873332 873333 873334 873335 873336 873337 873338 873339

Customer ID#2 16A7X 1681
1682

Alcohol Coking SMALL TRACE TRACE SMALL TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE SMALL NONE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE SMALL SMALL TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE
TRACE

Percent Moisture 1.72 1.18 1.32 1.40 1.20 1.26 1.36 1.36 1.54

Percent

Residue
47.03 59.84 58.81 57.27 62.67 62.98 59.64 58.85 55.73 79.34 73.58 66.96 71.01

Percent Incombustible
48.75 61.02 60.13 58.67 63.87 64.24 61.00 60.21 57.27 80.52 74.62 68.10 72.01 73.61 69.53 69.75 58.08 78.20 80.83

1683
1684 1685 1686
1687

16B7X 16CI 16C2 16C3 16C4 16C5 16C6 16C7 16C7X 16D1 16D3 1604 1605 1606 1607

1.18
1.04 1.14 1.00 1.06 1.02 1.10 1.58 0.86 1.30 1.48 1.46 1.75 1.28

72.55
68.51 68.65 56.50 77.34 79.53 63.99 60.94 62.42 65.27

65.47
62.40 64.17 66.55

Team 1- July 14,2010- 5NPARALLEL MAINS 20 I 002530-001 201002530-002 201002530-003 20 I 002530-004 201002530-005 201002530-006 201002530-007 201002530-008 873340 873341 873342 873343 873344 873345 873346 873347 6AI2 6AI2X 6AI3 6AI4 6AI4X 6AI5 6AI6 6AI7 NONE 0.94 1.08 1.08 1.12 0.96 1.30 1.34 1.26 69.14 66.75 75.59 61.91 73.09 59.17 60.24 60.83 70.08 67.83 76.67 63.03 74.05 60.47 61.58 62.09

NONE
NONE TRACE NONE
TRACE

TRACE TRACE

Respectfully Submitted,

~L @~

[!:~:~Y~:~~;~~~~~;~~~:~;~~~~~;:-~;~;~~-l~h~!~~~~~~f::~::~:;:I~~;~:~~~hr:~~~:~~~~~~~~::~~~;~:~~~~~~~~f~a~~r~;;~~~~~~~~;l~~~~~-~-~:~~~-~f~~~:-~fi:~~~~. __________
may not be reproduced
except in full, without the written approval of Standard Laboratories. Inc. Invalid if altered
,_,.,,
-·-"--"·"-'"'''-''"-~-----------------------""'"'""""'"'"'"'"'"'"'"

..................."----------------------.......

,_,,"'"'"~--------------"""'"'"'"'"·"-'"------------------------------------------------------------

...........................

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618)
539~5836

PITTSBURGH, PA 15236 ATTN: MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 11 of 59 Date: ll/15/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No.
201002530~009

Customer ID#l 873348 873349 873350 873351 873352 873353 873354 873355 873356 873357 873358 873359 873360 873361 873362 873363 873364 873365 873366 873367 873368 873369 873370 873371 873372 873373 873374 873375 873376 873377 873378 873379

Customer ID#2 6AI8 6A19 6A20 6BI2 6BI2X 6BI3 6BI4 16B14X 6BI5 6BI6 6BI7 6BI8 6CI2 6CI2X 6CI3 6CI4 6C14X 6CI5 6CI6 6012 6DI2X 6013 6014 6Dl4X 6EI2 6El3 6EI4 6EI6 6EI8 6Fl5 6FI6 6F17

Alcohol Coking TRACE TRACE TRACE NONE NONE TRACE TRACE NONE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE NONE NONE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE TRACE TRACE NONE NONE NONE

Percent Moisture 1.66 !.56 1.20 1.22 1.34 0.70 1.22 0.80 1.40 1.24 1.12 1.26 1.24 1.24 0.72 1.20 1.20 1.22 1.40 1.32 1.32 1.06 1.04 0.90 1.42 1.08 1.14 1.42 1.43 1.16 1.12 1.26

Percent Residue 55.13 58.40 61.37 61.62 48.51 84.59 75.04 82.88 61.68 57.12 64.46 62.53 70.64 72.63 83.98 74.94 74.38 75.98 58.42 51.27 61.89 80.35 77.40 81.94 56.59 73.31 74.37 75.38 63.08 72.96 68.16 58.38

Percent Incombustible 56.79 59.96 62.57 62.84 49.85 85.29 76.26 83.68 63.08 58.36 65.58 63.79 71.88 73.87 84.70 76.14 75.58 77.20 59.82 52.59 63.21 81.41 78.44 82.84 58.01 74.39 75.51 76.80 64.51 74.12 69.28 59.64

201002530-010 201002530-011 201002530-012 201002530-013 201002530-014 201002530-015 201002530-016 201002530-017 201002530-018 201002530-019
201002530~020

201002530-021 20 I 002530-022 201002530-023 20 I 002530-024 201002530-025 201002530-026 201002530-027 201002530-028 201002530-029 201002530-030 201002530-031 201002530-032 201002530-033 20 I 002530-034 201002530-035 201002530-036 201002530-037 201002530-038 201002530-039 201002530-040

Respectfully Submitted, ~oL_f! .fti'~

~

best judgment of Standard Laboratories, Inc. Standard Laboratories. Inc. makes no other representation or warranty. expressed or implied, regarding this report. This Certificate of Analysis i may not be reproduced except in full, without the written approval of Standard Laboratories, Inc. Invalid if altered ! ---"·"----------------····················"···----------------------------,..".""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""--·"""------------"··-············--"·--"-----------,.--············"······"-·"·····-·-······--····-·····"·"····"·-·"···--·······-·-·-·"·-·"·-·"·"·······--····"·-··"·"········-··"·-·····"····---·-----.J

Theana~;sis~~pi-;;-i;-;:;~"~r·i~t~;:-p~~~a-,ion-s-coniain-ed-i·n-·thi·~--~;;;rt"haVe"bee;:;-p-repa-red-;,-ihe·~i-i~-~~;s"di;:E;diOn-.-areba-sed·-~;;-~n··~;;s~·;:;ai;~n;~r-;.;;-;t;;;:;i-;;~.;.;;ieXbYthe·cTient·and-expre"SS-ihe·-----1

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618) 539-5836

PIDSBUROH, PA 15236 ATTN' MARK WESOWWSKI

Page: 12 of 59 Date: 11115/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No.

Customer ID#l

Customer ID#2

Alcohol Coking

Percent
Moisture

Percent Residue

Percent
Incombustible

Team 2 -July 14,2010-5 NORTil SECTION 20 I 002531-00 I
201002531-002 201002531-003 201002531-004 201002531-005 201002531-006 201002531-007 201002531-008 201002531-009 201002531-010 201002531-011 201002531-012 201002531-013 201002531-014 201002531-015 201002531-016 201002531-017 201002531-018 201002531-019 201002531-020 201002531-021 201002531-022 201002531-023 201002531-024 201002531-025 20 I 002531-026 201002531-027 201002531-028 201002531-029 873380 873381 873382 873383 873384 873385 873386 873387 873388 873389 873390 873391 873392 873393 873394 873395 873396 873397 873398 873399 873400 873401 873402 873403 873404 873405 873406 873407 873408 5BI7 5BI8 5BI9 5CI7 5CI8 5CI9 5015 5016 5017 TRACE SMALL TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE 1.65 1.44 1.26 1.42 1.36 1.16 1.22 1.24 1.20 60.47 53.92 64.24 60.51 59.05 61.89 67.59 65.11 63.68 69.47 62.87 82.46 76.82 86.13 75.32 70.72 76.49 85.03 83.16 81.85 86.45 88.50 83.43 64.43 58.73 60.39 68.72 70.56 68.75 62.12 55.36 65.50 61.93 60.41 63.05 68.81 66.35 64.88 70.59 64.07 83.30 77.78 86.85 76.34 71.70 77.49 85.67 83.94 82.69 87.07 89.06 84.15 65.86 60.23 61.77 70.00 71.86 70.18

TRACE
TRACE
TRACE SMALL TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE NONE NONE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE

5018
5019 5EI5
5E16

1.12
1.20 0.84 0.96 0.72 1.02 0.98 1.00 0.64 0.78 0.84 0.62 0.56 0.72 1.43 1.50 1.38 1.28 1.30 1.43

5EI7
5E18 5EI9

5FI5
5FI6

5FI7
5FI8

5Fl9
5F20 5F21 5G15 5016 5017

5GI8
5019 5020

Team 3- July 14,2010- HG 1 NORTH 201002532-001 873409 13BIO
LARGE

1.78

48.74

50.52

Respectfully Submitted,

~~@.dku,

The anal;;~;s~ ~p~~~~~~·o-;:-;-;,--;e;p--;:;i;ii~~s-;~~-;;ined inlhiS~eP~rt-h~~~- b"e~-nprepared-~t th~--~i·i;~t-; direction:-~-re based ;:;po-rlObSe-Na&;ns·;r-;;~"te~lal p~~id;d-bY"th'~--~~i-~~i-~-~d ~~p;e·~;-ih'~--bestjudgmenl of Standard laboratories, Inc. Standard laboratories. Inc. makes no other representation or warranty, expressed or implied, regarding this report. This Certificate of Analysis may not be reproduced except in ful!, without the written approval of Standard Laboratories. Inc. Invalid if altered

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX I8233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, JL 62243 (618) 539M5836

PIITSBURGH, PA 15236

ATTN' MARK WESOWWSKI

Page: 13 of 59 Date: 11/15/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No.

Customer ID#l 873410 8734I I 873412 873413 873414 873415 873416 873417 873418 873419 873420 873421 873422 873423 873424 873425 873426 873427 873428 873429 873430 873431 873432 873433 873434 873435 873436 873437 873438 873439 873440 873441

Customer ID#2 I3BII I3B12 13813 13814

Alcohol Coking LARGE LARGE
X LARGE

Percent Moisture

Percent Residue
52.15

Percent
Incombustible

201002532-002 20 I 002532-003 201002532-004 201002532-005 201002532-006 201002532-007 201002532-008 201002532-009 20I002532-0IO 201002532-011 201002532-012 201002532-013 201002532-014 201002532-015 201002532-016 201002532-017 201002532-018 201002532-019 201002532-020 201002532-021 201002532-022 201002532-023 201002532-024
20 I 002532-025

1.54 1.52 1.76 1.72 1.66 1.54 1.90 1.26 1.60 1.63 1.30 1.56 2.17 1.46 2.04 1.14 1.12 1.16 1.18 1.34 2.54 1.44 1.90 1.78 1.66 1.98 1.66 2.38 1.98 2.41 2.34 1.78

53.69 60.51 60.07 55.86 65.18

58.99 58.31 54.14 63.52 60.25 61.21 61.61 61.86 63.55 66.83 60.65 50.24 58.60 49.07 61.64 64.27 61.78 61.02 54.23 41.05 49.92 43.13 42.41 47.19 40.32 46.17 43.10 39.34 37.o7 39.49 43.16

X LARGE X LARGE LARGE X LARGE
SMALL

13BI4X 13Bl5
13B9X 13C10

61.79
63.11 62.87 63.46 65.18 68.13 62.21 52.41 60.06 51.11 62.78 65.39 62.94 62.20 55.57 43.59 51.36 45.03 44.19

13Cll 13CI2
13CI3 I3C14 13C14X 13CI5 13C9X 13D10 13011 13012 13013 13014 13014X 13015 13EIO 13E11 13EI2 13EI3 13E14

SMALL LARGE SMALL X LARGE X LARGE LARGE X LARGE SMALL
SMALL

LARGE LARGE
SMALL

X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE LARGE
X LARGE

201002532-026 201002532-027 20 I 002532-028 201002532-029 201002532-030 201002532-031 201002532-032 201002532-033

48.85
42.30 47.83 45.48 41.32 39.48

X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE LARGE

13El4X
13EI5 13E9X 13FIO 13FI1

41.83
44.94

RespectfullySubmitted,
················-·······-··---------- .........
·--·------------

~~ @~

[

......"""""""""""""""""""""""""""············-·-·-·-·..---·---·---·..

The analysis, opinions or interpretations contained in this report have been prepared at the client's direction, are based upon observations of material provided by the client and express the best judgment of Standard Laboratories, Inc. Standard laboratories. Inc. makes no other representation or warranty, expressed or Implied, regarding this report. This Certificate of Analys1s may not be reproduced except in full, without the written approval of Standard laboratories, Inc. Invalid if altered
"················-·----~---~·-·-·-·"·"···········-·-··-··--·--~----·-~---

···········------------·· ..... .

· · · · - - - - - - - - - ············--_·-··---·-----·-·--------··-------------------

---_--

..

..

""""""""""-·-·-·-·--··--···~----·-·-····"··················-

...... _... ______________________

~~--------·---~-·----·---·-·-·---·-·

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618) 539-5836

PITTSBURGH, PA 15236 ATTN: MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 14 of 59
Date: 11115/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No. 201002532-034 201002532-035 201002532-036

Customer ID#l 873442 873443 873444 873445

Customer 10#2

Alcohol Coking LARGE X LARGE LARGE LARGE

Percent Moisture
1.91 1.93 1.94 1.76

Percent Residue 42.11 38.56 34.08 37.33

Percent Incombustible 44.02 40.49 36.02 39.09

13FI2
13Fl3 13FI4 13FI5

201002532-037

Tcam4 -July 14,2010-17 TG 1 NORTH 20 I 002566-001
201002566-002 201002566-003 201002566-004 201002566-005 201002566-006 201002566-007 20 I 002566-008 201002566-009 201002566-010 20 I 002566-0 II 201002566-012 20 I 002566-013 201002566-014 873446 873447 873448 873449 873450 873451 873452 873453 873454 873455 873456 873457 873458 873459 873460 873461 873462 873463 873464 873465 873466 873467 873468 873469 873470 17AI8 17AI9 17A20 17A21 17A21X 17A22 17BI8 17B19 17B20 17B21 17B21X 17B22 17CI8 17CI9 17C20 17C21 17C21X 17C22 17DI9 l7D21X 17EI9 LARGE X LARGE LARGE SMALL SMALL SMALL LARGE SMALL SMALL LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE 2.01 1.88 2.11 2.00 1.93 1.79 2.10 2.14 1.92 2.12 1.92 2.16 1.48 1.08 1.61 49.54 48.90 51.63 51.82 50.80 45.55 50.34 32.67 48.59 45.18 51.89 44.56 63.43 72.46 51.68 71.18 65.35 68.06 56.61 48.49 38.19 37.76 51.83 34.64 35.19 51.55 50.78 53.74 53.82 52.73 47.34 52.44 34.81 50.51 47.30 53.81 46.72 64.91 73.54 53.29 72.36 66.63 69.42 58.21 50.54 39.97 39.70 53.49 36.99 36.93

SMALL
LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE SMALL SMALL SMALL

20 I 002566-015
201002566-016 201002566-017 201002566-018 201002566-019 201002566-020 201002566-021 20 I 002566-022 201002566-023 201002566-024 20 I 002566-025

1.18
1.28 1.36 1.60 2.05 1.78 1.94 1.66 2.35 1.74

17£20
17E21 17FI9 17F20

Team 5- July 14,2010-7 NORTH
201002567-001 873471 7A48 SMALL 1.68 43.90 45.58

Respectfully Submitted,

~L&/~
1

~

·h;~·;;·~iy;i·;;··~pj'~[';~s-or-interpfE;tali-;;-;;;··~~·nt~i;ect·i;thi; reporttia-v-eb;er;-p·;ep·~-~~d-~i"ihedient's di;-cli~-~~--~~~--b~~;;d~POn observations of material provided by the client and- expresS the est judgment of Standard Laboratories, Inc. Standard Laboratories, Inc. makes no other representation or warranty, expressed or implied, regarding this report. This Certificate of Analysis may not be reproduced except in full, without lhe written approval of Standard Laboratories, Inc. Invalid if altered
"_,

___________________ __________________________ _. ..............................
,

"---------------------"""""'"'"""'""""-""""

__________ ""'"'"'""""""""""""""""""-----·"·"-·"·"-----------------------------------_;i

MrNE SAFETY AND HEALTI-l ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, JL 62243 (618) 539-5836

PmSBURGH, PA 15236 AITN: MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 15 of 59 Date: 11115/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No. 201002567-002 201002567-003 201002567-004 201002567-005 201002567-006 201002567-007 201002567-008 201002567-009 201002567-010 201002567-011 201002567-012 201002567-013 201002567-014 201002567-015 201002567-016 201002567-017 201002567-018 201002567-019 201002567-020 201002567-021 201002567-022 201002567-023 201002567-024

Customer ID#l 873472 873473 873474 873475 873476 873477 873478 873479 873480 873481 873482 873483 873484 873485 873486 873487 873488 873489 873490 873491 873492 873493 873494

Customer ID#2 7A49 7B46 7847 7848 7849 7850 7C46 7C47 7C48 7C49 7C50 7046 7D47 7048 7049 7050 7E46 7E47 7E48 7E49 7F46 7F47 7F48

Alcohol Coking SMALL TRACE SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL TRACE SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL TRACE SMALL TRACE SMALL SMALL TRACE SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL

Percent Moisture 1.68 1.56 1.60 1.66 1.62 1.53 1.46 1.54 1.40 1.46 1.34 1.46 1.54 1.36 1.55 1.34 1.20 1.30 1.28 1.14 1.52 1.58 1.16

Percent Residue 44.19 32.44 34.70 33.36 38.27 50.83 39.62 35.99 49.53 49.71 54.89 45.70 44.47 47.83 50.38 56.91 54.56 51.79 47.56 59.88 38.03 30.86 63.88

Percent Incombustible 45.87 34.00 36.30 35.02 39.89 52.36 41.08 37.53 50.93 51.17 56.23 47.16 46.01 49.19 51.93 58.25 55.76 53.09 48.84 61.02 39.55 32.44 65.04

Team 6- July 14,2010-6 NORTIJ 201002568-001 201002568-002 201002568-003 201002568-004 201002568-005 201002568-006 201002568-007 201 002568-008 873495 873496 873497 873498 873499 873500 873501 873502 7810 7Bil 7B12 787 788 789 7Cll 7C12 TRACE TRACE SMALL SMALL SMALL TRACE TRACE TRACE 1.44 1.18 1.66 1.34 1.40 1.44 1.12 1.16 59.52 59.22 53.52 57.48 52.24 51.78 62.10 64.90 60.96 60.40 55.18 58.82 53.64 53.22 63.22 66.06

Respectfully Submitted, ~o/! @~
Thea-n-al;,s-;s:·op;;:;;-onso~l~l~~~~~;ih;n;·;:;;;-~t;i~~--~~~h;;-~~Port have b;;;en-;;·repared ;t-the·c~~enrs-dirE;CtiO~~;-re-b~;~d upo~-~b;~;;.;·;u~~~-~f-~~~e~i;l ;;-~~~~d-~dbYihe client and express the best judgment of Standard laboratories, Inc. Standard Laboratories, Inc. makes no other representation or warranty, expressed or implied, regarding this report. This Certificate of Analysis may not be reproduced except in full, without the written approval of Standard laboratories, Inc. Invalid if altered
I

j

MINE SAFETY AND HEAL1H ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

. STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618) 539-5836

PTITSBURGH, PA 15236 ATTN: MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 16 of 59 Date: 11/15/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No. 201002568-009 201002568-010 201002568-011 201002568-012 201002568-013 201002568-014 201002568-015 201002568-016 201002568-017 201002568-018 201002568-019 201002568-020 201002568-021

Customer ID#l 873503 873504 873505 873506 873507 873508 873509 873510 873511 873512 873513 873514 873515

Customer ID#2 7C7 7C8 7C9 707 708 709 7E5X 7E7 7E8 7E9 7F5 7F6 7F7

Alcohol Coking lRACE lRACE lRACE lRACE lRACE TRACE TRACE lRACE TRACE TRACE lRACE lRACE NONE

Percent Moisture 1.16 1.24 1.38 1.12 0.92 1.04 1.22 1.06 0.82 0.82 1.32 1.44 1.30

Percent Residue 57.58 55.56 55.35 66.25 78.72 72.47 72.15 73.94 76.74 74.72 57.38 56.32 60.88

Percent Incombustible 58.74 56.80 56.73 67.37 79.64 73.51 73.37 75.00 77.56 75.54 58.70 57.76 62.18

Team 7- July 14,2010-8 NORTH MAINS 201002569-001 201002569-002 20 I 002569-003 201002569-004 201002569-005 201002569-006 201002569-007 201002569-008 201002569-009 201002569-010 201002569-011 201002569-012 201002569-013 201002569-014 201002569-015 201002569-016 201002569-017 201002569-018 873516 873517 873518 873519 873520 873521 873522 873523 873524 873525 873526 873527 873528 873529 873530 873531 873532 873533 9A5 9A6 9A7 9A7X 9A8 985 986 987 9B7X 988 9C5 9C6 9C7 9C7X 9C8 905 906 907 lRACE SMALL SMALL LARGE SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL LARGE SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL 2.64 1.80 2.03 2.02 1.92 2.62 2.11 2.29 2.36 1.72 1.61 1.42 1.49 2.12 1.89 1.76 1.80 1.86 45.34 41.31 40.97 42.68 40.32 45.52 43.19 44.83 44.17 48.94 47.28 52.17 56.41 43.86 42.47 45.07 41.51 43.29 47.98 43.11 43.00 44.70 42.24 48.14 45.30 47.12 46.53 50.66 48.89 53.59 57.90 45.98 44.36 46.83 43.31 45.15

Respectfully Submitted, ~of'! .fti'~
----·--····--······

··-----------···-··················------····

...... ··-------·-·-·-·············----------- . ..... .

....... . . ..

··---·-·--·-··-----··----,

[

The analysis, opinions or interpretations contained in this report have been prepared at the client's direction, are based upon observations of material provided by the client and e)q)ress the best judgment of Standard Laboratories, Inc. Standard Laboratories, Inc. makes no other representation or warranty, expressed or implied, regarding this report. This Certificate of Analysis may not be reproduced except in full, without the written approval of Standard laboratories, Inc. Invalid if altered

!
!

!

-------------------·······-·······-·-·-··-------------"'""'"''"'''''""'''''''''''"'-------·--------------······-···-·---···----------------............ ,_ • ._ ____________________________ , _________________ , .... ., ...... ., ... ., .................., ... , _____________________ j

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618) 539-5836

PIDSBURGH, PA 15236 ATTN: MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 17 of 59
Date: ll/15/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No.
201002569-019 201002569-020 20 I 002569-021

Customer ID# 1
873534 873535 873536 873537 873538 873539 873540 873541 873542

Customer ID#2 9D7X 9D8 9E6 9E7 9E7X 9E8 9F6 9F7 9F8

Alcohol Coking SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL LARGE SMALL

Percent Moisture
2.44 1.60 2.25 1.68 2.07 1.88 2.49 1.60 1.85

Percent
Residue
42.10 50.06 42.61 46.94 39.64 46.44 34.58 42.51

Percent
Incombustible
44.54 51.66 44.86 48.62 41.71 48.32 37.07 44.11 42.99

201002569-022
201002569-023 201002569-024 201002569-025 201002569-026 201002569-027

SMALL
SMALL SMALL

41.14

Team 8- July 14,2010- SECT. 10 8 NORTH MAINS
201002570-001 20 I 002570-002 201002570-003 201002570-004 873543 873544 873545 873546 873547 873548 873549 873550 873551 873552 873553 873554 873555 873556 873557 873558 873559 873560 873561 873562 873563 873564 IOAIO lOA! OX
IOA11

LARGE X LARGE SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE SMALL SMALL

1.64 1.77 1.74 1.84 1.78 1.72 1.60 1.68 1.70

46.01 44.86 45.60 38.30 43.11 39.56 46.47 47.40 48.53 47.02 44.14 40.93 37.94 35.12 38.54 39.32 40.26 43.27 38.41 38.84 47.44 41.07

47.65 46.63 47.34 40.14 44.89 41.28

IOA4 IOA5 IOA6 IOA7 IOA8 IOA9 IOBIO lOBI OX lOBI!
1084
1085

20 I 002570-005
201002570-006 201002570-007 201002570-008 201002570-009

48.07
49.08 50.23 49.05 46.01 43.08 40.00 37.02 40.37 41.41 42.44 45.13 40.45 40.72 49.03 42.93

20 I 002570-0 I 0
201002570-011

2.03
1.87 2.15 2.06 1.90 1.83 2.09

201002570-012
201002570-013 201002570-014 201002570-015 201002570-016

IOB6 10B7
1088

SMALL
SMALL SMALL LARGE

20 I 002570-017
201002570-018 201002570-019 201002570-020 201002570-021 201002570-022

2.18
1.86 2.04

IOB9 IOC4

SMALL
SMALL SMALL SMALL

toes
IOC6 IOC7

1.88
1.59 1.86

Respectfully Submitted, ~eLf!@~

~

~.~~;~~~~~~~~-~~~~~;~~~~:~~~;:-f~;-~;~~~~~~J~:~~t~r~eas~f!~~::~~-~~~~Ir~~:~e:~~~i~~~~~:r:~~~:~~~~~:~~:~:fe~~!;~~f~;-~~i~~~~~~~~~~~~~~fJc~~~-~fi~:~~~
y not be reproduced except in ful!, without the written approval of Standard laboratories, Inc. Invalid if altered

"''- -]

--------------·-·········"'"''"-·"·-----------------···············"·----------------------····--·-·-----------,. ................ _, _________________________________________________________________________ ......J

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618) 539-5836

PmSBURGH, PA 15236
ATIN: MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 18 of 59
Date: 11115/2010 8:43:53 AM

Alcohol

Lab No.
201002570-023 201002570-024

Customer ID#l 873565 873566 873567 873568 873569 873570 873571 873572

Customer ID#2

Coking
SMALL

Percent Moisture
2.14 2.14 1.62 2.00 2.08 1.84 2.08 2.07

Percent Residue 37.33 38.04 52.86 44.05 37.63 39.48 38.75 44.19

Percent Incombustible
39.47 40.18 54.48 46.05

IOCS
IOC9 IOD4

SMALL

20 I 002570-025
201002570-026 201002570-027 201002570-028 201002570-029 201002570-030

SMALL
SMALL

1005
IOD6

SMALL
SMALL SMALL SMALL

39.71
41.32 40.83 46.26

1007
IOD8

10D9

Team9 -July 14,2010 -CUTOUTBETWEENHG IN AND IN
201002588-001 201002588-002 201002588-003 201002588-004 201002588-005 201002588-006 201002588-007 201002588-008 201002588-009 201002588-010 201002588-0ll 201002588-012 201002588-013 201002588-014 201002588-015 201002588-016 201002588-017 20 l 002588-0 I 8 201002588-019 201002588-020 201002588-021 201002588-022 201002588-023 873573 873574 873575 873576 873577 873578 873579 873580 873581 873582 873583 873584 873585 873586 873587 873588 873589 873590 873591 873592 873593 873594 873595 14C1 14C2 14C3 14C4 14C5 14C6 14C6X 14C7 14C8 X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE 2.40 1.98 1.93 1.91 1.79 1.32 1.54 !.52 !.56 !.90 1.82 2.02 1.82 1.34 1.92 !.56 1.83 1.70 1.82 1.74 1.39 1.89 1.70 47.42 48.15 46.72 47.52 49.37 52.49 45.00 48.47 43.79 51.67 52.65 48.71 46.00 59.16 45.31 52.36 45.28 43.71 59.06 54.55 53.63 48.69 53.08 49.82

50.13
48.65 49.43

X LARGE
LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE X LARGE X LARGE LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE LARGE X LARGE SMALL X LARGE LARGE SMALL X LARGE X LARGE

51.l6
53.81 46.54 49.99 45.35 53.57 54.47 50.73 47.82 60.50 47.23 53.92 47.11 45.41 60.88 56.29 55.02 50.58 54.78

1401
14D2 14D3 14D4 14D5 14D6
14D6X

1407
14D8 l4El I4E2 14E3 I4E4 14E5

RespectfullySubmitted, ~,L t'd~

[

··;:;~"~~-~iy;i·;;·;;p;-~j;;sor inte;:p~~~~-~-~~;··~~~i;inedirithiS-;:;p~rt-h"~~;-b~~;:;-prepared atth~-~~~~-~·i;;·dir~ction~-ar~-b~-;;:J"~P~~-~bs"~iVations of material p;.m;idedbY the client OOd8-;qlffiSs"th;--

b·'".. i"_''.·m·'· nl of S..'.'. ndard laboratories, Inc.. S.t.andard laborato. ries., Inc . m'.'". no other r_''. "_"".tation or warranty.. " .. ''.'.'."'. or impli_''· ..'..egar.din. g th.is rep '"_· T.his Certificate of Analysis .. .. __ m~ ~-~~ _b_~.:.=~-~-o-~u~.~-~ ex~~~ in full~~!~~"~~:..~.':.~~!ten approv~~~~-~:~-~-~-=:~.-=~ora~~~~~ ~~:".~~~::~~~~.~~red

____ "----···--····--······-···- _ ____________________________] ··-

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618} 539-5836

PITTSBURGH, PA 15236 AITN: MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 19 of 59 Date: 11/15/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No. 20 1002588-{124 201002588-025 201002588-026 201002588-027 20 I 002588-028 201002588-029 20 I 002588-030 201002588-031

Customer ID# 1 873596 873597 873598 873599 873600 873601 873602 873603

Customer ID#2 I4E6 14E6X 14E7 14E8 14F6 14F6X 14F7 14F8

Alcohol Coking X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE LARGE LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL

Percent Moisture 1.60 1.51 1.86 1.80 1.30 1.43 1.46 1.22

Percent Residue 52.13 54.57 48.52 48.49 56.55 52.78 53.22 51.01

Percent Incombustible 53.73 56.08 50.38 50.29 57.85 54.21 54.68 52.23

Team 10 -July 14,2010- SECTION 16 TG 201002589-001 201002589-002 201002589-003 201002589-004 201002589-005 201002589-006 201002589-007 20 I 002589-008 201002589-009 201002589-010 201002589-011 201002589-012 201002589-013 20 I 002589-014 201002589-015 201002589-016 201002589-017 201002589-018 20 I 002589-019 201002589-020 201002589-021 201002589-022 201002589-023 873604 873605 873606 873607 873608 873609 873610 873611 873612 873613 873614 873615 873616 873617 873618 873619 873620 873621 873622 873623 873624 873625 873626 16AIO 16All 16AI2 16A8 16A9 16B10 16Bl 1 16BI2 16B8 16B9 16CIO 16CII 16C12 16C8 16C9 16010 16011 16012 1608 16D9 16EIO 16EII 16EI2 SMALL SMALL SMALL TRACE TRACE SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL TRACE SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL !.56 1.94 2.10 1.54 1.72 1.74 1.58 1.78 1.46 1.38 1.18 1.42 1.16 1.22 1.42 1.40 1.85 1.44 1.44 1.46 1.66 1.70 1.89 52.16 46.96 41.18 54.15 48.11 55.69 54.20 50.84 57.32 59.47 66.73 65.75 65.66 69.82 59.04 70.68 55.17 63.64 63.52 66.21 49.61 51.56 42.83 53.72 48.90 43.28 55.69 49.83 57.43 55.78 52.62 58.78 60.85 67.91 67.17 66.82 71.04 60.46 72.08 57.02 65.08 64.96 67.67 51.27 53.26 44.72

Respectfully Submitted,

~at!! @~
;

~

-----·-··--·-···

The analysis, opinions or interpretations contained in this report have been prepared at the client's direction, are based upon observations of material provided by the client and express the best judgment of Standard Laboratories, Inc. Standard Laboratories, Inc. makes no other representation or warranty, expressed or implied, regarding this report This Certificate of Analysis may not be reproduced except in full, without the written approval of Standard Laboratories, Inc. Invalid if altered

··-·--··-----···-······---------· ......... -----------············-·---------·-···· . . . . ········-···--·----------------·--,

j
j

-------------.-·-·-·---------··"''"'""'"'-·-----------..---·-·-·"'""'"'"'"'"'"-----------..................._, ________________ .. ______ ., _____ ,,,...............................----·-··········----·-·--··················------l

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618) 539w5836

PmSBURGH, PA 15236 ATTN: MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 20 of 59 Date: 11/15/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No. 20 I 002589-024 201002589w025 20 I 002589-026 201002589w027 201002589-028

Customer ID#l 873627 873628 873629 873630 873631

Customer 10#2 16E9 16FIO 16Fll 16FI2 16GI2

Alcohol Coking SMALL SMALL SMALL LARGE LARGE

Percent Moisture 1.78 1.66 2.38 2.06 1.93

Percent Residue 49.76 55.37 50.65 41.81 47.48

Percent Incombustible 51.54 57.03 53.03 43.87 49.41

Team I wJuly 15,2010 wSN PARALLEL MAINS 201002590-00 I 201002590-002 201002590w003 201002590-004 20 I 002590-005 201002590-006 201002590-007 201002590-008 20 I 002590w009 201002590-010
201002590~011

873632 873633 873634 873635 873636 873637 873638 873639 873640 873641 873642 873643 873644 873645 873646 873647 873648 873649 873650 873651 873652 873653 873654 873655 873656

6AIO 6AIOX 6A7 6A8 6A8X 6A9 6BIO 6BIOX 6B7 6B8 6B8X 6B9 6CIO 6CIOX 6Cll 6C7 6C9 6010 6DIOX 6011 607 609 6EIO 6Ell 6E7

NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE

1.38 1.42 1.38 1.66 1.53 1.34 0.90 1.12 1.08 1.26 1.30 1.14 1.20 0.68 0.86 1.38 0.88 1.04 0.78 1.14 1.14 0.94 1.28 0.94 1.68

59.24 62.71 66.19 29.19 41.22 77.58 78.37 73.33 71.51 36.87 79.60 67.00 75.41 84.46 77.50 59.59 80.77 79.66 83.72 73.17 77.30 68.75 64.78 72.83 64.19

60.62 64.13 67.57 30.85 42.75 78.92 79.27 74.45 72.59 38.13 80.90 68.14 76.61 85.14 78.36 60.97 81.65 80.70 84.50 74.31 78.44 69.69 66.06 73.77 65.87

201002590-012 201002590-013 201002590w014 201002590-015 20 I 002590w0 16 201002590w017 201002590-018 201002590-019 201002590-020 201002590w021 201002590-022 20 I 002590-023 201002590-024 201002590-025

Team 2 wJuly 15,2010 • 5 NORTH SECTION

Respectfully Submitted,

~~W.dkw

~

The~n~·iy~i·;;·-~pl~ion·s-or-in;-~p-~;t";.;tl~n~--~~~t;in-ed in this-;:;;p;-rt··h-;;~~-·bae·~-prepared-ai·th-e-;l;;:;~i:~-;:;i·~~cti~n:arebaSed-~li-~~--~;;~e·;:;,;·~i-i~~~-;;f·;;~·teriai·p-;~~id-ed-b;-;;;~-~i~~-~~--;~d--eXPr~·~;-the-·-

bestjudgment of Standard Laboratories, Inc. Standard laboratories, Inc. makes no other representation or warranty, expressed or implied, regarding this report. This Certificate of Analysis

may not be reproduced except in full, without the written approval of Standard Laboratories, Inc. Invalid if altered

--------------------·········--··-·---···----------···-·-···················-·-·------------------·-·---·········-··--·---------------------·····-···················--·-------------------------················-····················-··-·······-··-·······-···········-··-·-······-·····-··-····-·-·················-·---·······..!

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618) 539-5836

PITTSBURGH, PA 15236
ATTNo MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 21 of 59 Date: 11115/2010 8:43:53 AM

Alcohol
Lab No. 201 002604-001 201002604-002 201002604-003 201002604-()04 20 I 002604-005 201002604-()06 201002604-007 201002604-008 201002604-009 201002604-010 201002604-011 201002604-012 201002604-013 201002604-014 201002604-015 201002604-016 201002604-017 201002604-018 201002604-019 201002604-020 201002604-021 201002604-022 201002604-023 201002604-024

Customer ID#l
873657 873658 873659 873660 873661 873662 873663 873664 873665 873666 873667 873668 873669 873670 873671 873672 873673 873674 873675 873676 873677 873678 873679 873680

Customer ID#2 5B13 5B14

Coking TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE NONE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE NONE NONE NONE TRACE TRACE NONE

Percent Moisture 1.14 1.24 1.08 1.58 1.58 1.22 1.36 1.42 1.30 1.34 1.47 1.34 120 1.38 1.10 1.18 1.92 0.80 0.90 0.96 0.48 1.26 1.94 2.26

Percent
Residue
63.64 66.41 74.08 56.90 59.82 56.69 59.08 61.72 69.27 57.45 57.57 45.26 56.16 66.23 73.47 70.54 73.03 85.81 84.03 77.59 95.60 84.57 56.19 54.41

Percent

Incombustible
64.78 67.65 75.16 58.48 61.40 57.91 60.44 63.14

5BI4X
5815 5816
5C12X 5C13 5C14

5CI4X
5C15 5C16 5D12 5D12X 5D13 5D14 5D14X 5E12 5E13 5E14

70.57
58.79 59.04 46.60 57.36

67.61
74.57 71.72 74.95 86.61

NONE
TRACE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE

84.93
78.55 96.08 85.83 58.13 56.67

5EI4X
5F13 5F14 5GB 5G14

Team3 -July 15,2010-HG I NORTH
201002609-001 201002609-002 201002609-003 201002609-004 201002609-005 201 002609-006 201002609-007 873681 873682 873683 873684 873685 873686 873687 13B16 13B17 LARGE X LARGE 1.62 2.35 2.24 1.62 57.29 40.12 41.68 49.70 52.15 63.92 44.31 58.91 42.47 43.92 51.32 53.89 65.14 46.08

13818
13B19 13C16

LARGE
LARGE X LARGE LARGE X LARGE

1.74
1.22 1.77

13Cl7
13C18

Respectfully Submitted, ~a~.'! @~

I

The-an-atysis~-~Pi~ion;·~~--j·~-;~;p-~i~li~~s-wntained-in-ihiS-;;port·h-~~~--b~~n-p;:epared-;t-the-cti;~t;;d;;c;;cn~~~~-bas~d;;pQ;iobservations-~Xmateriar-p-;c;~id-edbYthectientand-e;pres~-the----: best judgment of Standard laboratories, Inc. Standard laboratories. Inc. makes no other representation or warranty, expressed or implied, regarding this report. This Certificate of Analysis ! may not be reproduced except in full, without the written approval of Standard Laboratories, Inc. Invalid if altered !

·-----"-------"---------------------.....................""""-"·--------------------------·.,··-·--·····-·······"····--·--------------------·-·-·-·-.,···················"""""-""""""""""""--"----------------------------"-----------------------"--"---""-"""""""·"------J

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTil ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

. STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618) 539-5836

PTITSBURGH, PA 15236 ATTN: MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 22 of 59 Date: 11/15/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No. 201002609-008 201002609-009 201002609-010 201002609-0 l1 201002609-012 201002609.()13 201002609-014 201002609-015 201002609-016 201002609-017 201002609-018 201002609-019 20 I 002609-020

Customer ID#I 873688 873689 873690 873691 873692 873693 873694 873695 873696 873697 873698 873699 873700

Customer ID#2

Alcohol Coking SMALL SMALL LARGE LARGE SMALL X LARGE X LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE

Percent Moisture !.54
1.42

Percent Residue 49.94 49.11 53.22 47.30 53.47

Percent
Incombustible 51.48 50.53 54.54 48.78 54.81 37.42 38.53 40.95 43.64 44.84 45.98 42.73 43.16

13Cl9
13D16

13017
13D18 13D19 13E16

1.32 1.48 1.34 2.22 1.62 1.74

35.20
36.91 39.21 41.96 43.18 44.34 41.21 41.50

13EI7
13E18 13E19 13F16 13F17 13F18 13F19

1.68
1.66 1.64 1.52 1.66

Team 4- July 15, 2010- 17 TG 1 NORTII 201002611-001 201002611-002 201002611-003 201002611-004 201002611-005 20 I 002611-006 201002611-007 201002611-008 201002611-009 201002611-010 201002611-011 201002611-012 201002611-013 201002611-014 201002611-015 201002611-016 201002611-017 201002611-018 873701 873702 873703 873704 873705 873706 873707 873708 873709 873710 873711 873712 873713 873714 873715 873716 873717 873718

17AI4
17A15 17A16

X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE LARGE X LARGE LARGE LARGE

1.98 2.06 1.90 1.94 2.04 1.98 1.54 2.09 1.48 1.16 1.53 1.58 1.38 1.44 1.46 1.82 1.58 1.71

40.89 38.68 38.90 49.57 33.37 36.31 45.33 44.17 48.40 60.56 52.93 52.62 55.35 52.81 52.60 49.02 40.23 39.88

42.87 40.74 40.80 51.51 35.41 38.29 46.87 46.26 49.88 61.72 54.46 54.20 56.73 54.25 54.06 50.84 41.81 41.59

17AI7
17B14 17815 17816 17817 17C14 17C15 17C16 17C17 17D15 17D16

X LARGE X LARGE
X LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE

17017
17D18

17E15
17EJ6

Respectfully Submitted, ~L &1~

f

The·~~~~;;rs~~Pirli~ns-o;:-;;:;t;~-;;iai·i-;:;n;··~~nt~·;n;dTn-thiS·;;port-h~~~-b~~-~·;;·~~p;~;d-~i-tiie-clienrs-diffi~t;~·~·;··~~~--b·~~ed-~p-on-obse-Nafu;ns·arma.~;:;ai-;;ro~Td-ed··by-the-·~iie~ta;;-d--;;~p~es~th~

best judgment of Standard Laboratories, Inc. Standard Laboratories, Inc. makes no other representation or warranty, expressed or implied, regarding this report. This Certificate of Analysis may not be reproduced except in full, without the written approval of Standard Laboratories, Inc. Invalid if altered

!
i

-···································-·-·········-"·""-·"·---·--·-·------·-··-··-·····-····-·-·-··-·----------·-····-·-················-·""""""··"·"·--·--------·-·---·-·-···········-··-··-·-·-·"-"-·"-·---·-------------·-----·-----·-·-----·-·-·--·-·-·-·'

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618)
539~5836

PITTSBURGH, PA 15236 ATTN' MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 23 of 59 Date: 11115/2010 8:43:53 AM

Alcohol Lab No.
201002611-019 201002611-020 201002611-021 201002611-022 201002611-023 201002611-024 Customer ID#l 873719 873720 873721 873722 873723 873724 Customer 10#2 17E17 17E18 Coking LARGE X LARGE

Percent Moisture 1.50 1.78 1.57 1.51 1.85 1.83

Percent Residue 44.89 39.38 36.16 41.60 34.44 29.80

Percent Incombustible
46.39 41.16 37.73 43.11 36.29 31.63

17FI5
17F16 17Fl7 17F18

SMALL
SMALL

X LARGE
SMALL

Team 5 -July 15,2010-7 NORTH
201002612-001 201002612-002 201002612-003 201002612-004 201002612-005 201002612-006 201002612-007 201002612-008 201002612-009 201002612-010 201002612-011 201002612-012 201002612-013 201002612-014 201002612-015 201002612-016 201002612-017 201002612-018 201002612-019 201002612-020 201002612-021 201002612-{)22 201002612-023 201002612-024 201002612-025 873725 873726 873727 873728 873729 873730 873731 873732 873733 873734 873735 873736 7A45X 7A46 7A47 7B42 7B43 7B44 7B45 SMALL SMALL SMALL TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE SMALL TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE SMALL TRACE 1.62 1.64 1.57 1.74 1.62 1.60 1.72 1.70 1.46 1.56 1.60 1.50 1.62 1.58 1.50 1.56 1.62 1.66 1.14 1.62 1.40 1.41 1.81 1.60 1.60 34.67 39.78 42.74 34.26 35.77 37.13 40.55 34.74 43.35 39.69 39.76 39.93 42.65 47.16 47.70 47.04 44.03 52.51 62.18 42.72 48.80 48.70 40.68 31.33 35.95 36.29 41.42 44.31 36.00 37.39 38.73 42.27 36.44 44.81 41.25 41.36 41.43 44.27 48.74 49.20 48.60 45.65 54.17 63.32 44.34 50.20 50.11 42.49 32.93 37.55

7B45X
7C42 7C43 7C44 7C45 7C45X 7042 7043 7044 7045 7D45X

873737
873738 873739 873740 873741 873742 873743 873744

TRACE
TRACE TRACE

SMALL
SMALL SMALL TRACE TRACE SMALL

7E42
7E43 7E44 7E45 7E45X

873745
873746 873747 873748 873749

7F42
7F43

SMALL
TRACE

Respectfully Submitted, ~~ .fd~

f

rh-;;;·-~~~~y;r-;;:·~pi~-i~;;sorintar;;;:et~ti;:;;;~·-~~;;·;;;in;c;·;;;-~hiSrePorth-a;.;e-b~~;·p·~e"P;~ed";;i-ihe-CJient·S-di~~~ii·~-~·;··~~e·"b~Sed"~ponobse-rVatiOns·Or-materiaJ-pro~id-ed-bY-ih_e_Ciieni-and-e;press-the____

!

best judgment of Standard laboratories, Inc. Standard laboratories, Inc. makes no other representation or warranty, expressed or implied, regarding this report. This Certificate of Analysis i may not be reproduced except in full, without the written approval of Standard laboratories, Inc. Invalid if altered I ------------·--·••"'"""'"'"'''"''"'-·---------------~----·--· .. ··· ............. --·-·--"·-·"---------------.................... ".. """'"'-----------------------------............... --."·"-----"-·-"·-----------"~-----------~------------""---~J

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618)
539~5836

PITTSBURGH, PA 15236 ATTN: MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 24 of 59 Date: 11/15/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No. 201002612-026 201002612-027 Team 6
~July

Customer ID#l 873750 873751

Customer 10#2 7F44 7F45

Alcohol Coking TRACE TRACE

Percent Moisture 1.74 1.56

Percent Residue 34.35 41.78

Percent Incombustible 36.09 43.34

15,2010 ~ 6 NORTII 873752 873753 873754 873755 873756 873757 873758 873759 873760 873761 873762 873763 873764 873765 873766 873767 7BIOX 7CIO 7CIOX 7010 7D10X 7011 7012 7EIO 7EIOX 7Ell 7EI2 7FIO 7Fll 7F12 7F13 7FI4 SMALL TRACE SMALL TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE 1.66 3.65 3.83 1.70 1.42 1.81 1.34 1.00 1.50 2.08 1.08 1.56 2.96 2.83 1.82 1.76 50.87 57.48 53.17 65.64 67.82 68.51 65.58 71.53 65.40 76.66 71.45 59.53 61.13 58.86 52.50 52.17 52.53 61.13 57.00 67.34 69.24 70.32 66.92 72.53 66.90 78.74 72.53 61.09 64.09 61.69 54.32 53.93

201002613-001 201002613-002 201002613-003 201002613-004 201002613-005 20 I 002613~006 201002613-007 201002613-008 201002613-009 201002613-010 201002613-011
201002613~012
201002613~013

201002613-014 201002613-015 201002613-016

Team 7 ~July 15,2010 ~ 9 NORTIJ MAINS 201002614-001 201002614-002 201002614-003 201002614-004 201002614-005 201002614-006 201002614-007 201002614-008 201002614-009
201002614~010

873768 873769 873770 873771 873772 873773 873774 873775 873776 873777 873778 873779

9AIO 9All 9A12 9A9 9BIO 9BII 9BI2 9B9 9CIO 9Cll 9CI2 9C9

LARGE LARGE
LARGE

1.94 1.78 1.89 2.07 1.82 1.69 1.61 1.70 1.68 1.58 1.61 1.54

44.56 42.58 46.29 40.36 43.87 44.23 53.85 48.90 56.06 52.51 47.79 53.90

46.50 44.36 48.18 42.43 45.69 45.92 55.46 50.60 57.74 54.09 49.40 55.44

LARGE SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL

201002614-0 II 201002614-012

Respectfully Submitted, ~~@.dkt,

l

'"'"""""""""""""""'""""'""""'""'--"'---------------................. __ """-·----------..............................""'" ___ ., _______________ , _______ , ..........."""-·""'·-------------.. --------.. -----.. --...........................................................................................................___ ,..................... !

rh;·;;;~-aJys;s:op;nia-ns·;;-;~-i~ij;-~;;i'~iiO~scontainediri-thiS ~~p;rt·t;~;;~·-b;;~np~~;;aredat-ih-e-~-~~~-n-;;·g··di';:;;;i"On~-are-baS~d~-p;~··~bs-;;~ai·ions"Of-;;:;~t~~~~-;;~~id.~d-·by-;t;~-;Ti-;;n;·;;:;d"~~P~~ss··i'h-;-·-"·1 best judgment of Standard Laboratories, Inc. Standard laboratories. Inc. makes no other representation or warranty, expressed or implied, regarding this report. This Certificate of Analysis ! may not be reproduced except in full, without the written approval of Standard laboratories, Inc. Invalid if altered !

..

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, JL 62243 (618) 539-5836

PmSBURGH, PA 15236 ATTN: MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 25 of 59 Date: 11/15/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No. 201002614-013 201002614-014 201002614-015 201002614-016 201002614-017 201002614-018 201002614-019 201002614-020 201002614-021 201002614-022 201002614-023 201002614-024

Customer ID# 1 873780 873781 873782 873783 873784 873785 873786 873787 873788 873789 873790 873791

Customer ID#2 9010 9011 9012 909 9EIO 9Ell 9E12 9E9 9FIO 9Fll 9F12 9F9

Alcohol Coking SMALL LARGE LARGE SMALL SMALL SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE

Percent Moisture 1.76 1.78 1.62 1.64 1.52 1.46 1.78 1.62 1.80 1.70 1.74 2.50

Percent Residue 43.98 46.41 50.23 47.75 49.75 52.80 52.20 46.13 52.87 54.65 46.96 42.02

Percent Incombustible 45.74 48.19 51.85 49.39 51.27 54.26 53.98 47.75 54.67 56.35 48.70 44.52

Team 8 -July 15,2010- SECT. 10 8TH NORTH MAINS 201002615-001 201002615-002 201002615-003 201002615-004 201002615-005 201002615-006 201002615-007 201002615-008 201002615-009 201002615-010 201002615-011 201002615-012 201002615-013 201002615-014 201002615-015 201002615-016 201002615-017 201002615-018 201002615-019 873792 873793 873794 873795 873796 873797 873798 873799 873800 873801 873802 873803 873804 873805 873806 873807 873808 873809 873810 10A16 lOA17 IOAI8 IOA18X 10Al9X IOBI6 IOB17 !OBIS IOBI8X 10Bl9X IOCI6 10CI7 10016 10017 IOE12 IOE13 IOEI4 10E15 IOEI6 X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE LARGE X LARGE LARGE X LARGE X LARGE LARGE LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE 2.43 2.85 3.45 2.78 3.30 2.76 2.92 2.57 2.50 5.03 2.47 2.36 2.53 2.59 2.17 2.51 2.45 2.61 2.53 46.74 46.78 44.22 54.49 41.12 43.61 43.99 40.17 39.16 45.91 39.71 38.23 39.01 37.51 45.98 48.79 46.03 50.07 45.93 49.17 49.63 47.67 57.27 44.42 46.37 46.91 42.74 41.66 50.94 42.18 40.59 41.54 40.10 48.15 51.30 48.48 52.68 48.46

RespectfullySubmitted, ~~ @~
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - .........._. ___________________________ ,..................... _ .. ___________________________ ... . ........ ........ . .. ...... ..... .. ................ -------------The analysis, opinions or interpretations contained in this report have been prepared al the client's direction, are based upon observations of material provided by the client and express the best judgment of Standard laboratories, Inc. Standard laboratories, Inc. makes no other representation or warranty, expressed or implied, regarding this repor1. This Certificate of Analysis may not be reproduced except in full, without the written approval of Standard laboratories, Inc. Invalid if altered

................................................___________________________ ............------------------··-----·····--···--···..··..····----------·--··-................................................................................... _, _______________ --' 1

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618) 539-5836

PiTTSBURGH, PA 15236 ATTNo MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 26 of 59
Date: 11/15/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No.
20 I 002615-020

Customer ID#l 8738ll 873812 8738!3 873814 873815 873816

Customer ID#2 l0Fl2 l0Fl3 l0Fl4 lOFtS l0Fl6 l0F17

Alcohol Coking LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE
X LARGE

Percent Moisture
2.44 2.04 3.07 3.31 2.11 3.74

Percent Residue
43.73 53.23 42.28 44.66 54.43 46.63

Percent Incombustible 46.17 55.27 45.35 47.97 56.54 50.37

20!002615-021 20!002615-022 20 l 002615-023 201002615-024
20 I 002615-025

Team 9- July 15,2010- CUT-OUT BETWEENHGIN AND TGIN/CROSSOVER HG22-TG22 20!002616-001 20 l 002616-002 201002616-003 20!002616-004 20 !002616-005 20!002616-006 201002616-007 20 !002616-008 201002616-009 20 !002616-0 lO 201002616-0ll 201002616-012 201002616-0!3 20!002616-014 201002616-015 873817 873818 873819 873820 873821 873822 873823 873824 873825 873826 873827 873828 873829 873830 873831 l2AlX l2Bl l2BlX l2Cl 12CIX l2Dl l4F2 14F3 14F4 l4F5 l4G4 14G5 l4G6 l4G7 l4G8 SMALL TRACE LARGE TRACE LARGE TRACE SMALL LARGE X LARGE LARGE SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL !.82 !.52 !.64 1.38 !.76 l.l6 1.79 !.76 !.84 1.52 0.98 1.40 1.52 !.56 !.60 45.91 37.!1 44.07 43.88 44.55 54.04 5!.81 56.19 52.66 57.63 65.53 57.81 52.37 43.90 44.60 47.73 38.63 45.7! 45.26 46.31 55.20 53.60 57.95 54.50 59.15 66.51 59.21 53.89 45.46 46.20

SMALL

Team 10- July 15,2010- TG I NORTH
20!002617-001 201002617-002 201002617-003 201002617-004 20!002617-005 20!002617-006
20 I 002617-007

873832 873833 873834 873835 873836 873837 873838 873839 873840

16Al3

SMALL LARGE LARGE

!.78

44.92 4l.l4 34.07 40.09 50.37 5!.51 33.34 37.77 62.78

46.70 43.37 36.35 42.30 52.11 53.11 35.11 39.74 64.00

16Al4
16A15 l6A16 l6Bl3 l6Bl4 16Bl5 l6Bl6 l6Cl3

2.23
2.28 2.21

X LARGE
LARGE LARGE LARGE SMALL SMALL

1.74
!.60 !.77 !.97 !22

201002617-008 20!002617-009

Respectfully Submitted, ~.LW~

~

eana~YSTS;-;p-;;:;;o;:;so~-i-nt~;:p·;·~~iiQ;:;;·~ontaTned in u:;;sreporthW~"b~~-~-p~~p~-;:~d~!tlieCiient;sdi·recli~;,-:-·~~~··;;;;~~i ~p;;;:; observations of material p;.Ovlded-bY!h8Ciient-and stjudgment of Standard Laboratories, Inc. Standard Laboratories, Inc. makes no other representation or warranty, expressed or implied, regarding this report. This Certificate of Analysis y not be reproduced except in full, without the written approval of Standard Laboratories, Inc. Invalid if altered

e;presSth8"""--!

!
i

-·--·----·--·····-·-··--------·-·-·--·--·---·--·--·-·-·-·-·-·-·--·--·--~---------·-·-···············-····-··---·--·-·-·--·--------·--·--·-········-···--·--·---·-·-·--·-·--·-·--·-----·---·-------------)

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTil ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX I8233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618)
539~5836

PIITSBURGH, PA 15236 ATTN: MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 27 of 59 Date: 11/15/2010 8:43:53 AM

Alcohol
Lab No. 20I0026I7-0IO 2010026I7-0II 201002617-012 20I0026I7-0I3 201002617-014 20I0026I7-0I5 201002617-016 2010026I7-0I7 20I0026I7-0I8 201002617-019 20I0026I7-020 20I0026I7-02I 20I0026I7-022 20I0026I7-023 201002617-024 20I0026I7-025 20I0026I7-026 201002617-027 201002617-028

Customer ID#l
87384I 873842 873843 873844 873845 873846 873847 873848 873849 873850 87385I 873852 873853 873854 873855 873856 873857 873858 873859

Customer ID#2
I6CI4

Coking SMALL SMALL LARGE SMALL SMALL SMALL LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE X LARGE LARGE LARGE

Percent Moisture 1.14 1.36 1.60 1.46 I.48 1.14 1.24 1.64 1.86 1.76 1.70 1.70 1.76 1.78 1.92 1.95 1.67 1.85 2.04

Percent Residue
65.68 58.37 48.07 65.72 58.I9 66.46 60.56 44.63 42.87 40.78 38.80 48.0I 48.50 45.42 42.22 45.14 49.47 46.69 41.07

Percent Incombustible
66.82 59.73 49.67 67.I8 59.67 67.60 61.80 46.27 44.73 42.54 40.50 49.71 50.26 47.20 44.14 47.09 51.14 48.54 43.11

l6Cl5
I6CI6 16D13 I6DI4 I60I5 I60I6 I6EI3
16E14

16EI5
I6EI6 I6FI3 I6FI4

16FI5
16F16 16GI3 I6GI4 I6GI5 I6GI6

Team 1 -July 17,2010- SN PARALLEL MAINS 20I 002620-00 I 20 I 002620-002 20 I 002620-003 20 I 002620-004 20I 002620-005 201002620-006 20 I 002620-007 20I002620-008 201002620-009 201002620-010 201002620-011 20 I 002620-0I 2 874119 874I20 874I2I 874122 874123 874I24 874125 874I26 874I27 874128 874I29 874130 6A4
6A4X

NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE

0.90 1.04 1.24 1.28 1.14 1.00 0.74 1.44 1.02 0.72 1.18 1.18

71.79 61.28 67.53 68.04 68.92 70.04 83.88 68.94 80.18 84.29 77.13 69.55

72.69 62.32

6A5 6A6 6A6X 6B4 6B4X 6B5 6B6 6B6X 6C4 6C4X

68.77
69.32 70.06 71.04 84.62 70.38 81.20 85.0I 78.3I 70.73

RespectfullySubmitted,

~~ @~

~

may

b::t~~:~Y~s~~~~i~i~~~~;~~~:~f~:~~;;~~;~~~~~~~~~:b~~~nh~:~-~~~~~jff~~e~~~~~:~r~~~~~f~~~~~;fr~~;~~~r~~~:~~~a~;:~-~-::~~~~ff~~:~~~~:J~~~i~~~~~Tf:~~~~ . - - ·

--"--------"---------------------------.-·················"'"''""''"·"-"'"'----"------------------·-.. ·-··-·····---··--··-·"'"'"·"----------"--------------.-----.----··· .. ················"·----------------------------------------------------------------------

not be reproduced exoept in ful , without the writ en approval of Standard Laboratories, Inc. Invalid if altered

1

MrNE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618) 539-5836

PmSBURGH, PA 15236 ATTN: MARK WESOWWSKI

Page: 28 of 59 Date: 11/15/2010 8:43:53 AM

Alcohol Lab No.
20 I 002620-013
201 002620·0 14 Customer ID#l 874131 874132 874133 874134 874135 874136 874137 874138 874139 874140 874141 874142 874143 874144

Customer ID#2
6C5 6C6 6C6X 604 604X 605 606 6D6X 6E4 6E4X 6E6 6F4 6F5 605

Coking NONE NONE NONE NONE

Percent Moisture 0.88 0.88 1.10 0.84 0.94 0.82 0.96 1.46 1.06 1.18 1.50 0.92 1.70 1.52

Percent Residue
82.79 80.13 81.24 83.08 81.53 81.74 77.97 57.95 71.37 72.76 61.90 80.80 59.63 66.33

Percent Incombustible 83.67 81.01 82.34 83.92 82.47 82.56 78.93 59.41 72.43 73.94 63.40 81.72 61.33 67.85

20 I 002620-015
201 002620·0 16 201002620-017 201002620-018 201002620-019 201002620-020 201002620-021 201002620-022 201002620-023 201002620-024 201002620-025 201002620·026

NONE
NONE NONE NONE

NONE NONE
NONE NONE NONE

NONE

Team2- July 17,2010-5 NORTH SECTION
201002657-00 I 201002657-002 874145 874146 874147 874148 5Bll NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE 1.54 1.74 1.44 1.52 1.46 1.44 1.26 1.44 0.68 1.06 1.44 0.80 0.62 0.98 0.42 0.56 0.54 65.71 59.32 57.18 61.87 52.35 68.12 57.77 51.74 85.93 75.46 60.57 77.21 89.50 73.81 96.45 93.23 92.59 67.25 61.06 58.62 63.39 53.81 69.56 59.03 53.18 86.61 76.52 62.01 78.01 90.12 74.79 96.87 93.79 93.13

5BI2
5B12X 5CIO 5C10X 5Cll 5Cl2 5C9

20 I 002657-003
201002657-004 201002657-005 201002657-006 201002657-007 201002657·008

874149
874150 874151 874152 874153 874154 874155 874156 874157 874158 874159 874160 874161

NONE
NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE

20 I 002657-009
201002657-010 201002657-011

5010
5011 508X 509 5EIO SEll 5E8 5E8X 5E9

20 I 002657-012
201002657-013 201002657-014 201002657-015 201002657-016 201002657-017

RespectfullySubmitted, ~~ t'(l~

!::;r~;:~~~~~~~~~~nc:~i!~J~~e~s~ . out the writ en approval of Standard Laboratories, lnc. Invalid if altered fmay not be reproduced except in ful , with~~;.~~~~~~~-~i~~:~r~e~~:c~~::;:~·~~~~~~:~~:~~~i;~~~~~;;~~~:~~~~b~~~~\~J"~l;~~f~~~i~~:~~~~~g~~~~c:~~~;~~~!~~ . ."!
i

----·-·--·············•""""'"""'""'"--------··---·-···--····---·----·-------..········"·"-·"·-------·--······-·""""'"'"------.................""--··-·-·-------·--·-·-·-·-·-····-·-····-·--"""·----"·------------------ .• .J

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, JL 62243 (618) 539-5836

PmSBURGH, PA 15236 ATTN' MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 29 of 59 Date: 11115/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No.

Customer ID#t 874162 874163 874164 874165 874166 874167 874168 874169 874170

Customer ID#2

Alcohol Coking NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE

Percent Moisture 0.46 1.56 0.70 0.44 1.80 1.50 1.48 1.52 1.32

Percent Residue 90.89 75.54 80.12 93.87 80.80 54.65 52.24 67.23 58.85

Percent
Incombustible 91.35 77.10 80.82 94.31 82.60 56.15 53.72 68.75 60.17

20 I 002657-018 201002657-019 201002657-020 201002657-021 201002657-022 201002657-023 201002657-024 201002657-025 201002657-026

5FIO

SF lOX
5Fll 5F9 5GIO 5Gll 5Gl2 5G9 5HII

Team3 -July 17,2010-HG I NORTH
201002658-001 201002658-002 201002658-003 201002658-004 201002658-005 201002658-006 201002658-007
20 I 002658-008

874171 874172 874173 874174 874175

13BI9X 13B20 13B21 13B22 13CI9X 13C20 13C21 13C22 13C23 13DJ9X 13020 13021 13D22 13023 13EI9X 13E20 13E21 13E22 13E23 13F20 13F21 13F22

X LARGE X LARGE LARGE SMALL LARGE

1.75

40.75 43.51 43.11 39.66 39.36 45.52 49.23 41.15 41.93 35.77 42.24 40.69 47.53 42.66 37.22 40.39 41.16 41.68 37.61 45.31 45.67 39.70

42.50 45.81 45.05 42.70 41.06 47.16 50.55 42.65 43.43 37.84 44.00 42.25 48.89 44.04 39.67 42.00 42.70 43.16 39.03 46.89 47.19 41.14

2.30 1.94 3.04 1.70 1.64 1.32 1.50 1.50 2.07 1.76 1.56 1.36 1.38 2.45 1.61 1.54 1.48 1.42 1.58 1.52 1.44

874176
874177 874178 874179 874180 874181 874182 874183 874184 874185 874186 874187 874188 874189 874190 874191 874192

LARGE
SMALL SMALL

201002658-009 201002658-010 201002658-011 201002658-012 20 I 002658-013 201002658-014 201002658-015 201002658-016 201002658-017 201002658-018 20 I 002658-019 201002658-020 201002658-021 201002658-022

TRACE
X LARGE SMALL

SMALL
TRACE TRACE
X LARGE

LARGE SMALL TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE SMALL

Respectfully Submitted,

~~ t'tf~

[

Th~·~;:;~iY~i·;·: ~Pl~i·~;;;;-~~-~;;t~rpretatiOMCDni8i~d··;~-ihi;·;:~port-hava be~-~·;;;:;;p~-~~d-~i-iheCiient's di·re-~ii;;-~-.--~~~--b~~;;d-~;;on-obseNationsormaterial·;;ro-idedbYt_h_e_Ciie~tand;;~press-th~-

.

bestjudgment of Standard laboratories, Inc. Standard laboratories, Inc. makes no other representation or warranty, expressed or implied, regarding this report. This Certificate of Analysis may not be reproduced except in full, without the written approval of Standard laboratories, Inc. Invalid tl altered , --------------------------------""'"'"""''"'"""-------------------·-"""'"'"'"''""'"'"'"---------.. -.- ....................... __ ., _______________________ ,,_,_,,., .................. _,_,.,,_.,, ., ___________ ;
._

________________________________________

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618) 539-5836

PITISBURGH, PA 15236 ATTN' MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 30 of 59 Date: 11115/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No. 201002658-023

Customer 10#1 874193

Customer 10#2 13F23

Alcohol Coking TRACE

Percent Moisture 1.32

Percent Residue 42.10

Percent Incombustible 43.42

Team4 -July 17,2010- SECT. 17- TG 1 NORTH 201002659-001 201002659-002 20 I 002659-003 201002659-004 20 I 002659-005 201002659-006 201002659-007 20 I 002659-008 201002659-009 20 I 002659-010 201002659-011 201002659-012 201002659-013 201002659-014 20 I 002659-015 201002659-016 20 I 002659-017 201002659-018 20 I 002659-019 201002659-020 201002659-021 201002659.022 201002659-023 201002659-024 201002659-025 874194 874195 874196 874197 874198 874199 874200 874201 874202 874203 874204 874205 874206 874207 874208 874209 874210 874211 874212 874213 874214 874215 874216 874217 874218 17AI1X 17AI2 17AI3 17811X 17812 17Bl3 17C11X 17C12 17CI3 17DIIX 17012 17Dl3 17DI4 17EIIX 17EI2 17E13 17EI4 l7FIJX 17FI2 17FI3 17Fl4 17G11 17GI2 17Gl3 17014 X LARGE LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE SMALL X LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE X LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE X LARGE LARGE SMALL LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE SMALL 2.41 2.07 2.16 2.17 1.90 2.14 1.66 1.34 1.26 2.00 1.60 1.42 1.24 1.88 1.68 1.68 1.64 2.42 1.64 1.62 1.66 1.92 1.78 1.66 1.50 39.43 41.85 39.61 43.33 44.70 39.71 44.26 48.31 53.34 41.70 43.65 48.31 54.33 40.90 44.27 40.92 37.47 43.05 43.57 39.88 33.29 34.49 39.84 42.12 37.71 41.84 43.92 41.77 45.50 46.60 41.85 45.92 49.65 54.60 43.70 45.25 49.73 55.57 42.78 45.95 42.60 39.11 45.47 45.21 41.50 34.95 36.41 41.62 43.78 39.21

Team 5- July 17,2010-7 NORTH 201002660.001 201002660-002 201002660-003 201002660.004 874219 874220 874221 874222 7838 7B39 7840 7B40X TRACE TRACE TRACE LARGE 1.36 1.55 1.57 1.67 41.63 37.07 36.29 37.15 42.99 38.62 37.86 38.82

Respectfully Submitted, ~~W..dkut

l

may Inc. ............."""""""""-"····-·-·------·--·---"··--·-·"""""""""""""-----·---··--·--·-·""""············--·····-·"·-··-·-------·--·--"""""""""""""""-""""----·--·-·----·····"·········...··"""········"·-·"······--·---·--·----·--·------·-------·-·-·-----·-·--·-·-·"--·-·--""""""

~::;·r~j~~I~~o~i~~~~~;j~~~f~~~~~~~~;~~:~~-l~-~=·~~~ft~~e~~~:~;~fff~~~~~i~~~:~e::'~~\~n~~~;:~;~:~~r~~b~;~aJ::~-~~~~~~~~~~~~!~~~-~~~~~~~-~~~~:-~f~a~l~~--····"·

not be reproduced except in ful , without !he writ en approval of Standard laboratories, Invalid if altered

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, ll 62243 (618) 539~5836

PmSBURGH, PA I5236

ATIN: MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 31 of 59

Date: 11/15/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No.
20I002660-005 201002660-006 201002660-007 20I002660-008 201002660-009 20I002660-010 201002660-01 I

Customer ID#l 874223 874224 874225 874226 874227 874228 874229 874230 874231 874232 874233 874234 874235

Customer ID#2 7B4I 7C37 7C38 7C39 7C40 7C40X 7C41 7037 7038 7039 7040 7D40X 7041 7E37 7E38 7E39 7E40 7E40X 7E41 7F37 7F38 7F39 7F40 7F41

Alcohol Coking TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE SMALL

Percent Moisture 1.66 1.38 1.50 1.36 1.60 1.74 1.48 1.34 1.20 1.50 1.32 1.64 1.46 1.44 1.40 1.32 1.56 1.87 1.53 1.84 1.78 1.66 1.63 1.72

Percent Residue
32.79 47.62 41.53 50.I4 38.62 40.17 44.16 47.57 56.57 47.47 52.11 50.14 44.92 52.51 53.40 56.80 45.IO 45.94 47.07 32.90 31.75 34.39 34.56 31.13

Percent Incombustible
34.45 49.00 43.03 51.50 40.22 41.91 45.64 48.9I 57.77 48.97 53.43 51.78 46.38 53.95 54.80 58.12 46.66 47.81 48.60 34.74 33.53 36.05 36.19 32.85

LARGE
TRACE SMALL

20 I 002660-012
201002660-013 201002660-014 201002660-015 20I002660-016 201002660-017 201002660-018 20 1002660-0I 9 201002660-020 20 I 002660-021 201002660-022 201002660-023 20I002660-024 201002660-025 201002660-026 201002660-027 201002660-028

TRACE
SMALL
SMALL LARGE SMALL TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE LARGE SMALL TRACE TRACE

874236
874237 874238 874239 874240 87424I 874242 874243 874244 874245 874246

TRACE
TRACE TRACE

Team6 -July 17,2010-6 NORTH
201002680-00I 201002680-002 201002680-003 20 I 002680-004 201002680-005 201002680-006 201002680-007 874247 874248 874249 874250 874251 874252 874253 7BI5X 7CI3 7CI4 7CI5 7CI5X 7CI6 7013 SMALL TRACE TRACE TRACE X LARGE SMALL TRACE 1.48 1.04 0.86 1.12 1.70 1.22 1.06 54.19 67.90 75.04 65.86 53.63 62.30 70.63 55.67 68.94 75.90 66.98 55.33 63.52 71.69

Respectfully Submitted,

~~ @~

l

rh·~-~~~~;;rs~-~Pinions-o--;inierp;·~~~i"i·~n·;·;~~~;ine-din-iiiiS~e;;ort·h~-~~"b~~~-p~~"P~~~d-;i-the-cii80i;S"di-~~~~~n:arebaset.J-~POO-~b;e-Natio~s-oT~ie~i~i-p·;~~ki~d-bYth;·ciieni·;~d-~-;p~;ss·the

best judgment of Standard Laboratories, Inc. Standard Laboratories, tnc. makes no other representation or warranty, expressed or implied, regarding this report. This Certificate of Analysis may not be reproduced except in full, without the written approval of Standard Laboratories, Inc. Invalid if altered

"""'""'""''''""''"''""""""'"'""'"''"""""""'""'"'"'------------------------"'""'"""'"'""""-"'"-·"

____ ________________
.,

"_"_'"'""""'""""""''""'"'-------------------"--"'"""'"""'""""'""-·-·"·----------------------------------------------------------------------

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTil ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618) 539-5836

PmSBURGH, PA 15236 ATTN' MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 32 of 59 Date: 11/15/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No. 201002680-008 201002680-009 201002680-0 I 0 201002680-011 201002680-012 201002680-013 201002680-014 201002680-015 201002680-016 201002680-017 201002680-018

Customer ID#l 874254 874255 874256 874257 874258 874259 874260 874261 874262 874263 874264

Customer ID#2
7DI4

Alcohol Coking

Percent Moisture
1.12 1.12 1.38

Percent Residue
69.18 69.73 59.26 66.98 64.75 69.80 67.37 54.93 76.22 59.69 54.18

Percent
Incombustible
70.30 70.85 60.64 68.14 65.91 70.84 68.41 56.41

SMALL
SMALL X LARGE SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL LARGE SMALL TRACE TRACE

7Dl5
7DI5X 7DI6 7EI3 7EI4 7EI5 7E15X 7EI6 7FI5 7FI6

U6
1.16 1.04 1.04 1.48 0.92 1.42 1.56

77.14
61.11 55.74

Team 7 -July 17,2010- SECTION #9 201002681-001 201002681-002 201002681-003 201002681-004 201002681-005 201002681-006 201002681-007 201002681-008 201002681-009 201002681-010 201002681-0 II 201002681-012 201002681-013 201002681-014 201002681-015 201002681-016 201002681-017 201002681-018 201002681-019 201002681-020 874265 874266 874267 874268 874269 874270 9A12X 9AI3 9AI4 9AI5 X LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE SMALL X LARGE 1.96 1.70 52.58 41.65 46.38 44.87 45.51 42.86 60.23 50.01 50.59 43.60 46.96 43.68 42.46 54.54 43.35 48.10 46.59 47.18 45.16 61.57 51.45 51.89 45.18 49.35 45.57 44.40 46.63 52.41 50.14 44.16 45.43 50.19 53.57

1.72
1.72 1.67 2.30 1.34 1.44 1.30 1.58 2.39 1.89 1.94 1.57 1.59 2.39 1.96 1.58 1.62 2.18

9Al6
9BI2X 9BI3

874271
874272 874273 874274 874275 874276 874277 874278 874279 874280 874281 874282 874283 874284

SMALL
SMALL SMALL SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE LARGE

9Bl4
9BI5 9BI6

9CI2X
9CI3 9CI4

9Cl5
9CI6 9DI2X 9DI3 9DI4 9DI5 9EI2X

45.06
50.82 47.75 42.20 43.85 48.57 51.39

SMALL
X LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE

RespectfullySubmitted, ~,L ti1~

~

The8i18iY$iS.OPi~iO~-;~-~n·;~;p;e;atiOns conia;;:;-e;J·;n··thi;·;~p;rt-have been-p~pa~~d-~i-ih~"Cli~nl·s ctirectiOn:-;re-b~;~d··~p~n"ObserVationSOfn1aterial

~~!".~~:.~_:_~~~o~uce~_:~::~.~. ~.~-~~~~tho_u~-~~:'"~t~~~ -~-~~-~~:~~~:~~:~=-~~::o_r~-~-~·.. ~~-~.". -~~::~~ if alte~~~----·--·-·-·-··-·-· ... ·"·-··"--- --·~--- ~--~----~~~-·"---- ----~i

best judgment of. Standard. " .. '. o.c.eto. ries, Inc ..

S.tanda.~. ·L-aboratories, Inc. m.akes no oth·e·;· ;.'.'.".".ote.tion or warranty, expressed. ". r implie.d, regarding. this report.

provictedb;theCiienl.lndexPreSSfue-·-·-:
This Certificate of Ana. lysis
i_

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618) 539-5836

PITTSBURGH, PA I5236 ATIN: MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 33 of 59 Date: 11/15/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No. 20100268I·02I 20 100268I -022 20I 002681-023 20I00268I-024 201002681-025
201002681~26

Customer ID#l 874285 874286 874287 874288 874289 874290

Customer ID#2 9EI3 9EI4 9EI5 9FI3 9F14 9F15

Alcohol Coking SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE LARGE SMALL

Percent Moisture 1.76 1.78 1.46 1.72 1.78 1.84

Percent Residue 48.28 48.13 54.78 44.92 48.16 53.87

Percent Incombustible 50.04 49.9I 56.24 46.64 49.94 55.71

Team 8 -July 17,2010- SECT. 9& 10-8 NORTH MAINS 201002682-001 201002682-002 201002682-003 20I002682-004 201002682-005 201002682-006 201002682-007 201002682-008 20 I 002682-009 20I002682-0IO 201002682-011 201002682-012 201002682-013 201002682-014 201002682-015 201002682-016 201002682-017 201002682-018 20I002682-019 201002682-020 201002682-021 201002682-022 201002682-023 201002682-024 201002682-025 874291 874292 874293 874294 874295 874296 874297 874298 874299 874300 874301 874302 874303 874304 874305 874306 874307 874308 874309 874310 874311 874312 874313 874314 874315 10A12 10A13 10A14 IOA15 10812 10813 IOBI4 !OBIS IOC12 IOCI3 10Cl4 IOC15 IODI2 IODI3 IODI4 IOD15 9A17X 9A18 9BI7X 9818 9CI7X 9CI8 9D17X 9D18 9E17 SMALL LARGE LARGE LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE 2.09 2.05 2.06 2.32 1.96 2.08 2.22 2.59 2.23 2.29 2.28 2.48 2.48 2.49 2.28 2.52 2.08 1.68 2.05 1.66 2.19 2.02 2.38 1.98 1.90 45.30 44.87 45.39 45.84 53.83 44.37 44.8I 43.38 43.05 43.97 41.97 39.76 44.52 39.13 43.17 39.62 45.01 45.3I 41.50 42.55 43.42 40.65 42.40 38.09 47.44 47.39 46.92 47.45 48.I6 55.79 46.45 47.03 45.97 45.28 46.26 44.25 42.24 47.00 41.62 45.45 42.14 47.09 46.99 43.55 44.21 45.61 42.67 44.78 40.07 49.34

RespectfullySubmitted, ~~ @~

~

he anatyS1S,-ol);n~o~s or mterp-retation-s conta~~ed ~~ thls-reporth_a_ve bee-n-;;rep;;;;:ed at the ct1ent's d1re;t~on~ affi ba-sed-upon ob;ervat;ons male~ aI p~o~1ded bYihe -cl;ent and express the eSt JUdgment of Standard Laboratones Inc Standard Laboratones Inc makes no other representation or warranty expressed or 1mphed regardmg th1s report Th1s Certificate of Analysis ay not be reproduced except m full without the wntten approval of Standard Laboratones Inc Invalid 1f altered
------- - - - -

;f

'
1

-

- ---

---------

-

-

-----------

-- -

---

---------

- -

-

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618) 539-5836

PITTSBURGH, PA 15236 ATTN MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 34 of 59 Date: 11/15/2010 8:43:53 AM

Alcohol Lab No.
201002682-026 201002682-027 201002682-028 201002682-029 Customer ID#l 874316 Customer ID#2 9EI7X 9EI8 9FI7 9FI8 Coking LARGE LARGE LARGE

Percent Moisture
2.54 1.77 2.19 1.98

Percent Residue
44.79 48.51 44.05 45.12

Percent
Incombustible
47.33 50.28 46.24 47.10

874317
874318

874319

SMALL

Team 9 -July 17,2010- CROSSOVER BETWEENHG 22 & TG 22 201002683-00 I 201002683-002 201002683-003 20 I 002683-004 201002683-005 201002683-006 20 I 002683-007

874320
874321 874322 874323

12Al 12A2 12A3 12B2 12B3 12C2 12C3 12C6X 12D2

TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE SMALL TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE

1.84 1.86

44.41 52.15 44.88 48.06 39.59 42.19 46.40 45.57 48.64 54.87 60.89 58.51 62.17

46.25 54.01 47.00 49.56 41.17 43.61 47.82 47.30 49.98 56.13 61.93 59.61 63.31

2.12
1.50 1.58 1.42 1.42 1.73 1.34 1.26 1.04 1.10 1.14

874324 874325
874326

201002683-008
201002683-009 201002683-010 201002683-011 201002683-012 20 I 002683-013

874327
874328 874329 874330

1203 1204
12D5 12D6

874331
874332

Team 10 -July 17,2010- TG 1 NORTH
201002684-001 20 I 002684-002 201002684-003 201002684-004 874333 874334 874335 16AI6X 16AI7 16AI8 16AI9 16BI6X 16BI7 16BI8 16BI9 16Cl6X 16CI7 16CI8 16CI9 16DI6X X LARGE LARGE LARGE X LARGE X LARGE LARGE LARGE X LARGE X LARGE LARGE LARGE SMALL X LARGE 2.77 1.60 1.88 2.05 2.01 1.76 1.84 1.72 1.84 1.50 1.40 1.18 2.04 36.56 43.19 34.87 35.39 35.82 36.54 38.26 41.06 44.11 50.95 53.97 53.99 52.60 39.33 44.79 36.75 37.44 37.83 38.30 40.10 42.78 45.95 52.45 55.37 55.17 54.64

874336
874337 874338 874339 874340 874341 874342 874343

20 I 002684-005
201002684-006

201002684-007
20 I 002684-008 201002684-009 201002684-010 20 l002684-0 II 201002684-012 201002684.jj13

874344

874345

Respectfully Submitted, ~,LtV~

~

e analysis, opinions or interpretations contained in this report have been prepared at the client's dir-ection, are based upon observations of material provided by the client and express the stjudgment of Standard Laboratories, Inc. Standard laboratories. Inc. makes no other representalion or warranty, expressed or implied, regarding this report. This Cert1ficate of Analysis ay not be reproduced except in full, without the wrillen approval of Standard Laboratories, Inc. Invalid if altered
"""""""·"·"""·"·-·""""""·-------------""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""------------""""""""""""""""""""""·"

---------········

···----------···············---------····-···································--··-----------------------·---·-·-·-··-·-·-----·

____________

! i
i

,_"""""""""""""""""""""""_"

_________________________________

~

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618) 539-5836

PITTSBURGH, PA 15236 ATTN' MARK WESOWWSKI

Pag~:

35 of 59

Date: 11/15/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No. 20 I 002684-014 201002684-015 201002684-016 201002684-017 201002684-018 201002684-019 201002684-020 201002684-021 201002684-022 201002684-023 201002684-024 201002684-025 201002684-026

Customer ID# I 874346 874347 874348 874349 874350 874351 874352 874353 874354 874355 874356 874357 874358

Customer ID#2 16DI7 16018 16DI9 16EI6X 16EI7 16EI8 16EI9 16F16X 16F17 16FI8 16FI9 16GI8 16GI9

Alcohol Coking LARGE LARGE SMALL X LARGE LARGE X LARGE LARGE X LARGE SMALL LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE

Percent Moisture 1.40 1.12 1.12 1.92 1.60 1.86 1.79 1.96 1.52 1.96 1.83 2.08 2.09

Percent Residue 57.99 68.45 66.67 40.66 45.51 37.80 34.64 34.05 51.55 35.29 34.18 35.35 34.31

Percent Incombustible 59.39 69.57 67.79 42.58 47.11 39.66 36.43 36.01 53.07 37.25 36.01 37.43 36.40

Team 1 - July 18, 20 I 0 - Section 6 201002685-00 I 20 I 002685-002 20 I 002685-003 201002685-004 201002685-005 201002685-006 201002685-007 201002685-008 20 I 002685-009 201002685-010 20 I 002685-0 II 201002685-012 201002685-013 201002685-014 201002685-015 201002685-016 201002685-017 201002685-018 874359 874360 874361 874362 874363 874364 874365 874366 874367 874368 874369 874370 874371 874372 874373 874374 874375 874376 6AI 6A2 6A2X 6A3 6B2 6B2X 6B3 6C2 6C2X 6C3 6D2 6D2X 6D3 6EI 6E2 6E3 6FI 6F3 NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE 1.34 1.30 1.34 1.24 1.20 1.24 0.80 1.10 1.50 0.78 0.42 1.26 0.72 1.20 1.10 1.08 1.18 1.04 69.68 69.16 57.37 59.53 45.79 54.01 69.70 55.48 59.55 81.14 89.74 70.81 59.83 54.93 77.06 76.07 69.64 71.35 71.02 70.46 58.71 60.77 46.99 55.25 70.50 56.58 61.05 81.92 90.16 72.07 60.55 56.13 78.16 77.15 70.82 72.39

RespectfullySubmitled, ~,/! @~

t;~·t~f~~~~~~J~i~~~~;J~~:~;~~J~e~[~~;';~:~r~~!-~~-:~r~~~~:c~~;::~~;~:~~~~:~~~~~~:~ii~~~~:;;:~,~~:~:r~~~:~b~~~a;;~~~-~;~:~;~~(f~~~b~~fs~i~-~~~~~:-·~;~~~l~~--------, [may not be reproduced except in ful , without _______________ of Standard laboratories, Inc. Invalid if altered the wril en approval _. _________________________________________________________
"""'"""""'""'"'"""""'"""""-~------------

...............................

,,

___ ,,_, ......... - ..··--------------"""'""'""""'"--··---·---------------------........ .,...........

~-----

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618) 539-5836

PmSBURGH, PA 15236 ATIN: MARK WESOLOWSKl

Page: 36 of 59 Date: 11/15/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No.

Customer ID#l

Customer ID#2

Alcohol Coking

Percent

Moisture

Percent Residue

Percent Incombustible

Team 2- July 18,2010-5 NORTH SECTION
201002686-001 201002686-002 201002686-003
201002686-004

874377 874378 874379 874380 874381 874382 874383 874384 874385 874386 874387 874388 874389 874390 874391
874392

5C5 5C6 5C6X 5C7 5C8 5C8X
5D4X

NONE NONE

1.66
1.40

70.98 65.05
65.19

72.64

66.45 66.63
74.82

NONE NONE NONE
NONE NONE NONE NONE

1.44 1.46 1.40 1.89
2.09

73.36
63.60

201002686-005 201002686-006 201002686-007 201002686-008 201002686-009
201002686-010

65.00 74.80 49.46
77.51 65.65

72.91 47.37 76.33 64.41 69.87 92.60 98.38 82.74 97.47 93.15 94.87 66.37 91.57 96.05 94.41 69.60 92.20 92.15 68.23 69.01 74.55 72.74 52.26

5D6 5D6X 5D7 5D8 5E4 5E4X 5E5 5E6 5E6X 5E7 5F4 5F5 5F6 5F6X 5F7 5F8 5F8X 5G5 5G6 5G7 5G8

1.18

1.24

NONE
NONE NONE

1.20 0.46 0.36 1.00 0.30 0.54
0.44

71.07

20 I 002686-0 II 201002686-012 201002686-013
201002686-014

93.06 98.74 83.74 97.77 93.69 95.31 67.57 92.49
96.53

NONE
NONE
NONE NONE

201002686-015 201002686-016 201002686-017

874393 874394 874395 874396 874397
874398

NONE
NONE NONE

1.20 0.92 0.48 0.40 1.74 0.58 0.48 1.56

20 I 002686-018
201002686-019 20 I 002686-020 201002686-021 20 I 002686-022 201002686-023
201002686-024 201002686-025

NONE
NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE

94.81 71.34
92.78

874399 874400

92.63 69.79 70.53 76.03
74.48

874401

1.52
1.48

201002686-026 201002686-027 201002686-028

874402
874403 874404

1.74 1.76

54.02

Team3 -July 18,2010-AREA 13LONGWALL I NORTH 201002687-001

874405 874406

13B24X
13C24

TRACE SMALL

1.88 1.73

35.67 36.38

37.55 38.11

201002687-002

Respectfully Submitted, ~~W'.dk.n

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618) 539-5836

PITTSBURGH, PA 15236 ATIN: MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 37 of 59 Date: 11/15/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No. 201002687-003 201002687-004 201002687-005 201002687-006 201002687-007 201002687-008 201002687-009 201002687-010 201002687-011 201002687-012 201002687-013 201002687-014 201002687-015 201002687-016 201002687-017 201002687-018 201002687_-019 201002687-020 201002687-021 201002687-022

Customer ID# I 874407 874408 874409 874410 874411 874412 874413 874414 874415 874416 874417 874418 874419 874420 874421 874422 874423 874424 874425 874426

Customer ID#2 13C24X 13C25 13C26 13D24 13D24X 13D25 13D26 13E24 13E24X 13E25 13E26 13F24 13F24X 13F25 13F26 13F27 13G24 13G25 13G26 13G27

Alcohol Coking TRACE TRACE SMALL TRACE SMALL SMALL 1RACE TRACE TRACE TRACE SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL LARGE SMALL SMALL SMALL

Percent Moisture 2.03 1.72 1.64 1.62 1.70 2.14 1.64 1.60 1.36 1.62 1.89 1.74 1.40 1.71 1.94 1.88 1.80 1.59 1.90 1.66

Percent Residue 35.71 39.80 44.20 41.45 37.38 38.16 40.92 37.16 51.40 39.54 32.42 39.96 42.30 37.18 32.50 29.80 40.95 40.82 36.26 34.07

Percent Incombustible 37.74 41.52 45.84 43.07 39.08 40.30 42.56 38.76 52.76 41.16 34.31 41.70 43.70 38.89 34.44 31.68 42.75 42.41 38.16 35.73

Team4- July 18,2010- SECTION 17 TG l NORTH 201002741-001 201002741-002 201002741-003 201002741-004 201002741-005 201002741-006 201002741-007 201002741-008 201002741-009 201002741-010 201002741-011 874427 874428 874429 874430 874431 874432 874433 874434 874435 874436 874437 17AIO 17All 17A9 17810 17811 17B9 17CIO 17CII 17C8 17C9 17010 LARGE X LARGE LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE X LARGE 2.00 2.12 1.61 2.06 1.54 1.74 1.50 1.30 1.26 1.14 1.52 37.95 39.33 38.32 32.33 56.65 35.68 48.97 53.98 53.24 59.05 45.11 39.95 41.45 39.93 34.39 58.19 37.42 50.47 55.28 54.50 60.19 46.63

Respectfully Submitted,

~~ t'tf~

~

...................

stjudgmer~l

e arJalysis, opirliOrJS or irJ!erprelatior~s contairJed ir1 this report have beer! prepared at the clier~t's directiorJ, are based upon observations of material provided by the client ar1d express the of Star~dard laboratories, lr~c. Standard laboratories, Inc. makes no other representation orwarrar~ty, expressed or implied, regardir~g this report. This Certificate of Analysis y not be..................-----·--------...................................., approval of Standard laboratories, Inc. Invalid if altered ._ reproduced except in full, without !he written ........... ,. .. ., _________________________ , ____ __

_______________ ...............-------------......
,

- - - - - - - - - - ................

___________________ ........................................................................................
,,

_______

__________________________________________________

_________________________________

_____

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, ll 62243 (618) 539-5836

PITTSBURGH, PA 15236 ATTN: MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 38 of 59 Date: 11/15/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No. 201002741-012 201002741-013 201002741-014 201002741-015 201002741-016 201002741-017 201002741-018 201002741-019 201002741-020 201002741-021 201002741-022 201002741-023 201002741-024 201002741-025

Customer ID#J 874438 874439 874440 874441 874442 874443 874444 874445 874446 874447 874448 874449 874450 874451

Customer 10#2 17Dll 17D8 17D9 17EIO 17Ell 17E8 17E9 17F10 17Fll 17F8 17F9 17GIO 17G8 17G9

Alcohol Coking X LARGE LARGE LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE LARGE X LARGE SMALL X LARGE X LARGE

Percent Moisture 1.32 1.49 1.50 1.92 1.71 1.74 1.86 1.66 1.87 1.54 1.74 1.42 1.70 2.04

Percent Residue 47.34 47.79 48.97 43.47 42.64 42.92 39.39 39.90 35.29 43.35 37.41 47.16 37.84 37.25

Percent Incombustible 48.66 49.28 50.47 45.39 44.35 44.66 41.25 41.56 37.16 44.89 39.15 48.58 39.54 39.29

TeamS- July 18,2010-7 NORTH 201002742-001 201002742-002 201002742-003 201002742-004 201002742-005 20 I 002742-006 201002742-007 201002742-008 201002742-009 201002742-010 201002742-011 201002742-012 201002742-013 201002742-014 201002742-015 201002742-016 201002742-017 874452 874453 874454 874455 874456 874457 874458 874459 874460 874461 874462 874463 874464 874465 874466 874467 874468 7B33 7B34 7B35 7B35X 7B36 7B37 7C33 7C34 7C35 7C35X 7C36 7D33 7034 7D35 7D35X 7036 7E33 TRACE SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL TRACE SMALL SMALL SMALL TRACE SMALL SMALL TRACE TRACE 1.42 1.45 1.46 1.24 1.52 1.60 1.50 1.46 1.54 1.78 1.58 1.62 1.54 1.60 1.32 1.54 0.98 47.03 49.71 40.94 57.21 45.37 39.78 47.04 38.61 39.42 44.22 42.26 48.06 54.36 49.84 61.87 49.40 73.30 48.45 51.16 42.40 58.45 46.89 41.38 48.54 40.07 40.96 46.00 43.84 49.68 55.90 51.44 63.19 50.94 74.28

Respectfully Submitted, ~ oi!! @~

[

The~nai;srs;-op;;;rons or inter·p~~-~~~~~;;;·";~~~~~~edinthiSffipO~IhS;;;t;;.;·;;·p·;~p~~d--~i-the·~;~e;;t·SdiffictiOO,-;;.;·-b~;ed-~p-~~~b;e;;atl~;:;;·;;f;;-at~~i~IP~~id;d·byth-;;"die-~l"~;d··e;p~e·;~-~h;···

best judgment of Standard Laboratories, Inc. Standard Laboratories, Inc. makes no other representation or warranty, expressed or implied, regarding this report. This Certificate of Analysis may not be reproduced except in full, without the written approval of Standard Laboratories, Inc. Invalid if altered
"'""""""""''"'"'"--""

_____

"'"~~~------------------"·--·"·"-·"·---------------------------------·------------------------------·-------------·-------------------·"'"""'"'"'""""'"""'.""'"""""""'""""""'"'""'"'""'"'.'"'"'"'"'""

_____________________ __

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

. STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618) 539·5836

PmSBURGH, PA 15236
ATTN: MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 39 of 59 Date: 11/15/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No.
201002742-018 201002742-019 201002742-020 201002742-021 20 I 002742-022 201002742-023 201002742-024 201002742-025

Customer ID# I
874469

Customer JD#2 7E34 7E35

Alcohol Coking TRACE TRACE SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL TRACE

Percent Moisture 1.20 1.24 1.88 1.47 1.80 1.82 1.84 1.67

Percent

Residue
66.42 61.93 46.48 52.63 36.32 34.82 37.74 36.33

Percent Incombustible 67.62 63.17 48.36 54.10 38.12 36.64 39.58 38.00

874470
874471

7E35X
7E36 7F33 7F34 7F35 7F36

874472
874473 874474 874475 874476

Team 6- July 18,2010-6 NORTII
201002743-001 201002743-002 201002743-003 201002743-004 201002743-005 201002743-006 201002743-007 201002743-008 201002743-009 201002743-010 201002743-011 201002743-012 201002743-013 201002743-014 201002743-015 201002743-016 201002743-017 201002743-018 201002743-019 201002743-020 201002743-021 874477 874478 874479 874480 874481 874482 874483 7BI3
7814

SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL X LARGE SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL LARGE SMALL SMALL TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE

1.34 1.36 1.40 1.34 1.34 1.68 1.50 1.48 1.88 1.32 1.36 1.10 1.38 1.78 1.44 1.43 1.22 1.20 0.88 1.14 1.26

51.91 52.27 56.03 57.57 59.27 48.88 51.14 55.89 52.22 62.34 60.94 70.73 59.04 51.98 71.25 69.59 70.89 67.57 73.80 74.85 66.91

53.25 53.63 57.43 58.91 60.61 50.56 52.64 57.37 54.10 63.66 62.30 71.83 60.42 53.76 72.69

7815
7BI6
7817

7818
7BI9 7B20
7B20X

874484
874485 874486 874487 874488 874489 874490 874491 874492 874493 874494 874495 874496 874497

7CI7 7CI8 7CI9 7C20 7C20X 7Dl7 7018 7019 7020 7E18 7EI9 7E20

71.02
72.11 68.77 74.68 75.99 68.17

Team 7- July 18,2010- SECTION 8 NORTH MAIN 201002744-001 874498 SCI
TRACE

1.88

48.18

50.06

Respectfully Submitted,

~~@~

~

n;e-anaiYs~~Pi-nions·o~·in;;:;~;;-~ei-~i'i~n·s-coniai-nedi-nthis-;:;;~rt·h~~~-b~~·;;-prepared-atth~-ci'i~~~;;d;~ec~on:-areba-sed·-;;p;~-;;t;;e~·~ii'O~;··~f·;;;e;i~iP-~O~id;dbYth~-cli~;;t;~d-;;-~e;s-ihe---~

best judgment of Standard Laboratories, Inc. Standard Laboratories. Inc. makes no other representation or warranty, expressed or implied, regarding this report. This Certiflcate of Analysis ! may not be reproduced except in full. without the writlen approval of Standard Laboratories, Inc. Invalid if altered j ---·-----------""""""-----------·-----··-··-········-··-·-··-------------------·-···-·····..···----·-·-·-------------------·--·-·····-·-·-·····-·-.. -·-------------------------- .. ----··-···········-·····....................... _. __________ , ........................................................... ______ )

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTil ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618) 539·5836

PmSBURGH, PA 15236 ATTN: MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 40 of 59 Date: 11115/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No. 201002744-002 201002744-003 201002744-004 20 I 002744-005 201002744-006 201002744-007 201002744-008 201002744-009 201002744·010 201002744-011 201002744-012 201002744-013 201002744-014 201002744-015 201002744-016

Customer ID#J 874499 874500 874501 874502 874503 874504 874505 874506 874507 874508 874509 874510 874511 874512 874513

Customer ID#2 8CIX 8C2 8DI 8DIX 8D2 8EI 8EIX 8E2 9AI7 9BI7 9C17 9DI6 9DI7 9EI6 9F16

Alcohol Coking TRACE SMALL SMALL SMALL TRACE SMALL LARGE X LARGE LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL SMALL SMALL LARGE

Percent Moisture 2.76 1.94 !.50 1.72 1.36 1.42 1.34 1.64 1.55 1.72 2.03 1.68 2.00 1.40 1.95

Percent Residue 45.76 34.45 57.90 57.10 76.27 75.51 61.21 66.57 48.56 42.04 39.37 44.40 42.52 55.99 48.54

Percent Incombustible 48.52 36.39 59.40 58.82 77.63 76.93 62.55 68.21 50.11 43.76 41.40 46.08 44.52 57.39 50.49

Team 8- July 18, 2010- SECTION II 201002745-001 201002745-002 20 I 002745-003 201002745-004 201002745-005 201002745-006 201002745-007 201002745-008 201002745-009 201002745-010 201002745-011 201002745-012 201002745-013 201002745-014 201002745-015 201002745-016 874514 874515 874516 874517 874518 874519 874520 874521 874522 874523 874524 874525 874526 874527 874528 874529 II AI IIA2 1IA2X IIA3 IIA4 liB I IIB2 IIB2X IICI 11C2 IIC2X IIC3 1101 IID2 IID2X 1103 LARGE SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL LARGE SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL TRACE LARGE SMALL TRACE SMALL 1.89 !.57 1.70 1.94 1.48 1.60 1.28 1.28 1.50 1.20 1.14 1.26 1.16 1.08 0.88 1.30 46.75 49.81 47.96 41.80 44.81 48.61 56.79 57.02 53.51 53.75 64.41 60.03 65.50 62.18 74.88 65.35 48.64 51.38 49.66 43.74 46.29 50.21 58.o7 58.30 55.01 54.95 65.55 61.29 66.66 63.26 75.76 66.65

Respectfully Submitted, ~ot!! @~

l

r;;~·~~-~iy;;-;·;··~;;inions c;;:;n,erp·m~ti~~·;·~~nt~ineclin-u:.Ts~~;;ort·t;;~~·;;-;;~~-;;;;pa~et~-at-ihe-·~·~~~nt·:;··di;:;;~iiOn:are-iias~d-~P~n·~b;e~~ii~~s·~f;:;;at;~;al;;;:;;~d·;db).-the~iie-r;i-an-d·;;p~;ss-ihe-··--·1

best judgment of Standard Laboratories, Inc. Standard Laboratories, Inc. makes no other representation or warranty, expressed or implied, regarding this report. This Certificate of Analysis may not be reproduced except in full, without !he written approval of Standard Laboratories, Inc. Invalid if altered

! i

----·--·-···"······""""""""""""""""""·--·--·----·-·-·"········-··--····-·--·------------···············""""""-·"·---·-·---·-·-·--,·-···""""""""""-·"-·-·-·-----·--·--·---·-·-··"-····-·"············--·······""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""-·-·--·_j

MJNE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMJNISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618) 539-5836

PITTSBURGH, PA 15236 ATTN: MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 41 of 59 Date: 11115/2010 8:43:53 AM

Alcohol Lab No. 201002745-017 201002745-018 201002745-019 Customer ID#I 874530 874531 874532 Customer ID#2 liE! 11E2 IIE3

Coking
SMALL TRACE TRACE

Percent Moisture

Percent Residue
70.98 68.05 82.32

Percent Incombustible 72.00 69.17 83.08

1.02 l.l2 0.76

Team 9- July 18,2010- SECTION 12
201002746-001 201002746-002 201002746-003 201002746-004 201002746-005 201002746-006 201002746-007 201002746-008 201002746-009 201002746-010 201002746-011 201002746-012 201002746-013 201002746-014 201002746-015 201002746-016 201002746-017 201002746-018 874533 874534 874535 874536 874537 874538 874539 874540 874541 874542 874543 874544 874545 874546 874547 874548 874549 874550 12A4 TRACE TRACE TRACE SMALL TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE SMALL SMALL TRACE TRACE 2.03 2.07 1.40 1.00 1.48 2.36 1.52 1.64 1.80 1.83 1.58 1.38 1.30 0.92 l.l6 1.36 1.26 1.32 39.09 47.04 47.51 71.26 43.66 4l.l2 49.11 48.91 72.26 45.14 47.91 42.15 39.53 47.18 42.03 55.34 63.62 48.76 72.82 63.85 49.33 57.19 54.66

l2A5
12A6

12A6X 12A7 12A8 12B4 12B5 12B6 12B6X
1287 1288

45.55
40.63 37.89 45.38 40.20 53.76 62.24 47.46

12C4 12C5 12C6 12C7 12C8 12D8

TRACE
TRACE TRACE
TRACE

71.90
62.69 47.97 55.93 53.34

SMALL SMALL

Team 10- July 18,2010- TG 1 NORTH
201002747-001 201002747-002 201002747-003 201002747-004 201002747-005 201002747-006 201002747-007 201002747-008 201002747-009 874551 874552 874553 874554 874555 874556 874557 874558 874559 16A20 16A21 16A22 16A23 16B20 16821 16B22 16B23 16C20 LARGE X LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE X LARGE LARGE 1.82 2.04 2.14 1.92 1.92 2.04 1.64 1.88 128 38.02 39.84 37.56 42.87 45.46 40.58 35.53 41.58 42.39 52.89

35.52
40.73 43.54 38.66 33.49 39.94 40.51 51.61

X LARGE
LARGE

Respectfully Submitted, ~~t:t/~
·.··---·-----··-·----· ..
-

[.............................................. .. ___________________________.........__________________ .......... ___________
, _, ,

The analysis, opinions or interpretations contained in this report have been prepared at the clienrs direction, are based upon observations of material provided by the client and express the best judgment of Standard laboratories, Inc. Standard Laboratories. Inc. makes no other representation or warranty, expressed or implied, regarding this report. This Certificate of Analysis may not be reproduced except in full, without the written approval of Standard laboratories, Inc. Invalid if altered
,

.............. -----------···· ..··----------···· .........- - - - - - - - - · - · · - · · - - · · .................................................................... - .................

! i
!

___________ , ___ ,

____

~-------------------------------.,-------------

....

------------------~

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618) 539-5836

PTITSBURGH, PA 15236 ATTN MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 42 of 59 Date: 11/15/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No.
201002747-010 201002747-011 201002747-012 201002747-013 201002747-014 201002747-015 201002747-016 201002747-017 201002747-018 201002747-019 201002747-020 201002747-021 201002747-022 201002747-023 201002747-024 20 I 002747-025 201002747-026 201002747-027 201002747-028

Customer ID#J 874560 874561 874562 874563 874564 874565 874566 874567 874568 874569 874570 874571 874572 874573 874574 874575 874576 874577 874578

Customer ID#2 16C21 16C22 16C23 16020 16021 16022 16023
16E20

Alcohol Coking LARGE LARGE LARGE SMALL SMALL SMALL LARGE

Percent Moisture
1.70 1.52 1.64 1.16 1.66 1.61 1.76 1.92 1.86 1.74 1.72 2.43 2.00 2.00 1.94 2.17 1.91 1.96 1.59

Percent Residue
44.69 46.39

Percent Incombustible
46.39 47.91 43.16 63.35 51.79 53.67 46.39 39.33 37.69 42.27 36.90 30.25 32.83 34.20 39.61 39.40 39.24 42.10 43.34

41.52
62.19 50.13 52.06 44.63 37.41 35.83 40.53 35.18 27.82 30.83 32.20 37.67 37.23 37.33 40.14 41.75

X LARGE
X LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE SMALL

16E21 16E22 16E23 16F20

16F21
16F22 16F23 16G20 16G21 16022 16G23

SMALL
SMALL SMALL

Team lA- July 18,2010- I NORTH MAINS
201002759-00 I 201002759-002 201002759-003 201002759-004 20 I 002759-005 201002759-006 201002759-007 201002759-008 201002759-009 201002759-010 201002759-011 874579 874580 874581 874582 874583 874584 874585 874586 874587 874588 874589 IA3 IA3X IA4 IB3 IB3X IB4 NONE NONE 3.31 1.78 1.36 2.23 4.65 0.50 1.88 0.56 1.57 1.40 1.24

50.58
50.56 59.25 58.33 56.62 92.93 68.68 95.26

53.89 52.34 60.61 60.56 61.27 93.43 70.56 95.82 49.97 72.03 77.45

NONE
NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE

IBSX
IC3 IC3X IDS IE5X

48.40
70.63 76.21

Team 1 -July 19,2010- SECTION 1 NORTH MAINS

----··-····-- ---·-····· · · -· · · · · · . . . -·· ·- .. ·-.·-------·-····· . ... . . . ·--··--·----·------------·--·--·----------------·-·--------------, I
..................................... ---~-------------------- ..····----...............................................,. ____________________________ , _____ ,.,...........................- .. -~-----------------------~----·------------------~-·-···---~~-----~--·····~-j
The analysis, opinions or interpretations contained in this report have been prepared at the client's direction, are based upon observations of material provided by the client and express the best judgment of Standard laboratories, Inc. Standard Laboratories. Inc. makes no other representation or warranty, expressed or implied, regarding this report. This Certificate of Analysis may not be reproduced except in full, without the written approval of Standard Laboratories. Inc. Invalid if altered

Respectfully Submitted, ~LW~

i i i

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTil ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618) 539-5836

PITTSBURGH, PA 15236
ATINo MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 44 of 59
Date: 11/15/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No.
201002761-013 201002761-014 201002761-015 201002761-016 201002761-017 201002761-018 201002761-019 201002761-020 201002761-021 201002761-022 201002761-023 201002761-024

Customer ID# I
874621 874622 874623 874624 874625 874626 874627 874628 874629 874630 874631 874632

Customer ID#2
5EI 5E2
5E2X

Alcohol Coking

Percent Moisture
0.56 0.28 2.04 1.10 0.48 1.56 0.54 2.40 2.60 2.17 2.39 3.01

Percent Residue 90.03 97.59 66.78 96.56 91.92 73.00 92.59 52.35 60.03 78.79 63.37 50.01

Percent Incombustible 90.59 97.87 68.82 97.66 92.40 74.56 93.13 54.75 62.63 80.96 65.76 53.02

NONE
NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE

5E3 5FI 5F2 5F3 5F4X 5GI 5G2 5G3 5G4

Team3 -July 19,2010 -AREA 13 TG 22
201002762-001 201002762-002 201002762-003 201002762-004 201002762-005 201002762-006 201002762-007 201002762-008 201002762-009 201002762-010 201002762-011 201002762-012 201002762-013 201002762-014 201002762-015 201002762-016 201002762-017 201002762-018 874633 874634 874635 874636 874637 874638 13B29X 13C27 13C28 13C29 13C29X 13C30 13C31 13C32 13C33 13C34 TRACE TRACE TRACE 2.52 2.00 2.66 2.20 1.88 1.94 2.10 1.70 1.88 1.90 2.32 2.26 1.84 2.38 2.29 4.29 1.90 2.20 33.73 34.79 37.01 34.43 59.87 44.75 37.38 41.28 42.37 43.08 42.57 36.90 48.63 35.92 31.60 30.93 43.71 30.06 36.25 36.79 39.67 36.63 61.75 46.69 39.48 42.98 44.25 44.98 44.89 39.16 50.47 38.30 33.89 35.22 45.61 32.26

TRACE
TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE

874639
874640 874641 874642 874643 874644 874645 874646 874647 874648 874649 874650

13027
13D28 13D29 13E27 13E28

SMALL
TRACE SMALL SMALL SMALL

l3E29
13F28 13G28

Team4- July 19,2010- SECTION 17 TG I NORTH

Respectfully Submitted,

~~w~
!
i
i

~

--

8 analysis, opinions or interpretations contained in this report have been prepared at the client's direction, are based upon observations of material provided by the client and express the st judgment of Standard laboratories, Inc. Standard laboratories. Inc. makes no other representation or warranty, expressed or implied, regarding this report. This Certificate of AnalysiS ay not be reproduced except in full. without the written approval of Standard laboratories. Inc. Invalid if altered

···-········--------···-

·---------------·--··-······~-----····-·····-·------------------·····-····-·-·--·--------------------

---··-·-··········· ...··-·-·--·---··-·-...····-···-··--·------------·-·····-·······-·--·-------·--·-·-·-... ··--··--·----~------·-·-·-················ ...········-··············-········-·-···-·-·-·--·--·--·-·--·---·-·---------__j

MINE SAFETY AND HEAL1H ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

·.STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618) 539-5836

PnTSBURGH, PA 15236 ATTN: MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 45 of 59 Date: 11/15/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No. 201002764-001 201002764-002 201002764-003 201002764-004 201002764-005 201002764-006 201002764-007 201002764-008 201002764-009 201002764-010 201002764-011 201002764-012 201002764-013 201002764-014 201002764-015 201002764-016 201002764-017 201002764-018 201002764-019 201002764-020 201002764-021 201002764-022 201002764-023 201002764-024 201002764-025 201002764-026 201002764-027 201002764-028 201002764-029

Customer ID#I 874651 874652 874653 874654 874655 874656 874657 874658 874659 874660 874661 874662 874663 874664 874665 874666 874667 874668 874669 874670 874671 874672 874673 874674 874675 874676 874677 874678 874679

Customer ID#2 17A4 17A5 17A6 17A7 17A8 17B4 17B5 17B6 17B7 17B8 17C4 17C5 17C6 17C7 17D4 17D5 17D6 1707 17E4 17E5 17E6 l7E7 17F5 17F6 17F7 17G4 1705 1706 1707

Alcohol Coking LARGE X LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE X LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE SMALL SMALL X LARGE SMALL X LARGE X LARGE SMALL LARGE LARGE X LARGE X LARGE LARGE X LARGE LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE LARGE

Percent Moisture 1.62 1.79 1.78 1.83 1.89 2.06 1.82 1.69 1.72 1.68 1.28 1.54 1.26 1.32 1.96 1.76 1.32 1.62 1.70 1.38 2.11 1.74 1.77 1.49 1.96
IAS

Percent Residue 40.30 43.57 39.55 40.02 40.22 38.34 37.35 40.66 38.65 41.59 57.84 47.97 55.29 54.73 45.47 47.93 54.37 44.07 40.99 45.01 36.39 41.11 43.65 47.57 33.61 48.78 46.44 41.48 39.24

Percent Incombustible 41.92 45.36 41.33 41.85 42.11 40.40 39.17 42.'35 40.37 43.27 59.12 49.51 56.55 56.05 47.43 49.69 55.69 45.69 42.69 46.39 38.50 42.85 45.42 49.06 35.57 50.26 48.12 43.24 40.90

1.68 1.76 1.66

Team 5- July 19,2010-7 NOR1H 201002777-001 201002777-002 874680 874681 7B27 7B28 SMALL TRACE 1.14 1.10 64.48 62.68 65.62 63.78

Respectfully Submitted, ~ol_f! t!{/~
The analysis, opinions or interpretations contained in this report have been prepared al the client's direction, are based upon observations of material provided by the client and express the best judgment of Standard Laboratories, Inc. Standard laboratories, Inc. makes no other representation or warranty, expressed or implied, regarding this report. This Certificate of Analysis may not be reproduced except in full, without the written approval of Standard laboratories, Inc. Invalid if altered

.............., .. ······c··---------- ······--·--------------- ···············-------·-------····· .. ·---------------------···---··--·······························································

.-------·------------------- ..·-···········--·--·-----------··--·-··-···--·--·----------------------·-································--·--·--------------········-···-·-····--·-------------------------------------------·-·-·----···-·-·--------·-··---·-·····-1

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618) 539-5836

PmSBURGH, PA 15236 ATTN: MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 46 of 59 Date: ll/15/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No. 201002777-003 201002777-004 201002777-005 201002777-006 201002777-007 201002777-008 201002777-009 201002777-010 201002777-011 201002777-012 201002777-013 201002777-014 201002777-015 201002777-016 201002777-017 201002777-018 201002777-019 201002777-020 201002777-021 201002777-022 201002777-023 201002777-024 201002777-025 201002777-026 201002777-027 201002777-028 201002777-029 201002777-030 201002777-031 201002777-032 201002777-033 201002777-034

Customer ID#1 874682 874683 874684 874685 874686 874687 874688 874689 874690 874691 874692 874693 874694 874695 874696 874697 874698 874699 874700 874701 874702 874703 874704 874705 874706 874707 874708 874709 874710 874711 874712 874713

Customer ID#2 7B29B 7B30 7B30X 7B31A 7B3IB 7B32 7C27 7C28 7C29 7C30 7C30X 7C31 7C32 7027 7028 7029 7D30 7030X 7031 7D32 7E27 7E28 7E29 7E30 7E30X 7E31 7E32 7F27 7F28 7F29 7F30 7F31

Alcohol Coking TRACE SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL TRACE TRACE TRACE SMALL SMALL TRACE SMALL TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE SMALL SMALL SMALL TRACE SMALL SMALL TRACE SMALL

Percent Moisture 1.28 1.28 1.26 1.48 1.56 1.28 2.21 1.82 1.30 1.52 1.56 1.49 1.60 1.08 0.88 1.18 1.26

Percent Residue 57.00 62.44 62.06 55.18 51.28 50.51 63.26 58.65 62.31 56.23 49.27 49.28 42.08 69.75 78.10 63.92 61.24 70.75 65.43 52.13 69.34 73.01 80.91 66.65 52.72 65.39 66.77 41.26 4l.l1 45.29 52.40 44.42

Percent Incombustible 58.28 63.72 63.32 56.66 52.84 51.79 65.47 60.47 63.61 57.75 50.83 50.77 43.68 70.83 78.98 65.10 62.50 71.85 66.65 53.71 71.68 74.80 81.89 67.95 54.26 66.67 67.95 43.18 43.04 46.95 54.44 46.78

l.IO
1.22 1.58 2.34 1.79 0.98 1.30 1.54 1.28 l.l8 1.92 1.93 1.66 2.04 2.36

Respectfully Submitted, ~~ tf(/~

~

heanaly$1$ opmlo"ns or ~nterpfetat;o;:;scon~me-d In this-report h;v~ bSen prepared-at the Clle;t's dlrec;;on.-a~e b-ased upO"n" observ;tiO~s-of mat8nal PrO~;ded -b;lh-; cl~e~t.l"nd~xP;:-e;; eS!judgmenl of Slandard laboratones, Inc Standard Laboratones Inc makes no other representahon or warranty expressed or 1mplied, regarding lh1s report Th1s Cerlificate of AnalysiS ay nol be reproduced excepl m full Wllhoutlhe wntten approval of Standard Laboratones, Inc lnval1d 1f altered
-------

ihe ---

-

- ---------

-----

------------

-

-

------- -

---

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

.STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618) 539-5836

PmSBURGH, PA 15236 ATTN: MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 47 of 59 Date: 11/15/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No. 201002777-035

Customer ID#l 874714

Customer ID#2 7F32

Alcohol Coking SMALL

Percent Moisture 1.70

Percent Residue 38.45

Percent Incombustible 40.15

Team 6- July 19,2010-6 NORTH 201002778-001 201002778-002 201002778-003 201002778-004 201002778-005 20 I 002778-006 201002778-007 201002778-008 20 I 002778-009 201002778-010 201002778-011 201002778-012 201002778-013 201002778-014 201002778-015 201002778-016 201002778-017 201002778-018 201002778-019 201002778-020 201002778-021 201002778-022 201002778-023 201002778-024 20 I 002778-025 874715 874716 874717 874718 874719 874720 874721 874722 874723 874724 874725 874726 874727 874728 874729 874730 874731 874732 874733 874734 874735 874736 874737 874738 874739 7B21 7B22 7B23 7B24 7C21 7C22 7C23 7C24 7021 7022 7023 7024 7EI7 7E20X 7E21 7E22 7E23 7E24 7FI7 7FI8 7FI9 7F20 7F21 7F22 7F23 SMALL SMALL SMALL TRACE SMALL SMALL TRACE TRACE SMALL SMALL TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE 1.56 1.54 1.44 1.38 1.32 1.57 1.42 1.32 1.16 1.52 1.36 1.66 1.02 1.66 1.28 1.24 1.30 1.30 1.56 1.49 1.96 1.66 2.04 2.07 1.94 51.93 52.25 48.77 55.52 56.21 52.10 58.26 72.14 67.06 60.13 60.22 56.14 75.61 56.03 66.35 66.13 62.86 61.50 56.35 54.54 46.28 47.93 42.02 41.99 43.53 53.49 53.79 50.21 56.90 57.53 53.67 59.68 73.46 68.22 61.65 61.58 57.80 .76.63 57.69 67.63 67.37 64.16 62.80 57.91 56.03 48.24 49.59 44.06 44.06 45.47

Team 7- July 19,2010- SECTION 8 201002779-001 201002779-002 20 I 002779-003 201002779-004 874740 874741 874742 874743 8Fl 8FIX 8F2 8F3 SMALL SMALL SMALL LARGE 1.26 1.32 1.46 1.69 60.20 58.13 56.47 53.00 61.46 59.45 57.93 54.69

Respectfully Submitted,

~~w~

~

e-~naiY~is~--~;;r~~-~~;··~~--~~t~;:pretatiO~s·contain-;;d--i~--~;;i~-~~p-~rt-have-t;ee-n-P~~;;pared--~~--ih·~-~i-ie·~·;;·~-di;:;;ctiOn~-arebasect·-~;;-~~-~b~e-~ati-;:;~~-~f··;;:;ate~iai·;;;.;;~;d-~d-bYth-~-~~-ie~t-a·~ct-·e-;;;;~e~;-·;;;e·······

st judgment of Standard Laboratories, tnc. Standard Laboratories, tnc. makes no other representation or warranty, expressed or implied, regarding this report. This Certificate of Analysis futt, without the written ay not be reproduced except in__________________________approval_,_, _______________________________________________________________________________________________ , ...................................................................................................................... ------------------------···--······-·"'"'""'"'" ................... of Standard Laboratories, tnc. tnvatid if altered

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, JL 62243 (618) 539-5836

PITfS8URGH, PA 15236 ATIN: MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 49 of 59 Date: 11/15/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No. 20 I 002780-0 II 201002780-012 201002780-013 201002780-014 201002780-015 201002780-016 201002780-017 201002780-018 20 I 002780-019 20 I 002780-020 201002780-021 201002780-022 201002780-023 20 I 002780-024 201002780-025 201002780-026 201002780-027

Customer ID#l 874775 874776 874777 874778 874779 874780 874781 874782 874783 874784 874785 874786 874787 874788 874789 874790 874791

Customer 10#2 11822 11822X 11823 11824 11825 llB26 11827 11827X 11828 11829 IIC22 11C23 IIC24 IIC25 IIC26 1IC28 IIC29

Alcohol Coking SMALL X LARGE SMALL LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE SMALL LARGE LARGE LARGE SMALL LARGE X LARGE

Percent Moisture 2.94 6.98 2.54 3.16 5.42 2.60 3.16 IO.oJ 7.88 5.52 2.91 6.97 8.02 7.41 19.02 16.77 8.56

Percent Residue 41.29 39.85 41.99 44.54 44.99 56.14 56.93 49.88 46.72 46.67 40.32 43.57 36.26 41.32 32.00 43.88 44.36

Percent Incombustible 44.23 46.83 44.53 47.70 50.41 58.74 60.09 59.89 54.60 52.19 43.23 50.54 44.28 48.73 51.02 60.65 52.92

Team 10- July 19,2010- TG l NORTH 201002781-001 201002781-002 201002781-003 201002781-004 201002781-005 201002781-006 20 I 002781-007 201002781-008 201002781-009 201002781-010 201002781-011 201002781-012 201002781-013 201002781-014 874792 874793 874794 874795 874796 874797 874798 874799 874800 874801 874802 874803 874804 874805 l6A24 16A25 16A26 16A26X 16824 16825 16826 16B26X l6C24 16C25 16C26 16C26X 16024 16025 X LARGE X LARGE LARGE X LARGE X LARGE LARGE X LARGE LARGE LARGE SMALL LARGE LARGE SMALL SMALL 1.92 1.93 2.18 2.49 2.00 1.62 1.94 1.90 !.52 1.34 1.52 1.74 1.48 1.28 41.59 43.42 43.16 35.82 36.51 39.92 30.77 38.25 43.67 46.78 41.79 35.81 51.29 56.69 43.51 45.35 45.34 38.31 38.51 41.54 32.71 40.15 45.19 48.12 43.31 37.55 52.77 57.97

RespectfullySubmitted, ~~ W~

[

Th~--~~-~~y;;-;:··~p;-nionsrn:~nt~;p;~~~j·~~s·-~~~~~~";;~;;l~this·;:;porthave-beenp;:;;;pa~~d--;;;t·t;;·~-~i·~~;;t;s-ci;rectTon~mebase;d~P;;;-·~bs~·;;.;ai;~ns-;;t-;:;;-a;~~i-;;;i-Pm~w-;d-bY.th;·~~-~e;;tand·e;;;press-the----1

best judgment of Standard Laboratories, Inc. Standard Laboratories, Inc. makes no other representation or warranty, expressed or implied, regarding this report. This Certificate of Analysis may not be reproduced except in full, without the written approval of Standard Laboratories. Inc. Invalid if altered
··-·-····-····--····-········--··""""""-""""""-------·-·---··-··--·-·-····-···············"····-·-·--·-····----------·--·-----·-··-·-····--·-·-·-·-·"·---·-------·----·--·-·--·-------·---·-----------·--·-·-·-·----·-"-___ j

i
i

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618) 539-5836

PITTSBURGH, PA 15236 ATIN: MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 50 of 59 Date: 11115/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No. 201002781-015 201002781-016 201002781-017 201002781-018

Customer ID#I 874806 874807 874808 874809 874810 874811 874812 874813 874814 874815 874816 874817 874818 874819 874820

Customer ID#2 16D26 16D26X 16E24

Alcohol Coking SMALL LARGE SMALL SMALL SMALL X LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL X LARGE SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL

Percent Moisture
1.58 1.76 1.64 2.12 1.75 1.96 1.90 1.81 1.84 2.10 2.34 2.02 1.48 1.60 1.74

Percent Residue 53.24 42.51 38.29 37.01 38.27 37.01 35.84 35.78 40.12 35.99 40.64 38.90 45.71 38.53 38.58

Percent Incombustible
54.82 44.27 39.93 39.13 40.02 38.97 37.74 37.59 41.96 38.09 42.98 40.92 47.19 40.13 40.32

16£25
16E26 16E26X

201002781-019 201002781-020 201002781-021
20 I 002781-022 201002781-023

16F24
.16F25 16F26 16F26X 16G24 16G25 16G26 16G27 16G28

201002781-024
201002781-025 201002781-026 201002781-027 201002781-028 201002781-029

Team 1 -July 20,2010- SECTION 7 201002782-001 20 I 002782-002 201002782-003 20 I 002782-004 201002782-005 201002782-006 20 I 002782-007 201002782-008 201002782-009 201002782-0 I 0 201002782-011 201002782-012 201002782-013 201002782-014 874821 874822 874823 874824 874825 874826 874827 874828 874829 874830 874831 874832 874833 874834 7B25 7B25X 7B26 7C25X

SMALL
TRACE TRACE SMALL TRACE SMALL TRACE TRACE SMALL TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE

1.36 1.30 1.06 1.30 1.40 1.20 1.41 1.74 2.46 1.82 1.00 1.93 1.56 1.70

54.93 64.24 64.07 64.16 64.21 62.40 67.24 79.72 57.27 56.99 74.52 41.77 45.81 43.10

56.29 65.54 65.13 65.46 65.61 63.60 68.65 81.46 59.73 58.81 75.52

7025
7D25X 7D26A 7D26B

7E25
7E25X 7E26 7F24 7F25 7F26

43.70
47.37 44.80

Team 2- July 20,2010- SECTION 16 201002787-00 I 874835 16A27 LARGE 1.90

43.42

45.32

Respectfully Submitted,

~LW~
l
'

~

eanal;s~s ~pm1~n; or mterpretat10nS~ontarn.;i ;nthrs rePOrt h~v; be~~-p;:;;paredatthe clrent's ctrre~hon, arebased ~Pon-Ob;e~;h~ns of materral provrded by the client and express the est JUdgment of Standard laboralones, Inc Standard laboratorres. Inc makes no other represenlalron or warranty, expressed or rmplred, regardmg thrs report Thrs Certrficate of Analysrs ay not be reproduced except rn full, wrlhout the wrrtten approval of Standard laboratones, Inc Invalid rf altered

------

- -

----- -

-

---- -------

--------

-- - ------- -

-

--------------- -

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618) 539-5836

PITTSBURGH, PA 15236 ATTNo MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 51 of 59 Date: 11/15/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No.
201002787-002

Customer ID# I 874836 874837 874838 874839 874840 874841 874842 874843

Customer 10#2

Alcohol Coking LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE

Percent Moisture
1.80 1.56

Percent Residue
43.64 44.49 49.42 42.96 36.89 36.57

Percent Incombustible
45.44 46.05 50.99 44.92 38.88 38.55 36.63 39.16 37.20 47.33 53.98 45.24 52.31 47.48 55.78 58.04 54.78 57.62 57.97 44.52 39.07 38.46 40.32 38.88 45.98 38.34 42.21 35.64 35.65 36.38 41.15 40.03

l6A28
16A29 16A30 16A31 16B27 16B28 16B29 16B30 16B31 16C27 16C28 16C29 16C30 16C31
16D27

201002787..()03
201002787-004 20 I 002787-005 201002787-006 20 I 002787-007 201002787-008

1.57
1.96 !.99 1.98 1.88 1.92 1.68 1.54 1.36 1.52 1.42 1.63 1.64 1.48 !.52 1.54 1.46 1.81 1.84 1.76 1.50 1.88 1.72 1.91 1.94 1.95 1.80 1.68 1.78 1.75

34.75
37.24 35.52 45.79 52.62 43.72 50.89 45.85 54.14 56.56 53.26 56.08 56.51 42.71 37.23 36.70 38.82 37.00 44.26 36.43
40.27

201002787-009
20 I 002787-010 201002787-011 201002787-012 201002787-013 201002787-014 201002787-015 201002787-016 201002787-017 201002787-018 201002787-019 201002787-020 201002787-021 201002787-022 201002787-023 201002787-024 201002787-025 201002787-026 201002787-027 201002787-028 201002787-029 201002787-030 201002787-031 201002787-032 201002787-033

LARGE
X LARGE LARGE SMALL

874844
874845
874846 874847 874848 874849 874850 874851 874852 874853 874854 874855 874856 874857 874858 874859 874860 874861 874862 874863 874864 874865 874866 874867

SMALL
SMALL LARGE SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL

l6D28
16029 16030 16031 16E27 16E28 16E29 16E30 16E31 16E32 16F27 16F28 16F29 16F30 16F31 16F32 16G30

33.69 33.85

SMALL
TRACE SMALL SMALL

34.70
39.37 38.28

Respectfully Submitted, ~at! @~

[

Tii·~-~~~iy;;·;:·~pinionso~-;ni~~;;·;~i~li~;;-~-;:;~~~~~n;;·;n·thi~-~epart h_a_v_e baen·p~ep~·~ed··~t·th~"Ctie-nt;-s diffiC~on·:-arnb·;·;·~d··~p;~··ob~~·~aii~~;-~r;;~t~rial;;7o~ded-bYth~-~~";~~i"~-~d·;;;p~~;·;"ih;--·1
best judgment of Standard Laboratories, Inc. Standard Laboratories, Inc. makes no other representation or warranty, expressed or implied, regarding this report. This Certificate of Analysis may not be reproduced except in full, without the written approval of Standard LaboratorieS", Inc. Invalid if altered

! !

...................... """'"""""""'""""""""""----·-----·-·-·-.. """"""""'""'"""'"""'"""'"""""""""""-'"'-·""'"--------·--·--·-·---·-·"""""""""""""""""""""""--·---·-----·-·-··""""""'""'"""'"""""'""'"""""'""""'""'"""'"""""""'""'""""""""""'""""'""""""-·"·--·"""·"""""'"""""""""'"""'""'""""'"""'"""'""'""'"""'""'"""'""'"""'""'"'"""""'"""_j

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX I8233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618) 539~5836

PmSBURGH, PA I5236 ATTN: MARK WESOLOWSKJ

Page: 52 of 59 Date: 11/15/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No.
201002787-034 201002787-035

Customer ID#l
874868 874869

Customer ID#2

Alcohol Coking
SMALL SMALL

Percent Moisture
1.56 1.70

Percent

Percent

Residue
38.18 38.75

Incombustible
39.74 40.45

I603I 16032

Teams 3 & 6 -July20, 2010 -AREAS 15 and 16

201002788-001 201002788-002 201002788-003 201002788-004 201002788-005 201002788-006 201002788-007 201002788-008 201002788-009 201002788-010 201002788-011
201002788-012

874870 874871 874872 874873

l5A7 15A8 15B5
1586 1587 1588 15C5 15C6 15C7 15C8

SMALL TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE

1.82
2.14

46.65 48.96 42.62 54.65 47.84

48.47 51.10 44.06 55.95 49.16 46.72
56.54

1.44
1.30 1.32 1.38 1.34 1.38 1.25 1.68 1.36 1.36 1.39 1.69 1.46 1.36 1.36 1.34 1.56 1.68 1.66 1.62 1.60 1.44 1.72 1.64 1.60

874874
874875 874876 874877 874878 874879 874880 874881 874882 874883 874884
874885

45.34
55.20

51.21 57.01 41.31 46.05 47.86 46.98 42.07
45.94

52.59 58.26 42.99 47.41 49.22 48.37 43.76 47.40 50.95
54.92

1505
1506 1507 1508
15£5

201002788-013 201002788-014
201002788-015

TRACE
TRACE SMALL TRACE TRACE TRACE SMALL TRACE SMALL

201002788-016 201002788-017 201002788-018 201002788-019 201002788-020 201002788-021 201002788-022 201002788-023 201002788-024 201002788-025 201002788-026 201002788-027

15E6
15£7

49.59 53.56 47.39 46.70 46.90
45.64

874886 874887 874888 874889 874890 874891 874892 874893 874894 874895 874896

15E8 16E33 16E34 16E35 16F33 16F34 16F35 16033 16034 16035

48.73 48.26 48.58 47.30 50.41 50.47 47.46 48.18 49.01 47.08

SMALL
TRACE SMALL TRACE TRACE SMALL

48.79 48.87 46.02 46.46 47.37 45.48

Team 4- July 20, 2010- Section 17 TG 1 North

201002789-001

874897

17Al

LARGE

1.83

40.28

42.11

Respectfully Submitted, ~~w~

~:.=:~r~~~~s~~~~~~~~~~~=~o~~~~~;ff;~~~~~~~h~!~~:~;~e~~~~bc~~l~~~~~~~~~h::~::~~~~~~~:;;~~~~:~-i!~·~:~b~~-:~'f~f~!;~~f~i;~~~~~l~:~·~?~~:~~-~f~~~!.~ff:~~~~;;-may not be reproduced except in full, without the written approval of Standard Laboratories, Inc. Invalid if altered

r - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - .............................""""""---·--------------------·------............................... ""-""""-""""·------------------------------------------·-··---·--··----·---------------·----·-.-------------------------------------'

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTil ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618) 539-5836

PI1TS8URGH, PA 15236 ATTN: MARK WESOWWSKI

Page: 53 of 59 Date: 11/15/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No. 201002789-002 201002789-003
20 I 002789-004

Customer ID#l
874898 874899 874900 874901 874902 874903 874904 874905 874906 874907 874908 874909 874910 874911 874912 874913 874914 874915 874916 874917 874918 874919 874920 874921 874922

Customer 10#2

Alcohol Coking X LARGE
X LARGE

Percent Moisture 2.10 1.93 2.04 1.88 2.24 1.96 1.80 1.30 1.04 1.24 0.88 1.38 1.73 1.44 !.52 1.54 1.97 1.44 1.54 1.30 1.72 !.58 1.52 1.47 1.69

Percent Residue
44.04 38.53 36.59 43.09 45.94 37.29 35.46 58.90 67.11 56.42 67.10 50.57 51.60
55.16

Percent
Incombustible
46.14 40.46 38.63 44.97
48.18

17A1X
17A2 17A3 1781 1781X

X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE X LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE SMALL SMALL LARGE LARGE SMALL LARGE X LARGE X LARGE LARGE X LARGE LARGE LARGE
X LARGE

201002789-005 201002789-006 201002789-007 201002789-008
20 l 002789-009

1782
1783 17CI 17CIX 17C2 17C3

39.25 37.26 60.20 68.15 57.66 67.98 51.95 53.33 56.60 54.16 52.21 50.84 49.68 46.63 49.51 52.11 51.12 45.52 49.44 46.34

201002789-010 201002789-011 201002789-012 201002789-013 201002789-014 201002789-015 201002789-016 201002789-017 201002789-018 20 I 002789-019 201002789-020 201002789-021 201002789-022 201002789-023 20 I 002789-024 201002789-025 201002789-026

17Dl
17DIX 17D2 17D3

52.64 50.67 48.87 48.24 45.09 48.21 50.39 49.54 44.00 47.97 44.65

17EI
17EIX 17E2
17E3

17FI 17FIX 17F2 17GI 17G2 17G3

X LARGE

TeamS -July20,2010- SECTION 19
20 I 002791-00 I 201002791-002 201002791-003 20 I 002791-004 201002791-005 201002791-006 874923 874924 874925 874926 874927 874928 19A2 19A2X 1982 1982X 19B3 1983X LARGE LARGE SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL 1.80 2.02 1.62 1.68 1.48 33.07 38.43 41.14 45.16 62.79 59.25 34.87 40.45 42.76 46.84 64.27 60.66

1.41

RespectfullySubmitted,

~,L &!'~

~

T-h~-~;:;~iy;Ts~-~P~io;;;-~~-i~i~·;p·~~~~~;;;·-~~;:;t-;i-;;;~i;this report ha~b~~~-p;.;;;pa-~~d ~i.th~-~~~~~t;·~"di·~~~ii~;:~re·"b-a-sed~p-~;c;t;;e;vati~ns·;TmateriaTP·rovidedbvthedient best judgment of Standard Laboratories, Inc. Standard Laboratories, Inc. makes no other representation or warranty, expressed or implied, regarding this report. This Certificate of Analysis may not be reproduced except in full, without the written approval of Standard Laboratories, Inc. Invalid if altered

.

ande;q;ressthe--l

i
I

- - - · - - - - - - - - - · - - · - - - · - ·................................" ' " " ' ' " " " " " · - - - - - - · - - - · - - - · - · - · - -........................................""""""""""""----·----------·---------·-·----·---·""-""""""--"-"""""""""""""...J

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618) 539-5836

PITTSBURGH, PA 15236 ATTN: MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 54 of 59 Date: 11115/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No.
201002791-007 201002791-008 201002791-009 201002791-010 201002791-011 201002791-012 201002791-013 201002791-014 201002791-015 201002791-016 201002791-017 201002791-018 201002791-019 201002791-020 201002791-021 201002791-022 201002791-023

Customer ID# 1
874929 874930 874931 874932 874933 874934 874935 874936 874937 874938 874939 874940 874941 874942 874943 874944 874945

Customer ID#2 19C2 19C2X 19C3 19C3X 19C4

Alcohol Coking LARGE SMALL SMALL lARGE SMALL

Percent Moisture
1.42 1.26 1.52 1.90 1.66 1.75 1.54 1.83 1.64 1.74 1.98 2.14 1.66 2.76 2.17 1.82 1.92

Percent Residue 55.70 57.84 63.45 55.63 58.98 49.89 51.50 44.25 55.06 60.03 48.78 42.01 47.45 41.15 48.47 44.31 42.10

Percent Incombustible
57.12 59.10 64.97 57.53 60.64 51.64 53.04 46.08 56.70 61.77 50.76 44.15 49.11 43.91 50.64 46.13 44.02

I9C4X
19D2 19D2X 19D3 19D3X 19D4 19D4X 19E2 19E2X 19E4 19F2 19F2X

LARGE
SMALL SMALL SMALL lARGE lARGE X LARGE SMALL SMALL X lARGE

SMALL
SMALL

Team 6- July 20, 2010- SECTION 15 201002792-001 201002792-002 201002792-003 201002792-004 201002792-005 20!002792-006 201002792-007 201002792-008 201002792-009 201002792-010 201002792-011 201002792-012 201002792-013 201002792-014 874946 874947 874948 874949 874950 874951 874952 874953 874954 874955 874956 874957 874958 874959

15Bl
15B2 15B3 15B3X 15B4 15CI 15C2

TRACE TRACE TRACE SMALL TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE SMALL TRACE TRACE TRACE SMALL SMALL

1.36 1.34 1.42 1.48 1.46 1.36 1.14 1.48 1.66 1.48 1.53 1.54 1.66 1.79

54.22 52.59 52.00 48.63 47.89 52.18 60.25 51.66 48.37 52.91 47.56 44.34 48.65 50.20

55.58 53.93 53.42 50.11 49.35 53.54 61.39 53.14 50.03 54.39 49.09 45.88 50.31 51.99

I5C3
15C3X 15C4 15DI 15D2

1503
15D3X

RespectfullySubmitted, ~.,L': &;"~

~

The analys1s, opm1onS o~~nte7p~etallons ~nta1;;;;; ha~B been prepared-althe cl1enfs d~~~;On, are- b~Sed-~Pen ob;e;;:;a!1"0n_s_ of ma!enaiPfo~;ded-bYth8C~;"e;:;t-and8;Dr;s; the~ best JUdgment of Standard Laboratones Inc Standard Laboratones Inc makes no other representation or warranty, expressed or 1mpbed regarding thiS report Th1s Certificate of Analysis may not be reproduced excepl1n full, Without the wntten approval of Standard Laboratones Inc Invalid 1f altered

mlh-;-sre;;ort

--

- -

-------- --

-

- - - - ------- -

-- - ----

------

---

-

-- --

--

-- -

--

-

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX I8233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618) 539-5836

PmSBURGH, PA I5236 ATTN: MARK WESOLOWSKJ

Page: 55 of 59
Date: 11/15/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No.

Customer ID#l

Customer ID#2 I5D4 I5EI I5E2 I5E3 I5E4

Alcohol Coking TRACE
SMALL

Percent Moisture

Percent Residue
49.89 42.82 43.59 42.28 49.39

Percent
Incombustible

20I002792-0I5 20I002792-0I6 201002792-017 20I002792-0I8 20I002792-0I9

874960 87496I 874962 874963 874964

1.42
l.7I 1.79 1.60 1.46

51.3I 44.53 45.38 43.88 50.85

SMALL SMALL TRACE

Team 7- July 20,2010- SECTION 8 201002793-001 201002793-002 20I002793-003 201002793-004 874965 874966 874967 874968 874969 874970 87497I 874972 874973 874974 874975 874976 874977 874978 874979 874980 87498I 874982 874983 874984 874985 874986 8A6 8A6X 884 8B5 886 8B6X 8C3 8C4 8C5 8C6 8C6X 805 806 806X 8E3 8E4 8E5 8E6 8E6X 8F5 8F6 8F6X SMALL SMALL SMALL
X LARGE

2.24 3.00 2.13 2.88 2.I2 2.83 4.39 2.I2 2.94 2.98 3.29 3.05 2.53 1.88 2.37
2.IO

42.I9 54.08 38.58 39.0I 51.26 38.7I 34.82 43.20 41.28 40.85 35.55 44.73 41.63 39.60 60.96 54.59 70.I7 56.28 39.I9 54.29 51.27 46.56

44.43 57.08 40.7I 41.89 53.38 41.54 39.2I 45.32 44.22 43.83 38.84 47.78 44.I6 41.48 63.33 56.69 71.75 58.14 41.30 56.45 53.33 48.58

201002793-005
20I002793-006 201002793-007 201002793-008 201002793-009 201002793-0IO 201002793-0 II 201002793-0I2 20I002793-0l3 201002793-0I4 201002793-015 20I002793-0I6 201002793-0 I 7 20I002793-0I8 20I002793-0I 9 201 002793-020 20I002793-02I 20I002793-022

TRACE LARGE X LARGE LARGE X LARGE LARGE X LARGE
LARGE

X LARGE LARGE SMALL X LARGE LARGE X LARGE LARGE X LARGE X LARGE LARGE

1.58

1.86 2.11 2.I6
2.06

2.02

Team 8- July 20,2010- SECTION II HG 22 DEVELOPMENT SECTION 20I002795-00I 20 I 002795-002 20I002795-003 874987 874988 874989 IIAIO SMALL SMALL LARGE
3.42

37.7I 41.10 31.46

41.13 48.06 35.47

llAII l1Al3

6.96 4.0I

Respectfully Submitted,

~,L! @~

[~=J~f~~~~~~i~~~~~;~~~=~f~:~fs~·~;~~~~~!~~!~~~~-~f~~~!~~!f:~~e~~~h~~:~~s~f~i;~~~~~::;~"~~~:~:~~~:~bif~~~~~-"f~-;~1~~~\~i~;l~~~~~f:g~·~~Jc~~:-~~~;~l~~ ' not be reproduced e)(cepl in ful , without the writ en approval of-Standard laboratories. Inc. Invalid if altered _______ ____
may
----~-----~--------·-------------"""'""'"""'"""""""""""""""'"'"'"~~~-----------

... ..........

~-------------"'"""'""""""""""""""""'''·"'·"'·"'·---~-------~~-------------------------"·-----"'""""'"

,_____________________________

_

____ ;

-MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618) 539-5836

PITTSBURGH, PA 15236 ATTN' MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 56 of 59 Date: ll/15/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No. 20 I 002795-004 201002795-005 201002795-006 201002795-007 20 I 002795-008 201002795-009 201002795-010 201002795-0 II 201002795-012 201002795-013 201002795-014 201002795-015 20 I 002795-016 201002795-017 201002795-018 20 I 002795-019 201002795-020 201002795-021 20 I 002795-022 201002795-023 201002795-024 201002795-025

Customer ID#l 874990 874991 874992 874993 874994 874995 874996 874997 874998 874999 875000 875001 875002 875003 875004 875005 875006 875007 875008 875009 875010 875011

Customer ID#2 IIAI5 11Al7 11AI7X 11A19 11A21 IIBI4 11BI5 11BI6 11817 11Bl7X 11B18 11BI9 11B20 11821 IICI4 IICI5 11CI6 11C17 11CI8 11CI9 11C20 IIC21

Alcohol Coking SMALL SMALL LARGE SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL X LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE SMALL SMALL TRACE SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL

Percent Moisture 4.13 2.52 2.40 2.19 4.34 2.14 2.19 1.93 2.23 2.56 2.34 2.28 2.35 2.36 2.60 3.53 2.88 4.03 3.29 5.89 4.68 3.04

Percent Residue 32.35 43.37 37.41 39.16 39.98 33.43 34.78 45.44 39.65 47.57 40.11 43.55 44.77 41.77 45.98 42.83 39.92 41.17 46.23 38.37 42.38 36.48

Percent Incombustible 36.48 45.89 39.81 41.35 44.32 35.57 36.97 47.37 41.88 50.13 42.45 45.83 47.12 44.13 48.58 46.36 42.80 45.20 49.52 44.26 47.06 39.52

Team 9 -July20, 2010- SECTION II HG 22 201002796-001 201002796-002 201002796-003 201002796-004 201002796-005 201002796-006 201002796-007 201002796-008 20 I 002796-009 875012 875013 875014 875015 875016 875017 875018 875019 875020 11AI2 IIAI2X 11AI4 11AI6 11A18 11A20 11A7X llBIO 11B3 SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL LARGE LARGE LARGE SMALL SMALL 7.83 2.56 2.06 1.80 2.08 2.10 2.00 2.55 2.04 31.75 41.48 32.21 40.91 32.34 40.68 47.99 44.53 45.16 39.58 44.04 34.27 42.71 34.42 42.78 49.99 47.08 47.20

Respectfully Submitted, ~~ @~

~

e analys1s, op1mons or mterpretailons con tamed m th1s report have been prepared at the chenrs d1reclion, are b8.Sed-~-on observations of matenal prov1ded by the client and express the S!Judgment of Standard Laboratones Inc Standard Laboratones Inc makes no other representalion or warranty, expressed or 1mphed regarding this report Th1s Certificate of AnalysiS y not be reproduced except In full w1thout the wntlen approval of Standard Laboratones, Inc Invalid 1f altered
- - - - - --

--

-

--------------------

-

..

- --

- - - - - - - - - - --

-

------------------------------

---

- - - - ------------------

-

--- - - - -

----

-

-- - - - - ------------- - ----- ----- - ---

-

-----

MINE SAFETY AND HEALlli ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, JL 62243 (618) 539-5836

PIITSBURGH, PA 15236

ATTN: MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 57 of 59
Date: 11/15/2010 8:43:53 AM

Alcohol Lab No.
201002796-010 201002796-011 201002796-012 201002796-013 201002796-014 201002796-015 201002796-016 201002796-017 201002796-018

Customer ID#l
875021 875022 875023 875024 875025 875026 875027 875028 875029

Customer ID#2 IIB6 IIB7

Coking SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL TRACE TRACE TRACE TRACE

Percent Moisture 2.12 1.32 1.92 1.48 1.70 1.86 2.08 1.66 2.19

Percent Residue 48.18 57.64 49.79 48.15 50.17 47.41 50.11 45.48 44.89

Percent Incombustible 50.30 58.96 51.71 49.63 51.87 49.27 52.19 47.14 47.08

llB7X
IIB8 IIB9 11C6 IIC7 IIC8 IIC9

Team 10 -July20, 2010- TG I NORTH
201002797-001 201002797-002 201002797-003 201002797-004 201002797-005 201002797-006 201002797-007 20 I 002797-008 201002797-009 201002797-010 201002797-011 201002797-012 20 I 002797-013 201002797-014 201002797-015 20 I 002797-016 875030 875031 875032 875033 875034 875035 875036 875037 875038 875039 875040 875041 875042 875043 875044 875045 16A32 16A33 16A34 16A35
16832

LARGE LARGE X LARGE LARGE LARGE SMALL LARGE LARGE SMALL TRACE SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL

1.52 1.64 1.83 1.76 2.02 1.68 1.56 2.02 1.48 1.28 1.38 1.48

48.55 45.87 45.84 42.60 44.63 47.92 46.11 44.21 49.12 52.14 51.35 50.30 45.42 52.58 52.77 49.44

50.07 47.51 47.67 44.36 46.65 49.60 47.67 46.23 50.60 53.42 52.73 51.78 46.89 53.98 54.41 50.98

16B33 16B34

16835
16C32 16C33 16C34 16C35 16032 16033 16034 16035

1.47
1.40 1.64 1.54

SMALL
LARGE

Team l- July 21,2010-4 NORTil SECTION 4
201002798-001 20 I 002798-002 201002798-003 20 I 002798-004 201002798.005 875046 875047 875048 875049 875050 4A2 4A3 4A3X 4B2 4B3X NONE 1.16 0.90 0.76 0.40 0.88 66.17 80.10 74.69 91.97 73.29 67.33 81.00 75.45 92.37 74.17

NONE
NONE NONE NONE

Respectfully Submitted,

~L!W~

[

TheanaiYSis-:-~;xnions·;;··int~~p·~~~~i~nscontain_e_dinlhiS-rePQrt"h~-~~-·b;;;;~·p~~p~·;;d~ithecnen·rs·d·i";~~~~~;:;:··~re-"b~sed-;:;pon-obsefV_a_ti_On_s_Of-materialpro~d-ed-bYthe,x~entandeXP~e;;·th;
-------------------------------·-,·-··""""""'""""""""""""""""""""-""""-""

best judgment of Standard Laboratories, Inc. Standard Laboratories. Inc. makes no other representation or warranty, expressed or implied, regarding this report. This Certificate of Analysis may no! be reproduced except in full, without the written approval of Standard Laboratories, Inc. Invalid if altered

______________ ____
"

""'"-"'""""""""'"-"""'""'""""""'""·------------------"·"--"'""""""""'"""""""""'"""""""""-"""""""""

____

""""""""""-·-·"""""""""""""""·---·-·-··""""""""""""'""--·-·"·"·-··"·-··········"-'"""""""""""'""'"'""

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION P.O. BOX 18233

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.
8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IL 62243 (618) 539M5836

PmSBURGH, PA 15236 ATIN: MARK WESOLOWSKI

Page: 59 of 59

Date: 11115/2010 8:43:53 AM

Lab No.
201002803-001 201002803-002 20 I 002803-003 201002803-004

Customer ID#l 875077 875078 875079 875080

Customer ID#2
282

Alcohol Coking NONE NONE NONE NONE

Percent Moisture
4.72 3.81 5.39 2.88

Percent Residue 63.63 74.99 54.83 62.04

Percent Incombustible
68.35 78.80 60.22 64.92

2CIX
2DIX 2EI

Team 8- July 21,2010- HG 22 SECTION 11 DEVEWPMENT SECTION

20 I 002804-00 I
201002804-002 201002804-003 201002804-004 201002804-005 20 I 002804-006 201002804-007 201002804-008 201002804-009 201002804-010 201002804-0 II

875081 875082 875083 875084 875085 875086 875087 875088 875089 875090 875091 875092

liAS IIA6 11A7 liAS

SMALL

5.45 3.87 2.82 3.03 3.56 2.99 2.54 3.20

33.34 43.99 32.06 34.93 35.73 39.04 44.22 40.14 37.82 45.21 48.34 50.Q7

38.79 47.86 34.88 37.96 39.29 42.03 46.76 43.34 40.56 48.63 50.62 53.38

SMALL
SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL LARGE LARGE

IIA9
liB II 11812 11B12X 11813 IICII IICI2 IIC13

2.74
3.42 2.28 3.31

TRACE
TRACE

201002804-012

TRACE

Team 9- July 21,2010- SECTION 3 ELLIS PORTAL MAINS 201002805-00 I 201002805-002 201002805-003 201002805-004 201002805-005 201002805-006 201002805-007 201002805-008 875093 875094 875095 875096 875097 875098 875099 875100 3A4 3A5 3A5X 384 385 3B5X 3C4 3C5 NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE 0.88 1.32 1.46 1.20 0.58 1.64 1.48 2.77 75.33 54.60 35.79 91.77 90.45 58.22 50.34 53.02 76.21 55.92 37.25 92.97 91.03 59.86 51.82 55.79

NONE

RespectfullySubmitted, ~L &/~
The analysis, opinions or interpretations contained in this report have been prepared at the client's direction, are based upon observations of material provided by the client and express the best judgment of Standard Laboratories, Inc. Standard laboratories. Inc. makes no other representation or warranty, expressed or implied, regarding this report. This Certificate of Analysis may nol be reproduced except in full, without the written approval of Standard Laboratories, Inc. Invalid if altered

... .............

·····-----------------·········..····························-··---------------------- ...... . . .. ..

.. . .... ..

. .

--------------------------_

1 ··-·--·-··--·-··--..--,.·--··-·-······--·-·-·--·--·------·-----·-··-·-··-·-·········-·-·····-·-···································-·······--··-·--·----------------·--··-·-·------·--·-----·-·--·--------·--·-·---·---·--·-····-·--·--·..1

i !

!

StL
Count N Average

11115.12010

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.

S451 Rwer K1ng Drive, Freeburg, Illinois 622~3 (618) ~9-5886

UBB DUST SAMPLES

Re licates

QARRM-4

CaC03

1.56 0.0346 0.17 0.00 0.0303 0.10 0.00

5.79

5.87
0.1226 0.32 0.00 0.1020 0.21 0.29

0.20

0.19

Average Drfrerenc:e

0.0272

Max Difference Min Difference Repeatabi!ty STD DEV Estimated W~ll.ln L:.b REPEATABILTY {Based on first30) Within Lab REPEATABILITY (Bas..:! on Totnl Popul.rtion)

0.08 0.00 0.0232
0.00 0.00

Parameter.

Moisture

Pa1101 ol2

~

11/1512010

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.

8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, lllinois62243 (618) 539-5836

UBB DUST SAMPLES

CountN Avernge 1,56 1.55 Average Difference Max Difference Min Difference Repeatabitty STD DEV Estimated Wr!hln Lab REPEATABILTY (Based on first 30} Within Lat REPEATABIUTV (Baa! on Total Population)

5.79
0.0346

5.87

0.20
0.1226 0.32 0.00 0.1020

0.19
0.0272 0.08 0.00 0.0232 0.06
0.06

0.17 0.00 0.0303 0.10 0.01

,,, ,,,

Pa~Je~of2

s:t
Count N

1111512010

STANDARD LA BORA TORIES, INC.

8451 River King Drive, Freeburg, lllino;s 62243 (616} 539-5836

UBB DUST SAMPLES

Re licates

QARRM-4

CaCOJ

Average Average Difference Max Difference Min Difference Repeatabilty STD DEV

57.92

57.92
0.5979

12.68

12.72
0.0696 0.00 0.0624 11.19 0.17

99.88

99.98

'"" 0.01
0.5937

'"

0.1036 0.22 0.00 0.0825

Estimated W~hin Lab REPEATABILTY (Based on lil'$1 30) Within Lab REPEATABILITY (Ba~ed on Total Popul~tlon)

'·" '·"

MST-REPEATAEUTY Upo ...

Pago1 ol2

Sl._
Count N

1111512010

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.

B451 River King Drive, Freeburg, IIOnois 62243 (618) 539-5836

UBB DUST SAMPLES

Average
Average Difference

57.92

57.92

12.66
0.5979
3.98

12.72
0.0696 0.23 0.00 0.1)624 0.19 0.17

99.88

99.98
0.1036 0.00 0.0825 0.23 0.23

MaK Dffi'arence
MinOiffarence

Repeatabltty STO DEV Estimated Within lab REPEATABILTY (Based on fil$!30)
Within Lab REPEATABILIT'f {Based on Toto I Popul~!lm)

0.01 0.5937

,

·~

1.66

Parameter:

Residue

Page2of2

1111512010

-

STANDARD LA BORA TORIES, INC.
8451 River K;ng Drive, Freeburg, lllinols62243 (618) 539-5836

UBB DUST SAMPLES

Re lk:ates
CountN
A~araga

QARRM-4

CaC03 100.10 100.17
0.1553 0.41 0.01 0.1307 0.32 0.37

59.37

5941

Average Difference Max Diffe,...nce Min Difference Repeatabilty STO DEV
Estimated Wnhin Lab REPEATABILTY (Based on firs!JO) Within Lab REPEATABILITY (Based on Total Population)

0.5828

"

16.47

18.59

3.92 0.00
0.5791 2.25

0.0794 0.20 0.00 0.0646

0.17
0.16

1-62

Pogo 1 ol2

:R_

11/1512010

STANDARD LABORATORIES, INC.

8451 River King Drive, Freeburg. llllnoi• 62243 (618) 539-5836

UBB DUST SAMPLES

CountN Average Average Difference

59.37

59.41 0.5628 3.92 0.00 0.5791

1847

1859 0.1553 0.41 0.01 0.1307 0.32

100.10

100.17

Max Difference
Min Difference Repeat. billy STD DEV Estimated W~hin lab REPEATABJLTY (Based on first 30)
Within lab REPEATABlL!T'f (Based on Total Population)

,,,
1.62

,,

0.0794 0.20 0.00 0.0846 0.17 0.18

Parameter.

Incombustible

''

Pa~e2

of2

APPENDIX K INSPECTION HISTORY

Appendix K
Table K-1. Types and Number of Enforcement Actions for All UBB Inspection Events, Calendar Year 2009

Type of Enforcement Action 104(a) non-S&S citation 104(a) S&S citation 104(d)(1) citation 104(d)(1) order 104(d)(2) order 104(b) order 107(a) order 104(g)(1) order 103(k) order Total

No. Issued 284 176 1 1 48 4 1 1 1 517

Table K-2. Types and Number of Enforcement Actions for All UBB Inspection Events, Calendar Year 2010 through April 5, 2010 (Prior to the Explosion)

Type of Enforcement Action 104(a) non-S&S citation 104(a) S&S citation 104(b) order 104(d)(2) order 103(k) order 103(j) order Total

No. Issued 87 30 1 6 1 1 126

APPENDIX M SEISMIC EVENTS IN SOUTHERN WEST VIRGINIA

Appendix M Seismic Events in Southern West Virginia Data from the U.S. Geological Survey indicate that two rare seismic events occurred in southern West Virginia in the weeks preceding the explosion at UBB. The first was a 2.9 Magnitude event that occurred on March 27, 2010 in Logan County, approximately 27 miles away from UBB. The shallow depth and location in a historically bump-prone area of West Virginia suggests that the seismic event represents a coal pillar bump rather than an earthquake. Review of old mine maps, downloaded from the West Virginia Geologic and Economic Survey (WVGES), identified an old mine with extensive pillared works within one mile of the plotted location of the seismic event. The extensive pillared works in the abandoned mine surrounded large, square barrier-style pillars that may have experienced rapid failure after decades of degradation to reach a critical size. The second seismic event occurred on April 4, 2010 in Braxton County, approximately 60 miles from the face of the 1 North Panel, UBB (Figure M-1). Despite the seemingly close temporal relation between the April 4 seismic event (05:19:14), and the April 5 explosion (15:02), the 60 mile interval and 34-hour time difference does not support any recognizable relationship between the two events. After the April 5, 2010 explosion, seismic events continued to be recorded in the Upshur/Randolph County area. A 2.5 magnitude seismic event was reported on August 21, 2010, with the hypocenter exactly coinciding with a gas well that is exploiting the Devonian-aged Marcellus Shale (API # 4709703326), with a neighboring well also reported as developed to the Marcellus Shale (API # 47-09703622) (Figure M-2). Following the April 5, 2010 explosion, several seismic events were recorded in central West Virginia. A search of seismic events within 200 km of UBB indicated that six seismic events were recorded in 2010 along the crest of the Gassaway Anticline (Figure M-3). Because several of those events were reported as occurring at 0 km depth, the localized seismic activity is interpreted to be associated in some fashion with the recent increase in gas drilling in the state, and does not appear to have any recognizable association with UBB.

Figure M-1. Location of Randolph County 2.8 M “seismic event,” in relation to UBB, that occurred on April 4, 2010. The event was essentially at the surface, only 0.1 km deep and located over 60 miles away.

Figure M-2. Locations of seismic events in the vicinity of Upshur County shown in relation to the locations of gas wells developed to the Marcellus Shale. Event on August 21, 2010 plots directly on top of a gas well location, suggesting that increased drilling activity, possibly associated with fluid injection, is related to the increase in recorded seismic events.

Figure M-3. Map of seismic events recorded by the USGS in 2010 in West Virginia are located along the axis of the Gassaway Anticline, dominantly occurring essentially at the ground surface. Location along anticline axis is suggestive of gas drilling-related activity. Blue circles represent the locations of gas wells drilled to the Marcellus Shale.

APPENDIX N WVDEP SURFACE BLASTING

APPENDIX N WVDEP SURFACE BLASTING

Appendix N Surface Blasting on April 5, 2010 Although the US Geological Survey does not report events that are less than 1.0 Magnitude, the possibility of an association with surface blasting was assessed by portraying UBB workings in relation to surface mines on georeferenced air photos. The nearest surface operation is located nearly two miles from the vicinity of HG 22 and/or the 1 North Panel face. Surface shots conducted on April 5, 2010, the day of the explosion, were recorded by seismographs monitored by the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection’s (WVDEP) Office of Explosives and Blasting. The locations of surface blasts were plotted in a Geographic Information System (GIS) using coordinates provided by the WVDEP Office of Explosives and Blasting, along with the times of surface blasting. Four surface blasts were recorded approximately 2 ½ miles from the face of the 1 North Panel, but the earliest was over one hour after the 3:02 p.m. time of the explosion. The WVDEP was requested to provide the locations and times of all surface blasts for the week prior to the explosion, within a five mile radius of the 1 North Panel face. Discussions with David Vande Linde (Office of Explosives and Blasting) conducted on April 29-30, 2010, revealed that seismographs were located at Lindytown and Synergy, and agreed with the time data provided by the company, although located 1,500-2,000 feet away from the blast (Figure N-1). Mr. Vande Linde indicated that at that distance, the seismic magnitudes resulting from the surface shots were 0.01-0.06 Magnitude, representing very small events.

Figure N-1. UBB in relation to surface blasting events on April 5, 2010. Surface shots all occurred at least one hour after the 3:02 p.m. time of the explosion, and were located more than two miles south of the 1 North panel.

APPENDIX O GEOCHEMISTRY OF NATURAL GAS AND COALBED METHANE

Appendix O Geochemistry of Natural Gas and Coalbed Methane Primary gases originate from bacterial respiration (biogenic) and thermal alteration of liquid or solid organic precursors (thermogenic) (Schoell, 1983). Four values are found useful in describing variability in natural gases and deducing their origin and processes involved with their origin, including the concentration of C2 through C5 hydrocarbons (i.e. ethane, propane, butane, and pentane) relative to C1(i.e. methane), the carbon and hydrogen isotopic composition of methane, and the carbon isotopic composition of ethane (Schoell, 1983). Additionally, the hydrogen isotope composition of methane and ethane has been found useful for distinguishing between gas sources (Whiticar, 1996). Coalification involves a series of biochemical and geochemical reactions that transform plant material into a combustible, carbonaceous solid (Kim, 1973). Most coalbed gases are generated during the progressive burial and maturation of the coal (Scott, 1993). Samples of coal collected from various seams by Kim (1973) contained gas that was characterized by generally greater than 90% methane and 1.0-1.5% ethane, with negligible amounts of heavier gaseous hydrocarbons. Similarly, experiments conducted by Kim (1974) involving the collection of gas desorbed from coal samples revealed domination (99.5%) by methane and ethane, with only trace amounts of higher hydrocarbons. Scott (1993) reports that an average coalbed gas will contain 93.2% methane, 3.1% carbon dioxide, 2.6% wet gases (i.e. hydrocarbons C1) and 1.1% nitrogen. Isotopes are atoms with the same number of protons but different numbers of neutrons, which results in differing atomic mass for the same element. The difference in properties between two isotopes that may lead to a slight separation in distribution (fractionation) is largely a result of the different vibrational frequencies of heavy and light atoms in a molecular or crystal structure (Krauskopf and Bird, 1995). Atoms of a light isotope vibrate with higher frequencies, hence in general are less strongly bonded to other atoms than atoms of a heavy isotope. It is assumed that migration of gases in most situations does not appreciably change the isotopic composition of the hydrocarbons (Schoell, 1983). The element Carbon includes two stable isotopes, 12C and 13C, as well as the radioactive 14C. The element Hydrogen includes two stable isotopes, 1H and 2H, the latter being known as Deuterium and referred to with a capital “D.” Hydrogen has a third, radioactive isotope, Tritium (3H) with a short half-life of 12.26 years. Three mechanisms of isotope separation can be distinguished, including those depending on physical properties (such as evaporation and precipitation), exchange reactions resulting in equilibrium between two or more substances, and separation depending on reaction rates. The extent of separation between two phases is expressed by a ratio called the fractionation factor, which compares the ratio of concentrations of heavy to light isotope in one phase to the same ratio in another phase. The comparison ratio is reported in concentrations of per mil, or parts per thousand,

relative to the heavier isotope. Carbon isotope ratios are expressed as δ13C in parts per thousand (per mil or ‰) deviations from the Pee Dee Belemnite marine carbonate standard, for which the internationally accepted standard for the ratio of 13C/12C is equal to 0.0112372. A positive value of the fractionation ratio indicates relative enrichment of the heavier isotope, whereas a negative value represents a relative depletion of the heavier isotope compared to the lighter isotope. In practice, the Peedee Belemnite has a very high 13C content, so virtually all terrestrial samples will exhibit a negative value of δ13C‰ in comparison such that a relative enrichment will be expressed. Natural gas is generated from organic matter throughout the burial history of sedimentary rocks. Three principal episodes of gas generation are recognized: 1) biogenic gas is formed during the early, low temperature (60-100° C) phase of sediment burial history at shallow ( 3 km) depths, by anaerobic bacteria, characterized by isotopically light methane of δ13C -60‰; 2) early thermogenic gas is produced along with liquid hydrocarbons during the intermediate phase of burial history; 3) late thermogenic gas is produced during the high temperature phase of burial history, which is destructive to earlier formed liquid hydrocarbons. Jenden et al. (1993) state that at greater depths and temperatures, thermal degradation of kerogen yields thermogenic gases, in addition to hydrocarbon liquids, and that although geochemistry is strongly dependent on source rock and maturity, they are generally characterized by ethane contents greater than 1% and δ13C values for methane of greater than -50‰. In general the amount of natural gas formed increases as a sedimentary unit progresses through the various stages of gas generation (Claypool et al., 1978; Jenden et al., 1993). The gas formed during each of these stages has a characteristic chemical composition and stable carbon isotope ratio for methane. Biogenic gas is predominantly methane that is isotopically light (δ13C = -90 to -55‰). Methane originating during the thermal generation of petroleum is always accompanied by ethane and heavier hydrocarbons, and is isotopically heavier (δ13C = -55 to 35‰). Data from samples compiled by Scott (1993) for the San Juan, Piceance, and Black Warrior Basins, for coal classified as high-volatile C bituminous rank, indicates δ13C values for methane of -49.3 to -60.2‰, δD values for methane of 223 to -256‰, and δ13C values for ethane of -29.2 to -30.8‰. Data for samples compiled by Laughrey and Baldassare (1998) for coalbed methane in the central Appalachian Basin indicate δ13C values for methane of -39.9to -55.1‰ and values of δD for methane of -194 to -219‰. The accident investigation team collected gas samples from UBB, another longwall mine in the Eagle seam located 14 miles away, and from separate gas wells producing from the Greenbrier Formation and Marcellus Shale within seven miles of the 1 North Panel. The hydrocarbon contents and stable isotope ratios were compared and plotted on discrimination diagrams to determine the sources of gas entering the mine, and to understand the role of gas in the geologic model. Samples from the other Eagle seam longwall mine were collected from gas feeders that were discovered on June 7, and October 25, 2010. The gas content

(by mole) of the June 7 event contained 90.141% methane, 4.188% ethane, 1.496% propane, 0.838% combined butanes, 0.458% combined pentanes, 0.264% hexanes, 0.127% heptanes, and 0.203% hydrogen. The gas content from the October 25 event contained 98.27% methane, 1.23% ethane, 0.3% propane, 0.11% combined butanes, 0.03% combined pentanes, and 0.01% C6+ hydrocarbons. Therefore, the relatively high ethane content (4%), and presence of propane, butane, pentane, hexane, and heptane (i.e. a “wet” composition) is an indication that the floor gas represents natural gas derived from a source other than a coal seam. Plots of stable isotope values indicate that the gas was derived from a Type II kerogen, such as expected for organicrich shale. This suggests a source in the Devonian-aged black shale such as the Marcellus/Millboro/Lower Huron. Plots of stable isotope values on discrimination diagrams developed by Jenden et al. (1993) indicate a vitrinite reflectance value of approximately 0.7-0.8% for the source rock, which is at the lower range of vitrinite reflectance reported for the Lower Huron of western West Virginia, a source of Type II kerogen. Several samples of gas were collected at different times by MSHA, WVOMHST, and company investigators from floor feeders located behind the shield pontoons on the longwall face at shield 160 and shield 170. The immediate vicinity of the floor feeders were characterized by a distinctive smell similar to that noted at the other Eagle seam longwall mine, and registered high values of methane and CO. The samples were characterized by gas contents of 40.61% (90.15% normalized to 100% hydrocarbons) methane, 2.7% (5.99%) ethane and 1.21% (2.68%) propane, as well as 0.135% (0.3%) and 0.188% (0.41%) iso-butane and nbutane, respectively; 0.04% (0.08%) and 0.0202% (0.04%) iso-pentane and npentane, respectively, and; 0.018% (0.04%) hydrocarbons including or heavier than hexane. The sample also contained 0.279% hydrogen, and no CO, despite a hand-held methane detector indicating several hundred parts per million CO. These samples are chemically and isotopically very similar to those collected from the other Eagle seam longwall mine, and are representative of organic shale-derived thermogenic gas, rather than biogenic gas derived from humic coal. Numerous samples were collected by MSHA and company investigators from small feeders emanating from the floor throughout the HG 22 and ‘new’ TG 22 sections. Analysis results indicate a different kind of gas than that sampled at shield 160-170 or the other Eagle seam longwall mine. In contrast to those samples, which contained significant ethane and other heavier hydrocarbons, the HG 22 and TG 22 samples were characterized by methane content of 75-78%, with only 0.01-0.02% ethane and insignificant or nondetectable contents of C2+ hydrocarbons. Furthermore, the samples contained no hydrogen, and during the sampling process the hand-held gas detector indicated no CO. Although subsequent analyses indicated that no CO is actually present in any of the samples, a CO reading of several hundred parts per million is simply a proxy for hydrogen, which the hand-held detector is incapable of registering. These

samples were also subjected to determination of stable isotope contents, and plotted on discrimination diagrams for comparison with other collected samples, where they represent a distinct and separate sample population The source of coalbed methane bubblers may be the Lower (Little) Eagle seam, based on an absence of hydrocarbons higher than methane, although isotopes suggest some mixing with a deeper thermogenic source. A sample of Eagle seam coal was collected from the longwall face on August 31, 2010 in an aluminum desorption canister for determination of hydrocarbon content. After a prolonged period of desorption, five 15-cc test tubes of gas were obtained from the sample, and sent for analysis. Because the desorbed samples were highly diluted with air, chemical analysis indicated only 0.580% (mole) methane but failed to detect any C2+ hydrocarbons in the sample. This is an indication that the gas is typical of coalbed methane, but may also represent that last residual gas to desorb from the coal. Nitrogen and oxygen contents were similar to expected for ambient air, at 77.55% and 20.85%, respectively. Because of the very low sample volume and high dilution, the results may not be conclusive, since ethane occurs at such a small ratio to methane even in samples of natural gas. However, stable isotope contents for methane indicated a δ13C value of -61.68‰ and a δD value of -247‰, which is indicative of microbial gas. Thus, it appears that gas derived from the Eagle seam itself is different from the coalbed methane gas emanating from floor bubblers, as well as the natural gas emanating from floor fractures. A chemical analysis was obtained from Equitable Resources for well no. 7645 (API 005-00810) developed to the Greenbrier Formation, indicating over 89% methane, 4.8% ethane, 1.7% propane, 0.3% iso-butane, 0.6% n-butane, 0.2% iso-pentane, 0.2% n-pentane, and 0.4% content of hexane and longer hydrocarbons. This composition is very similar, in terms of the presence of longer-chain hydrocarbons, to the samples collected from the floor feeders at the other Eagle seam longwall mine, and from the floor fractures at Shields 160-170. Chemical analyses were obtained from samples of gas from two EXCO Resources wells producing from the Devonian-aged Marcellus Shale, located 6.25-7 miles ESE of the 1 North Panel face (API No.’s 4708101435 and 4708101436). Data from these samples were plotted on discrimination diagrams together with other samples collected from the mine, and are considered the basis for comparison with natural gas (Figures O-1 to O-4). The samples plot very close to those collected from the other Eagle seam longwall mine and from shields 160-170, confirming previous interpretations that those samples represent natural gas rather than coalbed methane.

Figure O-1. Plot of collected gas samples for δ 13C for methane (‰) and ethane versus vitrinite reflectance, after Berner and Faber (1996), indicating derivation from Type II kerogen, such as expected for organic shale. Vitrinite reflectance is unknown for Marcellus Shale beneath UBB, but values of 0.8% and 0.6% for samples collected from the American Eagle Mine and UBB, respectively, are based on Figure 46. Published data for area coal seams in the southern Appalachian Basin suggest that vitrinite reflectance may be as high as 0.9%. For both samples, values lie along the curve defined for methane, but diverge significantly from the curve defined for ethane. Red stars indicate samples that contain C2+ hydrocarbons; green stars indicate samples with little or no C2+ hydrocarbons. Blue stars indicate composition of natural gas produced from the Marcellus Shale.

Figure O-2. Discrimination diagram from Whiticar (1996) showing gas fields based on plotting δ 13 C for methane (‰) versus δ D for methane (‰). Red stars indicate samples that contain C2+ hydrocarbons; green stars indicate samples with little or no C2+ hydrocarbons. Blue star indicates samples that were obtained from the Dorothy 45 and Dorothy 47 wells, which produce natural gas from the Marcellus Shale.

Del D Methane (per mil)
.340 -65 Eagle Seam LW Face -60 .300 -260 -220 -180 -140 -100

~

Microbial Gas

Speed-14 -55 Mixed 95' inby ss24391 (22HG)

= E
..._ .,
~

-50

Q.

.,

.5 -45
22TG-3

1: .r;

"' .... .,
(')

.7
~ Q.;.
~

u
0

~

.....

.,

-40

22HG Mouth-1

-"' u

~
0

I 22TG-1 I
.35

0:: .0
.0 Speed-12

., u
..._
::l 0

I 22HG-1 I
I

(/)

.0

.30

-25 ~------------------------------~----~

Figure O-3. Discrimination diagram after Jenden et al. (1993) showing fields of microbial and thermogenic gas based on plotting values of δ 13C for methane (‰) and δ D for methane (‰). Values for vitrinite reflectance are shown for comparison. Red stars indicate samples that contain C2+ hydrocarbons; green stars indicate samples with little or no C2+ hydrocarbons. Blue star indicates samples that were obtained from the Dorothy 45 and Dorothy 47 wells, which produce natural gas from the Marcellus Shale.

Figure O-4. Discrimination diagram showing fields of gas from microbial and thermogenic sources, based on comparison of C1, C2, and C3 hydrocarbons (ratio of methane to combined ethane and propane), compared to δ 13C for methane (‰). Diagram modified from Whiticar, 1996). Red stars indicate samples that contain C2+ hydrocarbons; green stars indicate samples with little or no C2+ hydrocarbons. Blue star represents samples obtained from the Dorothy 45 and Dorothy 47 wells, which produce natural gas from the Marcellus Shale.

References
Berner, U. and Faber, E., 1996, Empirical carbon isotope/maturity relationships for gases from algal kerogens and terrigenous organic matter, based on dry, open-system pyrolysis. Organic Geochemistry, v. 24, p. 947.955. Claypool, G.E., Threlkeld, C.N., and Bostick, N.H., 1978, Natural gas occurrence related to regional thermal rank of organic matter (maturity) in Devonian rocks of the Appalachian Basin. Proceedings of the Second Eastern Gas Shales Symposium, Morgantown, WV, October 16-18, v. 1, p. 54-65. Jenden, P.D., Drazan, D.J., and Kaplan, I.R., 1993, Mixing of thermogenic natural gases in northern Appalachian basin. The American Association of Petroleum Geologists Bulletin, v. 77, p. 980-998.
rd Krauskopf, K.B. and Bird, D.K., 1995, Introduction to Geochemistry, 3 Ed. McGraw Hill, Boston, MA, 647 p.

Kim, A.G., 1973, The composition of coalbed gas. Bureau of Mines, Report of Investigation 7762, 9 p.

Kim, A.G., 1974, Low-temperature evolution of hydrocarbon gases from coal. Bureau of Mines, Report of Investigation 7965, 23 p. Laughrey, C.D. and Baldassare, F.J., 1998, Geochemistry and origin of some natural gases in the plateau province, central Appalachian basin, Pennsylvania and Ohio. AAPG Bulletin, v. 82, p. 317-335. Schoell, M., 1983, Genetic characterization of natural gases. AAPG Bulletin, v. 67, p. 2225-2238. Scott, A.R., 1993, Composition and origin of coalbed gases from selected basins in the United States, in Proceedings of the international coalbed methane symposium, Birmingham, Alabama, May 17-21, v. 1, p. 207-222. Whiticar, M.J., 1996, Stable isotope geochemistry of coals, humic kerogens and related natural gases. International Journal of Coal Geology, v. 32, p. 191-215.

APPENDIX P RECONSTRUCTION OF VENTILATION MAP CAN BE FOUND IN THE BACK OF THE BINDER

APPENDIX Q PETROGRAPHIC ANALYSES

Appendix Q Petrographic Analysis of Roof and Floor, 1 North Panel Face Samples of the roof and floor were collected from the tailgate side of the 1 North Panel face so that petrographic analyses could be conducted. Results of mineral content were plotted on a diagram to assess the incendive potential of the rock encountered by the shearing drums. Underground observations indicated that the tailside drum was cutting sandstone in the roof and floor, while the headside drum was cutting sandstone in the floor. A sample of rock from the face, directly in contact with the top of the coal seam, had been ejected outward onto the tail drive. The sample contains two rock types, coarsegrained micaceous quartzo-feldspathic siltstone interbedded with medium-grained feldspathic wacke (arkose). The siltstone layers are characterized by gradational laminations in color, highlighted by changes in the relative proportions of biotite and quartz + feldspar. Alternating bands of brown coloration are due to the proportion of biotite in bands that are less than 1 mm thick. Angular, commonly jagged grains of quartz (7% content, 0.03-0.2 mm diameter) are sporadically distributed throughout the rock, with individual grains commonly isolated by a matrix of biotite and muscovite lathes (Figure Q-1). Less commonly, quartz grains touch along tangential boundaries. Quartz grains also commonly touch plagioclase grains along tangential boundaries. Angular, jagged-edged grains of plagioclase (25% content, 0.04-0.2 mm diameter) touch along tangential boundaries and commonly show moderate to heavy sericite alteration. Thin, ragged flakes of biotite (15% content, 0.04-0.2 mm diameter) are abundantly distributed, with individual flakes isolated or concentrated in clusters between quartz and plagioclase. Flakes are oriented parallel and their abundance defines color banding in alternating layers (Figure Q-2). Biotite flakes are compacted around angular corners of quartz and plagioclase grains. Rarely, some flakes are completely altered to chlorite. Thin lathes and ragged flakes of muscovite (5% lathe content, 48% content including matrix sericite, 0.01-0.1 mm diameter) are sporadically distributed with individual lathes or flakes abundantly intermixed with quartz and plagioclase. Fine-grained flakes represent a matrix that generally surrounds individual grains of quartz and plagioclase and occupies angular interstices. In other layers, individual lathes are isolated between angular grains of sericitized plagioclase.

Figure Q-1. Angular grains of quartz (white, yellow) and plagioclase (gray, with dusty sericite alteration) are generally surrounded by a matrix of biotite (dark brown), muscovite (brightly speckled), and illite or very fine-grained muscovite in this sample of coarse siltstone from the 1 North Panel face roof. Field of view 1 mm at 100X.

Figure Q-2. The roof rock, viewed in plane polarized light, reveals how changes in the concentration of biotite mica impart the effect of color banding in the coarse siltstone collected from the 1 North Panel face roof. Field of view 1 mm at 100X.

The sandstone, characterized as feldspathic arenite/wacke or arkose, is comprised of angular grains of quartz, plagioclase, and minor microcline that touch along tangential or concavo-convex boundaries, with individual grains or clusters of grains surrounded by a matrix of illite or very fine-grained muscovite (Figure Q-3). Angular, commonly jagged grains of quartz, ranging in size from 0.07-0.6 mm in diameter and constituting 43% of the rock, touch along tangential or concavo-convex boundaries. Angular grains of plagioclase, ranging in size from 0.07-0.4 mm in diameter and constituting 34% of the rock, touch along tangential and concavo-convex boundaries, and are commonly intermixed between larger quartz grains, and exhibit light to moderate sericite alteration. Angular grains of microcline, ranging in size from 0.2-0.3 mm in diameter and constituting 6% of the rock, are sparsely distributed, surrounded by angular grains of quartz and plagioclase. Ragged lathes of muscovite (5% lathe content, 17% including sericite, 0.04-1.1 mm diameter) are sporadically distributed, with individual lathes isolated by surrounding quartz and feldspars (Figure Q-4).

Figure Q-3. Layer of feldspathic arenite interbedded with coarse siltstone from the roof of 1 North Panel face is characterized by angular grains of quartz (white), plagioclase (gray, with dusty sericite alteration), and rare microcline (plaid black and gray) that touch along tangential and concavo-convex boundaries that leave few interstices for illite/muscovite matrix material. Field of view 2.4 mm at 40X.

Figure Q-4. Angular grains of quartz (white, shadowed) and plagioclase (gray, with dusty sericite alteration) touch along straight, tangential, and concavo-convex boundaries that leave few interstices for illite/muscovite matrix. Field of view 1 mm at 100X.

A sample of the floor (LWTG ss22582) was collected for petrographic study from the 1 North Panel tailgate entry, from a layer of heaved up sandstone 36 feet outby the longwall face, beneath survey station 22582 (Figure Q-5). Extraction of sandstone from the floor heave slab’s brow fully exposed the crack and confirmed earlier observations that the fracture was rootless, and did not extend farther than 12 inches into the floor (Figure Q-6). Based on petrographic study, the rock is classified as fine-grained feldspathic arenite/subarkose sandstone. In general, angular grains of quartz, plagioclase, and minor microcline interlock along straight, concavo-convex, and sutured boundaries with small flakes of muscovite sporadically scattered throughout the rock. Small, angular interstices between quartz and plagioclase are filled with sericite, and plagioclase grains commonly exhibit light to moderate sericite alteration. Angular quartz grains, ranging in size from 0.03-0.2 mm in diameter and constituting 74% of the rock, interlock with each other and plagioclase along straight, concavo-convex, and less commonly, sutured boundaries, especially between quartz grains. Small patches of quartz grains exhibit sutured boundaries that meet at 120° angles. In layers with more sericite in larger interstices, grain to grain contacts may become tangential. Interstitial material and open spaces are rare, with mostly grain to grain contacts. Angular plagioclase grains, ranging in size from 0.07-0.1 mm in diameter and constituting 11% of the rock, interlock with

surrounding quartz grains along concavo-convex and straight boundaries. Grains are commonly lightly to moderately altered to sericite (Figure Q-7). Less commonly, grains interlock with quartz along complexly intergrown, sutured boundaries. Angular microcline grains, ranging in size from 0.1-0.2 mm in diameter and constituting 2% of the rock, are roughly rectangular and distributed sparsely throughout the rock, with individual grains surrounded by quartz and plagioclase, with which they interlock along straight and concavo-convex boundaries. Flakes of biotite, ranging in size from 0.07-0.2 mm in diameter and constituting 5% of the rock, are sporadically distributed uniformly throughout the rock, with individual flakes isolated by surrounding grains of quartz, plagioclase, and microcline. Areas of locally higher biotite content represent discontinuous mica-rich interbeds within the sandstone matrix. The long axes of flakes are aligned roughly parallel, reflecting indistinct bedding. Some flakes have been extensively altered to chlorite. Flakes of muscovite, ranging in size from 0.01-0.4 mm in diameter and constituting 8% of the rock if illite and “sericite” is included, are sparsely distributed throughout the rock, with individual flakes isolated between surrounding grains of quartz and feldspar. Muscovite flakes represent only 3% of the rock, with interstitial illite or sericite representing 5%. Angular grains of accessory apatite are sparsely distributed throughout the rock, with individual grains isolated by surrounding quartz and feldspars.

Figure Q-5. Sample of sandstone was collected from floor heave brow beneath survey station 22582 in 1 North Panel longwall tailgate, 36 feet outby the face. Brow of heaved sandstone slab reveals rootless crack.

Figure Q-6. View of exposed floor heave crack looking straight down, with hammer and tape measure for scale. The crack is rootless and dies out approximately 12 inches into the floor at a layer of shale.

Figure Q-7. In fine-grained feldspathic arenite/subarkose sandstone from floor, angular grains of quartz (yellow, gray) and plagioclase (wavy shades of gray) interlock along straight, concavo-convex, and sutured boundaries, with only minor amounts of mica or sericite in small, rare interstices. Cluster of quartz grains at center of view interlock along sutured boundaries that meet at roughly 120° angles, indicating compaction recrystallization. Field of view 1 mm at 100X.

Compared to the sample collected from the roof, the floor sample contains a much greater quartz content, and is characterized by a much greater degree of grain interlocking, with a significant number of concavo-convex and sutured boundaries. Several areas exhibit sutured boundaries along quartz grains that meet at 120° angles, indicating a degree of diagenetic compaction recrystallization. Similarly, mica flakes are wrapped around obdurate quartz grains due to intense compaction. Due to the higher quartz content in the floor sandstone, it has a higher average Mohs Hardness value of 6.31, compared to a value of 5.83 for the sandstone in the roof, or 3.64 for the dark gray siltstone in the roof. Furthermore, the floor sandstone appears to be more fine-grained, with maximum grains sizes of 0.2 mm compared to grains sizes of 0.4-0.6 mm in the roof sandstone. The grain size distribution also seems more uniform in the floor sandstone. Based on the mineral contents determined by thin section petrography, the samples were plotted on the ternary diagram developed by Ward et al. (2001) for comparison with the incendivity index developed for rocks in Australian coal mines (Figure Q-8). The layers of coarse siltstone, which contain a high mica content, plot in Category 1, indicating a low potential for frictional ignition. In contrast, the sandstone plots in Category 4, indicating a high potential for frictional ignition. The floor sandstone very nearly plots in

the Category 5 zone, due to its high quartz content. It should be noted that the incendivity index applies to rock-on-rock and metal-on-rock ignitions. Thus, sandstone falling in the gob behind the shields, or sandstone being struck by bits on the shearer would both represent potential ignition sources.

Figure Q-8. Ternary diagram after Ward et al. (2001) showing relation of Upper Big Branch roof (red crosses) and floor (blue diamond) sandstone (SS) and siltstone (ss) to contour lines of incendivity index. Rocks with an incendivity index of 4-5 were shown in tests to have a high potential for frictional ignition. Although sandstone from roof and floor have similar incendivity indices, the floor sample is composed dominantly of quartz.

APPENDIX R WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM TO THE LONGWALL SHEARER DUST SPRAYS

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION TECHNICAL SUPPORT

Appendix R: HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS REPORT Water Supply System to the Longwall Shearer Dust Sprays Upper Big Branch Mine-South (MSHA ID 46-08436) Montcoal (Raleigh County), WV April 5, 2010 PAR 98947

Prepared By:

Derrick M. Tjernlund, PE Sr. Fire Protection Engineer

November 26, 2011

-Originating OfficeApproval and Certification Center Mechanical and Engineering Safety Division Dennis Ferlich, Chief 765 Technology Drive Triadelphia, West Virginia 26059

2 Executive Summary This report identifies the methods and conclusions of an analysis conducted to determine the capability of the mine water system to adequately supply water to the Shearer dust sprays on the Longwall mining machine at the No. 1 Longwall Panel. This analysis was requested by Upper Big Branch Mine Accident Investigation Team Leader, Norman Page. The analysis is based upon conditions believed to be existing just prior to the mine explosion of April 5, 2010. The methodology herein was a four step process: Step 1: Determine the rate of water flow needed for various equipment, along with the pressures at the equipment. In this case, the equipment in question was the dust control sprays on the longwall Shearer and related longwall equipment (longwall Shields and Stage Loader). Step 2: Evaluate the water supply to determine the available pressure for the needed flow at a strategic location in the water distribution system. For this analysis, the strategic location chosen was the discharge side of the booster pump on the longwall mule train (Node U on the corresponding mine map, Appendix R, Figure R-1). Step 3: Starting at the Shearer sprays and using the flows determined in Step 1, calculate hydraulic pressure losses traveling upstream to the same strategic location referenced in Step 2 (Node U). This provides the pressure required to maintain the needed flow determined in Step 1. Step 4: Compare the pressure required in Step 3 to the available pressure determined in Step 2. If the required pressure exceeds the available pressure, the water system is deemed inadequate. For the analysis conducted herein, the required pressure exceeded the available pressure for all the flow scenarios that were considered. The following assumptions and conditions apply to the analysis. 1. Because the fluid is water and all piping and hoses are assumed to have smooth internal linings, hydraulic pressure losses due to friction in the piping or hoses can be determined accurately using the Hazen-Williams formula. This accuracy is generally considered adequate for water up to velocities of approximately 25 feet per second. The Hazen-Williams formula is normally expressed as: Ploss = 4.52Q 1.85 L C 1.85 D 4.87 (R-1)

3

Where: Ploss = pressure loss in pounds per square inch (psi) end to end in the pipe or hose Q = flow through the pipe in gallons per minute (gpm) D = internal diameter of the pipe or hose (inches) L = length of the pipe or hose (feet) C = Hazen-Williams factor representing the internal smoothness of the pipe 2. A Hazen-Williams C value (pipe smoothness factor) of 150 was used for all calculations. The lower the C value, the rougher the pipe or hose lining and the greater will be the pressure losses for a given flow. A C value of 150 represents very smooth pipe or hoses in a typically brand new condition. This value is being used since the actual internal conditions of the hoses and piping is unknown. One method of determining the actual C values for piping would be to conduct a detail hydraulic profile flow test of the system. However, the water system was damaged by the explosion and out of service, thus eliminating any opportunity to flow test it. 3. Velocity pressure differences between any reference point and related locations were not considered where such differences were less than 4 psi, which was the case in all analyzed situations. Furthermore, flow velocities were well below the upper limit of about 25 feet per second. 4. The flow characteristics of the Shearer are based upon both flow testing conducted underground on the Shearer on December 20, 2010, and upon flow estimates based upon nozzle data received from the MSHA UBB accident investigation team. Four scenarios for various combinations of flows were considered in the analysis. 5. For large diameter piping and hoses, and for long runs of smaller hoses, minor losses for fittings were considered negligible and have been excluded from the analysis. Where minor losses were deemed important, details were included in the Node by Node description of the water system. Additionally, the main water line contained a number of in-line control valves to isolate sections of the water line for the purpose of maintenance. It is assumed all of theses valves were in the fully open position and any losses across these valves are negligible.

4 6. Elevations of important or useful locations in the mine were estimated using a mine map showing “bottom” elevations. These elevations are listed in feet above mean sea level (MSL) 1 . All elevations, pressure sources, pressure losses, and net pump discharge pressure have been converted to equivalent feet of head for inclusion on the hydraulic profiles (Figures R-2 through R-5). Before plotting the data on a hydraulic profile, each pressure head value must be added to the elevation at the location in question. The equivalent feet of head for a pressure value can be determined by multiplying the pressure in psi by 2.31. The equivalent pressure value in psi for a given feet of head can be found by dividing the head by 2.31. 7. For the analysis, calculated pressures were rounded down to the nearest whole psi for required pressures, and rounded up to the nearest whole psi for available pressures, except where the decimal value was within about 0.2 psi of a whole psi. For those cases, the pressure was rounded to the nearest whole psi. General Description of the Mine Water System The Upper Big Branch mine water supply was a gravity fed system supplemented with underground booster pumps placed at strategic locations. For the long wall section at the 1 North Panel, two booster pumps, arranged in parallel, were located on the most outby car of the longwall mule train. Water for the system was stored in two steel cone roof surface tanks located on the hilltop above the southeast corner of the mine near the Silo Portal where the No. 1 South Belt exits the mine. The bottom elevation of the tanks was reported to be 1308 feet above MSL. The main water line between the tanks and the various parts of the mine consisted primarily of PVC plastic piping known as “Yelomine” pipe, a trademark of the Certainteed Corporation. The wall thicknesses and pressure ratings for this type of pipe are based upon SDR (standard dimensional ratio number) specifications. The main water line is primarily 8-inch piping but there were some sections consisting of 6-inch piping, including a long run in the No. 1 Headgate North Mains. Yelomine piping sections visually examined had an SDR number of 13.5, giving it a pressure rating of 315 psig. The water system had two locations where filter canisters removed sediment or debris from the water. The first bank of filters consisted of ten filters in parallel located approximately midway in the East Mains. The second bank consisted of
1

“feet above mean sea level” is hereafter abbreviated “ft MSL”.

5 four filters in parallel located on the longwall mule train booster pump car. The filter media were metal baskets consisting of No. 60 sieve material 2 . Several weeks before the explosion, the mine operator had stopped using cloth bags, commonly referred to as socks, typically sized to filter either at the 10 micron or 100 micron particle size. The layout of the water system is shown on two mine views presented in Appendix R, Figure R-1. One view shows the overall water line routing from the tanks to the longwall mule train connection; the second view shows the routing from the mule train connection to the Shearer connection. In both views, important locations are identified with individually lettered node labels. Certain letters, specifically I and O, were not used to designate nodes to prevent possible confusion with the numbers one or zero. The nodes were established as part of this analysis for the convenience of specifying various strategic locations along the water system routing. Node to Node Description of the Water System Node information, along with estimated pipe lengths between nodes, is summarized in Table 9 and Table 10. Elevations and node descriptions are also shown in these two tables. As indicated above, node locations are shown on the Appendix R Mine Map, Figure R-1. Node A This node is at the discharge from the storage tanks. Its elevation was reported to be 1308 feet MSL. Assuming a tank height of 28 feet including cone roof, and a fill level of 25 feet within each tank, the elevation when the tank is full would be at approximately 1333 ft MSL. Piping to next node The exact route of piping was not determined, but was approximated based upon the location of most likely useful mine entries. It is assumed that all piping is 8-inch Yelomine with an SDR of 13.5. Node B The exact location of this node is assumed based upon the location of mine entries. The elevation is approximately 1125 ft MSL. Piping to next node As with the piping between Node A and B, the exact route of piping was not determined, but was approximated based upon the location of most likely

2

A US 60 sieve will prevent passage of particles larger than 250 microns.

6 useful mine entries. It is assumed that all piping is 8-inch Yelomine with an SDR of 13.5. Node C The exact location of this node is assumed. The connection point to the East Mains water line in this area could not be found due to a large build up of rib sloughage and rock dust which buried this part of the water line. The elevation is approximately 1146 ft MSL. Piping to next node Except for the portion near the No 1 belt Silo Portal exit where the pipe was covered in sloughage, the piping was field verified as 8-inch Yelomine, SDR 13.5 piping. It ran on the mine floor alongside the belt conveyor in the East Mains. Node D This node is located at the No. 17 Break of the East Mains belt entry, at approximately 1128 ft MSL. Piping to next node This piping was field verified as 6-inch Yelomine, SDR 13.5 piping which moved over to an adjacent entry for two breaks, possibly to avoid the congestion created by a section-belt dumping point onto the main belt at Break 18. Node E This node is located at the No. 19 Break of the East Mains in the belt entry. It’s elevation is approximately 1128 ft MSL. Piping to next node This piping was field verified as 8-inch Yelomine, SDR 13.5 piping. It ran on the mine floor alongside the No.1 Belt conveyor in the East Mains. Nodes F and G These two nodes are at an elevation of approximately 1131 ft MSL. They are located in the belt entry, between break Nos. 24 and 25, and represent the connections into and out of a filter set consisting of ten parallel metal basket filters contained within individual cylindrical stainless steel pressure enclosures. These filters are Rosedale model 8-30-2P-150-S-B-S-BM60 filters. Even under the highest flow rate considered (344 gpm), the flow through this filter set would be split roughly equally between the ten filters, or about 35 gpm through each. Examination of performance curves in the Rosedale

7 technical literature indicate that at a flow of approximately 35 gpm, the loss across the filter is about 0.1 psi. Even with the short lengths of intervening 2inch piping and fittings, the loss across the entire filter set is considered negligible at less than 1 psi. Piping to next node This piping was field verified as 8-inch Yelomine, SDR 13.5 piping. As before, it ran on the mine floor alongside the No.1 Belt conveyor in the East Mains. Node H This node is located at the No. 49 Break of the East Mains in the belt entry. It’s elevation is approximately 1097 ft MSL. At this point, the line makes a 90 degree turn into the Northeast Mains. Piping to next node This piping was field verified as 8-inch Yelomine, SDR 13.5 piping. It ran on the mine floor alongside the Northeast Mains belt conveyor line. Node J This node is located at the No. 15 Break of the Northeast Mains in the belt line entry. It’s elevation is approximately 1071 ft MSL. Piping to next node At Node J, the 8 inch piping reduces to 6-inch Yelomine, SDR 13.5 piping and moved over to the adjoining parallel entry for two breaks. Node K This node is located at the No. 17 Break of the Northeast Mains in the belt conveyor entry. It’s elevation was also approximately 1071 ft MSL. Piping to next node At Node K, the 6-inch piping transitions back to 8-inch Yelomine, SDR 13.5 piping and continued along the belt line. At about No. 31/32 Break, the water line was located near the roof, crossing over the track entering along the North Portal Mains. Node L This node is located at the No. 51 Break of the East Mains in the belt entry. It’s elevation was approximately 1015 ft MSL. Piping to next node At Node L, the water line rerouted over to the adjacent track entry and continued along the track for approximately 4 breaks. It then returned to the

8 belt entry at No. 56 Break and continued inby. This piping was field verified as 8-inch Yelomine, SDR 13.5 piping. Starting at No. 56 Break, the Northeast Mains became the North Mains. Node M This node is located between the No. 59 and 60 Breaks of the North Mains in the belt entry. It’s elevation is approximately 1018 ft MSL. Piping to next node At Node M, the piping reduced to 6-inch Yelomine, SDR 13.5 piping. It ran on the mine floor alongside the Belt conveyor. However, the belt conveyor ends at No. 61 Break. Node N This node is located between the No. 62 and 63 Breaks of the North Mains in the belt entry. It’s elevation is approximately 1014 ft MSL. Piping to next node This piping was field verified as 8-inch Yelomine, SDR 13.5 piping. It ran on the mine floor in the former belt entry in the North Mains. This run of pipe is the second longest section of piping at just over 7000 feet in length. Node P This node is located at the No. 128 Break of the North Mains. It’s elevation is approximately 944 ft MSL. At this location, an in-line pressure reducing valve (CLA-VAL model CLA 90-01/690, rated at 0 to 300 psi) was installed. Statements by mine personnel indicated the valve was set to maintain a maximum pressure of 150 psig to the inlet of the booster pump at the longwall mule train. Based upon the difference in elevation between the pump and this reducing valve, the valve would have been set to reduce pressure to approximately 115 psig at the reducing valve outlet. (The pump is located at Node U.) Piping to next node This piping was field verified as 8-inch Yelomine, SDR 13.5 piping. It continued north, and at the No. 134 Break of the North Mains, crossed the east/west track serving the Ellis Portal. It continued one more break north to the No. 4 belt entry in the Old North Mains. Node Q This node is located at Survey Station # 18655 in the Old North Mains. It has an elevation of approximately 943 ft MSL.

9 Piping to next node This piping was field verified as 8-inch Yelomine, SDR 13.5 piping. It ran on the mine floor alongside the belt conveyor in the Old North Mains. This is the longest run of water line at just under 7700 feet in length. Node R This node is located at the No. 76 Break of the Old North Mains belt entry. It’s elevation is approximately 910 ft MSL. Piping to next node From this node, the water line turns into the belt entry in the North Glory Mains. The piping was field verified as 8-inch Yelomine, SDR 13.5 piping. Node S This node is located between the No. 103 and 104 Break of the North Glory Mains. It’s elevation is approximately 862 ft MSL. At this location, the water line flow path splits into two directions. The first direction is the existing the 8-inch line continuing inby along the belt conveyor toward for the No. 22 Longwall panel development section. The other flow path, the 6-inch pipe discussed next, is routed in the adjacent parallel entry to the belt entry for the No. 1 Headgate North Mains. Piping to next node This piping was field verified as 6-inch Yelomine, SDR 13.5 piping. It ran on the mine floor alongside the No. 1 Longwall Panel belt conveyor toward the mule train. At the No. 8 Break of the No. 1 Headgate North Mains, the track enters this entry and continues inby alongside the water line. Node T This node is located just inby No. 17 Break of the No. 1 Headgate North Mains. It’s elevation is approximately 852 ft MSL. Piping to next node At this node, the 6-inch pipe changes to 4-inch hydraulic hose. This arrangement consisted of approximately 26 feet of 4-inch hydraulic hose connected to a 5 foot length of 4-inch schedule 40 steel pipe. Four 2-inch schedule 40 steel pipes tap off of the 4-inch pipe to feed four individual metal basket filters, each in a stainless steel filter housing. On the discharge side of the filters, 2-inch piping then connected the flow to a second 4-inch schedule 40 steel pipe approximately 7 feet long which fed the suction sides of the two parallel booster pumps.

10 The four filters were similar to the ten filters at the filter set located between Nodes F and G. The valving to one of the four filters was found shut, thus splitting the maximum considered flow of 344 gpm pump flow approximately evenly between the other three filters, or approximately 115 gpm through each. Even at this higher flow, the pressure loss across the filters was less than 1 psi and thus considered negligible. However, the 115 gpm flow through the 2inch piping was not considered negligible. The 2-inch piping consisted of approximately 4 feet of actual pipe and 51 feet of equivalent pipe for the fittings consisting of four elbows, two gate valves, and one tee (total of 55 feet of equivalent 2 inch pipe). The equivalent pipe length for the fittings is based upon a Hazen-Williams C value of 150. To simplify the analysis, the Hazen-Williams equation was used to determine an equivalent length of 4 inch hose for the three parallel paths of 55 feet of 2-inch hose. This can be expressed as:

1 4.52Q4.85 1 4 C 4.85 D4 .87

⎛Q ⎞ 4.52⎜ 4 ⎟ ⎝ 3 ⎠ L4 = 1.85 4 C 2 D2 .87

1.85

L2

(R-2)

Here the subscripts refer to the 2-inch and 4-inch pipe respectively. Assuming the C values for both pipes are the same (150) and using nominal diameter for the four inch hose (4.00 inches) and the schedule 40 steel pipe diameter (2.067 inches) for the 2-inch pipe, solving equation R-2 for L4 yields an equivalent length of 180 feet for a single four inch hose carrying 344 gpm versus three parallel paths of 55 feet of 2-inch steel pipe, each carrying 115 gpm. In addition to the 26 feet of 4-inch hydraulic hose, the total 4 inch steel pipe was approximately 11 feet in length. This brings the total length of equivalent four inch hose to 217 feet (26+180+11). Node U This node is located at the longwall mule train No. 1 booster pump. The pump is on the first car of the mule train just inby No. 17 Break of Headgate No. 1 North Mains. The elevation of this node is approximately 852 ft MSL. There are actually two booster pumps plumbed in parallel. They were normally operated one at a time. After the accident, the pump located on the pump car toward the belt side of the entry (referred to as pump No. 1) was found with its valves open, indicating it was in use. The inlet and discharge valves for the other pump (referred to as pump No. 2) were found closed.

11

The nameplate data for the No. 1 booster pump is: Mfgr: Sunflo Model: P3-BVK s/n B1020796-01 Rating: 350 gpm at 1470 feet discharge head The No. 1 pump is powered by a three-phase AC induction motor with the following nameplate data. Mfgr: Reliance Electric Horsepower: 300 Volts: 460 Amps: 326 Service factor: 1.15 Model: P44G5183B Frame: 449TS Design: B Speed: 3570 RPM For reference, the No. 2 booster pump had a rating of 350 gpm at 1480 feet of head, and was thus nearly identical to the No. 1 pump. Piping to next node This piping is the discharge manifold off the pump and consists of 3-inch schedule 40 steel pipe. Together with the fittings, the equivalent length of 3inch piping was 68 feet. Node V This node is at the inby end of the pump discharge manifold piping where the discharge flows into two parallel 2-inch hydraulic hoses. The elevation is also 852 ft MSL. Piping to next node This piping consists of two 2-inch hydraulic hoses running in parallel on the mine floor to No. 20 Break, where it turns and travels over to the longwall belt entry. Node W This node is located at a water distribution box referred to as the “glut.” At the glut, the flow connects to the hoses running in the longwall monorail system. The elevation of the glut is approximately 847 ft MSL.

12

Piping to next node This piping is two 2-ich hydraulic hoses running in parallel on the monorail system. Node X At this node, located approximately one break outby the location of the longwall face, the two monorail 2-inch hoses connect into a distribution box that splits the incoming flow into three out going flows: water to the Shear, water to the shield dust sprays, and water to the Stage Loader sprays and cooling for the crusher motor. It is assumed for the analysis that all three flows normally add to the flow rating of the booster pumps of 350 gpm, which would be the basis for the rating of the pumps used. The elevation of this node is approximately 842 ft MSL. Piping to next node For the supply to the Shearer, the water traveled in a single 2-inch hydraulic hose that ran in a hose/wire bundle suspended beneath the chain conveyor framing. The elevation of this node is approximately 840 ft MSL. Node Y This node is located where the 2-inch hydraulic hose connects to the hose in the Bretby cable handler. This is a traveling cable tray that runs between the center of the longwall and the Shearer. It allows cables and the water supply needed by the Shearer to travel back and forth with the Shearer as it traverses the length of the longwall from headgate to tailgate. Piping to next node This piping is single 2-inch hydraulic hose that is enclosed in the Bretby cable handler. Node Z This node is located at the Shearer water inlet connection on the Shearer body. At the location where the Shearer was found after the accident, the elevation was approximately 851 ft MSL.

13 STEP 1, Longwall Shearer Water Requirements There are two aspects to developing the flow characteristics of the longwall Shearer. The first is to develop an estimate for minimum acceptable needed flow to the sprays on the Shearer to meet the requirements of the approved dust control plan. The second is to develop an estimate of the actual hydraulic characteristics of the Shearer water spray distribution system. Required minimum Shearer flow per the dust control plan The shearer dust sprays included a mixture of nozzles of various types different from those listed in the approved dust control plan. The approved dust control plan listed Conflow Code 2801CC full-cone staplelock nozzles having a 1/16inch orifice. However, documentation from the mine operator indicated use of 116 nozzles identified as Flow Technologies model 791C full cone staplelock sprays having 3/32-inch orifices (0.094 inches). There were also 41 sprays listed as made by the Spraying Systems Company. Field examination of the nozzles confirmed them to be those made by Flow Technologies. Flow Technologies maintains that at the same pressure, their nozzles produce equivalent flow and patterns to Conflow nozzles having 3/32 inch orifice. The field examination found that approximately 1/3 of the installed staplelock sprays were jet sprays, with the remainder being cone sprays. Each pattern type produces a different flow rate at any given pressure. The Spraying Systems nozzles were reported as model BD-5, based upon field examination of the nozzles installed on the Shearer and Stage Loader. Some spare nozzles found in the longwall supply area were BD-3 or Steinin 5-5 nozzles. Steinin indicated their 5-5 nozzles had the same flow characteristics as the Spraying Systems BD-5 nozzles. There were no BD-3 nozzles observed as installed on the Shearer or Stage Loader. The dust control plan required all nozzles at the shearer to have at least 90 psi when flowing. At this pressure, the staplelock full cone spray nozzles would flow approximately 1.32 gpm each, while the staplelock jet spray nozzles would flow approximately 1.75 gpm each. The BD-5 nozzles had a flow of 1.5 gpm each. Based upon nozzle counts and field observations, two possible flow conditions were estimated. These were based upon summing the minimum flow from each nozzle on the Shearer when each nozzle is at a pressure of 90 psi. A third flow condition was developed based upon data from the mine operator for nozzles at 125 psi (refer to Step 1 in the analysis for more detail). Shearer Flow Condition 1 116 staplelock cone sprays

14 41 Systems Spraying BD-5 nozzles. Total flow 214 gpm. Flow condition 1 at the Shearer has been included in the analysis, but is not representative of nozzles observed as installed on the Shearer. Shearer Flow Condition 2 116 staplelock nozzles, 78 cone sprays, 38 jet spray 41 Systems Spraying BD-5 nozzles. Total flow 231 gpm. This second flow condition is based upon the field observation that approximately one third of the Shearer staplelock nozzles were jet sprays, while the remainder were cone sprays. Note that the total flows provided in the flow conditions are the minimum flows into the Shearer needed to conceptually meet the 90 psi criteria. Since it is not likely that all nozzles will have the same pressure at any given total flow condition, total flows higher than the minimum would probably be needed under realistic conditions to ensure each nozzle having the minimum pressure of 90 psi. However, only the minimum flow is considered here since determining or predicting the pressure at all nozzles simultaneously is not practicable. Equivalent flow characteristics of the Shearer as found To establish an estimated equivalent flow characteristic for the Shearer, it was necessary to flow test the Shearer spray system. Since the normal mine water system was damaged by the explosion and out of service, it was necessary to provide a temporary water supply. During the flow test, gravity fed water from the surface above the mine was delivered through a bore hole near the longwall section and then through temporary piping over to the Shearer. At the Shearer, a test manifold was assembled consisting of filters, an adjustable pressure reducing valve, two in-line flow meters (one belonging to MSHA and the other to the mine operator), and appropriate pressure gages. The pressure reducing valve was used to regulate and adjust the pressure into the Shearer. The flow was then measured at various inlet pressures. Four tests were conducted on the Shearer on December 20, 2010. However, one of the tests was actually conducted twice after problems were identified when the filters on the test manifold had plugged up.

15 Because of the location of the Shearer, most nozzles on the headgate drum could not be reached and examined up close as this drum was mostly beneath unsupported roof and was not safely accessible. Additionally, fallen coal and rock around both Shearer drums created a situation making it impossible to view the condition of all nozzles, especially those at the bottom of the drums. Visible nozzles were identified as open, plugged, or missing. The Shearer flow tests are summarized as follows: Field Test No. 1 This was the Shearer tested in the post accident (as-found) condition including both plugged and missing nozzles. Field Test Nos. 2 and 2A Test 2 was also with the Shearer in the “as-found” condition including plugged and missing nozzles, but with one plugged nozzle on each drum replaced with a pressure gage. The second test (2A) was run after the filters that plugged during test 2 were replaced with clean filters. Field Test No. 3 In this test, those accessible nozzle openings with missing nozzles had open nozzles installed in those openings. This test represents the Shearer in an arrangement under conditions closer to what it should have been during operating in a properly maintained condition. Field Test No. 4 In this test, the nozzles that had been installed in openings with missing nozzles for Test No. 3 were again removed. However, nozzles found to be plugged were replaced with un-plugged nozzles. Again, this was done only for nozzle locations that were safely accessible and visible. This test also represents the Shearer in a semi-repaired condition. For each of the above flow tests, the flow and pressure data were used to estimate an equivalent single orifice nozzle having the same flow characteristics as the entire Shearer with its individual nozzles. A single orifice nozzle, or an equivalent single orifice nozzle representing multiple nozzles, will have flow characteristics that can be modeled as:

Q = kP n

(R-3)

Where Q is the flow in gpm, P is the nozzle pressure in psi, n is an exponent (equal to 0.5 for an ideal smooth circular orifice), and k is a factor associated with

16 the characteristics of a particular nozzle and takes into account the size, shape, and smoothness of the orifice. Using appropriate logarithmic identities, equation R-3 can be recast as:

ln Q = n ln P + ln k
Equation R-4 has the form of a straight line given as:

(R-4)

y = mx + b

(R-5)

Where x and y are the independent and dependent variable respectively, m is the slope of the line, and b is the y-axis intercept. The association between equations R-5 and R-4 is as follows:

y → ln Q, m → n, x → ln P, b → ln k
For reasonably well behave nozzles, the plot of ln 3 (Q) versus ln(P) will result in a straight line, or nearly straight line, having slope n and intercept ln(k). Using linear regression analysis, such as provided in the linear trend line feature of Microsoft Excel, the equation for the line can be determined. This linear equation then establishes the values for n and k. With these values determined, the pressure needed at the Shearer to maintain any specified flow can be estimated from the following:
⎛Q⎞ P=⎜ ⎟ ⎝k⎠
1 n

(R-6)

Test No. 1 is the initial test and most closely represents the Shearer in its asfound condition. Test No. 3 and No. 4 each represent the Shearer in a partially repaired condition, more closely representing how it should have been arranged during normal mining conditions. Using the methodology described above, the equations for the “equivalent nozzle” represented by the Shearer in the various conditions can be expressed in the form of equation R-3. The results were the following: Test No. 1 Configuration: Q = 12.44 P 0.469 Test No. 3 Configuration: Q = 7.61P 0.539

3

The symbol ‘ln’ represents the natural log function.

17 Test No. 4 Configuration: Q = 12.99 P 0.468 Note that the collective effects of various nozzle orifices are reflected in the equivalent k factor in equation R-3. The difference between the k factors for Test No. 1 and No. 3 should reflect the effect of installing unplugged nozzles where nozzles were missing. This should reduce the total effective discharge opening of the Shearer sprays. The result should be a reduced k factor from Test No. 1 to Test No. 3, which as the data reflects, is observed. The difference between the k factors for Test No. 1 and No. 4 should reflect the effect of installing unplugged nozzles where plugged nozzles originally existed. This should increase the effective Shearer discharge opening and result in an increased k factor between Test No. 1 and Test No. 4, which as the data reflects, is also observed. To estimate the overall effect of installing open nozzles where they were found missing (Test No. 3) and replacing plugged nozzles with unplugged nozzles (Test No. 4), the change in k factor between Test No. 1 and Test No. 4 is added to the k factor of Test No. 3. Inserting the appropriate values into equation R-6 results in an effective Shearer equivalent nozzle of: Pre-accident Expected Configuration: Q = 8.16 P 0.539 This would approximately be the hydraulic characteristics of the Shearer in the pre-accident condition when properly maintained (no missing nozzles and no plugged nozzles). Using equation R-6, the appropriate values for n and k above, and the two flow conditions identified previously, the resulting needed Shearer inlet pressure was:
⎛ 214 ⎞ Flow condition 1: P = ⎜ ⎟ ⎝ 8.16 ⎠ ⎛ 231 ⎞ Flow condition 2: P = ⎜ ⎟ ⎝ 8.16 ⎠
1 0.539

= 428 psi (990 feet of head) = 494 psi (1141 feet of head)

1

0.539

A third flow condition was identified by the mine operator based upon documentation submitted as part of the plan to conduct the underground flow tests on the Shearer. That documentation identified a flow through the Shearer at 224 gpm with all nozzles at a minimum pressure of 125 psi. Additionally, Joy, the longwall mining machine manufacturer, quoted a pressure loss across the

18 Shearer of 250 psi, although the flow at which this loss occurs was not specified. Hence, a third flow condition was included in the analysis as follows. Flow Condition 3: 224 gpm at a Shearer inlet pressure of 375 psi (125 + 250). These flow conditions establish the minimum pressures needed at the Shearer water inlet to conceptually provide either the minimum 214 gpm or 231 gpm spray flows, based upon the flow test results. These pressures become the starting points for Step 3 in the analysis process. Estimated flow for the Longwall Stage Loader There were a number of spray nozzles in the Stage Loader and crusher area, including three banks of 5 nozzles and 3 banks of 6 nozzles. The nozzles were identified as a variety of staplelock nozzles and BD-5 nozzles.. The dust control plan referenced a minimum pressure of 60 psi for these sprays. Assuming six full cone staple lock sprays and twelve BD-5 nozzles, all flowing at the minimum 60 psi, a minimum flow of 21 gpm was estimated for the Stage Loader dust sprays. Because the Stage Loader is hydraulically upstream of the Shearer, the pressure in the supply to these Stage Loader nozzles, in reality, could be substantially higher than the minimum 60 psi indicated in the plan. Hence, the actual flow at the Stage Loader could very well have been measurably higher than the minimum estimated 21 gpm. In addition to the sprays, the water system also supplied cooling water for the Stage Loader and Crusher motors. Four permanent flow meters were mounted on the Stage Loader. The readings of these flow meters were periodically documented in maintenance records. The last records for these flows were 10, 8, 9, and 10 gpm to each cooling circuit. This represents an additional possible flow demand of 37 gpm. Estimated flow for the Longwall Shields The survey of the Shields indicated that approximately every fourth or fifth shield was equipped with a pair of BD-5 spray nozzles. Most of these nozzles were operated manually by the longwall operator as the Shearer traveled the face. Most nozzles had control valves, although a limited number did not and were thus always on. Some were identified as having the control valves partially open. A few were disconnected. The Accident Investigation Team estimated the shield spray flow would have likely been about 55 gpm. The flows for the Stage Loader and Shield sprays are added to the Shearer flow at Node X (emulsion panel distribution box) when these flows are considered in any given scenario.

19 Four flow scenarios were considered. Scenario 1: This scenario only included the flow of 214 gpm from the Shearer (Flow Condition 1) in the calculations. Scenario 2: This Scenario considered the more likely 231 gpm Shearer flow (Flow Condition 2) plus the addition of the minimum Stage Loader flow of 21 gpm, for a total flow upstream beyond Node X of 252 gpm. The Stage Loader motor cooling flow and the Shield spray flow were not considered. Scenario 3: This Scenario considered Shearer Flow Condition 2 plus all other flows at the Stage Loader and Shield sprays for a total flow of 344 gpm. This is the most realistic flow required. Note that this flow lends credence to the chosen rated capacity of the mule train booster pumps of 350 gpm for each. Scenario 4: This Scenario considers only the Shearer flow condition 3. No flow demands for the Stage Loader or shield sprays are included. STEP 2, Determine the Available Pressure at the Mule Train Booster Pump Discharge. The pressure from the tank to the pump is supplied by gravity. Hence, the pressure available at the pump inlet is the static pressure at the pump inlet minus the friction losses in the piping from Node A to Node U. However, a pressure reducing value is located in this run of pipe (at Node P) and affects the maximum pressure available to the pump inlet. It was reported that this pressure reducing valve was normally set to ensure the pressure at the pump inlet did not exceed 150 psi (347 feet of head). If the losses in the upstream main piping reduce the pump inlet pressure below the regulated pressure of 150 psi, then the lower pressure is used in the analysis. If the losses do not reduce the pressure at the pump inlet below the regulated value, then the regulated pressure value of 150 psi is used for the pump inlet. To determine which condition exists, the losses in the water line from the tank to the pump inlet must be determined. Pressure losses in the water supply from the storage tanks to the pump under flowing conditions The run of pipe from Node A to Node U consists approximately of: 27,525 feet of 8-inch, SDR=13.5 piping (actual ID of 7.347 inches) 2635 feet of 6-inch, SDR=13.5 piping (actual ID of 5.644 inches) 217 equivalent feet of 4-inch hydraulic hose (actual diameter of 4.00 inches)

20

It is a common practice in water supply analysis to use the Hazen-Williams formula to convert pipes of different sizes to an equivalent length of pipe of one referenced size. In this case, the 6-inch pipe and 4-inch hydraulic hose are converted to equivalent lengths of 8-inch SDR 13.5 piping. For the 6-inch SDR piping, the equivalent length is:

⎛ 7.347 ⎞ Equiv. Length of 8 inch = (2635) × ⎜ ⎟ ⎝ 5.644 ⎠
For the 4-inch hose, the equivalent is:

4.87

= 9515 feet

⎛ 7.347 ⎞ Equiv. Length of 8 inch = (217) × ⎜ ⎟ ⎝ 4.0 ⎠

4.87

= 4190 feet

The total equivalent length of 8-inch pipe from Node A to Node U is thus: 27,525 + 9515 + 4190 = 41,230 feet Hence, 41,230 feet of 8-inch SDR 13.5 piping will create the same losses at any given flow as the sum of the losses in the actual 8-inch, 6-inch, and 4-inch piping and hoses. The maximum static pressure occurs with the tank full. This would be at an elevation of 1333 ft MSL. The elevation of Node U is 852 ft MSL, resulting in a difference in elevation of 481 feet of head, or 209 psi of static pressure at the pump inlet. The four flows were previously identified as: 214 gpm, 252, gpm, 344 gpm, and 224 gpm. Using the Hazen-Williams formula, the losses in the equivalent length of 8-inch piping (41,230 ft) can be calculated for each flow and then subtracted from the available static pressure of 209 psi to get the resulting residual flow at the inlet of the pump. The results are summarized in Table 1. Since all of the resulting net residual pressures are above the regulated pressure of 150 psi, the 150 psi regulated value will be used as the pump input pressure for all four scenarios.

21 Table 1 – Residual Pressure Available at Pump Inlet for Each Flow Scenario Flow Flow Amount Pressure loss Total pressure Net Residual Scenario (gpm) per foot of 8- loss from Node pressure at inch A to Node U pump inlet (psi/foot) (psi) Node U (psi) 1 214 0.0005 21 188 2 252 0.0007 29 180 3 344 0.0013 52 157 4 224 0.0006 23 186 Pressure added by the booster pump. For each flow Scenario, the inlet pressure to the pump must be added to the net pump discharge pressure. This net pump pressure is the pressure added by the pump to the incoming pressure at the pump inlet. The net discharge pressure varies with flow and is usually provided by the pump manufacturer in the form of a curve plotting pressure against flow, tabulated test data of pressure and flow, or both. In general, as the flow increases through the pump, the discharge pressure decreases. Although the pump nameplate data indicated a discharge head of 1470 feet (637 psi) at the rated flow of 350 gpm, additional information was obtained from the manufacturer’s pump test data for this particular pump. The as-new shop test data indicated a pump curve slightly higher than that identified for this general model of pumps. The information is summarized below. Table 2 – Booster Pump Net Discharge Characteristics Pump Flow Sunflo Sunflo (gpm) Model Shop Test (7.760 inch Discharge Discharge impeller) Head (feet) Head (feet) 0 1548 n/a 70 n/a 1598 140 1545 1617 210 1532 1621 280 1506 1585 350 1470 1543 385 n/a 1492 420 1351 1428 For the analysis, the higher tested pump data was used. Additionally, where the scenario flow values do not match a test flow, it is a common practice to interpolate the discharge pressure from the curve or tabulated data. However, in

22 this case for any flow scenario, in order to give the water system the benefit of the doubt, the discharge pressure at the next lower flow (higher pressure) is used rather than interpolating the data. This is justified at least in part because the interpolation is a linear process while the curve is non-linear. Linear interpolation will slightly under predict the discharge pressure. The net pump discharge pressures used in the analysis are summarized in Table 3. In Table 4, the regulated pump inlet pressure of 150 psi has been added to the net pump discharge pressure to arrive at the total pump discharge pressure available for each flow scenario. Table 3 – Net Pump Discharge Pressure Used for Each Flow Scenario Flow Flow Amount Pump flow Net discharge Equivalent Scenario in analysis test datum head at flow discharge (gpm) used datum pressure (gpm) (ft) (psi) 1 214 210 1621 702 2 252 210 1621 702 3 344 280 1585 686 4 224 210 1621 702 Table 4– Total Pressure at Pump Discharge Used for Each Flow Scenario Flow Total Equivalent Elevation plot Scenario Available available point on Pump discharge hydraulic Discharge head (ft) profile pressure (ft MSL) (psi) 1 852 1968 2820 2 852 1968 2820 3 836 1931 2783 4 852 1968 2820 STEP 3, Determine the Required Pressure needed at the Mule Train Booster Pump Discharge to maintain required flow at the Shearer. This process requires taking the pressure needed at the Shearer connection (Node Z) and then working backward upstream to Node U. The total required pressure is the sum of the pressure needed at the Shearer plus the losses in the piping or hoses from Node Z back to Node U.

23 From Node Z back to Node X represents a single run of 1210 feet of 2-inch hydraulic hose. The pressure losses are as follows for the four scenarios, assuming the actual hose diameter is the nominal diameter, which is usually the case for hydraulic hoses. At node X, additional flow is added for Scenarios 2 and 3, resulting in the total flows of 252 and 344 gpm respectively. Scenarios 1 and 4 do not include any additional flows to the Shearer flow. Table 5 summarized the pressure needed at the Shearer inlet, the line loss back to Node X, and the sum of these pressures resulting in the total required pressure at this node. Table 5 Resulting Pressure Required at Node X for Each Flow Scenario Flow Flow Required Pressure loss Total Total Scenario Amount pressure at per foot of 2- pressure loss pressure (gpm) Node Z inch hose from Node Z required (psi/ft) to Node X 1 214 428 0.298 360 788 2 231 494 0.344 415 909 3 231 494 0.344 415 909 4 224 375 0.325 392 767 From Node X back to Node V, the total flow is through 1400 feet of dual 2-inch hydraulic hoses in parallel. Because the lines are in parallel, it is only necessary to calculate the loss for one line, with the flow assumed to split evenly between the two hoses. For a 1400 foot length of 2-inch hydraulic hose, the pressure losses are as follows. Table 6 Resulting Pressure Required at Node V for Each Flow Scenario Split flow Pressure loss Total Total Flow Total Scenario flow amount per foot of 2- pressure loss pressure Amount inch hose from Node X required (gpm) (psi/ft) to Node V 1 214 107 0.083 115 903 2 252 126 0.112 156 1065 3 344 172 0.199 278 1187 4 224 112 0.090 126 893 Finally, from Node V to Node U, we have a single run of 3-inch piping consisting of 68 equivalent feet of schedule 40 pipe. The pressure losses and the final total pressures required are summarized in Table 7.

24 Table 7 Resulting Pressure Required at Node U – Pump Discharge Flow Total Pressure Total Total Elevation Scenario flow loss per foot pressure pressure plot point on Amount of 3-inch loss from required at Hydraulic (gpm) Sch 40 pipe Node V to pump profile (psi/ft) Node U discharge (ft MSL) (psi) 1 214 0.037 2 905 2942 2 252 0.050 3 1068 3319 3 344 0.089 6 1193 3607 4 224 0.040 2 895 2919 STEP 4, Compare the required pressure to the available pressure. Table 8 summarizes the results of this comparison. Table 8 Summary of System Pressure Shortages at Pump Discharge Pressure Total Total Flow Total difference pressure pressure Scenario flow required at (psi) Amount available at (negative pump pump (gpm) number discharge discharge indicates a (psi) (psi) deficit) 1 214 852 905 –53 2 252 852 1068 –216 3 344 836 1193 –357 4 224 852 895 –43 Conclusion For all of the scenarios, the required pump pressures exceed the available pump discharge pressures. Note that Scenario 4 is the closest to being adequate but does not include any flows for the Stage Loader or the shield sprays. Additionally, the pressure required for this scenario, 375 psi, is based upon data from the manufacturer of the longwall but does not indicate for what flow the pressure loss of 250 psi occurs. Note that using the pressure versus flow characteristics of the Shearer as tested, coupled with the associated methods utilized within this report, the required pressure at a flow of 224 gpm would be 466 psi, not 375. Hence, a more realistic pressure deficit for scenario 4 would be closer to a value of –134 psi rather than to –43 psi.

25 It must be emphasized that Scenario 3 represents the most realistic flow requirement for the dust control effort on the No. 1 Longwall Panel mining machine because it includes flows for the Shield sprays and the Stage Loader sprays and motor cooling. As the analysis indicates, there is a significant water pressure deficit between what is required to maintain this identified flow and what is available from the water system. The other three scenarios, included for reference, are also inadequate but represent less realistic water flows since they do not include complete water flows for the dust control sprays and motor cooling needs on all parts of the mining machine.

26

TABLE 9 —NODE DATA FROM TANK TO LONGWALL MULE TRAIN

Node SS n/a 2 2 17 19 btwn 24 & 25 EAST 49 15 17 51 btwn 59 & 60 btwn 62 & 63 128 135 /0 76 6 btwn 103 & 104 17 EAST NORTHEAST NORTHEAST NORTHEAST NORTH NORTH NORTH NORTH /OLD NORTH OLD NORTH NORTH GLORY HG 1 NORTH EAST EAST EAST EAST EAST Break No. 280 -183 21 -18 0 3 0 -34 -26 0 -56 3 -4 -70 -1 -33 -48 -10 0 0 0 1710 2715 0 8 7680 0 8 715 0 8 7015 0 8 0 300 6 975 0 8 3120 0 8 0 356 6 1310 0 8 1785 0 8 0 0 8 365 0 8 0 270 6 1045 0 8 520 0 8 0 8

Elevation

Delt Elev Mains Reference

8" length to next node 6" length to next node size of pipe to next node Comments Water Tanks

A

1308

B

1125

#1 East Mains South Belt-pipe routing assumed Location of connection assumed

C

1146

D

1128

E

1128

F

1131

Filter set Between F and G

G

1131

H

1097

J

1071

K

1071

L

1015

M

1018

N

1014

P

944

Pressure regulating valve at Node P.

Q

943

R

910

S

862

T

852

Mule train

27

TABLE 10 —NODE DATA FROM LONGWALL MULE TRAIN TO SHEARER CONNECTION

Node 217 6" SDR Connection to 4 inch pump feed hydraulic hose and piping and filters 26 ft 4" HH, 55 ft equiv 2" pipe, 4 ft 4" after filter to pump 3 inch Sch 40 Pump total Equvalent feet of 4 inch

Elevation

Length

Node description

Pipe description

Notes

T

852

U

852

68

total equivalent feet of 3 inch

V

852

400

End of 3" pump discahrge manifold Parallel 2 inch HH to glut Glut Parallel 2 inch on monorail system single 2 inch for shear water demand single 2 inch for shear water demand

111 equiv feet for parallel split flow

W

847

1000

280 equiv feet for parallel split flow

X

842

710

Distribution box on emulsion panel connection into Bretby cable handler SHEARER connection HH = hydraulic hose

Y

840

500

Z

851

28

905 PSI Required Pump Discharge Pressure for 214 GPM 53 PSI Water System Pressure Shortage 852 PSI Available Pump Discharge Pressure for 214 GPM

Two parallel 2-inch hose lines pressure loss gradient at 107 gpm each leg

Single 2-inch hose line pressure loss gradient at 214 gpm

428 PSI Shearer Inlet Pressure Required for 214 GPM based upon Flow Condition No.1

ELEVATIONSCALE AND PRESSURESCALE FT-MSL

Water tank static pressure line near full. 1333 feet MSL Water line pressure loss gradient at 214 gpm with tank near full

Node A is at Water Tank Discharge Node F and G are at Main Filter Pack Node P is at Pressure Regulating Valve Node U is at Pump Node Z is at Connection to Shearer Water Inlet

Pressure regulator setting for 150 psi max at pump inlet

Water line elevation profile

Pipe Node Locations and Pipe Lengths - FT

FIGURE R-2 UBB WATER SUPPLY TO LONGWALL HYDRAULIC PROFILE Flow Scenario 1 Shearer Flow 214 GPM Total Flow 214 GPM

29

1068 PSI Required Pump Discharge Pressure for 252 GPM

216 PSI Water System Pressure Shortage
Two parallel 2-inch hose lines pressure loss gradient at 126 gpm each leg

852 PSI Available Pump Discharge Pressure for 252 GPM

Single 2-inch hose line pressure loss gradient at 231 gpm

494 PSI Shearer Inlet Pressure Required for 231 GPM based upon Flow Condition No. 2

ELEVATIONSCALE AND PRESSURESCALE FT-MSL

Water tank static pressure line near full. 1333 feet MSL Water line pressure loss gradient at 252 gpm with tank near full

Node A is at Water Tank Discharge Node F and G are at Main Filter Pack Node P is at Pressure Regulating Valve Node U is at Pump Node Z is at Connection to Shearer Water Inlet

Water line elevation profile

Pressure regulator settingfor 150 psi max at pump inlet

Pipe Node Locations and Pipe Lengths - FT

FIGURE R-3 UBB WATER SUPPLY TO LONGWALL HYDRAULIC PROFILE Flow Scenario 2 Shearer Flow 231 GPM Total Flow 252 GPM

30

1193 PSI Required Pump Discharge Pressure for 344 GPM

Two parallel 2-inch hose lines pressure loss gradient at 172 gpm each leg

357 PSI Water System Pressure Shortage

836 PSI Available Pump Discharge Pressure for 344 GPM
Single 2-inch hose line pressure loss gradient at 231 gpm

494 PSI Shearer Inlet Pressure Required for 231 GPM based upon Flow Condition No. 2

ELEVATIONSCALE AND PRESSURESCALE FT-MSL

Water tank static pressure line near full. 1333 feet MSL Water line pressure loss gradient at 344 gpm with tank near full

Node A is at Water Tank Discharge Node F and G are at Main Filter Pack Node P is at Pressure Regulating Valve Node U is at Pump Node Z is at Connection to Shearer Water Inlet

Water line elevation profile

Pressure regulator settingfor 150 psi max at pump inlet

Pipe Node Locations and Pipe Lengths - FT

FIGURE R-4 UBB WATER SUPPLY TO LONGWALL HYDRAULIC PROFILE Flow Scenario 3 Shearer Flow 231 GPM Total Flow 344 GPM

31

895 PSI Required Pump Discharge Pressure for 224 GPM 43 PSI Water System Pressure Shortage 852 PSI Available Pump Discharge Pressure for 224 GPM

Two parallel 2-inch hose lines pressure loss gradient at 112 gpm each leg

Single 2-inch hose line pressure loss gradient at 224 gpm

466 PSI Shearer Inlet Pressure Required for 224 GPM based upon actual flow test data and MSHA methodology 375 PSI Shearer Inlet Pressure Required for 224 GPM based upon suggested data from longwall manufacturer

ELEVATIONSCALE AND PRESSURESCALE FT-MSL

Water tank static pressure line near full. 1333 feet MSL Water line pressure loss gradient at 224 gpm with tank near full

Node A is at Water Tank Discharge Node F and G are at Main Filter Pack Node P is at Pressure Regulating Valve Node U is at Pump Node Z is at Connection to Shearer Water Inlet

Pressure regulator settingfor 150 psi max at pump inlet

Water line elevation profile

Pipe Node Locations and Pipe Lengths - FT

FIGURE R-5 UBB WATER SUPPLY TO LONGWALL HYDRAULIC PROFILE Flow Scenario 4 Shearer Flow 224 GPM Total Flow 224 GPM

APPENDIX S SEDIMENT ANALYSIS FROM WATER BASKETS AND SPRAY NOZZLES

APPENDIX S SEDIMENT ANALYSIS FROM WATER BASKETS AND SPRAY NOZZLES

Appendix S Sediment Collection and Analysis from Water Baskets and Spray Nozzles

Water Baskets Background On March 10, 2011 sediment was collected from two wire mesh filters obtained by MSHA’s Accident Investigation Team from UBB. The filters are designated as PE-0448 (1 South Belt Water Basket) and PE-0423 (1 North Panel Pump Car). After sediment was collected from the filters, the sediment was weighed and then subjected to separation of particle sizes by a series of sieves. The sieves were stacked in order of decreasing grain size from top to bottom, with U.S. Standard Sieve Size No. 8 on top, followed successively downward by No.’s 60, 100, 140, 200, and 325. A pan placed at the bottom of the sequence collected any particles small enough to pass through the No. 325 sieve. The No. 8 sieve uses a mesh spacing of 2.36 mm, which corresponds to the geological size designation of “granule” and was used to catch visibly large particles such as cellophane wrappers and plant debris. The No. 60 sieve uses a mesh spacing of 0.250 mm, which corresponds to the boundary between the geological designations for medium-grained sand and fine-grained sand. The No. 100 sieve uses a mesh spacing of 0.150 mm, which corresponds to the geological particle size of fine sand. The No. 140 and 200 sieves use a mesh size of 0.106 mm and 0.075 mm, respectively, which correspond to the upper and lower ranges of the geological particle size of very fine sand. The No. 325 sieve uses a mesh size of 0.045 mm, which corresponds to the geological particle size of coarse silt. Any particles collected in the bottom pan would be designated as -325 mesh, and would represent material finer than coarse silt. After the stack of sieves was placed on a shaker table for 10 minutes, each size fraction was weighed, and the particles in each fraction were described by spreading the particles on a clean, white sheet of paper and inspecting the particles with a 10-power lens under bright light. Upon completion of the description, each size fraction was stored separately in a glass vial marked with the PE number and size fraction. Upon completion of all documentation activities, the vials were placed together in a freezer bag, which was stored inside the respective water basket. Observations PE-0448 Sediment was collected from the 1 South Belt water basket by dumping loose material out onto a clean, white sheet of paper. Additional material was obtained by brushing the inside of the basket with a paint brush and depositing any resulting material on the sheet of paper. The screen mesh of the basket itself was generally dirty and appeared mostly clogged with fine, gray material. A dial-gauge micrometer indicates that the mesh screen size is 0.01 inches, which is equivalent to 0.254 mm. Therefore, material corresponding to U.S. Standard Sieve Size No. 60 (0.250 mm) and smaller would theoretically be able to pass through the water filter. This size would represent the

upper boundary of the “fine sand” geological particle size. After all available sediment was collected on the white sheet of paper, it was funneled into a glass dish for weighing on a digital balance. It was determined that 1.15 g of sediment was collected from the water basket. It should be noted that due to likely measuring error, the aggregate weight of size fractions represents 110% of the initial sample weight.  The +8 sieve material weighed 0.12 g and consisted of fibrous mats of interlocking grass blades and stems. The agglomerated grass blades hosted sporadically distributed, 1 mm-diameter particles of coal, biotite, quartz, and yellowed cellophane wrappers, along with rare, spherical slag pellets. The +60 sieve material weighed 0.8 g and consisted of angular fragments of coal (30%), angular grains of frosted quartz (20%), thin sheets of limonite and goethitealtered rust flakes that were attracted by a small magnet (10%), yellowed cellophane (1%), and plant debris that consisted dominantly of seed pods (40%). There were also a few grains of broken concrete in which the aggregate sand was visible, one of which hosted heavy iron staining that suggested rusted rebar. The +100 sieve material weighed 0.17 g and consisted of angular coal fragments, a large number of spherical seeds, and abundant plant debris that dominated the sample. Also present were angular rust flakes and only minor quartz. The +140 sieve material weighed 0.04 g and consisted of angular coal fragments, quartz, plant debris, limonite-altered rust fragments that were attracted by a small magnet, and feldspars. The plant debris is represented by long fragments of cellulose stalks longer than +140 but of sufficient diameter to pass through the mesh. The +200 sieve material weighed 0.04 g and consisted of coal, quartz, feldspars, and minor limonite-altered rust. Plant debris included only a few fibers of cellulose. The +325 sieve material weighed 0.04 g and was dominated by coal and quartz, with grains that are subangular to subrounded due to abrasion. Minor limonitealtered rust flakes were present, and minor plant debris consisted of individual hairlike fibers. The -325 sieve material weighed 0.02 g and consisted almost exclusively of coal (40%) and quartz (60%).



 

 



PE-0423 Sediment had previously been collected from the 1 North Panel Pump Car on February 18, 2011 and stored in a plastic container, with preliminary descriptions of the material presented in a March 8th memorandum from Matthew Babington, Esq. (SOL) to Benjamin Wood, Patton Boggs, LLP. The collected material was viewed by all parties attending the testing in order to confirm that the container and material was the same as portrayed in photos included with the March 8th memorandum. The sample was weighed and represented 8.32 g of material.  The +8 sieve material weighed 0.58 g and consisted of cellophane and tinfoilcoated wrapping paper of the type used for snacks. Printing on the clear cellophane indicated that it represented a package of “Cheddar and Bacon” crackers and printing on the foil-coated paper indicated that it had represented a













bag of “Potato Skins” chips. Other clear wrappers were unmarked, but hosted a UPC code. The remaining material included 5 mm-diameter leaf fragments and a single shale pebble that was 8 mm in diameter. The +60 sieve material weighed 7.57 g and consisted dominantly of plant debris (65%) and coal fragments (30%). Plant debris consists of dried leaf fragments, grass stems and/or pine needles, small twigs, fragments of wood chips, and grass blades. Small red plastic fragments were intermixed with this material. The mineral fraction was dominated by square and angular coal fragments, with minor quartz grains. A small magnet was used to attract several small rust flakes, which showed orange-colored limonite alteration. The +100 sieve material weighed 0.11 g, and consisted of angular coal fragments (40%), angular limonite-altered rust fragments (40%), plant debris (10%), and quartz grains (10%). The plant debris represents grass blades and twigs, with small, hair-like stems and numerous spherical seeds. The +140 sieve material weighed 0.03 g and consisted of subangular to subrounded quartz (40%) and angular coal fragments (40%), with limonite-stained rust fragments (10%), and minor plant debris (10%). Plant debris consists of hairlike fibers. The +200 sieve material weighed 0.03 g and consisted of quartz (55%), coal (35%), plant fibers (7%), and limonite-stained rust fragments (3%). This sample is noticeable lighter in color compared to other samples, due to its greater quartz content. The +325 sieve material weighed 0.04 g and consisted of quartz (60%), coal (25%), plant fibers (10%), and limonite-stained rust flakes (5%). Quartz grains are subangular to subrounded, compared to coarser samples in which quartz was angular, reflecting abrasion of grains. The -325 sieve material weighed 0.02 g and consisted of quartz (80%), coal (15%), and plant fibers (5%) with no other material present.

Conclusion It appears that with decreasing grain size, noted especially with the +140 (0.106 mm) material that corresponds to the geological particle size of very fine sand, the samples begin to be dominated by quartz grains of the very fine sand to coarse silt size. The increase in the degree of rounding corresponding to decreasing grain size is an indication that quartz is more able to survive the processes of mechanical abrasion at smaller sizes. Quartz and coal are the only naturally occurring minerals in the sediment, which at larger size fractions host significant plant debris and man-made material such as rust flakes and snack wrappers. Based on a measurement of the screen size of the water baskets, which indicates a mesh spacing of 0.254 mm (0.01 in.), material smaller than the No. 60 mesh size could have been able to pass through the filter baskets. The -60 to +140 material is generally dominated by plant debris and coal, while material smaller than +140 is dominated by very fine-grained quartz sand, and by coarse-grained quartz silt. These size fractions represent less than 1.5% of the total weight of collected material, which is generally dominated by plant debris and coal.

Based on the analysis of the filter basket sediment, it should be expected that any downstream equipment might contain -60 (less than 0.250 mm) material that could include plant debris, coal, quartz, and rust flakes. It would be unlikely that material larger than 60 mesh (0.250 mm) found in any downstream equipment would have passed through the filter baskets, and would instead have to have been derived from an intervening source. It should also be noted that no shale, and only very sparse mica flakes, were documented in the water basket sediment. Therefore, clay minerals identified in downstream equipment would be expected to have a source other than the water supply, such as shale pulverized during the mining process. Spray Nozzles Background On March 17-18, 2011 sediment that had been previously collected from spray nozzles obtained by MSHA’s Accident Investigation Team from UBB was described in terms of grain size and mineralogy. Fine-grained material was sent to an independent, commercial laboratory for identification by x-ray diffraction. Under a previous protocol (Protocol for Collecting Material and Measuring Dimensions of Spray Nozzles Recovered from Longwall Shearer, Performance Coal Co., Upper Big Branch Mine), sediment had been collected from 20 spray nozzles and stored in glass vials. In some cases, sediment was collected from different portions of the same nozzle. The vials of sediment were documented under the same nomenclature as the spray nozzle from which they were collected, including PE-0391, PE-0395, and PE-0397. Sediment from each vial was separated into three size fractions by passing it through two screens. The top screen was U.S. Standard Sieve Size No. 12, which corresponds to 1/16th-inch; the second screen was U.S. Standard Sieve Size No. 60, which corresponds to the 0.01 inch screen size used in the longwall shearer water supply basket filters. After the stack of sieves was placed on a shaker table for 10 minutes, each size fraction was weighed, and the particles in each fraction were described by spreading the particles on a clean, white sheet of paper and inspecting the particles with a 10-power lens under bright light. Upon completion of the description, each size fraction was stored separately in a glass vial marked with the PE number and size fraction. Upon completion of all documentation activities, the vials were placed together in a freezer bag, which was stored inside the respective water basket. Particles from the +12 and +60 fractions were stored together, while particles from the -60 fraction were returned to their original vial and sent to an independent, commercial laboratory for quantitative analysis by x-ray diffraction. Observations PE-0391 Nozzle 1 J16 Material consists dominantly of coal fines with subordinate quartz fines and orange limonite staining occurs on grains of coal and sandstone.

PE-0391 Nozzle 1 #3  +12 size material consists of large, blocky coal fragments up to 1 cm in length. Material in this size fraction weighs 0.64 g.  +60 size material consists of approximately one-third each of angular coal, bony coal, and rust flakes. The largest fragments are represented by angular coal fragments, with limonite-altered rust flakes also occurring as larger pieces. The weight of this size fraction is 0.03 g.  -60 size material weighs 0.01 g and is insufficient in volume for analysis. Based on visual inspection, the fraction consists of up to 10% rust flakes, 10% sandstone, and the remainder represented by coal and bony coal. PE-0391 Nozzle 1 #7 Material consists of two large rust flakes (+60 size), with several +60 size mud balls that are composed of coal fines and quartz, with sparse, angular coal fragments. Fines consist of “black dirt” that may include some coal fines, but fine grains are clumped together possibly by oil or grease. PE-0391 Nozzle 1 Bit #8 Material consists dominantly of +60 size material, and minor -60 size material, in proportions of 5% sandstone, 10% bony coal, and 85% coal. PE-0391 Nozzle 1 #10  +12 size material consists of flat rust fragments that show iron oxide alteration, along with angular coal fragments that show iron oxide staining. There is also a single clast of gray, coarse-grained siltstone. The weight of this size fraction is 0.02 g.  +60 size material consists of 85% angular fragments of fine-grained micaceous sandstone and gray coarse-grained siltstone, 10% angular coal fragments, and 5% thin flakes of heavily limonite-altered rust. Gray siltstone/sandstone exhibits freshly broken surfaces. The weight of this size fraction is 0.69 g.  -60 size material weighs 0.5 g and was sent for XRD analysis. PE-0391 Nozzle 1 #15  +12 size material consists of a single fragment of bony coal, with weight below the measuring capability of the balance.  +60 size material consists of 85% angular fragments of coal and bony coal, 10% angular sandstone fragments, and 5% rust flakes, weighing 0.22 g.  -60 size material weighs 0.26 g and was sent for XRD analysis. PE-0392 Nozzle 1 1-1 Material consists of +60 coal, bony coal, and dark gray siltstone fragments with very minor amounts of -60 fines. Minor rust staining occurs on a few bony coal and dark gray siltstone fragments.

PE-0395 Internal to Nozzle #1  +12 size material consists of a single piece of coal, with the remaining pieces consisting of dark gray micaceous coarse-grained siltstone. The siltstone consists of angular, broken fragments characterized by fresh surfaces. The weight of this fraction is 0.10 g.  +60 size material consists of 75% dark gray siltstone, 15% sandstone, and 10% coal. Some siltstone hosts carbonized plant fossil traces; some sandstone hosts iron staining. All fragments exhibit angular, freshly broken surfaces. The weight of this fraction is 0.58 g.  -60 size material weighs 0.63 g and was sent for XRD analysis. PE-0395 Nozzle 1 #2 Inter Portion of Housing Vial A  +12 size material consisted of several rounded mud balls, that when lightly probed, were disaggregated into -60 size quartz silt with a single +12 fragment of coal.  +60 size material consists of angular fragments of sandstone (50%), dark gray siltstone (40%), and coal (10%). The dark gray siltstone hosts some iron staining. This size fraction weighs 0.13 g.  -60 size material weighs 0.25 g and was sent for XRD analysis. PE-0395 Internal to Nozzle #2 Vial B  +12 size material consists of rounded mud balls that, when disaggregated, are actually a composite of light-colored quartz silt that are considered as part of the 60 size fraction  +60 size material consists of rust 5% rust, 15% coal, 30% dark gray siltstone, and 50% sandstone. Rust flakes are heavily altered to limonite and colored orange. This size fraction weighs 0.39 g.  -60 size material weighs 0.9 g and was sent for XRD analysis. PE-0395 Nozzle 1 #3 Inter Portion of Housing Vial A  +12 size material consists of several large, rounded mud balls, which are easily disaggregated into fines that consist of quartz silt and coal, and are considered as part of the -60 size fraction.  +60 size material consists of 2% rust flakes, 10% angular coal fragments, 35% dark gray siltstone, and 53% light-colored quartz sandstone. Fragments are bounded by freshly broken surfaces with rounded-off edges, suggestive of milling. This size fraction weighs 0.61 g.  -60 size material weighs 1.09 g and was sent for XRD analysis. PE-0395 External Sides of Nozzle #3, No Ends, Vial B  +12 size material consists of subangular fragments of light-colored sandstone (15% and dark-gray, micaceous siltstone (85%), and weighs 0.07 g.  +60 size material consists of angular, freshly broken fragments of coal (10%) and bony coal (5%), with 30% subrounded milled fragments of dark gray siltstone and 50% light-colored micaceous sandstone that sometimes is stained with limonite. The size fraction also contains 5% rust flakes. The weight of this fraction is 0.49 g.  -60 size material weighs 0.96 g and was sent for XRD analysis.

PE-0395 Internal to Nozzle #3 Vial C  +12 size material at first appears to consist of three angular granules of sandstone. However, with light probing, each “granule” easily disaggregates in a fine-grained mixture of agglomerated quartz sand that contains small particles of coal. The agglomerated material hosts imprints of flat, machined parts, similar to congealed mud. No material was actually in the +12 size fraction, but is instead considered part of the -60 fraction  +60 size material consists of angular fragments of coal (3%), bony coal (5%), sandstone (35%) and dark gray, coarse-grained micaceous siltstone (57%). Angular fragments of sandstone and siltstone exhibit freshly broken surfaces, and exhibit some limonite staining. This size fraction weighs 0.82 g.  -60 size material weighs 0.86 g and was sent for XRD analysis. PE-0395 Nozzle 1 #4 Material consists of a single, large +12 fragment of bony coal with light gray sandstone adjoining and affixed to it, like a broken rock fragment. The grain is accompanied by 60 size angular fragments of coal and sandstone. PE-0395 Nozzle 1 #10  +12 size fraction contains no material  +60 size material consists of 10% sandstone, 15% coal, and 75% dark gray siltstone. The sandstone hosts visible muscovite flakes and some iron staining. This fraction weighs 0.54 g.  -60 size material weighs 0.67 g and was sent for XRD analysis. PE-0397 Nozzle 1 #3  +12 size material consists of a single grain of angular coal that is below the operating range of the balance.  +60 size material consists of 15% coal, 10% bony coal, 40% sandstone, and 35% dark gray siltstone, along with two heavily limonite-altered rust flakes. Coal and sandstone fragments host orange limonite staining. The weight of this size fraction is 0.76 g.  -60 size material weighs 0.33 g and was sent for XRD analysis. PE-0397 Nozzle 1 #5  +12 size material consists of a single grain of coal that is below the operating range of the balance.  +60 size material consists of 10% coal, 5% bony coal, 20% sandstone, and 65% dark gray siltstone with a single rust flake. The sandstone hosts visible muscovite flakes, and the siltstone hosts iron staining. This size fraction weighs 0.27 g.  -60 size material weighs 0.25 g and was sent for XRD analysis.

PE-0397 Nozzle 1 #6  +12 size material consists of two grains, which are quartz + coal “mud balls” that when disaggregated represent -60 quartz fines and a few angular fragments of coal that are -12 in size.  +60 size material consists of 5% coal, 15% sandstone, and 80% dark gray siltstone. Orange limonite staining is present on approximately half of all siltstone and sandstone. This size fraction weighs 0.37 g.  -60 size material weighs 0.2 g and was sent for XRD analysis even though it is slightly below the sample size requirement. The sample was visible assessed as being composed of intermixed dark gray siltstone, sandstone, and coal. PE-0397 Nozzle 1 #7  +12 size fraction contains no material.  +60 size material consists of angular fragments of coal (15%, dark gray siltstone (35%), and sandstone (50%). Sandstone is light-colored and commonly affected by iron staining. This size fraction weighs 0.66 g.  -60 size material weighs 0.46 g and was sent for XRD analysis. PE-0397 Nozzle 1 #9  +12 size material consists of two grains, one of coarse-grained dark gray siltstone and the other of fine-grained sandstone, which together weigh 0.02 g.  +60 size material consists of 10% coal, 40% sandstone, 50% dark gray siltstone, and fragments are characterized by freshly broken surfaces.  -60 size material weighs 0.56 g and was sent for XRD analysis. Conclusions Sediment from the 1 North Longwall Panel shearer spray nozzles were separated into three size fractions. The +12 U.S. Standard Sieve mesh size was chosen because it is similar to the 1/16-inch diameter size of the spray nozzle orifices. Thus, any material larger than +12 could not have entered the nozzle from the outside, or been blown into the orifice by the explosion. The +60 U.S. Standard Sieve mesh size (0.250 mm) was chosen because it is similar to the 0.01-inch mesh (0.254 mm) used as screening on the water supply filter baskets. Thus, any material larger than +60 should not have been able to pass through the water basket filter screen, and must have entered the spray nozzle by some mechanism other than the water supply. The presence of +60 and +12 size fragments in the spray nozzles may be an indication that the material entered through open nozzle ports on the shearer drum. It is significant that all of the +60 material consists of angular fragments of sandstone, siltstone, and coal, and that the fragments exhibit freshly broken, clean surfaces that are suggestive of generation by cutting activity of the longwall shearer. In contrast, quartz grains collected from the water baskets were characterized by subangular to subrounded, frosted grains that are considered typical of abrasion during transport on a geological time scale, and are likely to have been entrained in the water supply from the river or other surface supply. Individual sand grains of this nature were not observed in the +60 spray nozzle material. Furthermore, it is significant that the +60 size material

contains sandstone, as well as dark gray, coarse-grained siltstone. During previous petrographic study of rock samples collected from the roof and floor of the longwall face, as part of the assessment of incendive potential, it was determined that while the immediate floor is composed of sandstone alone, the immediate roof is composed of sandstone and thin layers of siltstone, which is represented by dark gray laminations. It therefore appears that chips of sandstone and siltstone from the roof had been falling into openings in the cutting drums for some unknown period of time. A significant conclusion of this observation is that it seems highly unlikely that the drum could have been filled with freshly cut rock chips if the spray nozzles had been removed only after the tail drum cut out as part of routine maintenance just prior to the explosion. The presence of a significant volume of the +60 material being represented by dark gray, coarse-grained siltstone is an indication of rock chips falling from the immediate roof. Therefore, the drum must have been operating with open nozzle ports, and concomitant lack of water pressure, for some unknown length of time prior to the explosion. This is not an indication that the drum was operating in the moments before the explosion, but does indicate that the drum was most likely being operated without functional water sprays in the hours or days prior to the explosion. The presence of imprints of flat, machined surfaces on mud composed of quartz and coal fines is an indication that these fines had been caked onto the sides of the nozzles in the presence of water, forming an agglomerated mixture. “Mud balls” composed of the same material were also collected from inside the spray nozzles. The sediment collected from the nozzles contained very few actual rust flakes, generally no more than 5%. It therefore seems unreasonable to conclude that the sprays were clogged by rust that had formed in the drum upon restoration of water to the shearer during the December 2010 test. Furthermore, the goethite-altered rust flakes collected from the water baskets is of a different nature than the bright-orange limonite that apparently formed inside the drum. Although the bright orange limonite was found as thin coatings on some sandstone and siltstone fragments, it was not a constituent of the “mud balls” found within the spray nozzles. It would therefore appear that the quartz + coal fines were already present and hardened within the spray nozzles prior to restoration of water to the shearer. Tailgate Drum Spray Nozzles Background On April 13-14, 2011 sediment that had been previously collected from spray nozzle ports, as well as sediment secured within spray nozzles collected by MSHA’s Accident Investigation team from UBB was described in terms of grain size and mineralogy. Although similar activity had been conducted previously for sediment collected during the course of measuring dimensions of nozzles retrieved from the headgate drum, tailgate drum, and ranging arm of the 1 North Panel longwall shearer, the activities of April 13-14 were conducted on nozzles and material collected from the tailgate drum only, after it had been rotated to expose the underside portion of the drum. Sediment had been collected in Zip-Loc baggies, and spray nozzles were taped closed

and placed in baggies where plastic basal inserts were not present, and provided by members of the Accident Investigation team. Nozzles and sediment were listed under the designations PE-0464 and PE-0465. Sediment from each vial was separated into four size fractions by passing it through three screens. The top screen was U.S. Standard Sieve Size No. 8, which corresponds to 3/32nd-inch and reflects the orifice diameter of the majority of spray nozzles utilized on the tailgate drum; the next screen was U.S. Standard Sieve Size No. 12, which corresponds to 1/16th-inch and reflects the orifice diameter of the spray nozzle stipulated in the company’s approved plan; the third screen was U.S. Standard Sieve Size No. 60, which corresponds to the 0.01-inch screen size used in the longwall shearer water supply basket filters. Material finer than No. 60 mesh was collected in a pan at the bottom of the sieve array. The first sample (PE-0465, Spray Port #38) was broken into seven size fractions (+8, +12, +60, +100, +140, +200, and -200), but due to the very small volume of material present, and the virtual absence of several intervening size fractions, subsequent samples were broken into only the four previously described fractions. Some sediment was provided loose in individual bags, while other bags contained a spray nozzle and associated staple lock. Some spray nozzles were wrapped with black electrical tape to ensure that any sediment present remained inside the nozzle. Other nozzles were not wrapped with tape but retained their original plastic insert at the base of the nozzle. In each respective case, the black electrical tape was unwrapped to first expose the nozzle outlet orifice, and the presence of any foreign matter was determined. Subsequently, the base of the nozzle was exposed by removing the tape, and a photograph of the inside of the nozzle and any material stuck to the tape was taken. If sediment was present, the stratigraphy of the sediment was noted in order to determine which sediment was deposited first and which most recently, with sediment at the base of the nozzle interpreted to have been deposited most recently. Where plastic inserts were in place, it was determined whether the orifices were clogged, and upon removal of the insert, the presence of foreign material was documented on the inside of the insert. Additionally, the presence of plastic flaps indicative of incomplete drilling was documented. After the stack of sieves was placed on a shaker table for 10 minutes, each size fraction was weighed, and the particles in each fraction were described by spreading the particles on a clean, white sheet of paper and inspecting the particles with a 10-power lens under bright light. Upon completion of the description, each size fraction was stored separately in a glass vial marked with the PE number and size fraction. Upon completion of documentation activities, the vials were placed together in the original sample bag, containing the spray nozzle, staple, and black electrical tape or insert used to retain material inside nozzles.

Observations PE-0465 Spray Port #10 (loose in bag) 5.57 g  +8 material (5.15 g) consists of a single large piece of welding bead or slag (17 mm long), two pieces of dark gray siltstone (4 mm long), and ten pieces of coal (310 mm long). The welding slag has a light patina of rust but mostly is shiny, beaded metal.  +12 material (0.07 g) consists of six pieces of coal/bony coal and four pieces of dark gray siltstone.  +60 material (0.3 g) consists of round, beaded welding spatter that has a light patina of rust but is still mostly shiny metal. The fraction is dominated by angular fragments of coal (60%), with dark gray siltstone (35%) and light gray sandstone (5%). The fraction also contains a bright silver lump of metal that is soft enough to be cut with a steel knife blade, and is interpreted to represent a bead of solder.  -60 material (0.05 g) consists of angular fragments of coal (35%), dark gray siltstone (50%), and light gray sandstone (5%) with sparsely distributed rust flakes (10%). PE-0465 Spray Port #38 (loose in bag)  +8 material (0.35 g) consists of a large, rectangular piece of coal that is 11 mm long, an angular piece of light gray, fine-grained sandstone with a portion of coal streak attached that is 3 mm long, and a large, flat rust flake that is 5 mm long and showing dark-colored goethite alteration. Two “mud balls” that were easily disaggregated into fines are also present.  +12 material (0.03 g) consists of two rust flakes that are 4 mm long, and a “mud ball” that is 3.5 mm long and composed of an aggregate of fines.  +60 material (0.4 g) is dominated by rust flakes (86%) with 10% angular coal fragments, 3% angular, dark gray siltstone, and 1% angular fragments of light gray, fine-grained sandstone. The size fraction also contains a single “mud ball” composed of fines.  +100 material consists of angular flat, angular fragments of rust (15%), as well as angular fragments of coal (15%), dark gray siltstone (50%), and light gray sandstone (25%).  +140 material (0.01 g) consists of angular fragments of rust (15%), coal (20%), dark gray siltstone (50%), and light gray sandstone (15%).  +200 material (0.01 g) consists of angular fragments of rust, coal, sandstone, and siltstone.  -200 material (0.02 g) consists of milled rock flour, which is dominated by dark gray siltstone and light gray sandstone that fives a salt-and-pepper color, with sparsely scattered coal but no rust. PE-0465 Spray Port #39 (loose in bag) 1.64 g  +8 material (0.07 g) consists of five large, angular rust flakes that are characterized by dark brown goethite alteration.  +12 material (0.17 g) consists dominantly of rust flakes (about 12-15 in number), with two coal fragments and three fragments of dark gray siltstone. The fraction

 

contains one possible piece of welding slag that is hollowed out with extensive limonite alteration inside. +60 material (0.92 g) consists dominantly of rust flakes, with 2% dark gray, angular siltstone fragments and 5% angular coal fragments. -60 material (0.38 g) consists of dark and “greasy” coal fines that have a tendency to adhere to the bottom collection pan. The fraction contains angular flakes of bright orange limonite rust flakes, as well as sparsely distributed discernible angular coal fragments.

PE-0465 Port #40 (loose in bag) 1.42 g  +8 material (0.62 g) consists of five angular fragments of coal that have had the sides and corners polished off, like in a rock tumbler. The largest fragment is 1 cm long. The fraction also contains a single rounded, bulbous metal fragment of welding slag.  +12 material (0.03 g) consists of two rust flakes, one angular fragment of coal with fresh, sharp edges, and one angular fragment of dark gray siltstone.  +60 material (0.51 g) consists dominantly of rust flakes (85%), with subordinate angular fragments of dark gray siltstone (10%) and coal fragments (5%) that exhibit freshly broken surfaces.  -60 material (0.2 g) consists of orange limonite and dark brown goethite-altered rust flakes that are abundantly intermixed with a brown-tinted mixture of dark gray siltstone and angular coal fragments. The fines have a tendency to adhere to the pan and contain significant coal fines. PE-0464 C (spray/staple) 0.15 g When the electrical tape was unwrapped, there was no loose material inside the nozzle, although it was evident that the nozzle outlet orifice was clogged with an angular piece of coal or dark gray siltstone. Small fragments of coal and dark gray siltstone are congealed together and blocked the nozzle orifice. The inside diameter of the nozzle hosts a thick rind of agglomerated fines that represent material referred to as “mud balls” in previous observations. A few small rust flakes and angular siltstone fragments were adhered to the electrical tape where it had covered the open base of the nozzle.    +8 material was not present +12 material (0.02 g) consists of a single, angular fragment of coal as well as three remnant aggregates of fines, dominantly representing coal, that formerly coated the inside of the spray nozzle. A thin, fragile rust flake was also present. +60 material (0.07 g) is dominated by rust flakes with very sparse angular fragments of dark gray siltstone and “mud balls” of coal fines that are remnants of the coating rind on the insides of the nozzle. The “mud balls” are easily disaggregated into fines with a slight touch. -60 material (0.03 g) is dominated by coal, with scattered rust flakes and dark gray siltstone.



PE-0464 D (spray/staple) 0.5 g When the electrical tape was unwrapped, it was evident that the nozzle orifice was plugged with sediment. Upon removal of the tape across the base of the nozzle, it was evident that loose rust flakes were trapped inside the nozzle. After the loose rust flakes were dumped out, there was still congealed material inside the nozzle on the inner surface of the plugged orifice. The sediment was removed in stages: at the base of the nozzle, loose rust flakes represent the most recent material deposited, while the material farthest in the innermost recesses of the nozzle, consisting of milled sandstone and coal fines, represent material that had been deposited first, prior to the introduction of the rust flakes.     +8 material (0.13 g) consists of one angular, blocky fragment of coal and one angular, milled fragment of light gray sandstone. +12 material (0.07 g) consists of one angular fragment of light gray sandstone, two angular fragments of dark gray siltstone, and five angular fragments of coal, some of which exhibit light, surficial iron staining. +60 material (0.22 g) consists of 5% angular fragments of light gray sandstone, 10% angular fragments of dark gray siltstone, 15% coal, and 70% rust flakes. -60 material (0.04 g) is dominated by light gray sandstone and dark gray siltstone with minor coal and sporadic orange limonite-altered rust flakes.

PE-0464 E (spray/staple) 0.43 g When the electrical tape was unwrapped, angular rust flakes were revealed in the interior of the nozzle, with many flakes stuck to the tape. After several seconds of aggressive tapping, angular rust flakes remained congealed together inside the nozzle. The mass was removed by pushing a stiff wire through the orifice, which induced the disaggregation of the mass of rust flakes.   +8 material (0.03 g) consists of two angular fragments of coal that are 4 mm in length. +12 material (0.05 g) consists of one angular fragment of light gray sandstone, three angular fragments of dark gray siltstone, a single angular fragment of coal, and two flat rust flakes. The rust flakes were characterized by dark brown goethite alteration with patchy orange limonite. +60 material (0.29 g) consists of 1% light gray sandstone that exhibits some iron staining, 2% angular coal fragments, and 97% rust flakes. -60 material (0.04 g) is dominated by rust flakes, with 10% angular coal fragments.

 

PE-0464 #10 (spray/staple) 0.02 g There was no tape on this nozzle, although the basal plastic insert was in place. It was evident that the outlet orifice was not clogged, but that all three holes in the plastic insert at the rear of the nozzle were filled with fines. Although there is some minor coating of coal dust inside the nozzle, there was no appreciable material inside the nozzle. Two of the three holes on the inner surface of the plastic insert have “hanging chads” and the third hole was drilled cleanly but still clogged. The inside surface of the plastic insert

was coated with coal dust. The very slight amount of material consisted of -60 mesh coal fines. PE-0464 #35 (spray/staple) 0.51 g When the electrical tape was unwrapped, it was evident that the nozzle outlet orifice was clogged with small, angular fragments of dark gray siltstone that abut against each other along angular corners. Upon removal of tape from the open bottom, it was evident that the inside of the nozzle was packed with fine-grained sediment that had been aggregated and completely filled the inside of the nozzle. The packed material consists of dark brown fines and angular fragments of coal and dark gray siltstone, but no rust flakes.     +8 material (0.16 g) consists of two angular fragments of coal and four angular fragments of dark gray siltstone. +12 material (0.07 g) consists of three angular fragments of dark gray siltstone and five angular fragments of coal, with the corners rounded off. +60 material (0.14 g) consists of 5% rust flakes, 30% coal, and 65% dark gray siltstone. Rock fragments exhibit angular, freshly broken surfaces. -60 material (0.08 g) consists of bright orange limonite rust flakes (10%), light gray sandstone (5%), and coal fines with dark gray siltstone (85%). The fraction contains coal dust that is “greasy” and adheres to the pan.

PE-0464 #38 (spray/staple) 0.8 g When the electrical tape was unwrapped, it was evident that a small rock chip was lodged in the nozzle orifice. Upon removal of the tape covering the open bottom of the nozzle, it was evident that the inside of the nozzle was packed with fine-grained rock flour that constitutes the “mud balls” collected from other sprays. The material was dislodged with a stiff, thick wire and required significant force to push through. The fines have partially lithified into a pseudo-rock and are not easily disaggregated when in-place.   +8 material (0.27 g) consists of two angular fragments of light gray sandstone, which exhibit sharp edges and angular corners. +12 material (0.03 g) consists dominantly of “mud balls” that represent the pseudolithified fines found inside the spray nozzle, but are easily disaggregated into fines with slight pressure after being shaken. The only real +12 material consists of three angular fragments of coal, and the “mud ball” material was added to the -60 fraction. +60 material (0.19 g) consists of angular fragments of light gray to white sandstone (10%), dark gray siltstone (30%), and coal (58%) that exhibit freshly broken surfaces, as well as “mud balls” that have been rounded off during shaking. The “mud balls” represent the pseudo-lithified fines that are easily disaggregated. The fraction also includes very rare rust flakes (2%). -60 material (0.28 g) consists dominantly of fines from the disaggregated, pseudolithified deposits on the inside of the nozzle. Discernible pieces are angular





fragments of coal and dark gray siltstone. The fines include the “mud ball” material from the +12 fraction. PE-0464 #42 (spray/staple) no material There was no tape on this nozzle, although the basal plastic insert was in place. It was evident that the outlet orifice was not clogged, but that all three of the holes in the plastic insert were clogged. Upon removal of the insert, it was evident that there was no material inside the nozzle. Inspection of the inner surface of the plastic insert indicated that the center hole was clogged, and that it is the only hole with a “hanging chad.” Inspection of the outer surface indicated that all three holes were filled with coal fines and angular fragments of dark gray siltstone. PE-0464 #43 (spray/staple) 0.13 g There was no tape on this nozzle, although the basal plastic insert was in place. It was evident that the outlet orifice was not clogged, and that of the three holes in the plastic insert, one was clogged with coal fines and one (central hole) was clogged with a shiny, metallic bead that is indicative of welding spatter. Upon removal of the plastic insert, it was apparent that the rear (inside surface) of the holes had flaps of plastic still attached, similar to a “hanging chad” that had impeded the passage of sediment through the hole. An angular fragment of dark gray siltstone, as well as a metal bead had been trapped by the “hanging chads.”     +8 material (0.1 g) consists of a single, rounded, shiny metallic piece that represents a welding bead, with some yellow brass or brazing on one part. The rounded ends are shiny metal, while the intervening part shows rust oxidation. +12 size fraction contains no material +60 material (0.01 g) consists of 5% rust flakes, 35% angular coal fragments, and 60% angular fragments of dark gray siltstone. -60 material (0.01 g) consists of 5% rust flakes, 25% dark gray siltstone, and 70% coal fragments and coal fines.

Conclusions Sediment from the 1 North Longwall shearer’s tailgate drum spray nozzles were separated into four size fractions. The No. 8 and No. 12 U.S. Standard Sieve mesh sizes were chosen because they are similar to the 3/32nd and 1/16th -inch diameter sizes of spray nozzle orifices used on the tailgate drum. Thus, any material larger than +8 or +12 could not have entered the respective nozzle from the outside. The No. 60 U.S. Standard Sieve mesh size (0.250 mm) was chosen because it is similar to the 0.01-inch mesh (0.254 mm) used as screening on the water supply filter baskets. Thus, any material larger than +60 should not have been able to pass through the water basket filter screen, and is more likely to have entered the spray nozzle by some mechanism other than the water supply. The presence of +60, +12, and +8 size fragments in the spray nozzles may be an indication that the material entered through open nozzle ports on the shearer drum. It is significant that all of the +60 material consists of angular fragments of sandstone,

siltstone, and coal, and that the fragments exhibit freshly broken, clean surfaces that are suggestive of generation by cutting activity of the longwall shearer. In contrast, quartz grains collected from the water baskets were characterized by subangular to subrounded, frosted grains that are considered typical of abrasion during transport on a geological time scale, and are likely to have been entrained in the water supply from the river or other surface supply. Individual quartz grains of this nature were not observed in any of the spray nozzle material. Furthermore, it is significant that the +60, +12, and +8 size material contains light gray to white sandstone, as well as dark gray, coarsegrained siltstone. During previous petrographic study of rock samples collected from the roof and floor of the longwall face, as part of the assessment of incendive potential, it was determined that while the immediate floor is composed of sandstone alone, the immediate roof is composed of light gray sandstone and thin layers of siltstone, which is represented by dark gray laminations. It therefore appears that chips of sandstone and siltstone from the roof had been falling into openings in the cutting drums for some unknown period of time. A significant conclusion of this observation is that it seems highly unlikely that the drum could have been filled with freshly cut rock chips if the spray nozzles had been removed only after the tail drum cut out as part of routine maintenance just prior to the explosion. The presence of a significant volume of the +60 material being represented by dark gray, coarse-grained siltstone is an indication of rock chips falling from the immediate roof. Therefore, the drum must have been operating with open nozzle ports, and concomitant lack of water pressure, for some unknown length of time prior to the explosion. This is not an indication that the drum was operating in the moments before the explosion, but does indicate that the drum was most likely being operated without functional water sprays in the hours or days prior to the explosion. The insides of several spray nozzles contained a rind of agglomerated coal fines and rock flour that in some cases had dried to a cement, and required significant force to dislodge. This material had in some cases coated the inside of the nozzle, clogging the outlet orifice especially where angular fragments of coal or siltstone had already become stuck inside the orifice. Although the nozzles in this batch of samples generally contained more rust flakes than the previous nozzles, and those rust flakes were of the +60/-12 fraction, the rust flakes occupied the basal portion of the spray nozzle interior, indicating that the coal/rock flour cement had been deposited first and clogged the spray, with the rust flakes deposited at some later time. In contrast to the sediment collected from the previously studied nozzles, which contained generally no more than 5% rust flakes, the nozzles collected from the bottom of the drum hosted a significant volume of rust flakes in the +60/-12 size fraction. This would suggest that the rust flakes preferentially settled to the bottom of the drum. However, it is not clear that the rust flakes were introduced during the restoration of water to the shearer in December 2010, because they should not have been able to pass through the water basket screen. Rust fragments are characterized by thin, flat flakes with a dark brown coloration and metallic luster, indicating the initial stages of oxidation to form lepidocrocite and goethite. This rust is of a different nature than the bright-orange, amorphous limonite staining that forms coatings on some angular rock chips collected

from the spray nozzles and collected in a 20-ounce bottle by members of the Accident Investigation team during the December 2010 restoration of water to the shearer. Although the timing of rust introduction is unknown, it was definitely introduced after the coal/rock flour cement had already clogged the spray nozzles. A significant amount of foreign material in the form of welding spatter and welding slag was present in this subset of nozzle samples, likely reflecting the propensity of highdensity material to settle to the bottom of the drum. Welding spatter exhibited shiny, polished surfaces that are interpreted to reflect abrasion from the numerous rock fragments entrained inside the rotating drum, producing a scouring action similar to a ball mill. Welding spatter in some cases had clogged the spray nozzle outlet orifices, and become lodged in the holes of the plastic inserts.

Appendix T Elimination of Electrical Ignition Sources
Lightning Lightning strikes were eliminated as a possible ignition source of the explosion event. Vaisala’s National Lightning Detection Network showed no lightning strikes within a ten mile radius of the mine site between 10:09:42 a.m. and 7:07:02 p.m. (See Vaisala Report 258028 in Appendix V). At the time of the explosion, there was no evidence of power outages related to storms in the area. Welding and Cutting There was no evidence of welding or cutting being performed at the time of the explosion, and no cutting equipment was found in the area of the longwall face. However, two electric welders were located near the longwall face in the headgate area. One welder (designated as “DC PTO”) was installed inside the third bay of the 480 Vac permissible headgate controller enclosure. This welder was interlocked with the longwall control circuitry, such that it could not be energized while the longwall 4,160 Vac power circuits were energized. Thus, the shearer and this welder could not be energized at the same time. In order to energize the welder through its circuit breaker “CB1,” the “DC PTO” switch handle on the outside of the headgate controller must be put in the “DC PTO” position. This switch was found in the “Normal” position, indicating the CB1 circuit breaker and the welder were de-energized. The two individual welding leads, approximately 15 feet long, exited the controller enclosure and were not connected to any other leads. The other electric welder, which normally hung on the monorail outby the headgate controller, was a portable unit that was found just inby the headgate controller enclosure. The power switch for this welder was found in the “off” position. The cable coupler to the distribution power box was found disconnected, indicating this welder was de-energized at the time of the explosion. No welding leads were connected to this welder when it was found. The only welding leads found in the area of the longwall face were in a flat cable, which was routed from the area of the headgate controller across the longwall face in the face conveyor’s (panline) cable handling tray. The end of this flat cable near the headgate enclosure had two male welding connectors, for the face welding leads, and were found disconnected and locked with a chain and padlock in the cable handling tray near the headgate controller. The keys for this padlock were normally kept on top of the headgate controller, and were found on the ground under the controller. From witness testimony, the last known welding operations in the longwall area was on the midnight maintenance shift prior to the accident. At that time, a welder was used to add additional flights to the face conveyor, and to replace the

shearer head drum cowl blade. Both of these welding tasks were conducted on the headgate side of the longwall face. Shearer Electrical Components The Joy Mining Machinery, Model 07LS1A shearer, serial number LSW525C, MSHA Shearer Evaluation No. SE-18630-0, was located at the tailgate end of the longwall. The electrical components on the shearer included explosion-proof enclosures (motors, main controller enclosure, shearer power cable connection enclosure, and solenoid valve enclosure), a methane monitoring system with warning light enclosure, various intrinsically safe circuits, components and sensors, and all associated cables. Electrical cables were examined and no damaged areas were found. The electrical control components of the shearer were housed in the main controller enclosure, MSHA Certification No. X/P-4161-0. The controller consisted of three bays; access to this single enclosure was provided by three separate covers for the left, middle and right controller bays. There was a small lens on the left cover, and a larger window on the middle cover. All accessible flame-arresting path surfaces of the permissible explosion-proof enclosures were measured on the shearer, and no excessive openings were found. All unused lead entrances were plugged. A visual inspection of the windows and lenses showed no visible cracking or crazing (network of fine cracks). All fasteners and retainers were in place, and all fasteners were tight. On the controller enclosure cover, all selector switches and circuit breaker handles were in their normal operating positions. The shearer e-stop mushroom switch, located on the main controller enclosure, was wired properly and functional, and was not activated. Wiring and components inside the explosion-proof enclosures were examined and checked against the electrical approval documentation, and no deficiencies that would affect shearer operation were found. There was no evidence of abnormal arcing, sparking, or heating of components. No unusual odors were noted, and no abnormal residue was noted on any of the flame-arresting path surfaces. The JNA event log recorded no protective circuit trip functions or alarms in the hours before the explosion. The last protective device trip was for an overload on the right-hand cutter motor, approximately 7 hours and 10 minutes before the explosion, but evidence indicates that this was not a prolonged shutdown of the machine. Other mechanical features, including the ranging arm pins and cutter torque shafts, were inspected. Evidence and testimony indicated that the tail ranging

arm “B-Lock” came out when the shearer was at the headgate. No electrical or mechanical deficiencies were found associated with the shearer. Shearer Remote Control Transmitter Shearer functions were controlled by two operators with handheld radio remote transmitters (Appendix U-1), designated by the JNA control system as left- and right-hand stations. The left transmitter and receiver operated at a frequency of 458.525 MHz, while the right transmitter and receiver operated at a frequency of 472.100 MHz. The station selector switch on the front panel of the shearer’s main controller was set to “both,” for the JNA control system to receive data from both remote transmitters. Therefore, both remotes must be functioning for the machine to be operational. The right-hand transmitter, identified by its frequency of 472.100 MHz, was a Matric Limited, Model TX1, Remote Control Transmitter, MSHA Approval No. 9B-220-0, and was found at shield 100. This transmitter was taken to the manufacturer for further examination and testing. The transmitter case and internal components had physical damage consistent with external forces. When attempting to turn the transmitter on, a “stuck button” error occurred. The microcontroller socket had physical damage, and after being replaced by a Matric Limited technician, the transmitter was used to perform functional testing for the shearers’ JNA0 and JNA1 units, without the need for its internal battery to be recharged. Testing found each switch on the remote transmitter to be in operating order. An inspection at A&CC did not identify signs of heating, arcing, or sparking inside or outside the remote transmitter. Evaluation and testing showed that the maximum voltage and current available on any of the external pins of the remote transmitter was intrinsically safe. Therefore, MSHA concluded that this transmitter was not the ignition source. The left-hand remote control transmitter was never found, but there was no indication that it was not functioning properly. The last record on the JNA event log prior to the explosion showed that the right-hand remote (Exhibit No. PE-0238) caused the shearer to stop. Automatic Chain Tensioning System A Joy Automatic Chain Tensioning System (ACTS) was installed at the tailgate area of the face to automatically control the face conveyor chain tension. The ACTS components included: an explosion-proof controller enclosure, a connection enclosure for the intrinsically safe circuits (referred to as a “marshalling box”), and various intrinsically safe transducers, sensors, a display beacon, and solenoids. This intrinsically safe system was accepted under MSHA Evaluation No. IA-18031-0. All accessible flame-arresting path surfaces of the ACTS controller enclosure were measured, and no excessive openings were found. All unused lead entrances were plugged. An ACTS “PanelView” window display, located on the

front enclosure cover, showed no visible cracking or crazing. All window fasteners and retainers were in place, and all fasteners were tight. All the intrinsically safe components were inspected, and no improper connections or damaged components were observed. None of the fuses in the intrinsically safe barriers, which protect the intrinsically safe circuits, measured “open.” There was no evidence of abnormal arcing, sparking, or heating of components inside the controller enclosure and the marshalling box, and no unusual odors were noted. No abnormal residue was noted on any of the flame-arresting path surfaces. A communication cable linked the ACTS programmable logic controller (PLC), located in the tailgate controller, to the PLC located in the headgate enclosure. This cable entered both enclosures, but the conductors were not connected to the PLC components in either. The 120 Vac power supply from the headgate was still connected inside both the headgate and the ACTS enclosure, although without communication to the headgate PLC, the ACTS could not operate in automatic mode. The selector switch control was found in the “Auto” position, but longwall employees stated that the ACTS was always operated by manual hand valves, without electrical controls. The PanelView connected to the PLC was designed to record the last 100 alarms of the ACTS programmable control system. When the alarm history was viewed, there were 100 identical alarms of a tailgate speed sensor fault, recorded within one second of each other, on September 11, 2009. Although the processor clock was off from “real time” by approximately one hour, it was concluded that the ACTS had not been used for many months prior to the accident. Tail Conveyor Drive Motor All accessible flame-arresting path surfaces of the enclosure, including the motor connection box, were measured, and no excessive openings were found. All unused lead entrances were plugged. Wiring and components inside the connection box enclosure were examined and checked against the longwall electrical approval documentation; no deficiencies were found. There was no evidence of abnormal arcing, sparking, or heating of components. No unusual odors were noted, and no abnormal residue was noted on any of the flame-arresting path surfaces. A Fluke 1520 megohmmeter was used to verify that no degradation of the motor insulation had occurred. Electrical Cables Along the Longwall Face Electrical cables along the longwall face were located either in the cable handling system of the panline or hung along the longwall shields. The cable handling system consisted of four vertically-stacked sections of a cable trough, accessible from the side of the panline facing the shields. Another cable tray on top of the panline allowed the shearer electrical and water hoses, in its “bretby” handling system, to follow the shearer as it progressed across the face. At shield 88, the

shearer power cable and water hose exited the second section of the cable trough, and entered the cable tray in its “bretby” handling system. The top section of the trough contained seven electrical cables: 1) flat electrical cable (#2/0 AWG, type W) that contained the welding conductors; 2) blue armored cable for the methane monitor sensor located at the tailgate; 3) yellow communication cable for the ACTS, which was disconnected at both ends, but entered the two enclosures; 4) #6 AWG, 3 conductor, type G-GC cable (previous pump cable disconnected at both ends), which was routed from the headgate area but ended at Shield 86; 5) #6 AWG, 3 conductor, type G-GC cable, (previous pump cable disconnected at both ends), which was routed from the headgate to the tailgate, but was severed, with the ends four feet apart, at shield 115; 6) #14 AWG, 3 conductor, type Remote Control and Drill Cord cable, which was disconnected at both ends, and; 7) #14 AWG, 4 conductor, type Remote Control and Drill Cord cable, which provided 120 Vac to the ACTS controller enclosure. Progressing downward, the second section of the cable trough contained two 4,160 Vac power cables. One was a blue power cable for the tailgate conveyor drive motor. The other was a yellow power cable for the shearer. The third section of the cable trough contained a 1-1/2” hydraulic hose for the shields, 1” hose for the tail conveyor motor drive cooling water, and a hose to the tail drive water coupling. The fourth (bottom) section of the cable trough contained a water hose that supplied the shearer, and a return hydraulic hose for the shield hydraulic system. Examination of the shearer power cable where it exited the second section of the cable trough at mid-face, and where it entered the shearer, indicated that the bretby handling system containing the hose and cable had sufficient slack. The examination revealed no deficiencies in any cables in the panline cable trough. The shearer cable had been replaced from mid-face to the shearer in mid-March; splices examined at shields 45 and 87 were constructed adequately. Two repairs to the tail face conveyor motor cable, at shields 91 and 105, were found to be constructed adequately. Insulation Testing of Power Cables (Panline) The shearer and tail conveyor motor cables were type SHD-GC, with a shield around each of the power conductors, and each conductor shield in contact with the ground conductor. The insulation of the power conductors in both the shearer and tail conveyor motor cables were tested, using an Extech Digital High Voltage Insulation Tester, Model 380395, set at 5,000 volts. For both cables, the tester was placed sequentially between each power conductor and the ground conductor at the respective disconnect enclosures. This tested the insulation of each of the cables’ power conductors for their entire length. The testing showed no degradation in the insulation of any of the power conductors in either cable.

Lighting System Components The lighting system power cable was a #6 AWG, 3-conductor, type G-GC cable, which provided 120 Vac three-phase power to the lighting power supply, explosion-proof enclosures. The type G-GC cable consisted of three-phase power conductors, an insulated ground-check “pilot” conductor, and two ground conductors. A lighting power supply enclosure was located at shields 3, 23, 43, 63, 83, 103, 123, 143, 163, and 173, each of which housed two intrinsically safe power supplies, accepted under MSHA Evaluation No. IA-13827-0. Each intrinsically safe power supply provided a nominal 12 volts direct current (Vdc) output to power five KH Controls Inc., Model LX1 luminaires (light assembly), located on every other shield. The luminaires were accepted under MSHA Evaluation No. IA-16453-0 and Certification No. X/P-4036-0. At shield 171, the lighting power cable was damaged, exhibiting a severed ground-check conductor and insulation damage on the black and white phase conductors. The lighting cable is normally zip-tied to the shield water line away from the chock interface unit (CIU). When inspected, the damaged area of the cable was laying on the damaged area of the CIU. The CIU had a bent mounting bracket, deformed enclosure, damaged internal circuit boards, and a damaged face plate. Upon initial inspection, the damage to the lighting cable was determined to have been caused by the same explosive forces, traveling from the tailgate toward the headgate, which damaged the CIU. The damaged section of the cable was recovered and sent to the A&CC for analysis... The lighting system power cable was protected by an SMC Electrical Products, Inc., Model C54-006, ground wire monitor in the headgate controller. (See Appendix - U-11) This ground wire monitor is designed to trip the lighting circuit breaker when an open or a short in the pilot wire occurs, thus de-energizing the entire longwall lighting circuit. There were no reports of the longwall lights not working and no evidence of maintenance being performed on the lighting circuit. The ground wire monitor circuitry and the pilot wire terminating diode were removed and tested at the A&CC to determine if sufficient energy existed in the pilot wire conductor to ignite an 8.3% methane-in-air mixture. Tests were conducted with and without simulated value of cable inductance. No testing ignited the methane-air mixture. The following protective circuit components were removed from the enclosure; lighting current transformer, lighting relay, ground fault relay, ground wire monitor, and lighting circuit breaker. A&CC performed functional testing of the protective circuitry components and no deficiencies were found. The lighting power supply explosion-proof enclosures located at shields 163 and 173 were examined. All accessible flame-arresting path surfaces of these enclosures were measured, and no excessive openings were found. There was no evidence of abnormal arcing, sparking, or heating of components in the enclosures (Appendix U-2). No unusual odors were detected, and no abnormal residue was noted on any of the flame-arresting path surfaces.

Various lighting system components were retrieved for further examination and testing at A&CC. The components retrieved were: Six KH Controls Model ISS1 – 13.0 – 8.10, IA-13827-0 Power Supplies  Exhibit No. PE-0246-a*, S/N 1034, recovered from shield 173 (written on the front of the supply)  Exhibit No. PE-0246-b*, S/N 1832, recovered from shield 173 (written on the front of the supply)  Exhibit No. PE-0247-a**, S/N 2536, recovered from shield 163 (written on the front of the supply)  Exhibit No. PE-0247-b**, S/N 995, recovered from shield 163 (written on the front of the supply)  Exhibit No. PE-0248-a***, S/N 2185, recovered from shield 3 (written on the back of the supply)  Exhibit No. PE-0248-b***, S/N 1295, recovered from shield 3 (written on the back of the supply) *A case with Exhibit No. PE-0246 was received and contained two power supplies. These two power supplies were assigned the newly generated Exhibit Nos. PE-0246-a and PE-0246-b when the case was opened. **A case with Exhibit No. PE-0247 was received and contained two power supplies. These two power supplies were assigned the newly generated Exhibit Nos. PE-0247-a and PE-0247-b when the case was opened. *** A case with Exhibit No. PE-0248 was received and contained two power supplies. These two power supplies were assigned the newly generated Exhibit Nos. PE-0248-a and PE-0248-b when the case was opened. Thirteen KH Controls Model LX1 Luminaire, IA-16453-0, X/P-4036-0  Exhibit No. PE-0254-a*, S/N 10774, recovered from shield 167  Exhibit No. PE-0254-b*, S/N unknown (missing approval plate), recovered from shield 124  Exhibit No. PE-0258-a**, S/N 12483, recovered from the area of shield 62  Exhibit No. PE-0258-b**, S/N 7791, recovered from the area of shield 66  Exhibit No. PE-0258-c**, S/N 6712, recovered from the area of shield 89  Exhibit No. PE-0258-d**, S/N 7353, recovered from the area of shield 173  Exhibit No. PE-0258-e**, S/N 12535, recovered from the area of shield 64  Exhibit No. PE-0258-f**, S/N 10437, recovered from the area of shield 139  Exhibit No. PE-0474, S/N unknown (missing approval plate), recovered from the area of Survey Spad 22567

   

Exhibit No. PE-0475, S/N unknown (missing approval plate), recovered from the area of the cross cut adjacent to Survey Spad 22567 Exhibit No. PE-0476, S/N unknown (missing approval plate),recovered from the area of the tailgate entry at the shearer Exhibit No. PE-0477, S/N unknown (missing approval plate), recovered from the area of Shield 175 Exhibit No. PE-0478, S/N unknown (missing approval plate), recovered from the area of Shield 172

The recovered from location information was obtained from the shield number written on the light, and/or the evidence tag. *A cardboard box with Exhibit No. PE-0254 was received and contained two KH Controls Model LX1 Luminaire exhibits. These two exhibits were assigned the newly generated Exhibit Nos. PE-0254-a, and PE-0254-b when the box was opened. *A cardboard box with Exhibit No. PE-0258 was received and contained six KH Controls Model LX1 Luminaire exhibits. These six exhibits were assigned the newly generated Exhibit Nos. PE-0258-a, PE-0258-b, PE-0258c, PE-0258-d, PE-0258-e, and PE-0258-f when the box was opened. IS Lighting Cable with connectors- Exhibit No. PE-0324, 91 feet of 14AWG, 3/C SOW, recovered from shield 143 to shield 152 Based on technical analysis and inspection of the underground installation, no evidence was found that the lighting system was an electrical ignition source. All lighting power supplies were functional, tested within approved safety settings, and exhibited no sign of internal tampering or damage significant enough to affect the operation. Each recovered luminaire showed effects of explosion-related heat and/or impact damage, which was consistent with all observed luminaires on the face. Luminaires from shields 124 and 66 (Exhibit Nos. PE-0254-b and PE-0258-b) were found in a condition indicating they were not maintained in permissible condition prior to the explosion, but these did not contribute to the explosion. Exhibit No. PE-0254-b had electrical tape wrapped around a significant crack in the connection where the polycarbonate tube, which contained dust and dirt, threaded into the maintenance sleeve. Exhibit No. PE-0258-b had a missing end cap, and the polycarbonate tube, which had electrical tape wrapped around it, was broken off at the threaded end. A crack would defeat the explosion-proof integrity of the assembly. However, these exhibits were not located where the ignition occurred. None of the other damaged luminaires taken as evidence or examined underground had electrical tape covering cracks.

Electrohydraulic Shield System The Joy MS40 electrohydraulic system, consisting of a Master Supply Unit (MSU) and a Support Control Centre (SCC) at the headgate, controlled the movement of the shields. The intrinsically safe components were accepted under MSHA Evaluation No. IA-408-10. The MSU and SCC were powered by their own intrinsically safe power supplies, (KH Controls, Inc. Model ISSA-13.0-6.8-AL1, accepted under MSHA Evaluation No. IA-13827-0), installed in explosion-proof enclosures, MSHA Certification No. X/P-3929-0. A CIU control enclosure was located on each of the 176 shields along the longwall face. The MSU supplied intrinsically safe, nominal 12 Vdc power for the CIU enclosures via a “roadway” armored cable. On each shield, the CIU controlled six hydraulic solenoid valves, which initiated movement of the shields, and connected to a pressure and a distance transducer. A dump valve kit, consisting of a solenoid and pressure switch, was designed to release the main system hydraulic pressure to the return line, if any e-stop button was depressed on any face CIU or the MSU, or if the system hydraulic pressure was inadequate. The MSU provided power for the dump valve, and provided monitoring for the e-stop system to protect against solenoid valve short circuit or low voltage conditions. CIU enclosures were mounted on each shield. Two spare CIU enclosures, missing faceplates and internal printed circuit boards, were found at shields 27 and 77. The CIU enclosures at shields 1, 2, and 6 were damaged, and had several circuit boards missing. CIU circuit boards found in the tailgate area would likely correspond either to CIU enclosures at shields 1, 2, or 6, or from the spare CIU enclosures. Various components were retrieved for further examination and testing at A&CC, including:  CIU enclosures from shields 62, 64, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, and 176. CIU enclosures from shields 169 through 176 were retrieved because they exhibited signs of external heat or physical damage. CIU enclosures from shields 62 and 64 were retrieved because of visible heat damage on the infrared receiver lens. The roadway cable between CIU enclosures at shields 169 and 170, which was found disconnected at the headgate side of the CIU enclosure at shield 170. The KH Controls, Inc. Model ISSA-13.0-6.8-AL1 power supply for the MSU unit, accepted under MSHA Evaluation No. IA-13827-0. The MSU unit.









The SCC, which was taken to the manufacturer’s facility, where engineers and technicians familiar with this equipment attempted to view and recover the event and fault logs. Damage to the SCC and its internal circuitry was too extensive to allow data recovery. Six hydraulic solenoid valves recovered from shield 170, and two hydraulic solenoid valves recovered from shield 145.



The intrinsic safety analysis conducted at A&CC examined:      Output of the intrinsically safe MSU power supply. Inductive energy stored in the roadway cable. Energy stored in the hydraulic solenoid valves of the shields. Energy stored in the total system capacitance of the connected system. The possibility of thermal ignition from small-gauge wire strands.

The analysis indicated that no signs of electrical heating, arcing, or sparking were observed on any of the components in the CIU enclosures, solenoids, power supplies, or associated cables. Based on the technical analysis and inspection of the underground installation, the electro-hydraulic shield control system is not considered an electrical ignition source (Appendix U-3). Comtrol Communication System The Comtrol longwall face communication/conveyor lock-out system, MSHA Approval No. 9B-71-2, consisted of Longwall Loudmouth Model LM115 phones positioned at the headgate area and typically, every eighth shield. Each phone is powered by its own 12-volt battery. An 18 AWG, 4 conductor, type SOOW cable connected each of the phone enclosures, and was protected by hose conduit up to the in-line connector near the phone. The system was linked to the startup sequence of the longwall face conveyor, through a Model LM1574A start up alarm control receiver, so that an alarm was given over the speakers when the conveyor was about to start. Each phone enclosure was provided with a lockout control capability to prevent the face conveyor from operating. Investigators noted that some phones were not in their original positions (i.e. mounted on shields). The phone at shield 173, the last in the system, was missing, as was the phone at shield 117. At least four phones were missing on the headgate side of the longwall. Phone circuit boards and enclosure pieces were found at several different locations across the face, as well as in the No. 7 tailgate entry. Electrical investigators that have traveled the face area did not observe any components or cables that showed signs of being an electrical ignition source.

Various system components were retrieved for further examination and testing at A&CC . Worst case tests for intrinsic safety were performed on the power supply, start-up alarm/phone (located near the headgate enclosure), and an equivalent end-of-line termination unit, which was used because the actual termination unit was not located prior to the test, but found later at shield 110 approximately 360 feet from shield 173. This unit was also tested. All tests were performed with a worst case methane-in-air mixture of 8.3%, and indicated that a page transmitted from the headgate enclosure area would not ignite a methane-in-air mixture at the tailgate. A conveyor lockout switch passed the same test. Five Loudmouth phones and the start-up alarm/phone (from the headgate) were tested at A&CC for functionality. The phone from shield 165 was spark-ignition tested, and did not ignite an 8.3% methane-in-air mixture. Three face phones (shields 85, 109, and 165) and the headgate start-up alarm/phone were fully functional (communication and lock-out functions). Two phones obtained near the crusher and belt conveyor tailpiece had functioning conveyor lock-out switches, but had slight communication issues, in that the tailpiece phone could receive but not transmit, whereas the stageloader/crusher phone could receive, but transmitted a low, audible signal. Two terminating devices and additional Loudmouth phone components found across the longwall face were also sent to AC&C for further examination. Witness testimony did not indicate any issues with the longwall communication/conveyor lock-out system. The phone at shield 173 has not been found. An electrician that worked the midnight shift prior to the explosion stated that it was working properly. Pieces of telephone components were found around the longwall tailgate area that was possibly from the 173 phone. None of these components showed any signs of arcing and sparking (Appendix U-4). Multi-Gas Detector A MSA Solaris multi-gas detector (Exhibit No. B-15-B), carried by Richard Lane, Longwall Section Foreman, was retrieved from mid-face for examination and testing at A&CC. Testing determined that it was in working order. Downloaded data indicated that the device was energized at the time of the explosion and continued operating for several hours thereafter. During thermal ignition testing, the detector did not cause an ignition of a 7.75% methane-in-air mixture when energized (Appendix U-5). Personal Electrical Items Various electrical items were removed from six victims found and the longwall face.

Tracking Tags Pyott-Boone Model 1980 tracking tag transmitters, MSHA Approval No. 23-A080004-0, were used by the miners. The following tracking tags belonged to victims found on the longwall face:       Tracking Tag ID 570, belonging to Chris Bell, Exhibit No. PE-0483; Tracking Tag ID 584, belonging to Joel Price, Exhibit No. PE-0239; Tracking Tag ID 564, belonging to Rick Lane, Exhibit No. B-15-D; Tracking Tag ID 547, belonging to Gary Quarles, Exhibit No. B-11-A; Tracking Tag ID 540, belonging to Dillard Persinger, Exhibit No. B-10-A; and, Tracking Tag ID 546, belonging to Grover Skeens, Exhibit No. B-9-A.

Exhibits PE-0483 and PE-0239 were found near shields 109 and 94-95, respectively. Exhibits B-9-A, B-10-A, B-11-A, and B-15-D were brought out of the mine in the days immediately after the accident. Twenty-four tracking tags, including the six already noted, were retrieved for further examination and testing at A&CC. The examination of the tags indicated that the tracking tag enclosures were not exposed to heat or fire, electrical energy within the tracking tags was not exposed to the mine atmosphere, and that none of the tracking tags represented a thermal or a spark ignition source (Appendix U-6). Cap Lamps An assortment of intact cap lamps and components were retrieved. Of these, thirty-three individual items were subjected to further examination and testing at A&CC. Many items exhibited explosion-related damage, i.e. heat, charring, soot, missing pieces or severe physical force. No evidence indicated that any of the cap lamp batteries had sufficient electrical energy to ignite a methane-in-air mixture or enough thermal energy to ignite coal dust (Appendix U-7). Air-Purifying Helmet Components Seven components from the air purifying helmets including four batteries, a portion of a battery case, and pieces of the helmet and cable were retrieved for further examination and testing at A&CC. None of the electrical components indicated signs of arcing, sparking or electrical heating. Methane ignition did not occur during a spark ignition test with the highest short circuit current and highest open circuit voltage that was measured from any of the batteries (Appendix U-8). Watches and Calculators Several non-permissible electrical items, including six watches and two calculators, were recovered from the longwall face and subjected to examination and testing at A&CC. These items were all disassembled and inspected. Four watches and one calculator were functional and working as expected. None of the items indicated signs of arcing, sparking, or electrical heating, and there is no

evidence that any of these items were a source of spark or thermal ignition (Appendix U-9). Methane Monitor Sensor Components. Two CSE Model 140B LD IR methane monitor sensors (Exhibit Nos. PE-0169 and PE-0170) were retrieved from the tailgate area and tested at A&CC. The inspection of these components did not reveal any conditions that would suggest that the components caused an explosion. The sensors did not cause an ignition of a 7.5% methane-in-air mixture when energized in the test gas (Appendix U10). See Figures T-1 and T-2 for maps of the Electrical System, Equipment, and Associated Items that shows locations of some of these items and others inspected during the investigation.

APPENDIX U TESTING RESULTS FOR ALL EQUIPMENT TESTED AT A&CC

Appendix T Elimination of Electrical Ignition Sources
Lightning Lightning strikes were eliminated as a possible ignition source of the explosion event. Vaisala’s National Lightning Detection Network showed no lightning strikes within a ten mile radius of the mine site between 10:09:42 a.m. and 7:07:02 p.m. (See Vaisala Report 258028 in Appendix V). At the time of the explosion, there was no evidence of power outages related to storms in the area. Welding and Cutting There was no evidence of welding or cutting being performed at the time of the explosion, and no cutting equipment was found in the area of the longwall face. However, two electric welders were located near the longwall face in the headgate area. One welder (designated as “DC PTO”) was installed inside the third bay of the 480 Vac permissible headgate controller enclosure. This welder was interlocked with the longwall control circuitry, such that it could not be energized while the longwall 4,160 Vac power circuits were energized. Thus, the shearer and this welder could not be energized at the same time. In order to energize the welder through its circuit breaker “CB1,” the “DC PTO” switch handle on the outside of the headgate controller must be put in the “DC PTO” position. This switch was found in the “Normal” position, indicating the CB1 circuit breaker and the welder were de-energized. The two individual welding leads, approximately 15 feet long, exited the controller enclosure and were not connected to any other leads. The other electric welder, which normally hung on the monorail outby the headgate controller, was a portable unit that was found just inby the headgate controller enclosure. The power switch for this welder was found in the “off” position. The cable coupler to the distribution power box was found disconnected, indicating this welder was de-energized at the time of the explosion. No welding leads were connected to this welder when it was found. The only welding leads found in the area of the longwall face were in a flat cable, which was routed from the area of the headgate controller across the longwall face in the face conveyor’s (panline) cable handling tray. The end of this flat cable near the headgate enclosure had two male welding connectors, for the face welding leads, and were found disconnected and locked with a chain and padlock in the cable handling tray near the headgate controller. The keys for this padlock were normally kept on top of the headgate controller, and were found on the ground under the controller. From witness testimony, the last known welding operations in the longwall area was on the midnight maintenance shift prior to the accident. At that time, a welder was used to add additional flights to the face conveyor, and to replace the

shearer head drum cowl blade. Both of these welding tasks were conducted on the headgate side of the longwall face. Shearer Electrical Components The Joy Mining Machinery, Model 07LS1A shearer, serial number LSW525C, MSHA Shearer Evaluation No. SE-18630-0, was located at the tailgate end of the longwall. The electrical components on the shearer included explosion-proof enclosures (motors, main controller enclosure, shearer power cable connection enclosure, and solenoid valve enclosure), a methane monitoring system with warning light enclosure, various intrinsically safe circuits, components and sensors, and all associated cables. Electrical cables were examined and no damaged areas were found. The electrical control components of the shearer were housed in the main controller enclosure, MSHA Certification No. X/P-4161-0. The controller consisted of three bays; access to this single enclosure was provided by three separate covers for the left, middle and right controller bays. There was a small lens on the left cover, and a larger window on the middle cover. All accessible flame-arresting path surfaces of the permissible explosion-proof enclosures were measured on the shearer, and no excessive openings were found. All unused lead entrances were plugged. A visual inspection of the windows and lenses showed no visible cracking or crazing (network of fine cracks). All fasteners and retainers were in place, and all fasteners were tight. On the controller enclosure cover, all selector switches and circuit breaker handles were in their normal operating positions. The shearer e-stop mushroom switch, located on the main controller enclosure, was wired properly and functional, and was not activated. Wiring and components inside the explosion-proof enclosures were examined and checked against the electrical approval documentation, and no deficiencies that would affect shearer operation were found. There was no evidence of abnormal arcing, sparking, or heating of components. No unusual odors were noted, and no abnormal residue was noted on any of the flame-arresting path surfaces. The JNA event log recorded no protective circuit trip functions or alarms in the hours before the explosion. The last protective device trip was for an overload on the right-hand cutter motor, approximately 7 hours and 10 minutes before the explosion, but evidence indicates that this was not a prolonged shutdown of the machine. Other mechanical features, including the ranging arm pins and cutter torque shafts, were inspected. Evidence and testimony indicated that the tail ranging

arm “B-Lock” came out when the shearer was at the headgate. No electrical or mechanical deficiencies were found associated with the shearer. Shearer Remote Control Transmitter Shearer functions were controlled by two operators with handheld radio remote transmitters (Appendix U-1), designated by the JNA control system as left- and right-hand stations. The left transmitter and receiver operated at a frequency of 458.525 MHz, while the right transmitter and receiver operated at a frequency of 472.100 MHz. The station selector switch on the front panel of the shearer’s main controller was set to “both,” for the JNA control system to receive data from both remote transmitters. Therefore, both remotes must be functioning for the machine to be operational. The right-hand transmitter, identified by its frequency of 472.100 MHz, was a Matric Limited, Model TX1, Remote Control Transmitter, MSHA Approval No. 9B-220-0, and was found at shield 100. This transmitter was taken to the manufacturer for further examination and testing. The transmitter case and internal components had physical damage consistent with external forces. When attempting to turn the transmitter on, a “stuck button” error occurred. The microcontroller socket had physical damage, and after being replaced by a Matric Limited technician, the transmitter was used to perform functional testing for the shearers’ JNA0 and JNA1 units, without the need for its internal battery to be recharged. Testing found each switch on the remote transmitter to be in operating order. An inspection at A&CC did not identify signs of heating, arcing, or sparking inside or outside the remote transmitter. Evaluation and testing showed that the maximum voltage and current available on any of the external pins of the remote transmitter was intrinsically safe. Therefore, MSHA concluded that this transmitter was not the ignition source. The left-hand remote control transmitter was never found, but there was no indication that it was not functioning properly. The last record on the JNA event log prior to the explosion showed that the right-hand remote (Exhibit No. PE-0238) caused the shearer to stop. Automatic Chain Tensioning System A Joy Automatic Chain Tensioning System (ACTS) was installed at the tailgate area of the face to automatically control the face conveyor chain tension. The ACTS components included: an explosion-proof controller enclosure, a connection enclosure for the intrinsically safe circuits (referred to as a “marshalling box”), and various intrinsically safe transducers, sensors, a display beacon, and solenoids. This intrinsically safe system was accepted under MSHA Evaluation No. IA-18031-0. All accessible flame-arresting path surfaces of the ACTS controller enclosure were measured, and no excessive openings were found. All unused lead entrances were plugged. An ACTS “PanelView” window display, located on the

front enclosure cover, showed no visible cracking or crazing. All window fasteners and retainers were in place, and all fasteners were tight. All the intrinsically safe components were inspected, and no improper connections or damaged components were observed. None of the fuses in the intrinsically safe barriers, which protect the intrinsically safe circuits, measured “open.” There was no evidence of abnormal arcing, sparking, or heating of components inside the controller enclosure and the marshalling box, and no unusual odors were noted. No abnormal residue was noted on any of the flame-arresting path surfaces. A communication cable linked the ACTS programmable logic controller (PLC), located in the tailgate controller, to the PLC located in the headgate enclosure. This cable entered both enclosures, but the conductors were not connected to the PLC components in either. The 120 Vac power supply from the headgate was still connected inside both the headgate and the ACTS enclosure, although without communication to the headgate PLC, the ACTS could not operate in automatic mode. The selector switch control was found in the “Auto” position, but longwall employees stated that the ACTS was always operated by manual hand valves, without electrical controls. The PanelView connected to the PLC was designed to record the last 100 alarms of the ACTS programmable control system. When the alarm history was viewed, there were 100 identical alarms of a tailgate speed sensor fault, recorded within one second of each other, on September 11, 2009. Although the processor clock was off from “real time” by approximately one hour, it was concluded that the ACTS had not been used for many months prior to the accident. Tail Conveyor Drive Motor All accessible flame-arresting path surfaces of the enclosure, including the motor connection box, were measured, and no excessive openings were found. All unused lead entrances were plugged. Wiring and components inside the connection box enclosure were examined and checked against the longwall electrical approval documentation; no deficiencies were found. There was no evidence of abnormal arcing, sparking, or heating of components. No unusual odors were noted, and no abnormal residue was noted on any of the flame-arresting path surfaces. A Fluke 1520 megohmmeter was used to verify that no degradation of the motor insulation had occurred. Electrical Cables Along the Longwall Face Electrical cables along the longwall face were located either in the cable handling system of the panline or hung along the longwall shields. The cable handling system consisted of four vertically-stacked sections of a cable trough, accessible from the side of the panline facing the shields. Another cable tray on top of the panline allowed the shearer electrical and water hoses, in its “bretby” handling system, to follow the shearer as it progressed across the face. At shield 88, the

shearer power cable and water hose exited the second section of the cable trough, and entered the cable tray in its “bretby” handling system. The top section of the trough contained seven electrical cables: 1) flat electrical cable (#2/0 AWG, type W) that contained the welding conductors; 2) blue armored cable for the methane monitor sensor located at the tailgate; 3) yellow communication cable for the ACTS, which was disconnected at both ends, but entered the two enclosures; 4) #6 AWG, 3 conductor, type G-GC cable (previous pump cable disconnected at both ends), which was routed from the headgate area but ended at Shield 86; 5) #6 AWG, 3 conductor, type G-GC cable, (previous pump cable disconnected at both ends), which was routed from the headgate to the tailgate, but was severed, with the ends four feet apart, at shield 115; 6) #14 AWG, 3 conductor, type Remote Control and Drill Cord cable, which was disconnected at both ends, and; 7) #14 AWG, 4 conductor, type Remote Control and Drill Cord cable, which provided 120 Vac to the ACTS controller enclosure. Progressing downward, the second section of the cable trough contained two 4,160 Vac power cables. One was a blue power cable for the tailgate conveyor drive motor. The other was a yellow power cable for the shearer. The third section of the cable trough contained a 1-1/2” hydraulic hose for the shields, 1” hose for the tail conveyor motor drive cooling water, and a hose to the tail drive water coupling. The fourth (bottom) section of the cable trough contained a water hose that supplied the shearer, and a return hydraulic hose for the shield hydraulic system. Examination of the shearer power cable where it exited the second section of the cable trough at mid-face, and where it entered the shearer, indicated that the bretby handling system containing the hose and cable had sufficient slack. The examination revealed no deficiencies in any cables in the panline cable trough. The shearer cable had been replaced from mid-face to the shearer in mid-March; splices examined at shields 45 and 87 were constructed adequately. Two repairs to the tail face conveyor motor cable, at shields 91 and 105, were found to be constructed adequately. Insulation Testing of Power Cables (Panline) The shearer and tail conveyor motor cables were type SHD-GC, with a shield around each of the power conductors, and each conductor shield in contact with the ground conductor. The insulation of the power conductors in both the shearer and tail conveyor motor cables were tested, using an Extech Digital High Voltage Insulation Tester, Model 380395, set at 5,000 volts. For both cables, the tester was placed sequentially between each power conductor and the ground conductor at the respective disconnect enclosures. This tested the insulation of each of the cables’ power conductors for their entire length. The testing showed no degradation in the insulation of any of the power conductors in either cable.

Lighting System Components The lighting system power cable was a #6 AWG, 3-conductor, type G-GC cable, which provided 120 Vac three-phase power to the lighting power supply, explosion-proof enclosures. The type G-GC cable consisted of three-phase power conductors, an insulated ground-check “pilot” conductor, and two ground conductors. A lighting power supply enclosure was located at shields 3, 23, 43, 63, 83, 103, 123, 143, 163, and 173, each of which housed two intrinsically safe power supplies, accepted under MSHA Evaluation No. IA-13827-0. Each intrinsically safe power supply provided a nominal 12 volts direct current (Vdc) output to power five KH Controls Inc., Model LX1 luminaires (light assembly), located on every other shield. The luminaires were accepted under MSHA Evaluation No. IA-16453-0 and Certification No. X/P-4036-0. At shield 171, the lighting power cable was damaged, exhibiting a severed ground-check conductor and insulation damage on the black and white phase conductors. The lighting cable is normally zip-tied to the shield water line away from the chock interface unit (CIU). When inspected, the damaged area of the cable was laying on the damaged area of the CIU. The CIU had a bent mounting bracket, deformed enclosure, damaged internal circuit boards, and a damaged face plate. Upon initial inspection, the damage to the lighting cable was determined to have been caused by the same explosive forces, traveling from the tailgate toward the headgate, which damaged the CIU. The damaged section of the cable was recovered and sent to the A&CC for analysis... The lighting system power cable was protected by an SMC Electrical Products, Inc., Model C54-006, ground wire monitor in the headgate controller. (See Appendix - U-11) This ground wire monitor is designed to trip the lighting circuit breaker when an open or a short in the pilot wire occurs, thus de-energizing the entire longwall lighting circuit. There were no reports of the longwall lights not working and no evidence of maintenance being performed on the lighting circuit. The ground wire monitor circuitry and the pilot wire terminating diode were removed and tested at the A&CC to determine if sufficient energy existed in the pilot wire conductor to ignite an 8.3% methane-in-air mixture. Tests were conducted with and without simulated value of cable inductance. No testing ignited the methane-air mixture. The following protective circuit components were removed from the enclosure; lighting current transformer, lighting relay, ground fault relay, ground wire monitor, and lighting circuit breaker. A&CC performed functional testing of the protective circuitry components and no deficiencies were found. The lighting power supply explosion-proof enclosures located at shields 163 and 173 were examined. All accessible flame-arresting path surfaces of these enclosures were measured, and no excessive openings were found. There was no evidence of abnormal arcing, sparking, or heating of components in the enclosures (Appendix U-2). No unusual odors were detected, and no abnormal residue was noted on any of the flame-arresting path surfaces.

Various lighting system components were retrieved for further examination and testing at A&CC. The components retrieved were: Six KH Controls Model ISS1 – 13.0 – 8.10, IA-13827-0 Power Supplies  Exhibit No. PE-0246-a*, S/N 1034, recovered from shield 173 (written on the front of the supply)  Exhibit No. PE-0246-b*, S/N 1832, recovered from shield 173 (written on the front of the supply)  Exhibit No. PE-0247-a**, S/N 2536, recovered from shield 163 (written on the front of the supply)  Exhibit No. PE-0247-b**, S/N 995, recovered from shield 163 (written on the front of the supply)  Exhibit No. PE-0248-a***, S/N 2185, recovered from shield 3 (written on the back of the supply)  Exhibit No. PE-0248-b***, S/N 1295, recovered from shield 3 (written on the back of the supply) *A case with Exhibit No. PE-0246 was received and contained two power supplies. These two power supplies were assigned the newly generated Exhibit Nos. PE-0246-a and PE-0246-b when the case was opened. **A case with Exhibit No. PE-0247 was received and contained two power supplies. These two power supplies were assigned the newly generated Exhibit Nos. PE-0247-a and PE-0247-b when the case was opened. *** A case with Exhibit No. PE-0248 was received and contained two power supplies. These two power supplies were assigned the newly generated Exhibit Nos. PE-0248-a and PE-0248-b when the case was opened. Thirteen KH Controls Model LX1 Luminaire, IA-16453-0, X/P-4036-0  Exhibit No. PE-0254-a*, S/N 10774, recovered from shield 167  Exhibit No. PE-0254-b*, S/N unknown (missing approval plate), recovered from shield 124  Exhibit No. PE-0258-a**, S/N 12483, recovered from the area of shield 62  Exhibit No. PE-0258-b**, S/N 7791, recovered from the area of shield 66  Exhibit No. PE-0258-c**, S/N 6712, recovered from the area of shield 89  Exhibit No. PE-0258-d**, S/N 7353, recovered from the area of shield 173  Exhibit No. PE-0258-e**, S/N 12535, recovered from the area of shield 64  Exhibit No. PE-0258-f**, S/N 10437, recovered from the area of shield 139  Exhibit No. PE-0474, S/N unknown (missing approval plate), recovered from the area of Survey Spad 22567

   

Exhibit No. PE-0475, S/N unknown (missing approval plate), recovered from the area of the cross cut adjacent to Survey Spad 22567 Exhibit No. PE-0476, S/N unknown (missing approval plate),recovered from the area of the tailgate entry at the shearer Exhibit No. PE-0477, S/N unknown (missing approval plate), recovered from the area of Shield 175 Exhibit No. PE-0478, S/N unknown (missing approval plate), recovered from the area of Shield 172

The recovered from location information was obtained from the shield number written on the light, and/or the evidence tag. *A cardboard box with Exhibit No. PE-0254 was received and contained two KH Controls Model LX1 Luminaire exhibits. These two exhibits were assigned the newly generated Exhibit Nos. PE-0254-a, and PE-0254-b when the box was opened. *A cardboard box with Exhibit No. PE-0258 was received and contained six KH Controls Model LX1 Luminaire exhibits. These six exhibits were assigned the newly generated Exhibit Nos. PE-0258-a, PE-0258-b, PE-0258c, PE-0258-d, PE-0258-e, and PE-0258-f when the box was opened. IS Lighting Cable with connectors- Exhibit No. PE-0324, 91 feet of 14AWG, 3/C SOW, recovered from shield 143 to shield 152 Based on technical analysis and inspection of the underground installation, no evidence was found that the lighting system was an electrical ignition source. All lighting power supplies were functional, tested within approved safety settings, and exhibited no sign of internal tampering or damage significant enough to affect the operation. Each recovered luminaire showed effects of explosion-related heat and/or impact damage, which was consistent with all observed luminaires on the face. Luminaires from shields 124 and 66 (Exhibit Nos. PE-0254-b and PE-0258-b) were found in a condition indicating they were not maintained in permissible condition prior to the explosion, but these did not contribute to the explosion. Exhibit No. PE-0254-b had electrical tape wrapped around a significant crack in the connection where the polycarbonate tube, which contained dust and dirt, threaded into the maintenance sleeve. Exhibit No. PE-0258-b had a missing end cap, and the polycarbonate tube, which had electrical tape wrapped around it, was broken off at the threaded end. A crack would defeat the explosion-proof integrity of the assembly. However, these exhibits were not located where the ignition occurred. None of the other damaged luminaires taken as evidence or examined underground had electrical tape covering cracks.

Electrohydraulic Shield System The Joy MS40 electrohydraulic system, consisting of a Master Supply Unit (MSU) and a Support Control Centre (SCC) at the headgate, controlled the movement of the shields. The intrinsically safe components were accepted under MSHA Evaluation No. IA-408-10. The MSU and SCC were powered by their own intrinsically safe power supplies, (KH Controls, Inc. Model ISSA-13.0-6.8-AL1, accepted under MSHA Evaluation No. IA-13827-0), installed in explosion-proof enclosures, MSHA Certification No. X/P-3929-0. A CIU control enclosure was located on each of the 176 shields along the longwall face. The MSU supplied intrinsically safe, nominal 12 Vdc power for the CIU enclosures via a “roadway” armored cable. On each shield, the CIU controlled six hydraulic solenoid valves, which initiated movement of the shields, and connected to a pressure and a distance transducer. A dump valve kit, consisting of a solenoid and pressure switch, was designed to release the main system hydraulic pressure to the return line, if any e-stop button was depressed on any face CIU or the MSU, or if the system hydraulic pressure was inadequate. The MSU provided power for the dump valve, and provided monitoring for the e-stop system to protect against solenoid valve short circuit or low voltage conditions. CIU enclosures were mounted on each shield. Two spare CIU enclosures, missing faceplates and internal printed circuit boards, were found at shields 27 and 77. The CIU enclosures at shields 1, 2, and 6 were damaged, and had several circuit boards missing. CIU circuit boards found in the tailgate area would likely correspond either to CIU enclosures at shields 1, 2, or 6, or from the spare CIU enclosures. Various components were retrieved for further examination and testing at A&CC, including:  CIU enclosures from shields 62, 64, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, and 176. CIU enclosures from shields 169 through 176 were retrieved because they exhibited signs of external heat or physical damage. CIU enclosures from shields 62 and 64 were retrieved because of visible heat damage on the infrared receiver lens. The roadway cable between CIU enclosures at shields 169 and 170, which was found disconnected at the headgate side of the CIU enclosure at shield 170. The KH Controls, Inc. Model ISSA-13.0-6.8-AL1 power supply for the MSU unit, accepted under MSHA Evaluation No. IA-13827-0. The MSU unit.









The SCC, which was taken to the manufacturer’s facility, where engineers and technicians familiar with this equipment attempted to view and recover the event and fault logs. Damage to the SCC and its internal circuitry was too extensive to allow data recovery. Six hydraulic solenoid valves recovered from shield 170, and two hydraulic solenoid valves recovered from shield 145.



The intrinsic safety analysis conducted at A&CC examined:      Output of the intrinsically safe MSU power supply. Inductive energy stored in the roadway cable. Energy stored in the hydraulic solenoid valves of the shields. Energy stored in the total system capacitance of the connected system. The possibility of thermal ignition from small-gauge wire strands.

The analysis indicated that no signs of electrical heating, arcing, or sparking were observed on any of the components in the CIU enclosures, solenoids, power supplies, or associated cables. Based on the technical analysis and inspection of the underground installation, the electro-hydraulic shield control system is not considered an electrical ignition source (Appendix U-3). Comtrol Communication System The Comtrol longwall face communication/conveyor lock-out system, MSHA Approval No. 9B-71-2, consisted of Longwall Loudmouth Model LM115 phones positioned at the headgate area and typically, every eighth shield. Each phone is powered by its own 12-volt battery. An 18 AWG, 4 conductor, type SOOW cable connected each of the phone enclosures, and was protected by hose conduit up to the in-line connector near the phone. The system was linked to the startup sequence of the longwall face conveyor, through a Model LM1574A start up alarm control receiver, so that an alarm was given over the speakers when the conveyor was about to start. Each phone enclosure was provided with a lockout control capability to prevent the face conveyor from operating. Investigators noted that some phones were not in their original positions (i.e. mounted on shields). The phone at shield 173, the last in the system, was missing, as was the phone at shield 117. At least four phones were missing on the headgate side of the longwall. Phone circuit boards and enclosure pieces were found at several different locations across the face, as well as in the No. 7 tailgate entry. Electrical investigators that have traveled the face area did not observe any components or cables that showed signs of being an electrical ignition source.

Various system components were retrieved for further examination and testing at A&CC . Worst case tests for intrinsic safety were performed on the power supply, start-up alarm/phone (located near the headgate enclosure), and an equivalent end-of-line termination unit, which was used because the actual termination unit was not located prior to the test, but found later at shield 110 approximately 360 feet from shield 173. This unit was also tested. All tests were performed with a worst case methane-in-air mixture of 8.3%, and indicated that a page transmitted from the headgate enclosure area would not ignite a methane-in-air mixture at the tailgate. A conveyor lockout switch passed the same test. Five Loudmouth phones and the start-up alarm/phone (from the headgate) were tested at A&CC for functionality. The phone from shield 165 was spark-ignition tested, and did not ignite an 8.3% methane-in-air mixture. Three face phones (shields 85, 109, and 165) and the headgate start-up alarm/phone were fully functional (communication and lock-out functions). Two phones obtained near the crusher and belt conveyor tailpiece had functioning conveyor lock-out switches, but had slight communication issues, in that the tailpiece phone could receive but not transmit, whereas the stageloader/crusher phone could receive, but transmitted a low, audible signal. Two terminating devices and additional Loudmouth phone components found across the longwall face were also sent to AC&C for further examination. Witness testimony did not indicate any issues with the longwall communication/conveyor lock-out system. The phone at shield 173 has not been found. An electrician that worked the midnight shift prior to the explosion stated that it was working properly. Pieces of telephone components were found around the longwall tailgate area that was possibly from the 173 phone. None of these components showed any signs of arcing and sparking (Appendix U-4). Multi-Gas Detector A MSA Solaris multi-gas detector (Exhibit No. B-15-B), carried by Richard Lane, Longwall Section Foreman, was retrieved from mid-face for examination and testing at A&CC. Testing determined that it was in working order. Downloaded data indicated that the device was energized at the time of the explosion and continued operating for several hours thereafter. During thermal ignition testing, the detector did not cause an ignition of a 7.75% methane-in-air mixture when energized (Appendix U-5). Personal Electrical Items Various electrical items were removed from six victims found and the longwall face.

Tracking Tags Pyott-Boone Model 1980 tracking tag transmitters, MSHA Approval No. 23-A080004-0, were used by the miners. The following tracking tags belonged to victims found on the longwall face:       Tracking Tag ID 570, belonging to Chris Bell, Exhibit No. PE-0483; Tracking Tag ID 584, belonging to Joel Price, Exhibit No. PE-0239; Tracking Tag ID 564, belonging to Rick Lane, Exhibit No. B-15-D; Tracking Tag ID 547, belonging to Gary Quarles, Exhibit No. B-11-A; Tracking Tag ID 540, belonging to Dillard Persinger, Exhibit No. B-10-A; and, Tracking Tag ID 546, belonging to Grover Skeens, Exhibit No. B-9-A.

Exhibits PE-0483 and PE-0239 were found near shields 109 and 94-95, respectively. Exhibits B-9-A, B-10-A, B-11-A, and B-15-D were brought out of the mine in the days immediately after the accident. Twenty-four tracking tags, including the six already noted, were retrieved for further examination and testing at A&CC. The examination of the tags indicated that the tracking tag enclosures were not exposed to heat or fire, electrical energy within the tracking tags was not exposed to the mine atmosphere, and that none of the tracking tags represented a thermal or a spark ignition source (Appendix U-6). Cap Lamps An assortment of intact cap lamps and components were retrieved. Of these, thirty-three individual items were subjected to further examination and testing at A&CC. Many items exhibited explosion-related damage, i.e. heat, charring, soot, missing pieces or severe physical force. No evidence indicated that any of the cap lamp batteries had sufficient electrical energy to ignite a methane-in-air mixture or enough thermal energy to ignite coal dust (Appendix U-7). Air-Purifying Helmet Components Seven components from the air purifying helmets including four batteries, a portion of a battery case, and pieces of the helmet and cable were retrieved for further examination and testing at A&CC. None of the electrical components indicated signs of arcing, sparking or electrical heating. Methane ignition did not occur during a spark ignition test with the highest short circuit current and highest open circuit voltage that was measured from any of the batteries (Appendix U-8). Watches and Calculators Several non-permissible electrical items, including six watches and two calculators, were recovered from the longwall face and subjected to examination and testing at A&CC. These items were all disassembled and inspected. Four watches and one calculator were functional and working as expected. None of the items indicated signs of arcing, sparking, or electrical heating, and there is no

evidence that any of these items were a source of spark or thermal ignition (Appendix U-9). Methane Monitor Sensor Components. Two CSE Model 140B LD IR methane monitor sensors (Exhibit Nos. PE-0169 and PE-0170) were retrieved from the tailgate area and tested at A&CC. The inspection of these components did not reveal any conditions that would suggest that the components caused an explosion. The sensors did not cause an ignition of a 7.5% methane-in-air mixture when energized in the test gas (Appendix U10). See Figures T-1 and T-2 for maps of the Electrical System, Equipment, and Associated Items that shows locations of some of these items and others inspected during the investigation.

APPENDIX U TESTING RESULTS FOR ALL EQUIPMENT TESTED AT A&CC

APPENDIX U-1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION OF REMOTE CONTROL UNITS

U.S . Department of Labor

Mine Safety and Health Admin istration Approval and Certification Center 765 Technology Drive Triade lphia , West Virginia 26059

November 17, 2011
MEMORANDUM FOR NORMAN G. PAGE Accident Investigation Team Leader

FROM:

JOHN P. FAINI Chief, Approval and Certification Center Executive Summary of Investigation of Remote Control Units Recovered from Performance Coal Company's Upper Big Branch - South Mine

W

SUB,.IECT:

The Approval and Certification Center (A&CC), as requested by Upper Big Branch Mine Accident Investigation Team Leader, Norman Page, conducted a laboratory investigation associated with respect to Remote Control Units recovered from a fatal mine explosion at the Upper Big Branch Mine-South on April 5, 2010. The components received were: 1. Exhibit No. PE-0209 Matric Limited TX1 Remote Control Approval Number 9B-220-0 (Found between Survey Spads (S.S.) 22701 and 22692 as documented by the Evidence Identification Tag). 2. Exhibit No. PE-021 0 Matric Limited TX1 Remote Control Approval Number 9B-220-0 (Found between S.S. 22701 and 22692 as documented by the Evidence Identification Tag). 3. Exhibit No. PE-0211 Matric Limited TX1 Remote Control Approval Number 98-220-0 (Found in crosscut adjacent to S.S. 22692 as documented by the Evidence Identification Tag). 4. Exhibit No. PE-0238 Matric Limited TX1 Remote Control Approval Number 98-220-0 (Found at Shield 100 as documented by the Evidence Identification Tag). 5. Exhibit No. PE-0315 Matric Limited TX3 Remote Control Approval Number 2G-4096-0 (Found in TG-22 Entry #3 as documented by the Evidence Identification Tag). 6. Exhibit No. PE-0347 Matric Limited TX3 Remote Control Approval Number 2G-4096-0 (Found in HG-22 Section, #1 Entry RT Crosscut as documented by the Evidence Identification Tag). 7. Exhibit No. PE-0348 Matric Limited TX3 Remote Control Approval Number 2G-4096-0 (Found in HG-22 Section , #3 Entry as documented by the Evidence Identification Tag).

8. Exhibit No. PE-0376 Matric Limited TX3 Remote Control Approval Number 2G-4096-0 (Labeled as "Left Miner Remote TG-22" as documented by the Evidence Identification Tag ). The exhibits were initially documented and photographed du ring a Preliminary lnspecti,on in the condition in which they were received . The Preliminary Inspection included decontamination of items that were considered potentially biohazardous, documenting visual observations, and photographing conditions of the exhibits . This inspection was conducted as the equipment was received by the Primary Investigator during the accident investi9ation. After the Preliminary Inspection was completed, a Detailed Inspection was conducted. The Detailed Inspection included noting any signs of arcing , sparking , or electrical heating1on both the outside and inside of the equ ipment This involved disassembling the equipment and performing any applicable testing as modified per ASOP2026, Investigative Procedures for Evaluating Equ ipment from Mine Explosions. At the conclusion of the Detailed Inspection , each piece of equipment was compared to approval documentation . These inspections and tests found: • • There were no signs of internal heating , arcing, or sparking on any of the units . Several! minor discrepancies we re noted when the Remote Controls were compared to approval documentation. These discrepancies did not affect operation, safety features, or the intrinsic safety of the remotes. A comparison of the components and circuitry under the RF shield for Exhibit Nos. PE-0347, PE0348 , and PE-0376 and under the RF shield and battery potting for Exhibit Nos. PE-0209 , PE-0210 , PE-0211 was deemed unnecessary by the Accident Investigation Team since they determined that these exhibits were not located near the origin of the explosion.

2

APPENDIX U-2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION OF LONGWALL LIGHTING SYSTEM COMPONENTS

APPENDIX U-2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION OF LONGWALL LIGHTING SYSTEM COMPONENTS

U .S . Department of Labor

Mine Safety and Health Administrati on Approval and Ce rtification Cen te r 765 Technology Drive Triadelphia , West Virgin ia 26059

November 18. 2011
MEMORANDUM FOR NORMAN G. PAGE Accident Investigation Team Leader

FROM :

JOHN P. FAINI Chief, Approval and Certification Center Executive Summary of Investigation of Longwall Lighting System Components Recovered from Performance Coal Company 's Upper Big Branch- South Mine

91--

SUBJECT:

The Approval and Certification Center (A&CC), as requested by the Upper Big Branch Mine Accident Investigation Team Leader, Norman Page, conducted a laboratory investigation on the longwalllighting system components recovered from the April 5, 2010 mine explosion at the Upper Big Branch Mine-South. The components received were: Six KH Controls ModeiiSS1 - 13.0-8.1 0, IA-13827-0 Power Supplies. • Exhibit No. PE-0246-a*, S/N 1034, recovered from shield 173 (written on the front of the supply). • Exhibit No . PE-0246-b*, S/N 1832, recovered from sh ield 173 (written on the front of the supply). • Exhibit No. PE-0247-a** , SIN 2536 , recovered from shield 163 (written on the front of the supply). • Exhibit No. PE-0247-b**, S/N 995 , recovered from shield 163 (written on the front of the supply). • Exhibit No. PE-0248-a***, S/N 2185 , recovered from shield 3 (written on the back of the supply). • Exhibit No . PE-0248-b***, S/N 1295, recovered from shield 3 (written on the back of the supply).
*A case with Exhibit No. PE-0246 was received and contained two power supplies. These two power supplies were assigned the newly generated Exhibit Nos. PE-0246-a and PE-0246-b when the case was opened. **A case with Exhibit No. PE-0247 was received and contained two power supplies. These two power supplies were assigned the newly generated Exhibit Nos. PE-0247-a and PE-0247-b when the case was opened.

***A case with Exhibit No. PE-0248 was received and contained two power supplies. These two power supplies were assigned the newly generated Exhibit Nos. PE-0248-a and PE-0248-b when the case was opened.
Thilfteen KH Controls Model LX1 Luminai re, IA-16453-0, X/P-4036-0. • Exhibit No. PE-0254-a*, S/N 10774, recovered from shield 167. 1 • Exhibit No. PE-0254-b*, S/N unknown (miss·n9' approval plate) , recovered from shield 124. • Exhibit No . PE-0258-a**, S/N 12483, recovered from the area of shield 62 . • Exhibit No . PE-0258-b**, SIN 779 1 , recovered f rom the area of shield 66 . 1 • Exhibit No. PE-0258-c** , SIN 6712, recovered from the area of shield 89. • Exhib ~i t No. PE-0258-d**, SIN 7353, recovered from the area of sh ield 173. • Exhibit No. PE-0258-e**, SIN 12535, recovered from the area of slh ie1 64 . ld • Exhibit No . PE-0258-f**, S/N 10437, recovered from the area of shield 139. • Exhibit No . PE-0474, S/N unknown (missi ng approval plate) , recovered from the area of Survey Spad 22567 . • Exhibit No. PE-0475, S/N unknown (missing approval plate), recovered from the area of the cross cut adjacent to Survey Spad 22567. • Exhibit No. PE-0476 , SIN unknown (missing approva'l pl ate), recovered from the area of the tailgate entry at the shearer. • Exhibit No. PE-0477 , S/N unknown (missi ng. approval plate), recovered from the area of Shield 175. • Exhibit No . PE-0478, S/N unknown (missing approval plate), recovered from the area of Shield 172.
1 1

The recovered from location information was obtained from the shield number written on the light, and/or the evidence tag .

*A cardboard box with Exhibit No. PE-0254 was received and contained two KH Controls Model LX1 Luminaire exhibits. These two exhibits were assigned the newly generated Exhibit Nos. PE-0254-a, and PE-0254-b when the box was opened. **A cardboard box with Exhibit No. PE-0258 was received and contained six KH Controls Model LX1 Luminaire exhibits. These six exhibits were assigned the newly generated Exhibit Nos. PE-0258-a, PE~ 0258-b, PE-0258-c, PE-0258-d, PE~ 0258- e, and PE-0258-f when the box was opened.
IS Lighting Cable with connectors. • Exhibit No . PE-03 24, 91 feet of 14AWG, 3/C SOW, recovered from shield 143 to shield 152. The investigation began with a prelim inary inspection of all the evidence received . The preliminary inspection included documenting visual observations and photographing the
2

as-received conditions of the components . This inspection was conducted between October 13 and October 14, 2010. The second phase of the investigation was conducting the electnicaj and functional tests , inC'Iuding measuring the electrtcal characteristics of the power supplies, luminaires cable, and energizing the lighting ballasts . These tests were conducted between October 27 , 2010 and November 1, 2010 . The third phase involved a detailed inspedion of the evidence. The detailed inspection involved disassembling the evidence to investigate any signs of arcing, sparking, damage, or electrical heating . These inspections were conducted between October 29, 201 0 and November 18, 201 0. The fourth and final phase involved a comparison of the evidence to approval drawings. This was intended to discover any discrepancies between the ev,dence and the MSHA i approved drawings. These comparisons were conducted between November 3, 2010 and November 19,2010. Evidence with Exhibit Nos. PE-0474, PE-0475, PE-0476 , PE-0477, and PE-0478 were received at a later date. All inspections took place between May 16 -18, 2011 . All of the power supplies were functional and, when tested , were found to be within the specifi,c manufacturer's electrical parameters under which the power supp.y was l evaluated and accepted. None of the power supplies exhibited any signs of ,nternal i tampering or damage significant enough to affect the operation. There were only minor discrepancies found which did not affect the operation or safety features, and are considered non-critical. There is no evidence that these power supplies were a source of spark ignition alone or when electricallly connected to the IS lighting cable (excluding connection to the luminaires). All luminaires showed some damage such as heat damage and/or impact damage. This damage was most likely caused by the explosion, but the condition of these luminaires prior to the explosion i~s not definitely known. During the comparison to the approval drawings, only minor discrepancies were found which did not affect operation, safety features, or the explosion-proof integrity and are considered non ~cri tical. The 'uminaires identified by Exhibit Nos. PE-0254-b and PE-0258~b were found in a condition indicating they were not maintained in permissible condition prior to the explosion. • Exhibit No. PE-0254-b had electrical tape wrapped around a significant crack in the connection where the polycarbonate tube threads into the maintenance sleeve . Dust and dirt were found inside the polycarbonate tube.

3

•

Exhibit No. PE-0258-b had a missing end cap and the polycarbonate tube was broken off at the threaded end. There was electrical tape wrapped around the polycarbonate tube a few inches down from the broken end.

Based on laboratory testing and inspection of intrinsically safe lighting cables at the Upper Big Branch Mine, no evidence was found that the intrinsically safe lighting cables thermally ignited coal dust on the longwall system .

4

APPENDIX U-3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION OF ELECTROHYDRAULIC SHIELD CONTROL COMPONENTS

APPENDIX U-3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION OF ELECTROHYDRAULIC SHIELD CONTROL COMPONENTS

U .S . Department of Labor

Mine Safety and Health Administration Approval and Certification Center 765 Technology Drive Triade lphia , West Virginia 26059

November 17. 2011
MEMORANDUM FOR NORMAN G. PAGE Accident Investigation Team Leader

FROM:

JOHN P. FAINI Chief, Approval and Certification Center Executive Summary of Investigation of Electrohydraulic Shield Control Components Recovered from Performance Coal Company's Upper Big Branch- South Mine

W-

SUBJECT:

The Approval and Certification Center (A&CC), as requested by Upper Big Branch Mine Accident Investigation Team Leader, Norman Page, conducted a laboratory investigation associated with respect to the electrohydraulic shield control components recovered from a fatal mine explosion at the Upper Big Branch Mine-South on April 5, 2010 . The investigation focused on the area for the source of the explosion. The Accident Investigation Team determined this "zone of concern" to be from shield number 160 to the tailgate of the longwall. The components received were: One (1) Joy Mining Machinery Master Supply Unit (MSU) recovered from the longwall headgate area. • Exhibit No. PE-0490, Type 375186-00-30, MSHA IA-408-1 0, P/N 06-01357, Serial No. JMM003.

One (1) KH Controls, Inc. MSU Power Supply recovered from an explosion proof enclosure at the longwall headgate area. • Exhibit No. PE-0248-c*, ModeiiSS1 -13.0-6 .8-AL 1 Power Supply, MSHA IA-13827 -0, Serial Number 697.

Ten (1 0) Joy Mining Machinery MS 40 Chock Interface Units (CIU) , Part No. 06-01383 , IA-408-9, recovered from the longwall face. 1. Exhibit No. PE-0257, CIU from shield number 62, Serial No. JMM097. 2. Exhibit No. PE-0259, CIU from shield number 64, Serial No. R81 M. 3. Exhibit No. PE-0335-a*, CIU from shield number 169, Serial No. JMM 168A. 4. Exhibit No. PE-0335-b*, CIU from shield number 170, Serial No. B867 .

5. Exhibit No. PE-0334-a* , CIU from shield number 171, Serial No. E095. 6. Exhibit No . PE-0311-a* , CIU from shield number 172, Serial No. 07/E805 . 7. Exhibit No . PE-0334-b*, CIU from shield number 173 , Serial No. JMM 171 . 8. Exhibit No. PE-0311-b*, CIU from shield number 174, Serial No. 164. 9. Exhibit No. PE-0273-b*, CIU from shield number 175, Serial No . E097. 10. Exhibit No. PE-0273-a*, CIU from shield number 176, Serial No. JMM 060A. Eight (8) Shield Control Solenoid Valves recovered from the longwall face. 1. Exhibit No. PE-0255-a*, solenoid valve recovered from shield 145 with side label indicating "Joy Mining Machinery HPS04751" and no legible information on bottom nameplate. 2. Exhibit No. PE-0255-b*, solenoid valve recovered from shield 145 with side label indicating "United Mining Equipment 23739" and no pertinent information on bottom nameplate. 3. Exhibit No . PE-031 0-a*, solenoid valve recovered from shield 170 with no side label and no bottom nameplate. 4. Exhibit No. PE-031 0-b*, solenoid valve from shield 170 with no side label and bottom nameplate indicating "Joy Mining Machinery Type 146420-01-30 66069897". 5. Exhibit No . PE-031 0-c* , solenoid valve recovered from shield 170 with side label indicating "United Mining Equipment 14375" and no legible information on bottom nameplate. 6. Exhibit No . PE-0310-d*, solenoid valve recovered from shield 170 with no side label and partially legible information marked on bottom nameplate. The legible nameplate information matches labeling on PE-031 0-b. 7. Exhibit No. PE-0310-e*, solenoid valve recovered from shield 170 with no side label and no pertinent information on bottom nameplate. 8. Exhibit No. PE-0310-f*, solenoid valve recovered from shield 170 with no side label and bottom nameplate indicating 'Type 146420-01 -30 66069897" with no manufacturer's name. Nine (9) Miscellaneous Components recovered from the longwall face or the longwall tailgate area. 1. Exhibit No. PE-0284, CIU stainless steel cover plate. 2. Exhibit No. PE-0272, shield to shield cable marked 169-170. 3. Exhibit No. PE-0229, front panel circuit board from a CIU. 4. Exhibit No . PE-0283 , main circuit board from a CIU . 5. Exhibit No. PE-0488, CIU enclosure containing no circuit boards, and no front cover.

2

6. Exhibit No. PE-0486-a*, CIU cast aluminum front cover with stainless steel cover plate , and main/front panel PCBs attached. 7. Exh)bit No. PE-0486-b*, CIU cast aluminum front cover with missing approximately 1;4 of top center area. 8 .. Exhibit No. PE-0486-c*, approximately Y, of bottom center area of CIU cast aluminum front cover. 9. Exhibit No. PE-0486-d*, MS40, Part No. 06-01383, Serial No . 096 CIU nameplate. Fourteen (14) Components recovered from a warehouse. 1. Exhibit No. PE-0326-a*, Joy/Marco Type sns/dmd/d8, P/N 07-00504 leg pressure transducer, Joy Part No. 08-01653 , Serial No. 68342/2. 2. Exhibit No. PE-0326-b*, Joy P/N 08-01653 , 800mm cable assembly. Joy indicated that this cable interconnects the MS40 CIU and the RS20 solenoid valve junction box. Since no RS20 junction boxes were provided, it is assumed that this cable was mistakenly submitted. 3. Exhibit No. PE-0326-c*, United Mining Equipment PIN 08-00968 RAM transducer cable assembly. 4. Exhibit No. PE-0326-d* is a P/N 66161558 solenoid valve junction box. 5. Exhibit No. PE-0326-e*, United Mining Equipment P/N 08-00675 leg transducer cable. 6. Exhibit No. PE-0326-f*, Joy/Marco Type sns/rs/j1150c RAM transducer and housing tube, Joy Part No. 06-01307, Serial No. 34355-94 . 7. Exhibit No. PE-0346-a* is a solenoid valve labeled HPS01952. 8. Exhibit No. PE-0346-b* is a solenoid valve labeled HPS04932. 9. Exhibit No. PE-0346-c* is a solenoid valve labeled HPS02569. 10. Exhibit No. PE-0346-d* is a solenoid valve labeled H.PS02087. 11. Exhibit No. PE-0346-e* is a solenoid valve labeled HPS01941 . 12 . Exhibit No. PE-0346-f* is a solenoid valve labeled HPS02569. 13._ Exhibit No. PE-0346-g* is a P/N 08-00676 CIU-to-junction box cable. 14. Exhibit No. PE-0346-h* is a P/N 66161558 solenoid valve junction box. *Note: Multiple pieces of evidence that arrived at the A&CC under one exhibit number (e .g. Exhibit No. PE-0248 consisted of two lighting system power supplies and one shield control system power supply) were expanded into new unique exhibit numbers containing a dash followed by a letter (e .g. Exhibit No. PE-0248-c) . The investigation began with a preliminary inspection of all the shield control components recovered from the longwall face and a warehouse. The preliminary

3

inspection included documenting visual observations, and photographing the as received condition of the components. The most significant observations were that there were signs of melting observed on some of the CIUs around the buzzer, infrared receiver lens, and switch plate membrane; and differences in the construction of the solenoid valves. The next phase of the investigation included testing of some of the recovered components as well as experimental testing of non-evidence. Some of the detailed inspection that would not interfere with testing was conducted in conjunction with the testing phase. Tests of the system included spark ignition testing at the output of the power supply, spark ignition testing simulating various system inductances, power supply load capacitance spark ignition testing, and spark ignition testing simulating various solenoid valve configurations. No spark ignition test failures involving the recovered equipment were observed. CIU performance testing revealed that all except for one of the CIUs were functional to some degree. No specific faults of malfunctioning CIU circuits were identified during the performance testing. Experimental testing of non-evidence included determining the maximum current in which several wire strand sizes will remain below 150 oc (minimum ignition temperature of coal dust). Testing of the MSU revealed that all ten opto-isolators were capable of isolating a 20 Vdc power supply from input to output. The next phase of the investigation included a detailed inspection of all the shield control components recovered from the longwall section and a warehouse. For the equipment recovered from the longwall section, this involved disassembling the equipment to address irregularities found during the preliminary inspection or testing; determining whether any of the components showed signs of electrical heating, arcing, or sparking; and determining if any of the units contained faults which could be an ignition hazard. After disassembling and inspecting the equipment recovered from the longwall section, no faults, signs of arcing or sparking, or signs of electrical heating were observed to be caused by the shield control components. For the equipment recovered from a warehouse, this involved determining interconnection of components and whether the junction boxes used during spark ignition testing contained any components that would affect the results of the test. Additional detailed inspection of cutting open cables to determine minimum strand size used to construct conductors and breaking away encapsulant of two solenoids to determine the diode type and configuration was also conducted. The last phase of the investigation was comparing the recovered components to documentation on file at the A&CC. The encapsulated equipment (solenoid valves, sensors, and bottom half of the power supply) were not compared to the approval documentation. Discrepancies between the components and approval documentation were found, however, none of the discrepancies were considered to be factors in the accident.

4

It was concluded that: 1. The output of the power supply is not considered an ignition source of a methane-air atmosphere. 2. The inductive energy stored in the MSU-to-CIU , CIU-to-CIU , and CIU-to-sensor/solenoid valve cabling is not an ignition source of a methane-air atmosphere provided the unrecovered cables are similar to the cable measured at the Approval and Certification Center. 3. The inductive energy stored in twelve (12) solenoid valves is not an ignition source of a methane-air atmosphere provided the unrecovered solenoid valves are similar in construction to those tested. Twelve solenoid valves were chosen for the test since there were two shield operators on the longwall face at the time of the accident, and each shield has a total of six (6) solenoid valves. 4. Based on measurements and evaluation , other inductors used in the system such as relay coils within the MSU, MSU/CIU buzzer drive coils , or the dump valve are not considered an ignition source of a methane-air atmosphere since measurements confirmed that no faults existed that would connect the inductors in a manner capable of being an ignition hazard. 5. The only components identified in the recovered evidence capable of generating electrical energy were a battery within the MSU and piezo-electric crystals used to provide an audible warning for the CIUs and MSU. Based on the approval documentation, the battery does not have adequate energy when compared with published ignition curves to cause a spark ignition of a methane-air atmosphere . Based on measurements, inspection, and the original approval testing of the buzzers, the piezo-electric crystals are not considered an ignition source of a methane-air atmosphere provided the unrecovered CIUs are built according to the approval documentation. 6. The energy stored in the total system capacitance is not considered an ignition source of a methane-air atmosphere provided the unrecovered CIUs are built according to the approval documentation . 7. No signs of electrical heating, arcing , or sparking were observed within or caused by any of the CIUs or solenoid valves recovered from the "zone of concern" of the longwall face. The heat damage observed on the CIU buzzers and infrared receiver lenses was judged to be from an outside force. No faults that would affect the intrinsic safety of the components were found . 8. A thermal ignition caused by wire strands used to construct the individual conductors of the shield control system is not considered an ignition source of a methane-air atmosphere based on testing/evaluation of wire strands, and assuming the minimum measured resistance of the recovered CIU-to-CIU cable (Exhibit No. PE-0272).

5

9. Circuit board traces of the type used in the CIUs are not considered an ignition source of a methane-air atmosphere provided the unrecovered CIUs are built according to the approval documentation. The circuit board traces have adequate current carrying capacity to not be considered capable of smoldering a coal dust layer with up to 1.2 A of current available at the "zone of concern". 10. Although examples of permissibility discrepancies were identified that may render the components or system less safe than originally approved, none of the identified permissibility discrepancies are considered to be a contributing factor in the accident.

6

APPENDIX U-4 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION OF LONGWALL COMMUNICATION SYSTEM COMPONENTS

U .S. Department of Labor

Mine Safety and Health Administration Approval and Cert1frcation Center 765 Technology Drive Triadelph ia, West Virginia 26059

November 23 , 201:1

MEMORAN DUM FOR NO RMAN G. PAGE Accident Investigation Team Leader

FROM:

JOHN P FAINI Chief, Approval and Certification Center

~Q_ q?,_;,.._

A-

SU BJECT:

Executive Summary of Investigation of Longwall Commu nication System Components Recovered from Performance Coal Company' s Upper Big Branch- South Mine

The Approval and Certification Center (A&C C), as requested by Upper Big Branch Mine Accident Investigation Team Leader, Norman Page , conducted a laboratory investigation of Longwall Communication System Components recovered from a fatal mine explosion at the Upper Big Branch Mine-South on April 5, 2010. The com ponents received were : 1. Exhibit No. PE-0140, Battery. 2. Exhibit No. PE-0142 , Battery. 3. Exhibit No. PE-0148 , Battery. 4. Exhibit No. PE-0192, Battery. 5. Exhibit No. PE-0227, Comtrol Phone Printed Circuit Board. 6. Exhibit No. PE-0249*, Pelican Case. 7. Exh ibit No. PE-0249A*, Comtrol Power Supply. 8. Exhibit No. PE-02498*, Comtrol Start-Up Alarm Control Unit. 9. Exhibit No. PE-0276*, Pelican Case. 10. Exhibit No. PE-0276A*, Comtrol Phone. 11. Exhibit No. PE-02768*, Comtrol Phone. 12. Exhib it No. PE-0280 , Comtrol Phone Side Panel . 13. Exh ibit No. PE-0281 , Comtrol Phone Side Panel. 14. Exh ibit No. PE-0285 , Comtrol Phone Enclosure. 15. Exhibit No. PE-0336 , Comtrol Phone .

16. Exh ibit No. PE-0337 , Comtrol Phone . 17. Exh ibit No. PE-0338 , Comtrol Phone . 18. Exh ibit No . PE-0344, Communication Cable . 19. Exhibit No. PE-0479, Comtrol Phone Printed Circuit Board. 20. Exh ibit No. PE-0480, Comtrol Phone Speaker. 21. Exhibit No. PE-0481 -A, Comtrol Phone Terminal Strip . 22. Exhibit No. PE-0484*, Evidence Bag . 23 . Exhibit No. PE-0484-A*, Comtrol Phone Internal Mou nti ng Bracket. 24 . Exhibit No. PE-04 84-B*, Comtrol Phone Speaker. 25 . Exh ibit No. PE-0487 , Comtrol Phone . 26. Exhibit No. PE-0489*, Evidence Bag . 27. Exh ibit No. PE-0489-A*, Comtrol Phone Speaker. 28 . Exh ibit No. PE-0489-B*, Comtrol Phone Printed Circuit Board. 29 . Exhibit No. PE-0489-C *, Pyatt-Boone Page Phone Printed Circuit Board . *Note: Multiple pieces of evidence that arrived at the A&CC under one exhibit number (e .g. Exhibit No. PE-0249 consisted of a Comtrol Power Su pply and a Comtrol Start-u p Al arm Control Unit in a Pelican Case) was expanded into new unique exhibit numbers containing a suffix letter (e .g. Exhibit No. PE-0249A and Exh ibit No. PE-0249 B). The West Virginia Office of Miners' Health Safety and Training recovered several pieces of evidence from the longwall communication system . This evid en ce was inspected and tested as part of this investigation and is listed below. The West Virginia Office of Miners' Health Safety and Training retained custody of these exhibits: 1. Exhibit No. CMTL 02 .22 .11-S11 0: Identified as a Comtrol Line Termination Unit. 2. Exhibit No. CMTL 02 .22 .11-HG-1 : Identified as a Comtrol Line Termination Un it with a mounting bracket. 3. Exhibit No. CMTl 02 .22 .11-S24: Identified as a mounting bracket for a Comtrol Line Term ination Un it. 4. Exh ibit No. CMTL 02 .22 .11-S 105: Identified as a mounting bracket for a Comtrol Line Termination Un it. 5. Exhibit No. CMTL 02-22-11 -S171: Identified as the back, top , bottom and left side of a Comtrol phone enclosure . 6. Exhibit No. CMTL 02 .22 .11 -S 104: Identified as the back, top and bottom of a Comtrol phone enclosure .

2

7. Exhibit No. CMTL 02 .22 .11-S 106A: Identified as the left side of a Comtrol phone enclosure. 8. Exhib it No. CMTL 02 .22. 11 S85: Identified as the right sid e of a Comtrol phone enclosure. 9. Exh ibit No. CMTL 02.22.11-S61 : Identified as a right side of a Comtrol phone enclosure . 10. Exhibit No. CMTL 02-23-11 Spad 22567: Identified as a term inal strip mounting bracket with terminal strip label of a Comtrol ph one enclosure. 11. Exhibit No. CMTL 02. 22.11-S77: Identified as a front cover of a Comtrol phone enclosure . 12. Exhibit No. CMTL 02 .22 .11-S1 09: Identified as a back, top , bottom, and left and right sides of a Comtrol phone enclosure. 13. Exhi bit No. CMTL 02 .22 .11-S1 06: Identified as a front cover of a Comtrol phone enclosure. 14. Exh ibit No. CMTL 02.22.11-S114: Identified as a back, top, bottom and left side of a Comtrol phone enclosure. The first phase of the investigation began with a preliminary inspection of all the exhibits. The preliminary inspection included documenting observations and ph otog raphing as-received conditions of the exhibits. The second phase of the investigation included performi ng spark ignition and operation al tests of the applicable exhi bits. The third phase of the investigation included detailed inspection of all exhibits and add itional spark ignition tests . The inspections and tests found : • There were no signs of internal heating, arcing, or sparking on any of the exhibits. Several minor discrepancies were noted when the exhibits were compared to approval documentation . These discrepancies did not affect operation , safety features , or the intrinsic safety of the exhibits. Some of the exhibits collected by the West Virginia Office of Miners' Health Safety and Training were physically matched to and therefore were part of the exhibits collected by MSHA. Th e spark ignition testing of the applicable exhibits did not result in any failures; therefore, these exhibits are not considered an ignition source for a methane-air atmosphere.

•

•

•

3

•

The operational tests indicated that the applicable com ponents operated as designed except for Exhibit No. PE-02768. This compon ent had a relatively low audio level when tran smitting a page .

4

APPENDIX U-5 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION OF PORTABLE METHANE AND MULTI-GAS DETECTORS

U .S. Department of labor

Mine Safety and Health Adm inistratio n Approval and Certification Center 765 Technology Drive Triadelphia , West Virgini a 26059

November 17. 2011
MEMORANDUM FOR NORMAN G. PAGE Accident Investigation Team Leader JOHN P. FAINI ~ Chief, Approval and Certification Center Executive Summary of Investigation of Portable Methane and Multi-Gas Detectors Recovered from Performance Coal Company's Upper Big Branch - South Mine

FROM:

SUBJECT:

The Approval and Certification Center (A&CC) , as requested by Upper Big Branch Mine Accident Investigation Team Leader, Norman Page, conducted a laboratory investigation of portable methane and multi-gas detectors recovered from a fatal mine explosion at the Upper Big Branch Mine-South on April 5, 2010 . The investigation began with a preliminary inspection of all the exhibits. The preliminary inspection included decontamination of items that were considered potentially biohazardous, documenting visual observations, and photographing asreceived conditions of the detectors. These inspections were followed by performance checks ('bump tests') and thermal ignition tests. Data was downloaded from the detectors that featured datalogging capabilities. This data was provided to all interested parties as it became available. Where feasible, performance tests were conducted on operational detectors to determine the accuracy of the instruments when tested in the methane-air mixtures specified in 30 CFR Part 22.7. For the datalogging detectors, the time and date displayed by the detectors was observed over a period of up to approximately seven months and compared to time clocks from external time verification sources. The rate of change was calculated from this data ; where possible, this rate of change was used to extrapolate the instruments' time on April 5, 2010. A detailed inspection of all exhibits except Exhibit Number B15B was deemed unnecessary by the Accident Investigation Team since they determined that these exhibits were not located near the origin of the explosion . Therefore, only Exhibit Number B15B was subjected to a detailed inspection. The results of the inspections, tests, and evaluations are summarized below.

INSPECTIONS, TESTS, AND EVALUATIONS ON EXHIBITS Performance Checks ('Bump Tests') The performance of each functional instrument was checked at least once; some were checked contemporaneously with receipt but all were checked immediately prior to a complete methane performance test. These performance checks were performed with the respective manufacturer's calibration gas and equipment, and are commonly referred to as 'bump tests'. The following tables summarize the results of these checks, and, where available, give the last calibration date as stored in the detector's memory. Industrial Scientific Corporation M40•M
Last Calibration Date Fresh Air Readings Methane Bump Test Readings 2.5% Methane 100 ppm 19% Oxygen Date of Test

Exhibit No.

Serial No.

co

Oxygen

co
107

A-20

0701048573

2010-03-03

0.0

0

20.7

2.4

18.8

Jul8,2010

2

CSE 102/1 02LD Detectors
Exhibit No. Serial No. Fresh Air Reading Reading in 2.5% Methane Date of Test

7

0.0
~-

'

0:4 2.4

Jul 8,2010 Nov 3, 2010
'


A7A

5277 0.1

I
.
; .

,._

0.1
'

-

0.3
1.6 1..1

Jul8,2010 Nov 4, 2010
1il

B18-c

88486

0.1

·"' '
B26~d

.~

:.•
0.1 (e rratic) Nov 8, 2010
ll_

(erratic)

Jul8 , 2010

7328
I
Jli

.,

0.1 0.1

-

,,.
2.2:
'

,.

Nov 4, 2010
'\•
. ..

',. "·

2.2

Nov 8, 2010
:i;

I~

PE-0290

84403

li:W

.
;

0. 0 0.1

~ 2.2
2.2
¥ ";; "

Nov 4,2010 Nov 8, 2010 NO TESTING~ NOTESTING
2

Dl=.f'\?92 PE-0298

4898 7811

I~

!(!

N/A .· ~J.I N/A

.;

N/A

•if::il ~;

I

.'

··~:.,·~;.,·

PE-0314

79905

..

.

,.·l.., ;;,:(;; fo '
0.0

I
,.

NIA

2:3
2.3

.
!!

:;.

'Nov 4, 2010.
Nov 8, 2010

;;,11

l Exhibit Number PE-0292 was damaged as-received and no performance testing was possble. 2 Exhibit Number PE-0298 was damaged as-received and no performance testing was possible.

3

MSA Solaris Multi-Gas Detectors
Last Calibration Date Fresh Air Readings Methane CO Oxygen Bump Te st Reading s 2.5% Methane 60 ppm 15 % Oxygen Date of Test

Exhibit No.

Serial No.

co
15

A586223

0
3-18-2010

9
N/A 3-15-2010 0.20 N/A
Var.

N/A 19.6 N/A

N/A

Nov 3, 2011

PE-0074

4

A5104696

0.00

N/A N/A

14.
N/A

18, 201()
Nov 3, 2011

PE-0086

A558751

0.00
2-14-2010

8-11
0

20.8
20.8

..

2.35

2.00
2.30

48
51

14.7
14.9

Ju1,28,ZO~
Nov 3, 2011

PE-0118

5

A426051
A5106631

3-17-2010

I'

0.00

NIA

t NIA
N/A

I

N/A

I. I I t
Nh'\
N(A

IW/I

NJA
Nov 3, 2011

PE-0323

4-1-2010

0.00

20.8

2.25

N/A

14.7

The detectors that passed the 'Bump Test' were considered to be accurate and not subjected to the performance test. Those detectors that gave readings outside the acceptable limirs of the pass/fail cdteria of the 'Bump Test' were subjected to t performance testing (summarized below) both before and after calibration . The cri,teria for determining if a detector was outside the acceptable lrmits of the pass/fail criteria of i the 'Bump Test' was based on the criteria developed for machine-mounted methane mon:tors , that describes that, when tested with 2.5% methane-in-air gas mixture, the i allowable error is 2.5 ± 0.5. The following detectors gave readings outside the acceptable limits of the pass/fa ill criteria of the 'Bump Test' when tested at the A&CC, as applied to methane performance: Exhibit Numbers A~20, A7a, B26-d, PE-0290 , PE-0314, PE-0074, PE-0086 , and PE-0323.

3 Oxygen cell in Exhibit Number B 15B was greater than two years old when tested ; it was most likely past th e end of its useful life. 4 Oxygen cell in Exhi bit Number PE-0074 was apparently bad when the unit was rece ived at A&CC; by the time testing was conducted in November, the CO cell had apparent ly reached the end of its useful life. 5 No accuracy tests were performed on Exhibit Number PE-0 118. Initially, the display was bad, and , before tests could be conducted, the unit stopped working properly.

4

No determination can be made of calibration accuracy and status of any detector at the time of the explosion. Data Download The data stored in all MSA Solaris and Industrial Scientific Corporabon M40•M MultiGas Detectors was downloaded and provided to the Accident Investigation Team for further analysis . Additionally, the data downloaded from the MSA Solaris Multi-Gas Detectors was used to produce a document describing the contents of the data contained therein because such document was not available from the manufacturer. The downloaded data was also used in the time drift study discussed below. Performance Testing The operational detectors were subjected to testing in the methane-air mixtures specified in MSHA's test protocol for approval of portable methane detectors. The tables below summarize the results of the tests. The table entries in bold italic font were outside the allowable limits of error found in 30 CFR Part 22.7 for approval testing of a new, calibrated, methane detector.

5

e CSE C orpora t'1on M th ane De tectors
1

Exhibit No.

Model

Serial No.

Test Gas Mfxture (% 0.00 0.2 0.25 0.50 0.6 0.51 1.00

C~

in Air) 3.00 2;7 3.03 4.00 5.00 4.3 5.01 2.5

2.00 1.8 2.03

Source of Reading Detector

O A
0.24

0.9
1.02

3.4
4.02

A7A

102LD

5277 0.00 0.1

.,.

IR Analyzer

618-c6

0.0
0.24

0.1
0.51

0.3
1.02

0.9
2.03

.1.4
3.03

1.9
4.02

102

88486 0.00

"
5.01 4.2
-···
.:. r-

.
.

Detector

IR Analyzer Detec;;tor_ IR Analyzer Detector IR Analyzer

OA
626-d 102LD 7328 0.00

p.1
0.24 0.2 0.24

0.3
0.51 0.4 0.51

0.7
1.02 0.8 1.02 2.03

2.6
3.03
~.5
"

3.3
4.02

5.01 . 4.1 5.01

mo
PE-0290 102 84403 0.00 PE-0292 PE-0298 102LD 102LD 4898
10 I I

1.7
2.03

3.2
4.02
7

·''

3.03

NOTESTING NO TESTING 0.1 ·0:3 0.24 1'.0 1.8
~·

TI'

.
" Detect0r' IR Analyzer

8

2.7 3.03

3.4
4.02

3.9 5.01

PE-0314

102

79905 0.00

ITB
1

1.02

2.03

6 Exhibit Number Bl8-c could not be calibrated because the maximum reading with 2.5% cal. gas was 1.9. 7 Exhibit Number PE- 0292 was damaged and no performance testing was possible . 8 Exhibit Number PE-0298 was damaged and no performance testing was possible.

6

MSA Solaris Multi-Gas Detectors
Test Gas Mixture (% CH4 in Air) Exhibit No.
9

Seria l No. 0.00 0.25 0.50 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 NO PERFORMANCE TESTING

Source of Reading

8158

A5-8622 3

PE-0074

A5-104696

;· 0.10~0
0.00 0.27

to.oo
PE-0086 A5-58751 0.00 PE-0118
10

Q-25 t 0.50
0.27 0.50

~
0
[h

1.00
1.00

1.95
2.03

2.90;' 4.05 ··· 5.00
3.03 4.03 5.03

Dzt~ctor
IR Analyzer

,::,

' 1.00

m~~z.~
2.03 3.03

3.90
4.03

5,0011[
5.03

Detector
IR An alyzer

A4-26051

NO PE RFORMANCE TE STING

PE-0323

A5-106631

~J~o;
U .Lf

~40
0.52

.

'''"' . 0.15 1.70
1.00 2. 04

2.60
3.02

I'"

. "" •" 3.40 4.35

L

Detector
IR Analyzer

4.05

5.00

The Solaris readings noted as "5.00 " above were accompanied by an alternating message 'OVER' on the display, indicating an over range condition. All visual, audible and vibrating alarms were given as defined in each detector's setup. Industrial Scientific Corporation M40•M Multi-Gas Detector
Test Gas Mixture (% CH4 in Air) Source of Reading 0.00 0.25 0.50 1.00 2 .00 3.00 4.00

Exhibit No.

Serial No.

,.

5.00 4.5

0.0
A-20

0.0
0.28

0.:4
0.54

0.9
1.04

1.8
•...

070148-573
0.00 2.04

2.8 ,"
3 .04

3.7
4.00

o "etector
IR Analyzer

4.99

The M40·M gave all audible, visual, and vibrating alarms as expected .

9 When attempting to calibrate Exhibit Number 8 158, the detec tor gave a ·span failed ' message. No performance testing was cond ucted. 10 N o accuracy tests were performed on Exhibit N umber PE-011 8. Initially, the displ ay w as bad . After replacement of the di splay, the opera tiou of the de tector was en·atic. The detector stopped working properly before tests co uld be conduc ted .

7

Time Drift Study The Industrial Scientific Corporation and MSA instruments featured internal clocks. The length of a time period measured by these internal clocks can deviate from the length of the same time period measured by more precise means; one second measured by a gas detector can differ from one second as measured by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). In laboratory environmental conditions , it was noted that clocks in each detector did , indeed , differ from that obtained from external time verification sources. Given the tolerances of each time measurement, calculations were made to determine the minimum and maximum rates of drift of the detector's internal clock as compared to the time from external sources. The downloaded data from the detectors was scrutinized to locate an entry on April 5, 2010 that might signify a significant event (over-range of a specific gas or gases). The minimum and maximum drift rates were then used to correlate the time for that entry to the expected time from external sources. It was determined that the clock in the Industrial Scientific Corporation Model M40•M, Exhibit Number A-20, reset automatically when the battery was depleted. No correlation was possible, although the drift rate was calculated. It was determined that the MSA Solaris Multi-Gas Detector, Exhibit Number PE-0086 was ·not energized on April 5, 2010 . When the MSA Solaris Multi-Gas Detector, Exhibit Number PE-0074 was initially reviewed in July 2010, the difference between its internal clock and the external time verification source was approximately 25 hours and 40 minutes. The drift rate was calculated as 6.294 seconds per day; this was insufficient to describe the wide variation noted. Also, the ambient temperature required to cause the drift to describe the difference would necessarily have deviated from normal ambient temperature by unreasonable amount (496 °C higher or lower than normal room temperature). MSA, the manufacturer of the detector and Maxim, the manufacturer of the integrated circuit were consulted; the only reason that was postulated by either party was "human assistance." However, review of the downloaded data does not support that conclusion. The reason for the clock in Exhibit Number PE-0074 to have deviated from external time by such a wide margin could not be determined in this investigation. The M. A Solaris Multi-Gas Detector, Exhibit Number B15B recorded an over-range S event for combustible gas, oxygen, and carbon monoxide on April 5, 2010. Similarly, on the same date, the MSA Solaris, Exhibit Number PE-0118 recorded an over-range event for oxygen and carbon monoxide, followed by an over-range event for combustible gas at the next recording interval15 seconds later; it should be noted that these events could have been within as little as 1 second, or as much as 29 seconds. If

8

the drift was constant from April 5, 2010 until MSHA began taking time measurements, the actual expected time and date for the over-range events is as shown on the graph below.

Range of Extrapolated Event Times
MSA Solaris Exhi,bit Numbers B15B an d f'E-0118

15:03: 10 15:02:53
0
~

3:02:59PM

(\1
1/)

0

15:02:36

(

·.:::: 15:02:18 a.
U

E
1-

15:02:01 15:01 :44 1
1

3:02:14PM

15:01:26 B15B
Exhibit Number

PE-0118

The difference in the median of these two ranges is most likely due to the differences in the environment of the two detectors. Exhibit Number B 158 was rece ~ved on June 24 , 2010, and kept in the climate-controlled MSHA building. Exhibit Number PE-0118 was y not received until Julr 19, 2010. The environment before that date is not known, but has been anecdotally described as non-climate contro:lled . intrinsic Safety The only tests conducted to determine the intrinsic safety of the detectors were thermal ignition tests. The testing was conducted on Exhibit Numbers A 7A, A-20 , 8158, 818-c, 826-d , PE-0074 , PE-0086 , PE-0290, PE-0314, and PE-0323. The damage to Exhibit Numbers PE-0292 and PE-0298 was too extensive to allow for testing. The test was conducted primarily to verify that the catalytic sensor was not reaching temperatures high enough to ignite methane. No ignitions of the test gas mixture were observed. Additionally, for all the detectors (except those with Exhibit Numbers PE-0292 and PE-0298, because of the extent of damage), the preliminary inspection did not reveal any conditions that would suggest that any exhibit caused the explosion. OTHER TESTS AND EVALUATIONS

9

The following are based on tests on exemplar detectors and similar detectors tested in previous investigations, manufacturer's documentation, and other public documentation. The change in the reading associated with the combustible sensor in the MSA Solaris and Industrial Scientific Corporation M40·M is insignificant due to increases in barometric pressure. However, sudden increases in barometric pressure can cause b. th of these detectors to experience significant increases in the oxygen reading. o The MSA Solaris Multi-Gas Detector includes a temperature sensor inside the unit. The temperature is recorded every 15 minutes, and the data is contained in the periodic data log. As the temperature at the sensing detector inside the detector increases, the value recorded increases. However, the temperatt.,Jre sensor is somewhat insulated from the ambient temperature due its location: if the temperature outside the unit changes quickly, the temperature recorded by the unit will lag until the temperatures equalize. The methane (catalytic) sensor used in the detectors is actually a combustible gas sensor. It will respond to other combustible gases. The following tables give the expected cross-sensitivity to other combustrble gases, such as hexane, ethane, i propane, butane, and pentane. Expec te d Response o f MSA S o Ians t0 S e Iec te d G ases
Multiply %LEL Reading by Column 2 Normalized to methane Scaling Factor (Reciprocal of Column 3) Lower Explosive Limit of Gas of Interest
··" '

Com busti b!e Gas

Calculated Reading on Solaris at LEL of Gas of interest

Displayed Value on Solaris at LEL of Gas of Interest.

n-Hexane'. Ethane Propane Butane .. F?~otane Methane

'
i

.·L': .

•,

1;3 0.7 ·· 0,'8 1 1 0.6

2.1 6666667 1.16666667
'1.33333~33

1.66666667 t Q6f366667 1

0 .4.615~.8462 ·· ··· 0.857142857 0.75 0.6 .. 0:6 1

1 .~ ·
.

"'

3 ,i:.1 1.8 1.4 5

0.55 2.57
m~·

. '·

· ·t sa~

·

0.55 2.55 1.60 . 1.10 0:.85 5.00

1.08 0.84 ' 5.00

Expec t e d Response o f ISC M40 •M
Scaling Factor (Reciprocal of Column 2)

t0 S e Iec te d Gases
Calculated Reading on M40-m at LEL of Gas of Interest Displayed Value on M40mat LEL of Gas of Interest.
·-·

Combustible Gas

Correlation Factor

Lower Explosive Limit of Gas of Interest

n•Hexanen Ethane Ptop_ ane Butane
Pent~n~. .......... .. ·--·

i .1a 1. 24 1.51 1.64

1,84
0.6

9 .'4 58715596 0.806451613 ().662'251656 0.609756098 0,543478261
1

Methane

1.2 . . 3 '2. 1 1.8 1.4 1

0.5505 2.4194 1.3907 1.0976 0.7609 5

Q .60 2.40

1.40
1.10
__

,.

~o,.?Q-.

5.00

10

A document was created that describes the contents of the data downloaded from the MSA Solaris. This is included in an Appendix B to the report. It should be noted that individual data points can become corrupted, and not be reported in the data log . This report addresses the atmospheres or contaminants that can cause electrochemical oxygen and carbon monoxide sensors and catalytic combustible sensors to fail. For the electrochemical sensors, the most common cause for failure is time; they have a significantly shorter useful life than the catalytic combustible sensor. The most common poisoning agents for the catalytic combustible sensor are those containing silicon .

11

APPENDIX U-6 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE INVESTIGATION OF POWER SUPPLY, AMPLIFIER BATTERY, TRACKING TAG, AND TAG READER COMPONENTS ASSOCIATED WITH PYOTT-BOONE TRACKING BOSS TRACKER SYSTEM AND MINECOM UHF LEAKY FEEDER SYSTEM

APPENDIX U-6 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE INVESTIGATION OF POWER SUPPLY, AMPLIFIER BATTERY, TRACKING TAG, AND TAG READER COMPONENTS ASSOCIATED WITH PYOTT-BOONE TRACKING BOSS TRACKER SYSTEM AND MINECOM UHF LEAKY FEEDER SYSTEM

U.S . Department of Labor

Mine Safety and Health Administrati on App rova l and Certification Cen ter 765 Technology Drive Triade lphia , West Virgin ia 26059

November 17, 2011
MEMORANDUM FOR NORMAN G. PAGE Accident Investigation Team Leader

FROM :

JOHN P. FAINI '?if-· Chief, Approval and Certification Center Executive Summary of the Investigation of Power Supply, Amplifier Battery, Tracking Tag , and Tag Reader Components Associated with the Pyott-Boone Tracking Boss Tracker System and Minecom UHF Leaky Feeder System Recovered from Performance Coal Company's Upper Big Branch- South Mine

SUBJECT:

The Approval and Certification Center (A&CC), as requested by Upper Big Branch Mine Accident Investigation Team Leader, Norman Page, conducted a laboratory investigation of power supply, amplifier battery, tracking tag , and tag reader components associated with the Pyott-Boone Tracking Boss Tracker System and Minecom UHF Leaky Feeder System recovered from a fatal mine explosion at the Upper Big Branch Mine-South on April 5, 2010. The following components were examined. Their locations are as reported on the associated evidence identification tags and/or chain of custody forms , and the administrative file log and/or the physical evidence location map maintained by the accident investigation team: 1. Exhibit No. PE-0087, tracking tag 595, recovered between survey spads 22649 and 22625 . 2. Exhibit No. 5-5-10-2, tracking tag 805, recovered off a miner's belt. 3. Exhibit No. PE-0239, tracking tag 584, recovered at the edges of shields 94 and 95 . 4. Exhibit No. PE-0072, tracking tag 780, recovered near survey spad 19871, crosscut 102, 15 feet from the track. 5. Exhibit No. B-1-C, tracking tag , recovered from Exhibit No. B1, victim personal effects. 6. Exhibit No. A-23-A, tracking tag* 818, collected at the Ellis portal when victims were brought to the surface.

7. Exhibit No. A-23-8, tracking tag* 793, collected at the Ellis portal when victims were brought to the surface. 8. Exhibit No . A-23-C, tracking tag* 138, collected at the Ellis portal when victims were brought to the surface. 9. Exhibit No. A-23-D, tracking tag* 707, collected at the Ellis portal when victims were brought to the surface. 10. Exhibit No. A-23-E, tracking tag* 826, collected at the Elllis portal when victims were brought to the surface. 11. Exhibit No. A-23-F, tracking tag* 514 ,.coHected at the Ellis portal when victims were brought to the surface. 12. Exhibit No. A-23-G tracking tag* 807, collected at the Ellis portal when victims were brought to the surface. 13. Exhibit No. A-23-H, tracking tag* 625, collected at the Ellis portal when victims were brought to the surface. 14. Exhibit No. A-23-1, tracking tag* 569 , collected at the Ellis portal when victims were brought to the surface. 15. Exhibit No. A-23-J, tracking tag* 288, col'lected at the Ellits portal when victims were brought to the surface . 16. Exhibit No. A-23-K, tracking tag* 503, collected at the Ellis portal when victims were brought to the surface. 17 . Exhibit No. A-23-L, tracking tag* 810, collected at the Ellis portal when victims were brought to the surface. 18. Exhibit No. 8-9-A, tracking tag 546, removed from Exhibit No. 89, victim personal effects. 19. Exhibit No. B-11 5-D, tracking tag 564, removed from Exhibit No. 815 , victim personal effects. 20.Exhibit No. 8-10-A, tracking tag 540, :removed from Exhibit No. 8-10 at the Ellis portal on 04/10/10. 21.Exhibit No. 8-11-A, tracking tag 547, removed from Exhibit No. 811, victim personal effects . 22 . Exhibit No. 8-19-D, tracking tag 526 believed to be personal items. 23. Exhibit No. 8-22-8, tracking tag 769, removed from Ex:hibit No. 822, believed to be personal items. 24. Exhibit No. PE-0196, power supply (initially identified as a tag reader on the Exhibit ID tag), recovered at survey spad 19895. 25. Exhibit No. PE-01968, sample of dust removed from Exhibit No. PE-0196 at the A&CC intrinsic safety lab.

2

26. Exhibit No. PE-0138, tag reader recovered outby survey spad 19657 as indicated on the physical evidence location map. 27. Exhibit No. PE-0193, power supply (initially identified as a tag reader on the Exhibit ID tag) recovered at survey spad 20059 . 28 . Exhibit No. PE-0139, amplifier battery transferred to the A&CC on 11/01/10, recovered outby survey spad 19659 as indicated on the physical evidence location map. 29. Exhibit No. PE-0449, tag reader transferred to the A&CC on 03/02/11, recovered near survey spad 19882 as indicated by the Chain of Custody form. 30 . Exhibit No. PE-0450, tag reader transferred to the A&CC on 03/02/11, recovered near survey spad 19643 as indicated by the Chain of Custody form. 31. Exhibit No. PE-0483 , tracking tag 570 transferred to the A&CC on 05/09/11, recovered at shield 109. *These 12 tracking tags were received at A&CC in one box identified as Exhibit No. A-23. To facilitate identification of the individual tag, they were arbitrarily assigned Exhibit Nos. A-23-A , A-23-B , A-23-C , A-23-D, A-23-E, A-23-F , A-23-G, A-23-H , A-23-1 , A-23-J, A-23-K , and A-23-L. The administrative file log states that these tags were collected "on 4/9/10 at the Ellis portal when Victims were brought to the surface ." The investigation began with preliminary inspections of the exhibit items numbered 1 to 27 listed above on October 13, 2010. The preliminary inspections included decontamination of items that were considered hazardous material, documenting visual observations, and photographing as-received conditions of the components. The preliminary inspection of item 28 was conducted on November 2, 2010, and the preliminary inspection of items 29 and 30 was conducted on March 9, 2011. The preliminary inspection of item 31 was conducted on May 16, 2011 . Detailed inspections and performance tests were conducted after the preliminary inspections . Pyatt-Boone representatives Adam Godsey and Gary Sergent witnessed some of the inspections and agreed to bring the equipment necessary to evaluate the operation the equipment recovered from Upper Big Branch . Performance testing of the first 27 exhibit items, with the exception of the dust sample identified as Exhibit No . PE-0196-B was conducted as part of the detailed inspections with the assistance of the Pyatt-Boone representatives. One tracking tag was non-operational. A representative of Pyatt-Boone returned on May 18, 2011, to conduct performance testing on the tracking tag identified as Exhibit No. PE-0483. This exhibit was transferred to the A&CC on May 9, 2011. It was found to be non-operational. After changing out the communications printed circuit board , the tag reader identified as Exhibit No. PE-0138 operated properly. Both power supplies operated properly. Exhibit Nos. PE-0139, PE-0449 , and PE-0450 were not performance tested . The

3

condition of the amplifier battery identified as Exhibit No. PE-0139 precluded performance testing . The tag readers identified as Exhibit Nos. PE-0449 and PE-0450 were transferred to the A&CC in March 2011. Pyatt-Boone was requested to recover any tracking data that may be stored in the tag reader memories. However, PyattBoone explained that any stored data is non-recoverable once all power i:s removed from the ta9 reader. Si:nce any tracking data that might have been recorded postaccident was non-recoverab ~ e . performance testing of these two tag readers was deemed unnecessary. The comparison to approval· drawings was conducted following the detailed inspections . A few minor discrepancies between the exhibits and the respective approval documentat·on on file were noted . i No signs of arcing, sparking, or electrical heati.ng were observed in inspections of any of the exhibits . There is no evidence that any of these exhibits were a source of spark or thermal ignition.

4

APPENDIX U-7 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION OF KOEHLER-BRIGHT STAR MODEL 5100 AND 5200 SERIES CAP LAMPS AND CAP LAMP COMPONENTS

U .S. Department of labor

Mine Safety and Hea lth Adm inistration Approval and Certification Center 765 Technology Drive Triadelphia , West Virgin ia 26059

November 17. 2011
MEMORANDUM FOR NORMAN G. PAGE Accident Investigation Team Leader

FROM:

JOHN P. FAINI Chief, Approval and Certification Center Executive Summary of Investigation of Koehler-Bright Star Model 5100 and 5200 Series Cap Lamps and Cap Lamp Components Recovered from Performance Coal Company's Upper Big Branch - South Mine

Y5f-

SUBJECT:

The Approval and Certification Center (A&CC) , as requested by Upper Big Branch Mine Accident Investigation Team Leader, Norman Page, conducted a laboratory investigation associated with respect to Koehler-Bright Star cap lamps and cap lamp components recovered from a fatal mine explosion at the Upper Big Branch Mine-South on April 5, 201 0. The cap lamps and cap lamp components received were: Exhibit No. A-9- Mark V, 5200 Series cap lamp with plastic battery cover with PTO. 2. Exhibit No. A-10- Mark V, 5200 Series cap lamp with plastic battery cover. 3. Exhibit No. A-11 -Mark V, 5200 Series cap lamp with plastic battery cover. 4. Exhibit No. A-12- Mark V, 5200 Series cap lamp with metal battery cover with PTO. 5. Exhibit No. A-13 - Mark V, 5200 Series cap lamp with plastic battery cover. 6. Exhibit No. A-14- Mark V , 5200 Series cap lamp with plastic battery cover with PTO. 7. Exhibit No. A-15- Mark V, 5200 Series cap lamp with plastic battery cover. 8. Exhibit No. B-1-B- Mark V, 5200 Series cap lamp with plastic battery cover with PTO in pouch. 9. Exhibit No. B5-A- Mark V, 5200 Series cap lamp with plastic battery cover with PTO . 10. Exhibit No. B7-A- Mark V, 5200 Series cap lamp with plastic battery cover. 11. Exhibit No. B-11-C - Mark V, 5200 Series cap lamp with plastic battery cover. 12. Exhibit No. B15-A- Mark II , 5100 Series cap lamp with plastic battery cover. 1.

13. Exhibit No . 818-A- 5000 Series battery with plastic battery cover with PTO and cord . 14. Exhibit No. 819-A- Mark V , 5200 Series cap lamp with plastic battery cover. 15. Exhibit No . 8-20-8- Mark V, 5200 Series cap lamp with plastic battery cover. 16. Exhibit No. 8-22-A- 5000 Series battery with plastic battery cover and cord. 17. Exhibit No . 826-C- Mark V, 5200 Series cap lamp with plastic battery cover with PTO. 18. Exhibit No. 5-5-10-1 -Mark V, 5200 Series cap lamp with plastic battery cover. 19. Exhibit No. PE-0071 -Mark V, 5200 Series cap lamp with plastic battery cover (recovered from Survey Spad (S.S.) 19871 Crosscut 102). 20. Exhibit No. PE-0078- 5000 Series battery (recovered 233 ' outby S.S. 22649). 21. Exhibit No. PE-0080- Metal battery cover with PTO and cord (recovered outby S.S. 22649) . 22. Exhibit No. PE-0081 -Mark V headpiece (recovered outby S.S. 22649). 23 . Exhibit No . PE-0091 -Mark V , 5200 Series cap lamp with plastic battery cover with PTO (recovered Int. S.S . 22639) . 24 . Exhibit No. PE-0231 -Plastic battery cover and battery insulator and cord and Mark V headpiece (recovered from shield 112) . 25 . Exhibit No . PE-0231-A- Dirt and debris from Exhibit No. PE-0231 . 26. Exhibit No . PE-0232- 5000 Series battery (recovered from shield 1 09). 27 . Exhibit No. PE-0236- 5000 Series battery (recovered between pontoons of shields 108 and 1 09) . 28 . Exhibit No. PE-0240- 5000 Series battery (recovered from edge of shields 94 and 95) . 29. Exhibit No . PE-0241 -Plastic battery cover with PTO and cord and Mark V headp iece (recovered from shield 92). 30. Exhibit No . PE-0289- 5000 Series battery and cord (battery recovered from mantrip outby S .S. 24401 inby end of operator's compartment and cord laying on outby end of operator's compartment). 31 . Exhibit No. PE-0327- 5000 Series battery (recovered Adj. to Stage Loader). 32. Exhibit No . PE-0350- 5000 Series battery (recovered inby S.S. 24754). 33. Exhibit No. PE-0481-C- Components of a 5000 Series battery (recovered from shield 109). 34. Exhibit No. PE-0485- Components of a 5000 Series battery (recovered from shield 107) . A broad assortment of cap lamp exhibits was recovered ranging from fully intact exhibits to individual cap lamp components. It is unclear if any of the individual components were at one time part of a fully intact cap lamp. Additionally, the exhibits ranged from a small amount of dirt and debris to being entirely covered and/or filled with dirt and debris. Several of the exhibits were considered hazardous material and required decontamination prior to any investigation activities.

2

Multiple exhibits showed evidence of damage from the explosion such as heat damage, charring, soot, missing pieces or severe physical damage . .Some exhibits were not maintained in approved condition pre-explosion. Nearly all of the batteries had minimal to no detectable electrolyte fluid. Two of the exhibits battery covers were attached to the battery with electrical tape. Several of the exhibits had tape covering cuts in the cord casing. Several of the exhibits had cuts in the battery cover wiring exposing the conductors. Some of the exhibits had an excessive amount of corrosion on the battery cover wiring and battery terminals. Several of the exhibits had loose or missing hardware. From the evaluations and tests conducted there was no evidence found that any of the exhibits had enough electrical energy to ignite a methane and air mixture or enough thermal energy to ignite coal dust. The summary of the inspections, tests , and evaluations is below: There were various inspections, tests, and actions conducted on the exhibits such as filling each battery with electrolyte and charging, flash current testing, measuring the inductance of each cord, spark testing, measuring the surface temperature of each bulb and one exhibit cord , verifying that bulb ejection mechanism of each headpiece operated properly, performing a detailed inspection, and comparing each exhibit to the approval documentation on file. A total of 19 out of the 27 recovered batteries were able to be charged . Six batteries were damaged to the extent that they were not able to be filled with electrolyte. Two of the 21 batteries that were filled with electrolyte leaked and could not be charged. There were 19 batteries that were flash current tested. One battery was flash current tested as a single cell due to the other cell being damaged. Results from the testing showed that Exhibit No. 815-A had the lowest internal resistance and Exhibit No. PE0091 had the highest open circuit voltage. The inductance was measured on 15 of 24 cap lamp cords. Six of the cords were damaged and were not able to be measured . Three of the cords were not able to be accurately measured . Results from the measurements showed that Exhibit No. A-12 had the highest inductance. There were two spark ignition tests conducted . One test consisted of the battery of Exhibit No. 815-A and the cord of Exhibit No. A-12 and the second test consisted of the battery of Exhibit No. PE-0091 and the cord of Exhibit No. A-12. Results from the testing showed that neither combination had enough electrical energy to ignite a methane and air mixture. Surface Temperature tests were conducted on 10 of 12 headpiece bulbs. Two of the bulbs were damaged and were not able to be tested. Results from the testing showed

3

that the highest measured temperature was not enough thermal energy to ignite coal dust. The Bulb Ejection Mechanism for 20 of 21 headpieces was tested. One of the headpieces was damaged to the extent that it was not able to be tested. Results from the testing showed that all bulb ejection mechanisms operated properly. Detailed inspections and comparison to approval documentation for multiple exhibits showed evidence of damage from the explosion such as heat damage, charring, soot, missing pieces or severe physical damage. Some of the exhibits were found to have properties making it possible they were not maintained in permissible condition preexplosion and perhaps considerable enough to affect the operation. Nearly all of the batteries had minimal to no detectable electrolyte fluid. Two of the exhibit's battery covers were attached to the battery with electrical tape. Several of the exhibits had tape covering cuts in the cord casing. Several of the exhibits had slices in the battery cover wiring exposing the conductors. Some of the exhibits had an excessive amount of corrosion on the battery cover wiring and battery terminals. Several of the exhibits had loose or missing hardware. From the evaluations and tests conducted, there was no evidence found that any of the exhibits had enough electrical energy to ignite a methane and air mixture or enough thermal energy to ignite coal dust.

4

APPENDIX U-8 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE INVESTIGATION OF SEVEN POWER AIR PURIFYING RESPIRATORY (PAPR) HELMET BATTERY ASSEMBLIES AND PIECES

U .S . Department of Labor

Mine Safety and Health Administration Approval and Certification Center 765 Technology Drive Triadelph ia, West Virginia 26059

November 17. 2011
MEMORANDUM FOR NORMAN G. PAGE Accident Investigation Team Leader

FROM:

JOHN P. FAINI Chief, Approval and Certification Center Executive Summary of the Investigation of Seven Power Air Purifying Respiratory (PAPR) Helmet Battery Assemblies and Pieces Recovered from Performance Coal Company's Upper Big Branch -South Mine

CZJ7-

SUBJECT:

The Approval and Certification Center (A&CC), as requested by Upper Big Branch Mine Accident Investigation Team Leader, Norman Page, conducted a laboratory investigation of seven power air purifying respiratory (PAPR) helmet battery assemblies and pieces recovered from a fatal mine explosion at the Upper Big Branch Mine-South on April 5, 2010 . The components examined were: 1. Exhibit No. B11-B, Battery for longwall face helmet 3M (Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing) NiCad, recovered from the longwall face . 2. Exhibit No. PE-0205 , Airstream helmet battery, recovered from Survey Spad # 22692 (SS# 22692). 3. Exhibit No. PE-0208, Airstream helmet battery, recovered from SS# 22701. 4. Exhibit No. PE-0270, Airstream helmet battery, recovered from longwall Shield 121. 5. Exhibit No. PE-0151 , Airstream helmet battery case portion, recovered from between SS# 22738 and SS# 22759 . 6. Exhibit No. PE-0152 , Airstream helmet duct and cable, recovered from SS# 22759. 7. Exhibit No. PE-0481 , Airstream helmet duct and cable , recovered from Longwall Shield 109. The locations of the evidence were copied from the evidence ID tags.

The examination of these exhibits showed that: • None of the electrical components or assembly materials of the exhibits showed signs of arcing, sparking or electrical heating . • No ignition of methane gas occurred during a spark ignition test with the highest short circuit current and highest open circuit voltage that was measured from any of the exhibit batteries . • All electrical components , assembly materials and assemblies were in accordance with approval documentation on file with MSHA under approval number 2G-3143-0 and its subsequent extension (-1).

2

APPENDIX U-9 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION OF LOW-ENERGY NON-PERMISSIBLE ELECTRICAL ITEMS (WATCHES AND CALCULATORS)

U .S. Department of labor

Mine Safety and Health Admin istration Approval and Certification Center 765 Technology Drive Triadelphia , West Virg inia 26059

November 17. 2011
MEMORANDUM FOR NORMAN G. PAGE Accident Investigation Team Leader

FROM:

JOHN P. FAIN! Chief, Approval and Certification Center Executive Summary of Investigation of Low-Energy NonPermissible Electrical Items (Watches and Calculators) Recovered from Performance Coal Company's Upper Big Branch - South Mine

c:z59-

SUBJECT:

The Approval and Certification Center (A&CC), as requested by Upper Big Branch Mine Accident Investigation Team Leader, Norman Page , conducted a laboratory investigation associated with respect to low-energy non-permissible electrical items (watches and calculators) recovered from a fatal mine explosion at the Upper Big Branch Mine-South on April 5, 2010. The components received were: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Exhibit No. B-15-G, a watch with missing one side of the band . Exhibit No. B-21-A, a black rubber banded watch. Exhibit No. B-1-D, a blackened watch attached to a clip and taped . Exhibit No. B-15-F, a black calculator. Exhibit No. B-4-B, a Le World calculator. Exhibit No. PE-0172, a wrist watch with missing parts taken from Crosscut 69 lnby. 7. Exhibit No. PE-0245, a black wrist watch taken from Shield 59 . 8. Exhibit No. PE-0244, a wrist watch with missing parts and a ink-pen taken from Shield 84 .

The investigation began with a preliminary inspection of all the non-permissible watches and calculators received . The preliminary inspection included decontamination of items that were considered potentially biohazardous , documenting visual observations, and photographing as-received conditions of the components. All of the watches were functional except Exhibit Nos. PE-0172 and PE-0244 . The battery and some other parts of the non-functional watches were missing. Some of the watches and calculators had bubbling and discoloration effects.

The next phase of the investigation included a detailed inspection of all the low-energy non-permissible watches and calculators . The detailed inspection involved determining whether the calculators could be energized and disassembling the equipment to address any signs of arcing, sparking, and electrical heating internal to the equipment. The Exhibit No. B-15-F, a black calculator, could not be energized . After disassembling and inspecting all the exhibits, no signs of arcing, sparking , or electrical heating were observed. The watches and calculators are non-approved and non-permissible MSHA items, a comparison to approval drawings was not conducted.

2

APPENDIX U-10 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION OF MACHINE-MOUNTED METHANE MONITORS

U.S . Department of Labor

Mine Safety and Health Administration Approval and Certification Center 765 Technology Drive Triadelphia, West Virginia 26059

November 18, 2011
MEMORANDUM FOR NORMAN G. PAGE Accident Investigation Team Leader JOHN P. FAINI ~ Chief, Approval and Certification Center Executive Summary of Investigation of Machine-Mounted Methane Monitors Recovered from Performance Coal Company's Upper Big Branch- South Mine

FROM:

SUBJECT:

The Approval and Certification Center (A&CC), as requested by Upper Big Branch Mine Accident Investigation Team Leader, Norman Page, conducted a laboratory investigation of machine-mounted methane monitoring systems and related components recovered from a fatal mine explosion at the Upper Big Branch Mine-South on April 5, 2010. The investigation began with a preliminary inspection of all the exhibits . The preliminary inspection included documenting visual observations, and photographing as-received conditions of the methane monitoring systems. These inspections were followed by performance checks ('bump tests ') and thermal ignition tests. None of the methane monitoring systems had data logging capabilities. Where feasible, performance tests were conducted on operational methane monitoring systems to determine the operation of the systems when tested in the methane-air mixtures specified in 30 CFR 27. A detailed inspection of each system was conducted. This included comparison with the certification documentation . The results of the preliminary inspections, tests, and evaluations are summarized below.

CSE Model1408 LD IR Systems

1.1

Exhibit Number PE-0213 Control Unit and Power Supply; Exhibit Number PE0169 Sensor Assembly, A CSE Model 1408 LD IR Machine-Mounted Methane Monitoring System with Control Unit from longwall headqate and Sensor from lonqwall tailgate.

1.1.1 The system was tested with added laboratory resistors to simulate the long cable between the Sensor Assembly and the Control Unit. Without calibration, its power shut-off component operated when the sensor assembly was presented with a test gas mixture of approximately 2.1% methane-in-air. The final display reading with this test gas mixture was 2.6. 1.1.2 There was no obvious evidence that suggested that the components of the sys1em had been intentionally by-passed . 1.1.3 This sensor assembly did not cause an ignition of a 7.5% methane-in-air mixture when energized in that test gas. Additionally, the inspection did not reveal any conditions that would suggest that the components of this system caused an explosion. 1.1 .4 None of the discrepancies found from comparing the components of the system to the certification documentation were considered significant or would have affected the performance or permissibility of the methane monitoring system. 1.2 Exhibit Number PE-0166, Control Unit; Exhibit Number PE-0167, Power Supply; and Exhibit Number PE-0170, Sensor Assembly. A CSE Model 1408 LD IR Machine-Mounted Methane Monitoring Systems, Certification 32A-15/MS-8 , System from long wall Shearing Machine.

1.2.1 Without calibration, the power shut-off component of this system operated when the sensor assembly was presented with a test gas mixture of approximately 2.1% methane-in-air. The final display reading with this test gas mixture was 2.0. 1.2.2 There was no obvious evidence that suggested that the components of the system had been intentionally by-passed. 1.2.3 This sensor assembly did not cause an ignition of a 7.5% methane-in-air mixture when energized in that test gas. Additionally, the inspection did not reveal any conditions that would suggest that the components of this system caused an explosion. 1.2.4 None of the discrepancies found from comparing the components of the system to the certification documentation were considered significant or would have affected the performance or permissibility of the methane monitoring system.
2

1.2.5 There was minor damage to the polycarbonate lens of the control unit. The cause is unknown .
General Monitors Model S800 Systems

1.1

Exhibit Number PE-0256. A General Mon itors Model S800 Machine Mounted Methane Monitoring System Components and Relay from Barrier Section Continuous Mining Machine, Serial· Number JM5849. Before the system was calibrated , its power shut-off component did not operate when the sensor assembly was presented with a test gas mixture of approximately 2.1% methane-in-air. The final display reading with this test gas mixture was 1.4. The test gas concentration that caused the power shut-off component to operate was 3.00% methane-in-air.

1.1.1

1 .1 .2 After the system was calibrated , its power shut-off component operated when the sensor assembly was presented with a test gas mixture of approximately 2.1% methane-in-air. 1.1 .3 There was no evidence that suggested that the power shut-off components of the system were intentionally by-passed . 1.1.4 No thermal ignition testing was requested . The inspection did not reveal any conditions that would suggest that the components of this system caused an explosion. 1.1.5 None of the discrepancies found from comparing the components of the system to the certification documentation were considered significant or would have affected the performance or permissibility of the methane monitoring system. 1.2 Exh.ibit Number PE-0313, A General Monitors Model S800 Machine Mounted Methane Monitoring System Components from TG22 Section, Serial Number JM6053.

1.2.1 Before the system was calibrated , its power shut-off component did not operate when the sensor assembly was presented with a test gas mixture of approximately 2.1 % methane-in-air. The final display reading with this test gas mixture was 1.4. The test gas concentration that caused the power shut-off component to operate was 3. 00% methane-in-air. 1.2.2 After the system was calibrated , its power shut-off component operated when the sensor assembly was presented with a test gas mixture of approximately 2.1 % methane-in-air. 1.2.3 The wires connected to terminals 4 and 8 of the 12 position connector included are~s that were missing insulation ; that area of the wire connected to terminal 4
3

was wrapped with electrical tape. That area of the wire connected to terminal 8 was bare and dirty with several wire strands broken , suggesting that the area had been manipulated. Terminal 4 is "+15V" and terminal 8 is "CR", or 'Contactor Return '. Under normal operation of the system, terminal 8 is connected to terminal 9 which is "CD", or 'Contactor Drive', which is 12 Vdc. This voltage energizes the coil of the power shut-off component , Relay K1 . Whenever the system initiates a 'trip', an internal relay operates, disconnecting the 12 Vdc from terminal 8. This causes the coil of the power shut-off component to be de-energized. If the bare area of the wire connected to terminal 8 was in contact with the conductors under the tape on the wire connected to terminal 4, a short circuit of the +15 Vdc supply at terminal 4 to terminal 8 would exist. This would effectively bypass the methane monitoring system, causing the K1 Relay coil to be _ energized at all times that the system is energized. This short circuit was not present, however, when the system was received. 1.2.4 No thermal ignition testing was requested . The inspection did not reveal any conditions that would suggest that the components of this system caused an explosion. 1.2.5 None of the discrepancies found from comparing the components of the system to the certification documentation were considered significant or would have affected the performance or permissibility of the methane monitoring system. 1.3 Exhibit Number PE-0316, A General Monitors Model S800 Machine Mounted Methane Monitoring System Components and Relay from TG22 Section, Right Miner, Serial Number JM6044 .

1.3.1 Before the system was calibrated , its power shut-off component did not operate when the sensor assembly was presented with a test gas mixture of approximately 2_ 1% methane-in-air. The final display reading with this test gas mixture was 1.6. The test gas concentration that caused the power shut-off component to operate was 2.64% methane-in-air. 1.3.2 After the system was calibrated, its power shut-off component operated when the sensor assembly was presented with a test gas mixture of approximately 2.1% methane-in-air_ 1.3_ There was no evidence that suggested that the components of the system had 3 been intentionally by-passed. 1.3.4 No thermal ignition testing was requested . The inspection did not reveal any conditions that would suggest that the components of this system caused an explosion .
4

1.3.5 None of the discrepancies found from comparing the components of the system to the certification documentation were considered significant or would have affected the performance or permissibility of the methane monitoring system. 1.4 Exhibit Number PE-0342. A General Monitors Model S800 Machine Mounted Methane Monitoring System Components and Relay from HG22-002 Section, Left Joy Continuous Miner, Serial Number JM4918B. In the as-received condition, this system did not operate properly; the only indication given by the system was "FAULT" on the readout/display/control unit. The power shut-off component was in a position that would not allow a connected machine to operate. Substitution of components with known good components indicated that the as-received Electronics Assembly and the asreceived Sensor Assembly were both not functioning properly. Additionally, the resistance of closed contacts of the RC Relay assembly was high in the asreceived condition. Although the Power Supply Assembly provided the necessary de voltage to the Electronics Assembly, and its K1 Relay power shutoff component seemed to operate properly, the K2 Relay for remote light operation did not.

1.4.1

1.4.2 The Sensor Assembly housing was partially filled with water in the as-received condition, and all other components included the appearance of water damage. 1.4.3 The wires connected to terminals 4 and 8 of the 12 position connector included areas that were missing insulation and were wrapped with electrical tape. Additionally, very short lengths of small wire were connected to these terminals. As noted above, if the bare areas of the wires connected to terminal 8 and .terminal 4 were in contact, a short circuit of the +15 Vdc supply at terminal 4 to terminal 8 would exist. This would effectively bypass the methane monitoring system, causing the K1 Relay coil to be energized at all times that the system is energized. This short circuit was not present, however, when the system was received. 1.4.4 No thermal ignition testing was requested . The inspection did not reveal any conditions that would suggest that the components of this system caused an explosion. 1.4.5 No set screw was found at the cable entrance gland. One of the sensor cover bolts lock washers was missing. 1.4 .6 None of the discrepancies found from comparing the components of the system to the certification documentation were considered significant or would have affected the performance or permissibility of the methane monitoring system.

5

1.5

Exhibit Number PE-0343, comprising General Monitors Model S800 Machine Mounted Methane Monitoring System Components and Relay From HG22-001 Section, Right Joy Continuous Miner, Serial Number JM5811 . In the as-received condition, the components of this system were wet. After ·drying, this system did not operate properly; the only indication given by the system was "FAULT" on display. The power shut-off component was in a position that would not allow a connected machine to operate. Substitution of a known good Electronics Assembly indicated that the as-received Electronics Assembly was not functioning properly. Additionally, RC Relay assembly contacts were not fully engaging and the relay was noisy.

1.5.1

1.5.2 The Sensor Assembly enclosure was partially filled with water in the as-received condition, and all other components included the appearance of water damage. 1· 5.3 There was no evidence that suggested that the components of the system had . been intentionally by-passed . 1.5.4 No thermal ignition testing was requested. The inspection did not reveal any conditions that would suggest that the components of this system caused an explosion . 1.5.5 No set screw was found at the cable entrance gland. One of the sensor cover bolts lock washers was missing. 1.5.6 None of the discrepancies found from comparing the components of the system to the certification documentation were considered significant or would have affected the performance or permissibility of the methane monitoring system. 1.6 Exhibit Number PE-0297 , General Monitors Sensor Head . This was a sensor head assembly that was not mounted in a housing. It did not have the appearance that would indicate it was in a housing at the time of the explosion . No tests. were requested or performed . There were no conditions that would indicate that this component caused an explosion.

6

APPENDIX U-11 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION OF HIGH-ENERGY NON-PERMISSIBLE ELECTRICAL ITEMS

U.S. Department of Labor

Mine Safety and Health Administration Approval and Certification Center 765 Technology Drive Tr iadelphia , West Virginia 26059

November 18 , 201:1
MEMORANDUM FOR NORMAN G. PAGE Accident Investigation T earn Leader

FROM :

JOHN P. FAINI Chief, Approval and Certification Center Executive Summary of Investigation of High-Energy NonPermissible Electrical Items Recovered from Performance Coal Company's Upper Big Branch- South Mine

w-

SUBJECT:

The Approval and Certification Center (A&CC), as requested by Upper Big Branch Mine Accident Investigation Team Leader, Norman Page, conducted a laboratory investigation associated with respect to high-energy non-permissible electrical items recovered from a fatal mine explosion at the Upper Big Branch Mine-South on April 5, 2010. Item No. 1 2 3 4 5 Exhibit No. Description Preliminary Inspection Date 10-13-2010 10-13-2010 10-13-2010 10-14-2010 10-14-2010 10-14-2010 10-14-2010 10-14-2010 10-14-2010 Detailed Inspection Date 11-3-2010 11-3-2010 11-3-2010 11-2-2010 11-2-2010 11-2-2010 11-2-2010 11-2-2010 11 -2-2010 & 11-22-2010 11-2-2010 11-3-2010

PE-0189 PE-0202 PE-0203 PE-0271-A PE-0271-B PE-0275-A PE-0275-B PE-0275-C PE-0308

Battery Charger Switch Ten Unit Charging Station 28 In Lighting Cable 10Ft Lighting Cable Lighting Current Transformer (CT) Lighting Relay Lighting Ground Fault Relay (GFR) Lighting Ground Wire Monitor (GWM) GWM Terminating Diode Hand Tool Rechargeable Battery

6
7 8 9

10 11

PE-0325 PE-0175

11-2-2010 11-3-2010

Item No. 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 . 23 24 25

Exhibit No.

Description

PE-0155 PE-0190 PE-0191 PE-0154 PE-0277 PE-0278 PE-0181 PE-0328 PE-0201 PE-0185 PE-0153 PE-0345 PE-0158 PE-0455

Hand Tool Rechargeable Battery Hand Tool Rechargeable Battery Hand Tool Rechargeable Battery Hand Tool Rechargeable Battery Electrical Contactor Blasting Wire Battery Charger Blasting Machine Cover Switch Grease Gun Impact Wrench Lighting Circuit Breaker (CB) 120 Vac Hammer Drill Cable Extension Cord

Preliminary Inspection Date 11-3-2010 11-3-2010 11-3-2010 11-3-2010 11-3-2010 11-3-2010 11-3-2010 11-3-2010 11-4-2010 11-4-2010 11-4-2010 11-16-2010 11-23-2010 03-02-2011

Detailed Inspection Date 11-3-2010 11-3-2010 11-3-2010 11-3-2010 11-3-2010 11-3-2010 11-3-2010 11-3-2010 11-4-2010 11-4-2010 11-4-2010 11-22-2010 11-23-2010 03-02-2011

Note: Exhibit Nos. PE-0271 (Reference slide 20 of Appendix B) and PE-0275 (Reference slide 45 of Appendix B), as received at the A&CC, included several components. The designation "-A" and "-B", and "-C" were assigned to the individual components in order to identify the individual components. The locations of the evidence were obtained from the evidence ID tags. The investigation began with a preliminary inspection of the evidence. The preliminary inspection included documenting visual observations, and photographing as-received conditions of the components. The next phase of the investigation included a detailed inspection of the evidence. The detailed inspection involved determining whether the evidence could be energized and disassembling the evidence to address any signs of arcing, sparking, and electrical heating internal to the evidence. The power cord of Exhibit No. PE-0189 (Reference slides 1-8 of Appendix B), a battery charger, showed heat damage. Exhibit No. PE032e (Reference slides 9 & 10 of Appendix B) , the blasting machine cover, showed evidence of heating . The plastic tray that held the batteries was melted. The cover appeared to have been blown off or forcibly removed. Five of the six cover screws
2

were broken. Exhibit No. PE-0203 (Reference slides 11-16 of Appendix B) , a ten unit charging station, showed evidence of heating . The eight charging cords were melted together. Exhibit No. PE-0190 (Reference slides 17-19 of Appendix B). a hand tool rechargeable battery, showed evidence of heating. The battery had some melting of the case. For some components. a combined preliminary/detailed inspection was conducted. Since all items are non-approved and non-permissible items. no comparison to drawings was conducted.

3

APPENDIX U-12 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION OF A NELSON-KELLERMAN ANEMOMETER

APPENDIX U-12 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION OF A NELSON-KELLERMAN ANEMOMETER

U .S. Department of Labor

Mine Safety and Health Administration Approval and Certification Center 765 Technology Drive Triadelphia , West Virginia 26059

November 17. 2011
MEMORANDUM FOR NORMAN G. PAGE Accident Investigation Team Leader

FROM:

JOHN P. FAIN! Chief, Approval and Certification Center Executive Summary of Investigation of a Nelson-Kellerman Anemometer Recovered from Performance Coal Company's Upper Big Branch -South Mine

;J} -·

SUBJECT:

The Approval and Certification Center (A&CC), as requested by Upper Big Branch Mine Accident Investigation Team Leader, Norman Page, conducted a laboratory investigation of a Nelson-Kellerman Anemometer recovered from a fatal mine explosion at the Upper Big Branch Mine-South on April 5, 2010 . The component received was: 1. Exhibit No. PE-0075 Nielsen-Kellerman Company PMA-2008 Pocket Mining Anemometer (Found in crosscut 102 adjacent to S.S. 19871) as documented by the Evidence Identification Tag. The exhibit was initially documented and photographed during a Preliminary Inspection in the condition in which it was received. The Preliminary Inspection included documenting visual observations and photographing conditions of the exhibit. This inspection was conducted as the equipment was received by the Primary Investigator during the accident investigation. After the Preliminary Inspection was completed, a Detailed Inspection was conducted. The Detailed Inspection included noting any obvious signs of arcing, sparking, or electrical heating on both the outside and inside of the equipment. This involved taking apart the equipment and performing any applicable testing as modified per ASOP2026, Investigative Procedures for Evaluating Equipment from Mine Explosions . At the conclusion of the Detailed Inspection , the anemometer was compared to approval documentation . The anemometer appeared to be functional in its as received condition . There were no obvious signs of internal heating, arcing, or sparking.

The anemometer had several minor discrepancies when compared with the approval documentation. None of these disaepancies affected the intrinsic safety of the anemometer.

2

APPENDIX U-13 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION OF PORTABLE RADIOS

U .S. Department of Labor

Mine Safety and Health Admi nistra tion Approval and Certi fication Center 765 Technology Drive Triadelphia , West Virginia 26059

November 18, 2011
MEMORANDUM FOR NORMAN G. PAGE Accident Investigation Team Leader JOHN P. FAINI ~Chief, Approval and Certification Center Executive Summary of Investigation of Portable Radios Recovered from Performance Coal Company's Upper Big Branch - South Mine

FROM:

SUB,.IECT:

The Approval and Certification Center (A&CC), as requested by Upper Big Branch Mine Accident Investigation Team Leader, Norman Page, conducted a laboratory investigation of portable radios recovered from a fatal mine explosion at the Upper Big Branch Mine-South on April 5, 2010. The components received were: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Exhibit Exhibit Exhibit Exhibit Exhibit Exhibit Exhibit Exhibit Exhibit Exhibit Exhibit Exhibit Exhibit Exhibit Exhibit Exhibit Exhibit Exhibit Exhibit Exhibit Exhibit Exhibit Number A16, Radio #39 . Number A17, Radio #28. Number A18, Radio #29. Number B5B, Radio. Number B-19-B, Radio #187. Number B-20-A, Radio #181. Number B-22-D, Radio #182. Number B-26-A, Radio #188. Number PE-0041, Radio #30. Number PE-0042, Radio #32. Number PE-0070, Battery for Radio. Number PE-0079, Battery for Radio. Number PE-0092, Radio w/o battery. Number PE-0095, Radio #155. Number PE-0176, Radio w/o battery. Number PE-0187, Radio #162. Number PE-0206, Radio. Number PE-0215, Radio #134. Number PE-0286, Radio frame and PCB. Number PE-0299, Radio w/o battery. Number PE-0340, Radio w/o battery. Number PE-0349, Radio #230.

The investigation began with a preliminary inspection of all the exhibits. The preliminary inspection included decontamination of items that were considered hazardous material, documenting visual observations, and photographing as-received conditions of the components. The next phase of the investigation included a detailed inspection of all the radios . The detailed inspection involved determining whether the radios could be energized and disassembling all the equipment to address any signs of arcing , sparking, and electrical heating internal to the equipment. The inspection of the exhibits resulted, in part, in observation of the various settings of the radios. These are tabulated below. lt should be noted that the settings were asreceived at the A&CC; they may have been changed between the time of the accident and the time of receipt.

Exhibit Number A16 A17 A18

Radio Number 39 28 29

Channel

On/Off

Notes

2 4 1

On Off On Knob first noted in "on" position, but battery charge indicated that it was most likely 'off

B5B

260

6

Off

B19B B20A 8220 B-26-A PE-0041 PE-0042 PE-0092 PE-0095

187 181 182 188 30 32
?

2 2 2 4 4 7 2 5

On On Off Off On On On On Handwritten "AM" and "(illegible)4" on front of radio.

155

2

Exhibit Number PE-01 76 PE-0187 PE-0206 PE-0215

Radio Number

Channel

On/Off

Notes

?
162

1 1 7 2
?

?
Off Off On

Volume/on/off knob wou ld not turn

?
134

Channel selector knob missing

PE-0286 PE-0299 PE-0340 PE-0349

? ?
274 230

?
?

Case, knobs and volume/on/off shaft missing Knobs and volum e/on/off shaft missing

?
2 5

On On

There was a white dot on the push-to-talk button on several exhibits . The mine operator's representative indicated that this dot was placed by a technician after reprogramming at the mine site. Each complete exhibit that comprised a complete radio was tested to determine its functional status. The tests were conducted between radios with no base station . Two sets of tests were conducted: one set with the radios within approximately 20 feet of each other in a laboratory, and one set with the radios approximately 1 mile apart. • The following radios were found to be functional : Exhibit Numbers A16, A17, A18 , 8198, 820A, 8220, 826A, PE-0041, PE-0042 , PE-0095, PE-0187 , PE-0206, and PE-0215. The followi,ng radios were found to be non-functional : Exhibit Numbers 858 and PE-0349. The following exhibits represent the radios that were incomplete (did not include batteries , or were only batteries) and therefore were not tested : Exhibit Numbers PE-0070, PE-0079, PE-0092 , PE-0176, PE-0286, PE -0299, and PE-0340 .

•

•

Each exhibit was inspected and compared with the approval documentation. The voltage and short-drcuit cu rrent available from each battery pack were measured. Additionally, each complete exhibit that compdsed a complete radio was tested to determine if i't was a thermal ignition hazard.
3

•

As a result of these tests and evaluations, there was no evidence found that suggested the following exhibits caused an ignition: Exhibit Numbers A 16, A 17, A 18, 858, 8198, B20A, 8220, 826A, PE-0041 , PE-0042 , PE-0070 , PE-0092 , PE-0095, PE-0187, PE-0206 , PE-0215, PE-0340, and PE-0349 . There was no evidence that Exhibit Numbers PE-0079, PE-0176, PE-0286, and -PE-0299 caused an ignition. However, due to missing components, a complete assessment of these exhibits was not possible .

•

The worst case parameters measured in the short-circuit current tests were simulated and a spark-ignition test using those parameters was conducted. There was no ignition of the methane-air test gas.

4

APPENDIX U-14 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION OF PYOTT BOONE CO MONITORS

U .S . Department of Labor

Mine Safety and Health Administrati on App rova l and Certification Cen ter 765 Techno logy Drive Triade lphia , West Virginia 26059

November 17, 2011
MEMORANDUM FOR NORMAN G. PAGE Accident Investigation Team Leader JOHN P. FAINI ~ Chief, Approval and Certification Center Executive Summary of Investigation of Pyatt Boone CO Monitors Recovered from Performance Coal Company's Upper Big Branch -South Mine

FROM:

SUBJECT:

The Approval and Certification Center (A&CC), as requested by Upper Big Branch Mine Accident Investigation Team Leader, Norman Page, conducted a laboratory investigation associated with respect to Carbon Monoxide (CO) Monitors recovered from a fatal mine explosion at the Upper Big Branch Mine-South on April 5, 2010. The components received were : 1. Exhibit No. PE-0207, Pyatt Boone Model2103 CO Monitor, MSHA Sensor Classification G Issue Number 113. 2. Exhibit No. PE-0178, Pyatt Boone Model1703 CO Monitor. 3. Exhibit No. PE-0482, Pyatt Boone Model 2103 Partial Circuit Board, Unknown MSHA Approval Number. The investigation began with preliminary inspection of Exhibit Nos. PE-0207 and PE0178. The preliminary inspection included documenting visual observations, and photographing as-received conditions of the components. None of the exhibits were operated during the preliminary inspection. The exhibits both presented discoloration and were covered in a black dusty substance. The bottom lower half of the rear of the case was missing on Exhibit No. PE-0178. Exhibit No. PE-0482 was inspected and is a partial Smart Remote CPU Printed Circuit Board (PCB). The next phase of the investigation included a detailed inspection and performance test of Exhibit Nos. PE-0207 and PE-0178. Both exhibits were able to be powered using a bench power supply. Both exhibits initially reported CO readings when no CO was provided. After calibration, both exhibits reported CO readings correctly at 0 ppm, 50 ppm and 100 ppm. After disassembling and inspecting all the exhibits, no signs of arcing, sparking, or electrical heating were observed.

Exhibit Nos. PE-0207 and PE-0482 were compared to the drawings on file with MSHA. Exhibit No. PE-0178 is a non-approved and non-permissible CO Monitor; as such , there are no drawings on file with MSHA.

2

APPENDIX U-15 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION OF PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLER COMPONENTS

U .S. Department of Labor

Mine Safety and Health Administration Approval and Certification Center 765 Techno logy Drive Triadelph ia , West Virg inia 26059

No vember

28 , 20 11

MEMORANDUM FOR NORMAN G. PAGE Accident Investigation Team Leader JOHN P. FAINI ~ Chief, Approval and Certification Center Executive Summary of Investigation of Programmable Logic Controller Components Recovered from Performance Coal Company's Upper Big Branch- South Mine

FROM:

SUBJECT:

The Approval and Certification Center (A&CC) , as requested by Upper Big Branch Mine Accident Investigation Team Leader, Norman Page, assisted the accident investigation team in the investigation of Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) components of the longwall mining system . These components were recovered from a fatal mine explosion at the Upper Big Branch Mine-South which occurred on April 5, 2010 . The components examined were: 1. Exhibit No. PE-0168 Allen-Bradley PaneiView 600 recovered from the Automatic Chain Tensioner (ACT) controller enclosure located at the longwall tailgate. Note: The exhibit was placed into Exhibit No. PE-0250 protective case. 2. Exhibit No. PE-0214 Allen-Bradley PaneiView Plus 1000 and PaneiView Plus 24 Vdc power supply recovered from the longwall headgate master controller enclosure. 3. Exhibit No. PE-0222 which consisted of two pieces of evidence in the same protective case: a. Allen-Bradley PLC-5/20 processor module recovered from the longwall headgate master controller enclosure and; b. Allen-Bradley PaneiView Plus 1000 recovered from the longwall power center. 4. Exhibit No . PE-0223 Allen-Bradley PLC-5/40 processor module recovered from the longwall starter. 5. Exh ibit No. PE-0253 Allen-Bradley SLC 500 7-Slot Rack containing a SLC 5/04 processor module , power supply, three input modules and one output module recovered from the ACT controller enclosure located at the longwall tailgate.

6. Exhibit No. PE-0261 Allen-Bradley PaneiView Plus 1000 recovered from the emulsion pump starter. 7. Exhibit No. PE-0262 consisted of two pieces of evidence in the same protective case : a. Allen-Bradley PLC-5/30 processor module recovered from the emulsion pump starter; b. Allen-Bradley Enhanced PLC-5 Controller (PLC-5/30 processor module) recovered from the longwall power center. 8. Exhibit No. PE-0274 consisted of two pieces of evidence in the same protective case: a. Allen-Bradley DL40 Dataliner Message Display recove red from the longwall starter; b. Allen -Bradley SLC 5/04 processor module recovered from the water pump starter. 9. Exhibit No . PE-0309 Allen -Bradley Enhanced PLC-5 Controller (PLC-5/20 processor module) recovered from the longwalll 'headgate master controller enclosure. The exhibit was a spare processor module that was not installed. The PLC components used on the longwall mining system consisted of six processor modules. Each processor controlled a different system . These processors were mounted in separate locations and were intended to operate on a network. The PLC components were not configured with any additional hardware (storage medium) or software code to allow for data logging ; however, some of the components retained the last state of the PLC output registers. Attempts were made to retrieve this information from these PLC components in order to find data relative to the operating status of the longwall mining system immediately prior to the mine explosion. The MSHA accident investigation team requested the assistance of the longwall electrical equipment supplier and contracted with the PLC component manufacturer. The examinations and tests found : • • No PLC inputs or outputs were observed to be "forced" (no processors were found in a state where the software log i1 contro: was overridden) . c l Due to conflicting data when examin ing the retained last state of the PLC output registers, no definitive conclusions of the operating status of the longwall mining system could be obtained .

2

APPENDIX V VAISALA NATIONAL LIGHTNING DETECTION REPORT 258028

Jun 9, 2010 05:16:59 PM Thank you for using Vaisala's STRIKEnet-.,LE to validate the referenced claim. Your report was generated using data from Vaisala's National Lightning Detection Network-.,LE, the most comprehensive archive database in North America.

STRIKEnet Report 258028
Report Number: Claim Number: Insured/Claimant Name: Approx. Claim/Loss Value: Items Damaged/Loss Type: Search Period: Search Radius: Search Center Point: the given time period and location. Thank you again for selecting STRIKEnet. If you have any questions please contact us at 1 800 283 4557 or thunderstorm.support@vaisala.com. Best Regards, The. Vaisala STRIKEnet Team SF Performance Coal Co (Claim # Not Provided) Upper Big Branch Mine

Apr 5, 2010 06:00:00 AM US/Eastern to Apr 6, 2010 06:00:00 AM US/Eastern 10 mi/16 km around the given location. 37.943000° N (Latitude), 81.604000° W (Longitude)

Comments: 293 strikes were detected by the National Lightning Detection Network for

Vaisala Inc. Tucson Operations 2705 E. Medina Road Tucson, AZ 85706, USA thunderstorm.vaisala.com

(+) VAISALA
Jun 9, 2010 05:16:59 PM
Page 1

Tel. +1 520 806 7300 Fax +1 520 741 2848
thunderstorm.sales@vaisala.com

Copyright..,© Vaisala Group 2010. All rights reserved. This report is intended for the sole use of the customer(s) named herein. Permission to copy, modify, or distribute this report in part or its entirety to any third party is expressly forbidden unless expressed or written permission is provided by Vaisala.

STRIKEnet Report 258028
Report Title: SF Performance Coal Co Total Lightning Strokes Detected: 293 Lightning Strokes Detected within 10 mi/16 km radius: 195 Lightning Strokes Detected beyond 10 mi/16 km whose confidence ellipse overlaps the radius: 98 Search Radius: 10 mi/16 km Time Span: Apr 5, 2010 06:00:00 AM US/Eastern to Apr 6, 2010 06:00:00 AM US/Eastern

Location Points For Lightning Strokes
2010-04-05 06:00:00 EDT

2010-04-05 10:00:00 EDT

2010-04-05 14:00:00 EDT

2010-04-05 18:00:00 EDT

2010-04-05 22:00:00 EDT

2010-04-06 02:00:00 EDT

Lightning data provided by Vaisala's

NLDN~JE

and/or Environment Canada's CLDN.

Vaisala Inc. Tucson Operations 2705 E. Medina Road Tucson, AZ 85706, USA thunderstorm.vaisala.com

(+1 VAISALA
Jun 9, 2010 05:16:59 PM
Page2

Tel. +1 520 806 7300 Fax +1 520 741 2848
thunderstorm.sales@vaisala.com

Copyright-.© Vaisala Group 2010. All rights reserved. This report is intended for the sole use of the customer(s) named herein. Permission to copy, modify, or distribute this report in part or its entirety to any third party is expressly forbidden unless expressed or written permission is provided by Vaisala.

\1

;
'
\'~,

"

\h

6: f.(~

STRIKEnet®
STRIKEnet Report 258028

··
'

.

t,

Report Title: SF Performance Coal Co Total Lightning Strokes Detected: 293 Lightning Strokes Detected within 10 mi/16 km radius: 195 Lightning Strokes Detected beyond 10 mi/16 km whose confidence ellipse overlaps the radius: 98 Search Radius: 10 mi/16 km Time Span: Apr 5, 2010 06:00:00 AM US/Eastern to Apr 6, 2010 06:00:00 AM US/Eastern

Confidence Ellipses For Lightning Strokes

2010-04-05 10:00:00 EDT

2010-04-05 14:00:00 EDT

2010-04-05 18:00:00 EDT

2010-04-05 22:00:00 EDT

2010-04-06 02:00:00 EDT

Lightning data provided by Vaisala's NLDN~fE and/or Environment Canada's CLDN. Note: These ellipses indicate a 99% certainty that the recorded lightning event contacted the ground within the bounds of the ellipse.
Vaisala Inc. Tucson Operations 2705 E. Medina Road Tucson, AZ 85706, USA thunderstorm.vaisala.com

\+i VAISALA
Jun 9, 2010 05:16:59 PM
Page 3

Tel. +1 520 806 7300 Fax +1 520 741 2848
thunderstorm.sales@vaisala.com

Copyright,© Vaisala Group 2010. All rights reserved. This report is intended for the sole use of the customer(s) named herein. Permission to copy, modify, or distribute this report in part or its entirety to any third party is expressly forbidden unless expressed or written permission is provided by Vaisala.

1~

/

:,;,

""

SIR IKEnet®
/

~ 1~

,

STRIKEnet Report 258028
Area Of Study With Center Point

Vaisala Inc. Tucson Operations 2705 E. Medina Road Tucson, AZ 85706, USA thunderstorm.vaisala.com
Tel. +1 520 806 7300 Fax +1 520 741 2848

{lJ VAISALA
Jun 9, 2010 05:16:59 PM Page 4

thunderstorm.sales@vaisala.com

Copyright •© Vaisala Group 2010. All rights reserved. This report is intended for the sole use of the customer(s) named herein. Permission to copy, modify, or distribute this report in part or its entirety to any third party is expressly forbidden unless expressed or written permission is provided by Vaisala.

' ,

' 

~' ~"%

STRIKEnet®
STRIKEnet Report 258028

· · /· -. ~ .
'

Report Title: SF Performance Coal Co Total Lightning Strokes Detected: 293 Lightning Strokes Detected within 10 mi/16 km radius: 195 Lightning Strokes Detected beyond 10 mi/16 km whose confidence ellipse overlaps the radius: 98 Search Radius: 10 mi/16 km Time Span: Apr 5, 2010 06:00:00 AM US/Eastern to Apr 6, 2010 06:00:00 AM US/Eastern

Lightning Stroke Table (Note: Earliest 50 events shown. Events ordered by time.)
Peak Date Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010
Valsala Inc. Tucson Operations 2705 E. Medina Road
Tucson, AZ 85706, USA

D1stance From Center (m1/km) 11.9/19.1 11.1/17.9 8.8/14.2 7.4/11.9 6.4/10.3 6.0/9.8 7.5/12.1 4.4/7.1 3.5/5.7 6.3/10.2 5.8/9.4 3.7/6.0 6.8/10.9 4.3/6.9 1.4/2.3 5.3/8.5 4.8/7.8 6.8/11.0 5.8/9.3 5.7/9.2 9.3/15.0 8.9/14.4 11.7/18.8 9.5/15.4 9.8/15.8 10.4/16.8 11.4/18.4 10.3/16.7 8.4/13.5 10.0/16.2 10.9/17.6 8.6/13.9 8.1/13.1 10.4/16.8 10.5/16.9 9.3/14.9 9.3/14.9 Lat1tude 38.0000 37.9954 37.9710 37.9933 38.0079 38.0015 38.0177 38.0010 37.9933 38.0071 38.0109 37.9899 38.0133 37.9977 37.9631 38.0058 37.9966 38.0420 37.9747 37.9779 37.9759 37.9807 37.9658 37.9954 37.9709 37.9724 37.9582 37.9709 38.0274 38.0512 38.0413 38.0198 38.0236 38.0504 38.0526 38.0411 38.0385 Long1tude -81.8098 -81.7969 -81.7618 -81.7243 -81.6885 -81.6868 -81.7049 -81.6376 -81.5926 -81.6873 -81.6678 -81.5700 -81.5173 -81.5670 -81.6107 -81.5485 -81.5469 -81.6145 -81.5057 -81.5083 -81.4381 -81.4471 -81.3911 -8.1.4419 -81.4270 -81.4162 -81.3949 -81.4172 -81.7143 -81.7277 -81.7618 -81.7293 -81.7132 -81.7389 -81.7379 -81.7205 -81.7239

T1me 09:36:04AM 09:36:05AM 09:36:05AM 09:40:34 AM 09:43:40AM 09:45:11 AM 09:45:11 AM 09:48:36 AM 09:50:13 AM 09:50:13 AM 09:50:13AM 09:51:57 AM 09:51:57 AM 09:51:57 AM 09:52:55 AM 09:54:34AM 09:54:34AM 09:54:35AM 09:57:41 AM 09:57:41 AM 10:02:18AM 10:02:18 AM 10:05:34 AM 10:05:34AM 10:09:42AM 10:09:42AM 10:09:42 AM 10:09:42 AM 07:07:02 PM 07:07:14 PM 07:07:50 PM 07:07:50 PM 07:07:54 PM 07:08:16 PM 07:08:16 PM 07:08:44 PM 07:08:44 PM

Current (kA) -5.3 -7.4 -36.9 -32.6 -18.3 18.6 -53.8 -25.8 -16.3 -9.2 -2.2 -16.9 31.2 -9.7 -13.2 -15.9 -14.9 -25.4 -75.3 -19.3 -101.8 -12.7 -7.7 -2.3 -91.0 -19.3 -5.8 -24.2 -27.5 -14.7 -9.5 -5.3 -12.6 -11.0 -16.0 -34.8 -26.4

..... VAISALA ,,
PageS

thunderstorm.vaisala.com
Tel. +1 520 806 7300 Fax +1 520 741 2848

thunderstorm.sales@vaisala.com

Jun 9, 2010 05:16:59 PM

Copyright.,© Vaisala Group 2010. All rights reserved. This report is intended for the sole use of the customer(s) named herein. Permission to copy, modify, or distribute this report in part or its entirety to any third party is expressly forbidden unless expressed or written permission is provided by Vaisala.

\i' "

\
" 0

~

\

""~,~~

STRIKEnet®
Date Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 T1me 07:08:44 PM 07:08:44 PM 07:08:44 PM 07:09:07 PM 07:09:49 PM 07:09:49 PM 07:10:11 PM 07:10:31 PM 07:10:31 PM 07:10:31 PM 07:10:31 PM 07:10:31 PM 07:10:32 PM Peak Current (kA) "37.6 -8.9 -32.4 -2.0 -8.5 -8.8 -7.9 -20.0 -15.2 -34.3 -3.5 -2.3 -11.6

"
/

"

/

&
'

D1stance From Center (m1/km) 9.4/15.2 9.5/15.2 9.4/15.1 15.5/25.0 8.4/13.5 9.1/14.6 9.0/14.5 10.4/16.8 10.3/16.6 10.6/17.0 10.6/17.0 8.8/14.2 10.5/17.0

Lat1tude 38.0445 38.0425 38.0444 38.0994 38.0323 38.0396 37.9995 38.0570 38.0551 38.0573 38.0562 38.0344 38.0580

Longitude -81.7207 -81.7237 -81.7192 -81.8094 -81.7089 -81.7174 -81.7533 -81.7301 -81.7299 -81.7333 -81.7348 -81.7177 -81.7318

Vaisala Inc. Tucson Operations 2705 E. Medina Road Tucson, AZ 85706, USA thunderstorm.vaisala.com Tel. +1 520 806 7300
Fax +1 520 741 2848 thunderstorm.sales@vaisala.com

(+) VAISALA
Jun 9, 2010 05:16:59 PM
Page 6

Copyright •© Vaisala Group 2010. All rights reserved. This report is intended for the sole use of the customer(s) named herein. Permission to copy, modify, or distribute this report in part or its entirety to any third party is expressly forbidden unless expressed or written permission is provided by Vaisala.

~

;

,
;c

o

'

M

~·a

STRIKE net®
STRIKEnet Report 258028

,

"~ 0

Report Title: SF Performance Coal Co Total Lightning Strokes Detected: 293 Lightning Strokes Detected within 10 mi/16 km radius: 195 Lightning Strokes Detected beyond 10 mi/16 km whose confidence ellipse overlaps the radius: 98 Search Radius: 10 mi/16 km Time Span: Apr 5, 2010 06:00:00 AM US/Eastern to Apr 6, 2010 06:00:00 AM US/Eastern

Lightning Stroke Table (Note: Closest 50 events shown. Events ordered by distance.)
Date Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010
Vaisala Inc. Tucson o·perations 2705 E. Medina Road Tucson, AZ 85706, USA thunderstorm.vaisala.com

T1me 09:52:55AM 10:51:39 PM 10:51:39 PM 10:24:44 PM 10:47:30 PM 10:52:00 PM 08:14:12 PM 11:07:56 PM 10:53:58 PM 09:50:13 AM 11:01:41 PM 09:51:57 AM 10:43:14 PM 09:51:57 AM 10:47:41 PM 10:52:46 PM 09:48:36 AM 10:55:39 PM 10:59:49 PM 11:02:01 PM 10:59:49 PM 10:59:07 PM 10:59:07 PM 10:59:49 PM 10:59:07 PM 09:54:34 AM 10:59:49 PM 10:56:21 PM 10:33:56 PM 10:43:14 PM 10:59:49 PM 10:33:56 PM 10:55:01 PM 11:01:41 PM 10:55:39 PM 10:56:21 PM 10:56:21 PM

Peak Current (kA) -13.2 -16.4 -9.5 16.0 -9.6 -12.9 -2.0 -11.2 -3.3 -16.3 27.9 -16.9 -19.4 -9.7 -6.0 -8.9 -25.8 -6.2 -19.3 -2.8 -12.3 -38.9 -9.6 -9.2 -13.4 -14.9 -18.3 -8.4 -26.2 -8.7 -14.3 -48.0 -18.4 42.4 -12.8 -22.8 -11.8

Distance From Center (m1/km) 1.4/2.3 1.7/2.7 1.8/2.9 2.2/3.6 2.8/4.5 3.1/5.0 3.1/5.0 3.2/5.2 3.5/5.6 3.5/5.7 3.7/5.9 3.7/6.0 4.2/6.8 4.3/6.9 4.3/7.0 4.4/7.1 4.4/7.1 4.4/7.1 4.5/7.2 4.5/7.3 4.6/7.4 4.6/7.5 4.7/7.6 4.8/7.7 4.8/7.7 4.8/7.8 4.8/7.8 4.9/7.8 4.9/7.8 4.9/7.9 4.9/7.9 4.9/8.0 5.0/8.0 5.0/8.1 5.1/8.2 5.1/8.2 5.1/8.3

Lat1tude 37.9631 37.9610 37.9615 37.9507 37.9774 37.9801 37.9878 37.9821 37.9860 37.9933 37.9922 37.9899 37.9901 37.9977 37.9372 38.0046 38.0010 37.9960 37.9434 37.9709 37.9380 37.9425 37.9445 37.9443 37.9428 37.9966 37.9415 38.0073 38.0115 37.9961 37.9431 38.0081 37.9745 37.9560 38.0152 38.0121 38.0116

.... VAISALA
·~
Page 7

Long1tude -81.6107 -81.6244 -81.6271 -81.6441 -81.5763 -81.5720 -81.6125 -81.5725 -81.5712 -81.5926 -81.5778 -81.5700 -81.6530 -81.5670 -81.6835 -81.5839 -81.6376 -81.5580 -81.5220 -81.5289 -81.5194 -81.5189 -81.5168 -81.5159 -81.5158 -81.5469 -81.5148 -81.5677 -81.5835 -81.6635 -81.5139 -81.5661 -81.5217 -81.5130 -81.5858 -81.5699 -81.5675

Tel. +1 520 806 7300 Fax +1 520 741 2848
thunderstorm.sales@vaisala.com

Jun 9, 2010 05:16:59 PM

Copyright •© Vaisala Group 2010. All rights reserved. This report is intended for the sole use of the customer(s) named herein. Permission to copy, modify, or distribute this report in part or its entirety to any third party is expressly forbidden unless expressed or written permission is provided by Vaisala.

1

STRIKEnet®
Date Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Time 10:55:38 PM 10:55:38 PM 09:54:34 AM 11:06:51 PM 10:48:52 PM 11:29:48 PM 07:11:24PM 10:29:49 PM 10:38:37 PM 10:45:21 PM 11:29:48 PM 11:29:48 PM 11:02:21 PM Peak Current (kA) -10.0 -12.3 -15.9 -14.1 -5.6 -19.7 -4.1 -14.0 -24.8 -7.9 -15.7 -40.3 -11.5

r

,r

~~~~

/

~

_.,s,z

k.

~.
Latitude 37.9857 38.0121 38.0058 37.8661 37.9466 38.0216 37.9171 37.9828 38.0051 37.9486 38.0225 38.0226 37.8968 Longitude -81.5251 -81.5653 -81.5485 -81.6188 -81.7034 -81.5969 -81.6984 -81.6904 -81.6662 -81.5039 -81.5972 -81.6094 -81.6864

D1stance From Center (mi/km) 5.2/8.4 5.2/8.4 5.3/8.5 5.4/8.6 5.4/8.7 5.4/8.8 5.4/8.8 5.4/8.8 5.5/8.8 5.5/8.8 5.5/8.9 5.5/8.9 5.5/8.9

Vaisala Inc. Tucson Operations 2705 E. Medina Road Tucson, AZ 85706, USA thunderstorrn.vaisala.com

{+i VAISALA
Jun 9, 2010 05:16:59 PM
PageS

Tel. +1 520 806 7300 Fax +1 520 741 2848
thunderstorm.sales@vaisala.com

Copyright...,© Vaisala Group 2010. All rights reserved. This report is intended for the sole use of the customer(s) named herein. Permission to copy, modify, or distribute this report in part or its entirety to any third party is expressly forbidden unless expressed or written permission is provided by Vaisala.

~

c
\

,(.',,'


STRI KEnet®
STRIKEnet Report 258028

'

,

k

Report Title: SF Performance Coal Co Total Lightning Strokes Detected: 293 Lightning Strokes Detected within 10 mi/16 km radius: 195 Lightning Strokes Detected beyond 10 mi/16 km whose confidence ellipse overlaps the radius: 98 Search Radius: 10 mi/16 km Time Span: Apr 5, 2010 06:00:00 AM US/Eastern to Apr 6, 2010 06:00:00 AM US/Eastern

Lightning Stroke Table (Note: All events shown. Events ordered by time.)
Peak
Date Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010
Vaisala Inc. Tucson Operations 2705 E. Medina Road Tucson, AZ 85706, USA thunderstorm.vaisala.com

D1stance From
Center (m1/km) 11.9/19.1 11.1/17.9 8.8/14.2 7.4/11.9 6.4/10.3 6.0/9.8 7.5/12.1 4.4/7.1 3.5/5.7 6.3/10.2 5.8/9.4 3.7/6.0 6.8/10.9 4.3/6.9 1.4/2.3 5.3/8.5 4.8/7.8 6.8/11.0 5.8/9.3 5.7/9.2 9.3/15.0 8.9/14.4 11.7/18.8 9.5/15.4 9.8/15.8 10.4/16.8 11.4/18.4 10.3/16.7 8.4/13.5 10.0/16.2 10.9/17.6 8.6/13.9 8.1/13.1 10.4/16.8 10.5/16.9 9.3/14.9 9.3/14.9 Latitude 38.0000 37.9954 37.9710 37.9933 38.0079 38.0015 38.0177 38.0010 37.9933 38.0071 38.0109 37.9899 38.0133 37.9977 37.9631 38.0058 37.9966 38.0420 37.9747 37.9779 37.9759 37.9807 37.9658 37.9954 37.9709 37.9724 37.9582 37.9709 38.0274 38.0512 38.0413 38.0198 38.0236 38.0504 38.0526 38.0411 38.0385 Longitude -81.8098 -81.7969 -81.7618 -81.7243 -81.6885 -81.6868 -81.7049 -81.6376 -81.5926 -81.6873 -81.6678 -81.5700 -81.5173 -81.5670 -81.6107 -81.5485 -81.5469 -81.6145 -81.5057 -81.5083 -81.4381 -81.4471 -81.3911 -81.4419 -81.4270 -81.4162 -81.3949 -81.4172 -81.7143 -81.7277 -81.7618 -81.7293 -81.7132 -81.7389 -81.7379 -81.7205 -81.7239

T1me 09:36:04 AM 09:36:05 AM 09:36:05AM 09:40:34AM 09:43:40 AM 09:45:11 AM 09:45:11 AM 09:48:36AM 09:50:13AM 09:50:13AM 09:50:13 AM 09:51:57 AM 09:51:57 AM 09:51:57 AM 09:52:55AM 09:54:34AM 09:54:34 AM 09:54:35AM 09:57:41 AM 09:57:41 AM 10:02:18 AM 10:02:18 AM 10:05:34AM 10:05:34AM 10:09:42AM 10:09:42 AM 10:09:42 AM 10:09:42AM 07:07:02 PM 07:07:14 PM 07:07:50 PM 07:07:50 PM 07:07:54 PM 07:08:16 PM 07:08:16 PM 07:08:44 PM 07:08:44 PM

Current (kA) -5.3 -7.4 -36.9 -32.6 -18.3 18.6 -53.8 -25.8 -16.3 -9.2 -2.2 -16.9 31.2 -9.7 -13.2 -15.9 -14.9 -25.4 -75.3 -19.3 -101.8 -12.7 -7.7 -2.3 -91.0 -19.3 -5.8 -24.2 -27.5 -14.7 -9.5 -5.3 -12.6 -11.0 -16.0 -34.8 -26.4

; VAISALA
';,{j;
Jun 9, 2010 05:16:59 PM

••

Tel. +1 520 806 7300 Fax +1 520 741 2848
thunderstorm.sales@vaisala.com

Page 9

Copyright.,© Vaisala Group 2010. All rights reserved. This report is intended for the sole use of the customer(s) named herein. Permission to copy, modify, or distribute this report in_ part or its entirety to any third party is expressly forbidden unless expressed or written permission is provided by Vaisala.

"

;:,

'

'

"'

~ s1f'!

STRIKEnet®
Date Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010
Vaisala Inc. Tucson Operations 2705 E. Medina Road Tucson, AZ 85706, USA thunderstorm.vaisala.com

\., ,
1

,

1,

·~
Lat1tude 38.0445 38.0425 38.0444 38.0994 38.0323 38.0396 37.9995 38.0570 38.0551 38.0573 38.0562 38.0344 38.0580 38.0492 38.0460 38.0462 38.0321 38.0387 37.9294 37.9346 37.9329 37.9326 37.9322 37.9171 37.9250 38.0477 38.0479 38.0525 38.0397 38.0544 38.0445 38.0480 38.0451 38.0388 38.0454 38.0388 38.0503 38.0568 38.0561 38.0543 38.0524 38.0465 38.0597 38.0612 38.0576 38.0620 38.0620 38.0366 38.0552 38.0565 Long1tude ·81.7207 ·81.7237 ·81.7192 ·81.8094 ·81.7089 ·81.7174 ·81.7533 -81.7301 -81.7299 -81.7333 -81.7348 -81.7177 -81.7318 -81.6960 -81.6626 -81.6928 -81.7129 -81.7098 -81.7185 -81.7177 -81.7159 -81.7143 -81.7165 -81.6984 -81.7118 -81.6961 -81.7143 -81.7006 -81.6953 -81.6920 -81.7005 -81.6915 -81.6898 -81.6790 -81.6899 -81.6785 -81.6852 -81.7088 -81.7104 -81.7192 -81.7146 -81.6466 -81.6936 -81.6932 -81.6990 -81.6908 -81.6964 -81.6561 -81.6841 -81.6842

T1me 07:08:44 PM 07:08:44 PM 07:08:44 PM 07:09:07 PM 07:09:49 PM 07:09:49 PM 07:10:11 PM 07:10:31 PM 07:10:31 PM 07:10:31 PM 07:10:31 PM 07:10:31 PM 07:10:32 PM 07:11:07 PM 07:11:07 PM 07:11:07 PM 07:11:07 PM 07:11:23 PM 07:11:24 PM 07:11:24 PM 07:11:24 PM 07:11:24 PM 07:11:24 PM 07:11:24 PM 07:11:24 PM 07:11:54 PM 07:11:54 PM 07:12:09 PM 07:12:34 PM 07:12:34 PM 07:12:34 PM 07:12:34 PM 07:12:34 PM 07:12:34 PM 07:12:34 PM 07:12:34 PM 07:12:34 PM 07:13:22 PM 07:13:22 PM 07:13:22 PM 07:14:08 PM 07:14:09 PM 07:14:42 PM 07:14:42 PM 07:14:42 PM 07:14:42 PM 07:14:42 PM 07:14:42 PM 07:14:42 PM 07:14:42 PM

Peak Current (kA) ·37.6 ·8.9 ·32.4 ·2.0 ·8.5 ·8.8 ·7.9 -20.0 -15.2 -34.3 -3.5 -2.3 -11.6 -16.8 -5.4 -9.0 -5.6 -16.0 -27.0 -20.6 -10.6 -9.3 -7.9 -4.1 -5.0 -50.0 -3.3 -15.7 -65.1 -21.6 -2.8 -25.6 -22.1 -8.0 -42.6 -8.8 -11.1 -14.7 -14.0 -20.5 -21.2 -14.1 -84.0 -11.0 -19.0 -31.4 -19.4 -5.3 -15.5 -13.8

D1stance From Center (m1/km) 9.4/15.2 9.5/15.2 9.4/15.1 15.5/25.0 8.4/13.5 9.1/14.6 9.0/14.5 10.4/16.8 10.3/16.6 10.6/17.0 10.6/17.0 8.8/14.2 10.5/17.0 8.9/14.3 7.8/12.6 8.6/13.9 8.5/13.8 8.8/14.1 6.3/10.2 6.2/10.0 6.1/9.9 6.0/9.7 6.2/9.9 5.4/8.8 6.0/9.7 8.8/14.2 9.4/15.2 9.2/14.8 8.3/13.4 9.0/14.6 8.7/14.1 8.7/14.0 8.4/13.6 7.8/12.5 8.5/13.6 7.7/12.5 8.6/13.9 9.7/15.6 9.7/15.6 9.9/16.0 9.6/15.6 7.5/12.1 9.4/15.2 9.5/15.3 9.4/15.2 9.5/15.3 9.6/15.5 7.0/11.4 8.9/14.3 9.0/14.4

••ta VAISALA
.. I'
Jun 9, 2010 05:16:59 PM
Page 10

Tel. +1 520 806 7300 Fax +1 520 741 2848
thunderstorm.sales@vaisala.com

Copyright"'© Vaisala Group 2010. All rights reserved. This report is intended for the sole use of the customer(s) named herein. Permission to copy, modify, or distribute this report in part or its entirety to any third party is expressly forbidden unless expressed or written permission is provided by Vaisala.

Date Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010
Vaisala Inc. Tucson Operations 2705 E. Medina Road Tucson, AZ 85706, USA thunderstorm.vaisala.com
Tel. +1 520 806 7300 Fax +1 520 741 2848

Trme 07:14:43 PM 07:14:43 PM 07:17:35 PM 07:17:35 PM 07:19:06 PM 07:24:10 PM 07:24:10 PM 07:24:10 PM 07:24:10 PM 07:24:10 PM 07:24:10 PM 07:25:15 PM 07:29:47 PM 07:29:48 PM 07:30:36 PM 07:31:23 PM 07:31:23 PM 07:32:21 PM 07:32:22 PM 07:34:43 PM 07:46:13 PM 07:46:13 PM 07:49:11 PM 08:08:28 PM 08:14:12 PM 08:31:30 PM 08:31:30 PM 08:33:58 PM 08:39:19 PM 08:53:47 PM 09:05:46 PM 09:57:07 PM 10:00:09 PM 10:07:19 PM 10:13:19 PM 10:17:39 PM 10:23:11 PM 10:23:41 PM 10:24:18 PM 10:24:44 PM 10:25:48 PM 10:25:57 PM 10:26:35 PM 10:27:04 PM 10:27:49 PM 10:29:49 PM 10:29:49 PM 10:31:08 PM 10:31:20 PM 10:31:47 PM

Peak Current (kA) -8.4 -8.5 -41.4 -33.6 30.0 -55.9 -23.2 -13.2 -16.1 -29.8 -25.1 -7.8 -3.0 -2.0 -10.5 -11.6 -2.0 -5.4 -7.7 -2.2 -3.4 -4.8 -10.3 -7.4 -2.0 15.5 -51.1 -6.5 -3.2 -9.5 -8.6 -8.3 -8.1 -2.1 -2.2 -8.1 -8.4 -7.2 -30.1 16.0 -8.5 -2.3 32.3 -8.9 -2.8 -12.7 -14.0 -3.7 -2.1 -41.1

D1stance From Center (mr/km) 8.2/13.2 9.6/15.5 10.1/16.3 10.2/16.5 8.8/14.3 10.2/16.4 10.5/17.0 10.4/16.8 10.3/16.6 10.5/16.9 10.5/16.9 24.6/39.6 14.7/23.7 13.4/21.6 8.6/13.8 15.2/24.6 11.0/17.8 10.4/16.8 11.7/18.9 8.9/14.4 11.0/17.8 11.3/18.3 7.8/12.6 10.0/16.1 3.1/5.0 10.2/16.4 10.0/16.2 9.3/15.0 10.2/16.5 23.0/37.2 13.3/21.5 26.4/42.6 21.6/34.8 16.3/26.4 14.1/22.8 20.9/33.7 16.5/26.6 17.4/28.0 12.8/20.6 2.2/3.6 14.9/24.0 14.5/23.4 12.9/20.8 13.3/21.4 13.6/21.9 9.8/15.8 5.4/8.8 6.2/10.1 6.9/11.2 9.8/15.7

Latrtude 38.0490 38.0625 38.0736 38.0854 38.0303 38.0109 38.0269 38.0278 38.0245 38.0253 38.0231 38.1531 38.0753 37.9503 38.0642 38.1011 38.0595 38.0614 38.0589 38.0542 38.0997 38.1031 38.0561 38.0845 37.9878 37.8947 37.8977 37.9243 37.9506 38.1389 38.1360 38.2417 38.2179 38.0754 38.1356 38.2459 38.1787 38.1938 38.1280 37.9507 38.1404 38.0553 38.1197 38.0992 38.1042 38.0108 37.9828 37.9916 38.0027 38.0784

Longrtude -81.6711 -81.6951 -81.6890 -81.6578 -81.7233 -81.7701 -81.7656 -81.7628 -81.7620 -81.7663 -81.7676 -81.9692 -81.8157 -81.8497 -81.6383 -81.8003 -81.7432 -81.7225 -81.7616 -81.6879 -81.6437 -81.6511 -81.6062 -81.6406 -81.6125 -81.4271 -81.4287 -81.4349 -81.4163 -81.2600 -81.6066 -81.9087 -81.7932 -81.8536 -81.6939 -81.5829 -81.6579 -81.6337 -81.6063 -81.6441 -81.4917 -81.8297 -81.6838 -81.7473 -81.7469 -81.7624 -81.6904 -81.7009 -81.7070 -81.6560

··~ VAISALA
~Jr"
Jun 9, 2010 05:16:59 PM
Page 11

thunderstorm.sales@vaisala.com

Copyright •© Vaisala Group 2010. All rights reserved. This report is intended for the sole use of the customer(s) named herein. Permission to copy, modify, or distribute this report in part or its entirety to any third party is expressly forbidden unless expressed or written permission is provided by Vaisala.

-~

)

r



v

~'~'"~~~

STRI KEnet®
Peak Date Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010
Vaisala Inc. Tucson Operations 2705 E. Medina Road Tucson, AZ 85706, USA thunderstorm.vaisala.com
Tel. +1 520 806 7300 Fax +1 520 741 2848 thunderstorm.sales@vaisala.com

, , ,:,
Time 10:33:28 PM 10:33:56 PM 10:33:56 PM 10:33:56 PM 10:36:31 PM 10:37:14 PM 10:37:14 PM 10:37:44 PM 10:38:37 PM 10:38:38 PM 10:40:19 PM 10:41:51 PM 10:42:39 PM 10:42:39 PM 10:43·.02 PM 10:43:14 PM 10:43:14 PM 10:43:14 PM 10:43:14 PM 10:43:14 PM 10:43:14 PM 10:43:29 PM 10:44:17 PM 10:44:29 PM 10:44:29 PM 10:45:12 PM 10:45:12 PM 10:45:12 PM 10:45:18 PM 10:45:21 PM 10:47:30 PM 10:47:41 PM 10:47:41 PM 10:48:03 PM 10:48:03 PM 10:48:5:2 PM 10:49:15 PM 10:51:39 PM 10:51:39 PM 10:52:00 PM 10:52:46 PM 10:53:58 PM 10:54:49 PM 10:55:01 PM 10:55:01 PM 10:55:01 PM 10:55:38 PM 10:55:38 PM 10:55:39 PM 10:55:39 PM Current (kA) -4,5 -26.2 -48.0 -7.2 -8.6 -3.0 -16.7 -9.0 -24.8 -7.1 -11.1 -7.8 -28.9 -15.1 -12.9 -30.2 -19.4 -13.8 -8.4 -19.4 -8.7 -11.7 -7.7 -28.6 -16.2 -9.0 -6.7 -4.8 17.0 -7.9 -9.6 -6.0 -6.1 -10.7 -8.2 -5.6 -8.8 -16.4 -9.5 -12.9 -8.9 -3.3 -32.7 -12.0 -18.4 -3.4 -10.0 -12.3 -12.8 -6.2

, " ~,
Latitude 38.0744 38.0115 38.0081 38.0195 38.2134 38.1066 38.0778 38.0691 38.0051 38.0728 37.9385 37.9315 38.0891 38.0888 38.0727 37.9606 37.9577 37.9457 37.9621 37.9901 37.9961 38.0908 38.2296 37.9664 37.9513 37.9929 38.0088 38.0421 38.0759 37.9486 37.9774 37.9372 37.9549 37.9686 37.9408 37.9466 38.0772 37.9610 37.9615 37.9801 38.0046 37.9860 38.0570 37.9936 37.9745 38.0277 37.9857 38.0121 38.0152 37.9960 Longitude -81.5411 -81.5835 -81.5661 -81.5667 -81.5310 -81.7003 -81.6157 -81.6192 -81.6662 -81.5918 -81.7977 -81.7962 -81.5689 -81.5743 -131.5463 -81.7799 -81.7612 -81.7636 -81.7534 -81.6530 -81.6635 -81.5468 -81.3635 -81.7666 -81.7409 -81.7091 -81.7106 -81.7603 -81.5163 -81.5039 -81.5763 -81.6835 -81.7252 -81.4826 -81.4389 -81.7034 -81.5673 -81.6244 -81.6271 -81.5720 -81.5839 -81.5712 -81.5623 -81.5154 -81.5217 -81.6097 -81.5251 -81.5653 -81.5858 -81.5580

Distance From Center (mi/km) 9.7/15.6 4.9/7.8 4.9/8.0 5.6/9.1 19.1/30.7 12.4/20.0 9.3/15.0 8.7/14.1 5.5/8.8 9.0/14.5 10.5/17.0 10.5/16.9 10.3/16.5 10.2/16.4 9.5/15.3 9.6/15.6 8.6/13.9 8.7/14.0 8.2/13.3 4.2/6.8 4.9/7.9 10.7/17.2 23.7/38.2 9.0/14.5 7.5/12.0 6.7/10.8 7.4/11.9 10.9/17.6 10.3/16.6 5.5/8.8 2.8/4.5 4.3/7.0 6.6/10.7 6.8/11.0 9.0/14.5 5.4/8.7 9.5/15.3 1.7/2.7 1.8/2.9 3.1/5.0 4.4/7.1 3.5/5.6 8.2/13.2 5.9/9.6 5.0/8.0 5.8/9.4 5.2/8.4 5.2/8.4 5.1/8.2 4.4/7.1

lt\ VAISALA
.j;
Jun 9, 2010 05:16:59 PM
Page 12

Copyright •© Vaisala Group 2010. All rights reserved. This report is intended for the sole use of the customer(s) named herein. Permission to copy, modify, or distribute this report in part or its entirety to any third party is expressly forbidden unless expressed or written permission is provided by Vaisala.

!

/
\

"'

'"';:; ~"

STRIKEnet®
Peak

""(
T1me 10:55:45 PM 10:56:21 PM 10:56:21 PM 10:56:21 PM 10:56:21 PM 10:56:21 PM 10:56:21 PM 10:56:21 PM 10:56:32 PM 10:56:32 PM 10:57:16 PM 10:57:40 PM 10:57:40 PM 10:57:56 PM 10:57:56 PM 10:57:56 PM 10:57:56 PM 10:57:56 PM 10:57:56 PM 10:57:57 PM 10:57:57 PM 10:57:57 PM 10:58:35 PM 10:59:07 PM 10:59:07 PM 10:59:07 PM 10:59:07 PM 10:59:07 PM 10:59:07 PM 10:59:32 PM 10:59:49 PM 10:59:49 PM 10:59:49 PM 10:59:49 PM 10:59:49 PM 10:59:49 PM 10:59:52 PM 10:59:52 PM 10:59:52 PM 10:59:52 PM 10:59:52 PM 10:59:52 PM 11:01:05 PM 11:01:41 PM 11:01:41 PM 11:01:41 PM 11:01:41 PM 11:01:41 PM 11:01:41 PM 11:01:41 PM Current (kA) -11.0 -14.4 -15.4 -7.9 -17.2 -11.8 -22.8 -8.4 -26.7 -7.9 -7.8 -3.0 -13.4 -12.0 -14.5 -16.3 -14.6 -5.5 -14.9 -9.0 -14.7 -8.7 -11.7 -46.9 -9.6 -16.1 -13.4 -14.0 -38.9 -9.7 -18.3 -12.3 -19.3 -14.3 -9.2 -3.3 -7.6 -6.0 -17.1 -31.7 -8.9 -17.2 -8.6 -23.5 -15.4 -27.9 27.9 -11.5 -36.4 42.4

,
/

,,

&

/

D1stance From

Date Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010
Valsala Inc. Tucson Operations 2705 E. Medina Road Tucson, AZ 85706, USA thunderstorm.vaisala.com
Tel, +1 520 806 7300 Fax +1 520 741 2848

Center (m1/km) 20.3/32.7 5.8/9.3 5.6/9.0 5.7/9.3 6.0/9.7 5.1/8.3 5.1/8.2 4.9/7.8 10.3/16.6 10.1/16.4 9.5/15.3 9.9/16.0 10.5/16.9 10.3/16.7 10.5/16.9 10.6/17.0 10.5/17.0 10.1/16.3 10.4/16.8 10.5/16.9 10.4/16.8 10.3/16.6 13.4/21.7 9.3/15.0 4.717.6 8.9/14.4 4.8/7.7 10.3/16.7 4.6/7.5 6.0/9.7 4.817.8 4.617.4 4.5/7.2 4.9/7.9 4.817.7 6.5/10.5 8.2/13.2 8.1/13.0 7.1/11.5 6.8/11.0 7.5/12.1 8.2/13.2 6.2/10.1 6.4/10.3 6.6/10.6 6.4/10.4 3.7/5.9 6.6/10.6 6.4/10.3 5.0/8.1

Latitude 38.0959 37.9927 38.0061 37.9844 37.9888 38.0116 38.0121 38.0073 37.8780 37.8751 37.8799 37.8674 37.8911 37.8884 37.8821 37.8813 37.8819 37.8527 37.8828 37.8844 37.8811 37.8750 38.0604 37.8419 37.9445 37.8465 37.9428 37.8303 37.9425 37.9593 37.9415 37.9380 37.9434 37.9431 37.9443 37.9206 37.8651 37.8565 37.8958 37.9083 37.9006 37.8820 37.9433 37.9374 37.9349 37.9370 37.9922 37.9373 37.9342 37.9560

Long1tude -81.2853 -81.5181 -81.5393 -81.5124 -81.5096 -81.5675 -81.5699 -81.5677 -81.7737 -81.7694 -81.7588 -81.7588 -81.7846 -81.7808 -81.7809 -81.7815 -81.7814 -81.7503 -81.7795 -81.7819 -81.7793 -81.7720 -81.4065 -81.7176 -81.5168 -81.7137 -81.5158 -81.7296 -81.5189 -81.4952 -81.5148 -81.5194 -81.5220 -81.5139 -81.5159 -81.4877 -81.7181 -81.7037 -81.7210 -81.7214 -81.7311 -81.7335 -81.4893 -81.4867 -81.4835 -81.4857 -81.5778 -81.4831 -81.4866 -81.5130

··~ VAISALA ""~
Jun 9, 2010 05:16:59 PM
Page 13

thunderstorm.sales@vaisala.com

Copyright •© Vaisala Group 2010. All rights reseiVed. This report is intended for the sole use of the customer(s) named herein. Permission to copy, modify, or distribute this report in part or its entirety to any third party is expressly forbidden unl~ss expressed or written permission is provided by Vaisala.

1;;1

~~'

'

"0

~Jt

STRIKEner
Date Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010
Vaisala Inc. Tucson Operations 2705 E. Medina Road Tucson, AZ 85706, USA thunderstorm.vaisala.com

, '
Trme 11:02:01 PM 11:02:01 PM 11:02:21 PM 11:02:47 PM 11:03:20 PM 11:03:26 PM 11:04:44 PM 11:04:51 PM 11:05:06 PM 11:06:51 PM 11:06:51 PM 11:06:51 PM 11:06:51 PM 11:06:51 PM 11:07:56 PM 11:08:38 PM 11:09:56 PM 11:09:56 PM 11:09:56 PM 11:09:56 PM 11:09:57 PM 11:09:57 PM 11:09:57 PM 11:10:15PM 11:11:38 PM 11:11:38 PM 11:11:38 PM 11:11:38 PM 11:12:23 PM 11:15:07 PM 11:19:36 PM 11:20:36 PM 11:23:02 PM 11:23:23 PM 11:25:49 PM 11:26:42 PM 11:26:42 PM 11:28:18 PM 11:28:19 PM 11:28:21 PM 11:29:45 PM 11:29:48 PM 11:29:48 PM 11:29:48 PM 11:30:37 PM 11:30:37 PM 11:32:09 PM 11:32:49 PM 11:37:27 PM 11:37:27 PM Peak Current (kA) -13.0 -2.8 -11.5 -8.2 -11.3 -11.2 -17.1 -4.6 -6.2 -7.3 -10.0 -14.1 -13.3 -7.9 -11.2 -20.0 -30.7 -32.3 -26.0 -33.8 -17.1 -37.9 -8.7 -7.4 -12.2 -13.1 -12.2 -2.9 -2.2 -3.5 -15.1 -31.9 -4.4 -5.2 -2.8 -34.1 -18.2 -3.3 -3.8 -8.5 -3.4 -40.3 -19.7 -15.7 -12.9 -20.0 -2.3 -3.0 -18.6 28.5

/ ~ ,
Latrtude 37.9411 37.9709 37.8968 37.9828 37.8701 37.9726 37.8050 37.9377 37.8510 37.8647 37.8747 37.8661 37.8527 37.8214 37.9821 37.7983 37.8012 37.8130 37.8004 37.7913 37.7973 37.7963 37.8179 38.0697 37.8350 37.8319 37.8358 37.8208 37.8689 37.7713 38.0209 37.7993 37.9215 37.9143 37.7224 38.0261 38.0290 37.7681 37.7436 38.0331 37.7523 38.0226 38.0216 38.0225 38.0216 38.0214 37.7831 37.7262 37.9716 37.8536 Longrtude -81.4786 -81.5289 -81.6864 -81.4416 -81.6479 -81.4269 -81.6727 -81.4804 -81.7039 -81.6674 -81.6596 -81.6188 -81.6218 -81.6483 -81.5725 -81.5979 -81.5869 -81.5624 -81.5847 -81.5839 -81.5830 -81.5846 -81.6319 -81.8915 -81.5920 -81.5849 -81.6081 -81.5201 -81.7149 -81.5485 -81.7390 -81.6150 -81.3788 -81.3638 -81.5043 -81.6441 -81.6286 -81.5371 -81.5016 -81.6236 -81.4823 -81.6094 -81.5969 -81.5972 -81.6265 -81.5693 -81.3993 -81.5556 -81.4852 -81.5566

Dtstance From Center (mr/km) 6.8/11.0 4.5/7.3 5.5/8.9 9.2/14.9 5.6/9.0 9.8/15.9 10.2/16.5 6.7/10.8 8.4/13.5 6.4/10.3 5.6/9.0 5.4/8.6 6.3/10.2 8.7/14.1 3.2/5.2 10.0/16.1 9.8/15.8 9.2/14.9 9.9/15.9 10.5/17.0 10.1/16.3 10.2/16.4 8.8/14.1 17.9/28.9 7.5/12.1 7.7/12.5 7.4/11.9 9.6/15.5 7.9/12.8 12.2/19.7 9.1/14.7 9.9/16.0 12.3/19.9 13.2/21.3 16.2/26.0 6.1/9.9 6.1/9.8 12.6/20.3 14.8/23.9 6.3/10.2 14.7/23.8 5.5/8.9 5.4/8.8 5.5/8.9 5.6/9.0 5.7/9.2 15.7/25.3 15.2/24.5 6.8/10.9 6.7/10.8

.... VAISALA
~~
Page 14

Tel. +1 520 806 7300 Fax +1 520 741 2848 thunderstorm.sales@vaisala.com

Jun 9, 2010 05:16:59 PM

Copyright-.© Vaisala Group 2010. All rights reserved. This report is intended for the sole use of the customer(s) named herein. Permission to copy, modify, or distribute this report in part or its entirety to any third party is expressly forbidden unless expressed or written permission is provided by Vaisala.

~
I

.

h%

.

STRIKE net®
Peak
Date Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Time 11:38:30 PM 11:41:31 PM 11:42:32 PM 11:43:41 PM 11:44:35 PM 11:45:04 PM Current (kA) -3.7 -3.6 -14.1 -2.9 -2.6 -3.1

,

'

~

Distance From
Center (mi/km) 16.7/27.0 16.2/26.1 9.7/15.7 19.7/31.7 20.8/33.6 14.4/23.3 Latitude 37.7744 37.7757 37.9553 37.7072 37.7614 37.8062 Longitude -81.3832 -81.3962 -81.4259 -81.4006 -81.2982 -81.4034

Valsala Inc. Tucson Operations 2705 E. Medina Road

\+i VAISALA
Jun 9, 2010 05:16:59 PM Page 15

Tucson, AZ 85706, USA
thunderstorm.vaisala.com

Tel. +1 520 806 7300 Fax +1 520 741 2848
thunderstorm.sales@valsala.com

Copyright "'T@ Vaisala Group 2010. All rights reserved. This report is intended for the sole use of the customer(s) named herein. Permission to copy, modify, or distribute this report in part or its entirety to any third party is expressly forbidden unless expressed or written permission is provided by Vaisala.

~'(;

,\

i

« 1vX

'

/

STRIKEnet'~
STRIKEnet Report 258028

,,

, \

~

Report Title: SF Performance Coal Co Total Lightning Strokes Detected: 293 Lightning Strokes Detected within 10 mi/16 km radius: 195 Lightning Strokes Detected beyond 10 mi/16 km whose confidence ellipse overlaps the radius: 98 Search Radius: 10 mi/16 km Time Span: Apr 5, 2010 06:00:00 AM US/Eastern to Apr 6, 2010 06:00:00 AM US/Eastern

Lightning Stroke Table (Note: All events shown. Events ordered by distance.)
Peak Date Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5. 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010
Vaisala Inc. Tucson Operations 2705 E. Medina Road Tucson, AZ 85706, USA thunderstorm.vaisala.com

D1stance From Center m1/km 1.4/2.3 1.7/2.7 1.8/2.9 2.2/3.6 2.8/4.5 3.1/5.0 3.1/5.0 3.2/5.2 3.5/5.6 3.5/5.7 3.7/5.9 3.7/6.0 4.2/6.8 4.3/6.9 4.3/7.0 4.4/7.1 4.4/7.1 4.4/7.1 4.5/7.2 4.5/7.3 4.6/7.4 4.6/7.5 4.7/7.6 4.8/7.7 4.8/7.7 4.8/7.8 4.8/7.8 4.9/7.8 4.9/7.8 4.9/7.9 4.9/7.9 4.9/8.0 5.0/8.0 5.0/8.1 5.1/8.2 5.1/8.2 5.1/8.3 Lat1tude 37.9631 37.9610 37.9615 37.9507 37.9774 37.9801 37.9878 37.9821 37.9860 37.9933 37.9922 37.9899 37.9901 37.9977 37.9372 38.0046 38.0010 37.9960 37.9434 37.9709 37.9380 37.9425 37.9445 37.9443 37.9428 37.9966 37.9415 38.0073 38.0115 37.9961 37.9431 38.0081 37.9745 37.9560 38.0152 38.0121 38.0116 Long1tude -81.6107 -81.6244 -81.6271 -81.6441 -81.5763 -81.5720 -81.6125 -81.5725 -81.5712 -81.5926 -81.5778 -81.5700 -81.6530 -81.5670 -81.6835 -81.5839 -81.6376 -81.5580 -81.5220 -81.5289 -81.5194 -81.5189 -81.5168 -81.5159 -81.5158 -81.5469 -81.5148 -81.5677 -81.5835 -81.6635 -81.5139 -81.5661 -81.5217 -81.5130 -81.5858 -81.5699 -81.5675

T1me 09:52:55AM 10:51:39 PM 10:51:39 PM 10:24:44 PM 10:47:30 PM 10:52:00 PM 08:14:12 PM 11:07:56 PM 10:53:58 PM 09:50:13AM 11:01:41 PM 09:51:57 AM 10:43:14 PM 09:51:57 AM 10:47:41 PM 10:52:46 PM 09:48:36 AM 10:55:39 PM 10:59:49 PM 11:02:01 PM 10:59:49 PM 10:59:07 PM 10:59:07 PM 10:59:49 PM 10:59:07 PM 09:54:34 AM 10:59:49 PM 10:56:21 PM 10:33:56 PM 10:43:14 PM 10:59:49 PM 10:33:56 PM 10:55:01 PM 11:01:41 PM 10:55:39 PM 10:56:21 PM 10:56:21 PM

Current (kA) -13.2 -16.4 -9.5 16.0 -9.6 -12.9 -2.0 -11.2 -3.3 -16.3 27.9 -16.9 -19.4 -9.7 -6.0 -8.9 -25.8 -6.2 -19.3 -2.8 -12.3 -38.9 -9.6 -9.2 -13.4 -14.9 -18.3 -8.4 -26.2 -8.7 -14.3 -48.0 -18.4 42.4 -12.8 -22.8 -11.8

••• VAISALA
'-ii
Jun 9, 2010 05:16:59 PM
Page 16

Tel. +1 520 806 7300 Fax +1 520 741 2848
thunderstorm.sales@vaisala.com

Copyright,© Vaisala Group 2010. All rights reserved. This report is intended for the sole use of the customer(s) named herein. Permission to copy, modify, or distribute this report in part or its entirety to any third party is expressly forbidden unless expressed or written permission is provided by Vaisala.

'-j

J

-'

,~

"

"

'

;i\lif;,

STRIKEnet®
Peak Date T1me Current (kA)

' · - ,..
\ f

, " .
Lat1tude Long1tude

D1stance From Center (m1/km)

Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010
Vaisala Inc. Tucson Operations 2705 E. Medina Road Tucson, AZ 85706, USA thunderstorm.vaisala.com
TeL +1 520 806 7300 Fax +1 520 741 2848 thunderstorm.sales@vaisala.com

10:55:38 PM 10:55:38 PM 09:54:34AM 11:06:51 PM 10:48:52 PM 11:29:48 PM 07:11:24 PM 10:29:49 PM 10:38:37 PM 10:45:21 PM 11:29:48 PM 11:29:48 PM 11:02:21 PM 11:30:37 PM 11:03:20 PM 10:56:21 PM 11:06:51 PM 10:33:56 PM 11:30:37 PM 09:57:41 AM 10:56:21 PM 09:57:41 AM 10:56:21 PM 09:50:13AM 10:55:01 PM 10:55:01 PM 07:11:24PM 10:59:32 PM 10:56:21 PM 07:11:24 PM 09:45:11 AM 11:26:42 PM 07:11:24 PM 11:26:42 PM 07:11:24 PM 07:11:24 PM 11:01:05PM 10:31:08 PM 07:11:24 PM 11:06:51 PM 11:28:21 PM 09:50:13 AM 11:01:41 PM 11:06:51 PM 11:01:41 PM 09:43:40AM 11:01:41 PM 10:59:49 PM 11:01:41 PM 11:01:41 PM

-10.0 -12.3 -15.9 -14.1 -5.6 -19.7 -4.1 -14.0 -24.8 -7.9 -15.7 -40.3 -11.5 -12.9 -11.3 -15.4 -10.0 -7.2 -20.0 -19.3 -7.9 -75.3 -14.4 -2.2 -3.4 -12.0 -5.0 -9.7 -17.2 -9.3 18.6 -18.2 -10.6 -34.1 -7.9 -20.6 -8.6 -3.7 -27.0 -13.3 -8.5 -9.2 -23.5 -7.3 -36.4 -18.3 -27.9 -3.3 -15.4 -11.5

5.2/8.4 5.2/8.4 5.3/8.5 5.4/8.6 5.4/8.7 5.4/8.8 5.4/8.8 5.4/8.8 5.5/8.8 5.5/8.8 5.5/8.9 5.5/8.9 5.5/8.9 5.6/9.0 5.6/9.0 5.6/9.0 5.6/9.0 5.6/9.1 5.7/9.2 5.7/9.2 5.7/9.3 5.8/9.3 5.8/9.3 5.8/9.4 5.8/9.4 5.9/9.6 6.0/9.7 6.0/9.7 6.0/9.7 6.0/9.7 6.0/9.8 6.1/9.8 6.1/9.9 6.1/9.9 6.2/9.9 6.2/10.0 6.2/10.1 6.2/10.1 6.3/10.2 6.3/10.2 6.3/10.2 6.3/10.2 6.4/10.3 6.4/10.3 6.4/10.3 6.4/10.3 6.4/10.4 6.5/10.5 6.6/10.6 6.6/10.6

37.9857 38.0121 38.0058 37.8661 37.9466 38.0216 37.9171 37.9828 38.0051 37.9486 38.0225 38.0226 37.8968 38.0216 37.8701 38.0061 37.8747 38.0195 38.0214 37.9779 37.9844 37.9747 37.9927 38.0109 38.0277 37.9936 37.9250 37.9593 37.9888 37.9326 38.0015 38.0290 37.9329 38.0261 37.9322 37.9346 37.9433 37.9916 37.9294 37.8527 38.0331 38.0071 37.9374 37.8647 37.9342 38.0079 37.9370 37.9206 37.9349 37.9373

-81.5251 -81.5653 -81.5485 -81.6188 -81.7034 -81.5969 -81.6984 -81.6904 -81.6662 -81.5039 -81.5972 -81.6094 -81.6864 -81.6265 -81.6479 -81.5393 -81.6596 -81.5667 -81.5693 -81.5083 -81.5124 -81.5057 -81.5181 -81.6678 -81.6097 -81.5154 -81.7118 -81.4952 -81.5096 -81.7143 -81.6868 -81.6286 -81.7159 -81.6441 -81.7165 -81.7177 -81.4893 -81.7009 -81.7185 -81.6218 -81.6236 -81.6873 -81.4867 -81.6674 -81.4866 -81.6885 -81.4857 -81.4877 -81.4835 -81.4831

••• VAISALA
~J;
Jun 9, 2010 05:16:59 PM
Page 17

Copyright •© Vaisala Group 2010. All rights reserved. This report is intended for the sole use of the customer(s) named herein. Permission to copy, modify, or distribute this report in part or its entirety to any third party is expressly forbidden unless expressed or written permission is provided by Vaisala.

"

j

(

,,

'

-

-

~

'

STRIKEnet®
Peak Date Apr5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010
Valsala Inc. Tucson Operations 2705 E. Medina Road Tucson, AZ 85706, USA thunderstorm.vaisala.com

·
T1me 10:47:41 PM 10:45:12 PM 11:37:27 PM 11:04:51 PM 11:37:27 PM 09:51:57 AM 10:59:52 PM 11:02:01 PM 10:48:03 PM 09:54:35AM 10:31:20 PM 07:14:42 PM 10:59:52 PM 10:45:12 PM 11:11:38 PM 09:40:34 AM 10:44:29 PM 11:11:38 PM 07:14:09 PM 10:59:52 PM 09:45:11 AM 11:11:38 PM 07:12:34 PM 07:12:34 PM 07:11:07 PM 07:49:11 PM 11:12:23 PM 10:59:52 PM 07:07:54 PM 07:14:43 PM 10:54:49 PM 10:59:52 PM 10:59:52 PM 10:43:14 PM 07:12:34 PM 07:07:02 PM 11:05:06 PM 07:09:49 PM 07:12:34 PM 07:12:34 PM 07:11:07 PM 07:30:36 PM 07:11:07 PM 10:43:14 PM 07:12:34 PM 07:07:50 PM 07:12:34 PM 10:43:14 PM 11:06:51 PM 10:37:44 PM Current (kA) -6,1 -9.0 28.5 -4.6 -18.6 31.2 -31.7 -13.0 -10.7 -25.4 -2.1 -5.3 -17.1 -6.7 -12.2 -32.6 -16.2 -12.2 -14.1 -8.9 -53.8 -13.1 -8.8 -8.0 -5.4 -10.3 -2.2 -6.0 -12.6 -8.4 -32.7 -17.2 -7.6 -8.4 -65.1 -27.5 -6.2 -8.5 -22.1 -42.6 -5.6 -10.5 -9.0 -19.4 -11.1 -5.3 -25.6 -13.8 -7.9 -9.0

'

.

&.

/

D1stance From Center (m1/km) 6.6/10.7 6.7/10.8 6.7/10.8 6.7/10.8 6.8/10.9 6.8/10.9 6.8/11.0 6.8/11.0 6.8/11.0 6.8/11.0 6.9/11.2 7.0/11.4 7.1/11.5 7.4/11.9 7.4/11.9 7.4/11.9 7.5/12.0 7.5/12.1 7.5/12.1 7.5/12.1 7.5/12.1 7.7/12.5 7.7/12.5 7.8/12.5 7.8/12.6 7.8/12.6 7.9/12.8 8.1/13.0 8.1/13.1 8.2/13.2 8.2/13.2 8.2/13.2 8.2/13.2 8.2/13.3 8.3/13.4 8.4/13.5 8.4/13.5 8.4/13.5 8.4/13.6 8.5/13.6 8.5/13.8 8.6/13.8 8.6/13.9 8.6/13.9 8.6/13.9 8.6/13.9 8.7/14.0 8.7/14.0 8.7/14.1 8.7/14.1 Lat1tude 37.9549 37.9929 37.8536 37.9377 37.9716 38.0133 37.9083 37.9411 37.9686 38.0420 38.0027 38.0366 37.8958 38.0088 37.8358 37.9933 37.9513 37.8350 38.0465 37.9006 38.0177 37.8319 38.0388 38.0388 38.0460 38.0561 37.8689 37.8565 38.0236 38.0490 38.0570 37.8820 37.8651 37.9621 38.0397 38.0274 37.8510 38.0323 38.0451 38.0454 38.0321 38.0642 38.0462 37.9577 38.0503 38.0198 38.0480 37.9457 37.8214 38.0691 Long1tude -81.7252 -81.7091 -81.5566 -81.4804 -81.4852 -81.5173 -81.7214 -81.4786 -81.4826 -81.6145 -81.7070 -81.6561 -81.7210 -81.7106 -81.6081 -81.7243 -81.7409 -81.5920 -81.6466 -81.7311 -81.7049 -81.5849 -81.6785 -81.6790 -81.6626 -81.6062 -81.7149 -81.7037 -81.7132 -81.6711 -81.5623 -81.7335 -81.7181 -81.7534 -81.6953 -81.7143 -81.7039 -81.7089 -81.6898 -81.6899 -81.7129 -81.6383 -81.6928 -81.7612 -81.6852 -81.7293 -81.6915 -81.7636 -81.6483 -81.6192

, ... ••• VAISALA
Jun 9, 2010 05:16:59 PM
Page 18

Tel. +1 520 806 7300 Fax +1 520 741 2848 thunderstorm.sales@vaisala.com

Copyright,© Vaisala Group 2010. All rights reseiVed. This report is intended for the sole use of the customer(s) named herein. Permission to copy, modify, or distribute this report in part or its entirety to any third party is expressly forbidden unless expressed or written permission is provided by Vaisala.

Date Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010
Vaisala Inc. Tucson Operations 2705 E. Medina Road

Trme 07:12:34 PM 07:11:23 PM 11:09:57 PM 07:11:54 PM 09:36:05AM 07:10:31 PM 07:19:06 PM 07:11:07 PM 07:14:42 PM 10:02:18 AM 07:34:43 PM 10:59:07 PM 07:14:42 PM 10:38:38 PM 10:48:03 PM 10:44:29 PM 07:10:11 PM 07:12:34 PM 07:09:49 PM 11:19:36 PM 07:12:09 PM 11:02:47PM 11:09:56 PM 07:08:44 PM 07:08:44 PM 08:33:58 PM 10:02:18 AM 10:37:14 PM 10:59:07 PM 07:08:44 PM 07:11:54 PM 07:14:42 PM 07:14:42 PM 07:08:44 PM 07:08:44 PM 07:14:42 PM 10:49:15 PM 10:57:16 PM 10:43:02 PM 07:14:42 PM 10:05:34AM 11:11:38 PM 07:14:43 PM 07:14:42 PM 10:43:14 PM 07:14:08 PM 10:33:28 PM 07:13:22 PM 07:13:22 PM 11:42:32 PM

Peak Current (kA) -2.8 -16.0 -8.7 -50.0 -36.9 -2.3 30.0 -16.8 -15.5 -12.7 -2.2 -16.1 -13.8 -7.1 -8.2 -28.6 -7.9 -21.6 -8.8 -15.1 -15.7 -8.2 -32.3 -26.4 -34.8 -6.5 -101.8 -16.7 -46.9 -32.4 -3.3 -84.0 -19.0 -37.6 -8.9 -31.4 -8.8 -7.8 -12.9 -11.0 -2.3 -2.9 -8.5 -19.4 -30.2 -21.2 -4.5 -14.7 -14.0 -14.1

Distance From Center (mr/km) 8.7/14.1 8.8/14.1 8.8/14.1 8.8/14.2 8.8/14.2 8.8/14.2 8.8/14.3 8.9/14.3 8.9/14.3 8.9/14.4 8.9/14.4 8.9/14.4 9.0/14.4 9.0/14.5 9.0/14.5 9.0/14.5 9.0/14.5 9.0/14.6 9.1/14.6 9.1/14.7 9.2/14.8 9.2/14.9 9.2/14.9 9.3/14.9 9.3/14.9 9.3115.0 9.3/15.0 9.3/15.0 9.3/15.0 9.4/15.1 9.4/15.2 9.4/15.2 9.4/15.2 9.4/15.2 9.5/15.2 9.5/15.3 9.5/15.3 9.5/15.3 9.5/15.3 9.5/15.3 9.5/15.4 9.6/15.5 9.6/15.5 9.6/15.5 9.6/15.6 9.6/15.6 9.7/15.6 9.7/15.6 9.7/15.6 9.7/15.7

Latrtude 38.0445 38.0387 37.8179 38.0477 37.9710 38.0344 38.0303 38.0492 38.0552 37.9807 38.0542 37.8465 38.0565 38.0728 37.9408 37.9664 37.9995 38.0544 38.0396 38.0209 38.0525 37.9828 37.8130 38.0385 38.0411 37.9243 37.9759 38.0778 37.8419 38.0444 38.0479 38.0597 38.0576 38.0445 38.0425 38.0620 38.0772 37.8799 38.0727 38.0612 37.9954 37.8208 38.0625 38.0620 37.9606 38.0524 38.0744 38.0568 38.0561 37.9553

••,. VAISALA
~

Longrtude -81.7005 -81.7098 -81.6319 -81.6961 -81.7618 -81.7177 -81.7233 -81.6960 -81.6841 -81.4471 -81.6879 -81.7137. -81.6842 -81.5918 -81.4389 -81.7666 -81.7533 -81.6920 -81.7174 -81.7390 -81.7006 -81.4416 -81.5624 -81.7239 -81.7205 '81.4349 -81.4381 -81.6157 -81.7176 -81.7192 -81.7143 -81.6936 -81.6990 -81.7207 -81.7237 -81.6908 -81.5673 -81.7588 -81.5463 -81.6932 -81.4419 -81.5201 -81.6951 -81.6964 -81.7799 -81.7146 -81.5411 -81.7088 -81.7104 -81.4259

...

Tucson, AZ 85706, USA thunderstorm. vaisala.com Tel. +1 520 806 7300 Fax +1 520 741 2848 thunderstorm.sales@vaisala.com

Jun 9, 2010 05:16:59 PM

Page 19

Copyright-.© Vaisala Group 2010. All rights reseiVed. This report is intended for the sole use of the customer(s) named herein. Permission to copy, modify, or distribute this report in part or its entirety to any third party is expressly forbidden unless expressed or written permission is provided by Vaisala.

.
'

.

'

!

•

-

"

.

STRIKE net®
Date Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Vaisala Inc.
Tucson Operations 2705 E. Medina Road Tucson, AZ 85706, USA thunderstorm.vaisala.com

\,
Trme 10:31:47 PM 10:29:49 PM 10:09:42 AM 11:09:56 PM 11:03:26 PM 11:09:56 PM 10:57:40 PM 07:13:22 PM 11:20:36 PM 08:08:28 PM 11:08:38 PM 08:31:30 PM 07:07:14 PM 10:57:56 PM 11:09:57 PM 07:17:35 PM 10:56:32 PM 07:24:10 PM 11:09:57 PM 10:42:39 PM 08:31:30 PM 08:39:19 PM 11:04:44 PM 07:17:35 PM 10:42:39 PM 07:24:10 PM 10:56:32 PM 10:57:57 PM 07:10:31 PM 10:45:18 PM 10:57:56 PM 10'09:42 AM 10:59:07 PM 07:32:21 PM 10:57:56 PM 10:09:42 AM 07:08:16 PM 07:24:10 PM 07:10:31 PM 10:57:57 PM 10:57:40 PM 07:24:10 PM 10:41:51 PM 10:57:57 PM 07:24:10 PM 07:08:16 PM 10:57:56 PM 11:09:56 PM 07:24:10 PM 10:57:56 PM Peak Current (kA) -41.1 -12.7 -91.0 -30.7 -11.2 -26.0 -3.0 -20.5 -31.9 -7.4 -20.0 -51.1 -14.7 -5.5 -17.1 -41.4 -7.9 -55.9 -37.9 -15.1 15.5 -3.2 -17.1 -33.6 -28.9 -16.1 -26.7 -8.7 -15.2 17.0 -12.0 -24.2 -14.0 -5.4 -14.9 -19.3 -11.0 -13.2 -20.0 -14.7 -13.4 -25.1 -7.8 -9.0 -29.8 -16.0 -14.5 -33.8 -23.2 -14.6

.
Distance From Center (mr/km) 9.8/15.7 9.8/15.8 9.8/15.8 9.8/15.8 9.8/15.9 9.9/15.9 9.9/16.0 9.9/16.0 9.9/16.0 10.0/16.1 10.0/16.1 10.0/16.2 10.0/16.2 10.1/16.3 10.1/16.3 10.1/16.3 10.1/16.4 10.2/16.4 10.2/16.4 10.2/16.4 10.2/16.4 10.2/16.5 10.2/16.5 10.2/16.5 10.3/16.5 10.3/16.6 10.3/16.6 10.3/16.6 10.3/16.6 10.3/16.6 10.3/16.7 10.3/16.7 10.3/16.7 10.4/16.8 10.4/16.8 10.4/16.8 10.4/16.8 10.4/16.8 10.4/16.8 10.4/16.8 10.5/16.9 10.5/16.9 10.5/16.9 10.5/16.9 10.5/16.9 10.5/16.9 10.5/16.9 10.5/17.0 10.5/17.0 10.5/17.0

w

Latrtude 38.0784 38.0108 37.9709 37.8012 37.9726 37.8004 37.8674 38.0543 37.7993 38.0845 37.7983 37.8977 38.0512 37.8527 37.7973 38.0736 37.8751 38.0109 37.7963 38.0888 37.8947 37.9506 37.8050 38.0854 38.0891 38.0245 37.8780 37.8750 38.0551 38.0759 37.8884 37.9709 37.8303 38.0614 37.8828 37.9724 38.0504 38.0278 38.0570 37.8811 37.8911 38.0231 37.9315 37.8844 38.0253 38.0526 37.8821 37.7913 38.0269 37.8819

Longrtude -81.6560 -81.7624 -81.4270 -81.5869 -81.4269 -81.5847 -81.7588 -81.7192 -81.6150 -81.6406 -81.5979 -81.4287 -81.7277 -81.7503 -81.5830 -81.6890 -81.7694 -81.7701 -81.5846 -81.5743 -81.4271 -81.4163 -81.6727 -81.6578 -81.5689 -81.7620 -81.7737 -81.7720 -81.7299 -81.5163 -81.7808 -81.4172 -81.7296 -81.7225 -81.7795 -81.4162 -81.7389 -81.7628 -81.7301 -81.7793 -81.7846 -81.7676 -81.7962 -81.7819 -81.7663 -81.7379 -81.7809 -81.5839 -81.7656 -81.7814

••• VAISALA
~:.;:
Jun 9, 2010 05:16:59 PM
Page 20

Tel. +1 520 806 7300 Fax +1 520 741 2848
thunderstorm.sales@vaisala.com

Copyright ...© Vaisala Group 2010. All rights reserved. This report is intended for the sole use of the customer(s) named herein. Permission to copy, modify, or distribute this report in part or its entirety to any third party is expressly forbidden unless expressed or written permission is provided by Vaisala.

'
\

~

"

ii!"9 ~

STRIKEnet®
Peak

\'
Trme 07:10:32 PM 10:40:19 PM 10:57:56 PM 07:10:31 PM 07:10:31 PM 10:43:29 PM 10:45:12 PM 07:07:50 PM 07:46:13 PM 07:31:23 PM 09:36:05AM 07:46:13 PM 10:09:42 AM 10:05:34AM 07:32:22 PM 09:36:04AM 11:15:07 PM 11:23:02 PM 10:37:14 PM 11:28:18 PM 10:24:18 PM 10:26:35 PM 11:23:23 PM 10:27:04 PM 09:05:46 PM 07:29:48 PM 10:58:35 PM 10:27:49 PM 10:13:19 PM 11:45:04 PM 10:25:57 PM 07:29:47 PM 11:29:45 PM 11:28:19 PM 10:25:48 PM 11:32:49PM 07:31:23 PM 07:09:07 PM 11:32:09 PM 11:25:49 PM 11:41:31 PM 10:07:19 PM 10:23:11 PM 11:38:30 PM 10:23:41 PM 11:10:15 PM 10:36:31 PM 11:43:41 PM 10:55:45 PM 11:44:35 PM Current (kA) -11.6 -11.1 -16.3 -3.5 -34.3 -11.7 -4.8 -9.5 -3.4 -2.0 -7.4 -4.8 -5.8 -7.7 -7.7 -5.3 -3.5 -4.4 -3.0 -3.3 -30.1 32.3 -5.2 -8.9 -8.6 -2.0 -11.7 -2.8 -2.2 -3.1 -2.3 -3.0 -3.4 -3.8 -8.5 -3.0 -11.6 -2.0 -2.3 -2.8 -3.6 -2.1 -8.4 -3.7 -7.2 -7.4 -8.6 -2.9 -11.0 -2.6

"

'

. z ,
Latrtude 38.0580 37.9385 37.8813 38.0562 38.0573 38.0908 38.0421 38.0413 38.0997 38.0595 37.9954 38.1031 37.9582 37.9658 38.0589 38.0000 37.7713 37.9215 38.1066 37.7681 38.1280 38.1197 37.9143 38.0992 38.1360 37.9503 38.0604 38.1042 38.1356 37.8062 38.0553 38.0753 37.7523 37.7436 38.1404 37.7262 38.1011 38.0994 37.7831 37.7224 37.7757 38.0754 38.1787 37.7744 38.1938 38.0697 38.2134 37.7072 38.0959 37.7614 Longrtude -81.7318 -81.7977 -81.7815 -81.7348 -81.7333 -81.5468 -81.7603 -81.7618 -81.6437 -81.7432 -81.7969 -81.6511 -81.3949 -81.3911 -81.7616 -81.8098 -81.5485 -81.3788 -81.7003 -81.5371 -81.6063 -81.6838 -81.3638 -81.7473 -81.6066 -81.8497 -81.4065 -81.7469 -81.6939 -81.4034 -81.8297 -81.8157 -81.4823 -81.5016 -81.4917 -81.5556 -81.8003 -81.8094 -81.3993 -81.5043 -81.3962 -81.8536 -81.6579 -81.3832 -81.6337 -81.8915 -81.5310 -81.4006 -81.2853 -81.2982

D1stance From

Date Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010
Vaisala Inc. Tucson Operations 2705 E. Medina Road Tucson, AZ 85706, USA

Center (mr/km) 10.5/17.0 10.5/17.0 10.6/17.0 10.6/17.0 10.6/17.0 10.7117.2 10.9/17.6 10.9/17.6 11.0/17.8 11.0/17.8 11.1/17.9 11.3/18.3 11.4/18.4 11.7/18.8 11.7/18.9 11.9/19.1 12.2/19.7 12.3/19.9 12.4/20.0 12.6/20.3 12.8/20.6 12.9/20.8 13.2/21.3 13.3/21.4 13.3/21.5 13.4/21.6 13.4/21.7 13.6/21.9 14.1/22.8 14.4/23.3 14.5/23.4 14.7/23.7 14.7/23.8 14.8/23.9 14.9/24.0 15.2/24.5 15.2/24.6 15.5/25.0 15.7/25.3 16.2/26.0 16.2/26.1 16.3/26.4 16.5/26.6 16.7/27.0 17.4/28.0 17.9/28.9 19.1/30.7 19.7/31.7 20.3/32.7 20.8/33.6

...... VAISALA "'""
Jun 9, 2010 05:16:59 PM
Page 21

thunderstorm.vaisala.com
Tel. +1 520 806 7300 Fax +1 520 741 2848 thunderstorm.sales@vaisala.com

Copyright.,© Vaisala Group 2010. All rights reserved. This report is intended for the sole use of the customer(s) named herein. Permission to copy, modify, or distribute this report in part or its entirety to any third party is expressly forbidden unless expressed or written permission is provided by Vaisala.

-'j

}

'

9'"

STRIKEnet®
Date Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr 5, 2010 Apr5,2010 Apr 5, 2010 T1me 10:17:39 PM 10:00:09 PM 08:53:47 PM 10:44:17 PM 07:25:15 PM 09:57:07 PM Peak Current (kA) -8,1 -8,1 -9.5 -7.7 -7.8 -8.3

" ., / (
D1stance From Center (m1/km) 20,9133,7 21,6134,8 23.0/37.2 23.7138.2 24.6139.6 26.4142.6

0
Lat1tude 382459 382179 38.1389 38.2296 38.1531 38.2417 Long1tude -81.5829 -81,7932 -81.2600 -81.3635 -81.9692 -81.9087

Vaisala Inc. Tucson Operations 2705 E. Medina Road Tucson, AZ 85706, USA thund.erstorm.vaisala.com

\+'} VAISALI
Jun 9, 2010 05:16:59 PM
Page 22

Tel. +1 520 806 7300 Fax +1 520 741 2848
thunderstorm.sales@vaisala.com

Copyright© Vaisala Group 2010. All rights reserved. This report is intended for the sole use of the customer(s) named herein. Permission to copy, modify, or distribute this report in part or its entirety to any third party is expressly forbidden unless expressed or written permission is provided by Vaisala.

APPENDIX W MINE ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

Appendix W Mine Electrical System
Electrical Power System Power was supplied to the mine by a 46,000 volt alternating current (Vac) service drop from the American Electric Power utility company. The voltage was transformed from 46,000 Vac to 12,470 Vac by two 10 mega-volt amperes (MVA) three-phase transformers, located in the substation near the south portals. The secondary side of each transformer was grounded through 25 ampere grounding resistors. Gang-operated disconnect switches and lightning arrestors were installed on the primary and secondary side of each transformer. Power was supplied from the substation to various underground locations by five separate 4/0 American Wire Gauge (AWG), 15 kilovolt (KV) shielded mine power cables (See Figures AC-1, AC-2 and AC-3). Each cable was protected by a vacuum circuit breaker (VCB) installed in the substation. A color code was used by the mine electricians to differentiate the five high-voltage distribution circuits used underground. According to electrical maps in use at the time of the accident, the “violet” circuit supplied power to the longwall section. The “red” circuit provided power for the HG 22 and TG 22 development sections, several conveyor belt drives, and areas of the mine near the Ellis Portal. The “blue” circuit supplied power to the Barrier Section and other loads located in the North Mains area of the mine. The “green” circuit provided power to various conveyor belt drives, pumps, and other assorted equipment, located outby the longwall section. The “orange” circuit supplied power to the south side of the mine. All of the high voltage circuits, except for the “orange” circuit, entered the underground area of the mine through the No.3 entry of the North Portal. The “orange” circuit entered the mine through the No.3 entry of the South Portal. Inspections made of all these circuits determined that each was equipped with devices that could provide short circuit protection, overload protection, grounded-phase protection, undervoltage protection, and ground wire monitoring. The violet, red, and green 12,470 Vac circuits ran through a series of high voltage circuit breakers and feed-throughs (power boxes) prior to and after entering the explosion area. Several circuit breakers on each circuit tripped during the mine explosion. All three circuits were routed into the explosion area from the Old North Mains track entry into the North Glory Mains track entry. From there they were routed into Headgate 1 North, HG 22, and TG 22. All three circuits had damage at various locations. Damage was observed along the Headgate 1 North, HG 22, and TG 22 entries, but the first occurrence of damage was observed along the North Glory Mains, when traveling inby. The “red” circuit served primarily as a power supply for the development section belt lines and for the continuous mining section equipment in the explosion area. This circuit made a final split at crosscut 7 of the HG 22 Panel. From there, it

terminated at the 2,500 kilo-volt amperes (KVA) section power center for the HG 22 section and terminated at the 2,250 KVA section power center for TG 22 section. Both of these power centers supplied 995 Vac and 480 Vac power to mining equipment in the face areas. The “green” circuit served primarily as a power supply for the North Glory Mains conveyor belts inside the explosion area. This circuit ended at crosscut 105 of the North Glory Mains, where it supplied the No. 7 North belt conveyor. The circuit providing power to Headgate 1 North was designated as the “violet” circuit. The “violet” circuit was dedicated totally for the longwall section equipment and the longwall conveyor belt. From the surface sub-station at the UBB Portal, 12,470 Vac was provided to the longwall section power center, located in the track entry outby the longwall face at the mule train. The 5,750 KVA longwall power center reduced the voltage to 4,160 Vac and 480 Vac for utilization on the longwall section. 4,160 Vac was provided from the power center to the longwall starter box located at the mule train. Longwall Section The 4,160 Vac, longwall starter controlled power to the shearer, face conveyor motors, crusher motor, and stageloader motors. Power was delivered to these longwall components through cables, which were routed from the longwall starter along a monorail system in the belt entry. 480 Vac was provided from the section power center to the headgate controller (gate box). This cable was also routed along the monorail system. The monorail system and several of the cables suspended from it were damaged heavily during the explosion. The cable supplying 480 Vac to the headgate controller was a #6 AWG 3conductor, type G-GC, and entered the controller through a permissible plug and receptacle. The grounding conductors in the cable were attached to the frame of the controller. The approved drawings for the controller showed the pilot circuit for the ground monitor connected to a normally closed contact on the emergency stop (e-stop) switch. The pilot circuit then connected to a terminating diode which was attached to the controller frame, completing the ground monitor circuit. Operating the e-stop switch should have opened the ground monitor pilot circuit and caused the circuit breaker at the power center to trip, de-energizing the 480 Vac circuit. However, the circuit was not properly wired when inspected after the explosion. A terminating diode was installed between the pilot wire on the back of the receptacle and the frame of the controller. This rendered the e-stop switch ineffective for tripping the 480 Vac power to the controller, although it would have de-energized the 4,160 Vac circuits. When installed as approved, the e-stop would have de-energized all power on the longwall face when depressed; however, by the manner in which this e-stop was installed, only the high-voltage motor and shearer circuits would have been de-energized, while all other circuits (e.g. lighting, methane monitors, etc.) would have remained energized.

APPENDIX X EXAMINATION OF COMPONENTS OF JOY MINING MACHINERY JNA CONTROL SYSTEM

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION TECHNICAL SUPPORT

INVESTIGATIVE REPORT Examination of Components of Joy Mining Machinery JNA Control System Recovered from a Mine Explosion at Performance Coal Company Upper Big Branch Mine-South (MSHA ID 46-08436) Montcoal (Raleigh County), WV April 5, 2010 PAR 98462

Prepared By: Robert Holubeck, Electrical Engineer Matthew Heightland, Electrical Engineer November 23, 2011

-Originating OfficeApproval and Certification Center Electrical Safety Division Kenneth J. Porter, Chief 765 Technology Drive Triadelphia, West Virginia 26059

2

EXAMINATION OF COMPONENTS OF JOY MINING MACHINERY JNA CONTROL SYSTEM 1 ABSTRACT The Approval and Certification Center (A&CC), as requested by Upper Big Branch Mine Accident Investigation Team Leader, Norman Page, assisted the accident investigation team in the examination of components of the Joy Mining Machinery Joy Network Architecture (JNA) Control System associated with the longwall shearing machine. These components were recovered from a fatal mine explosion at the Upper Big Branch Mine-South which occurred on April 5, 2010. The components examined were: 1. Exhibit No. PE-0164, Joy Mining Machinery JNA0 control unit, S/N 56602AH003, Part No. 00572110-0020, recovered from the Joy longwall shearing machine installed at the mine. 2. Exhibit No. PE-0165, Joy Mining Machinery JNA1 control unit, S/N 100304AC006, Part No. 100133930, recovered from the Joy longwall shearing machine installed at the mine. 3. Exhibit No. PE-0173, Joy Mining Machinery, JNA1 control unit, S/N 113203AH002, Part No. 100133930, recovered in the area of survey spad 22699. The JNA1 recovered as Exhibit No. PE-0173 is reported to be a spare unit. 4. Exhibit No. PE-0204, Joy Mining Machinery JNA0 control unit, S/N 56605AC010, Part No. 00572110-0020, recovered in the area of survey spad 22701. The JNA0 recovered as Exhibit No. PE-0204 is reported to be a spare unit. 5. Exhibit No. PE-0269, Joy Mining Machinery, JNA0 control unit, S/N 50905T0002, Part No. 00572110-0020, recovered by the accident investigation team from the Joy facility in Bluefield, VA, on August 23, 2010. For Exhibit No. PE-0164, JNA0 unit recovered from the longwall shearer, the electronic event log of April 5, 2010 was viewed. The last two recorded events on April 5, 2010 on the JNA0 unit were: “ERR Right Handheld Dataloss” and “STS Right Handheld Estop.” These records are an error message and a machine status code. No other events were recorded in the event log for approximately 43 minutes prior to the above listed events. Events recorded in the JNA0 event log are time stamped. In order to determine the actual time that events on April 5, 2010 were recorded in the Exhibit No. PE-0164, JNA0 unit’s electronic event log, a time drift analysis was conducted on

3 the system clock of the JNA0 unit. At standard laboratory temperature of approximately 20 ºC, the system clock was drifting at a rate between 0.49971 and 0.4824 seconds per day. Assuming that the environmental conditions of the JNA0 unit before it was delivered to the A&CC were constant, the rate of drift of the system clock would remain constant. This means, if the drift was constant from April 5, 2010 until the measurements started, the actual expected time and date for the last “STS Right Handheld ESTOP” event, as recorded on the JNA0 event log, was between 2:59:32 PM and 2:59:38 PM on April 5, 2010. Functional testing was conducted on Exhibit Nos. PE-0164 (JNA0) and PE-0165 (JNA1) on a Joy shearer test panel which mimicked the functionality of the shearer installed at the longwall. The purpose of this functional testing was to ensure that machine control system events monitored by the JNA system are properly interpreted by the JNA system, the proper actions were taken by the JNA system, and the appropriate events were properly recorded on the JNA0 event log. During the functional testing, machine functions were initiated by Exhibit No. PE-0238, Model TX1 remote control unit after being restored to working order. Events were stored in the Exhibit No. PE-0164 (JNA0) event log when expected. The functional testing indicated that Exhibit Nos. PE-0164 (JNA0) and PE-0165 (JNA1) functioned as expected. Attempts were made to view the electronic event logs of additional JNA control units recovered during the accident investigation. No event logs were stored in Exhibit Nos. PE-0173, PE-0204, or PE-0269. 2 2.1 INTRODUCTION Request. The Approval and Certification Center (A&CC), as requested by Upper Big Branch Mine Accident Investigation Team Leader, Norman Page, assisted the accident investigation team in the examination of components of the Joy Mining Machinery JNA Control System associated with the longwall shearing machine. The examinations included recovering data stored in the memory of these units and comparing the internal time clocks of these units with presumed accurate time clocks. These components were recovered from a fatal mine explosion at the Upper Big Branch Mine-South which occurred on April 5, 2010. Equipment. The longwall shearing machine installed at the Upper Big Branch Mine-South was a Joy Mining Machinery, Model 07LS1A shearer, serial number (S/N) LSW525C, MSHA Shearer Evaluation No. SE-18630-0. Components of the JNA control system were recovered from the shearer. In addition, the investigation team recovered spare JNA components located underground and at a repair facility. Description of JNA control system. The JNA control system was the computer control center for the Joy shearing machine installed in the

2.2

2.3

4 longwall shearer at the Upper Big Branch Mine-South Mine. The control system monitored the various machine functions and also contained the circuitry necessary for remote control operation. A display screen was provided to assist in operating or troubleshooting the machine. The display screen was viewed through a window of the main controller enclosure of the shearer. The JNA control system consisted of two components or units, referred to as JNA unit 0 and JNA unit 1, or also as the JNA0 and JNA1 units. The JNA0 unit performed various computer and control functions; it also contained the system display. The JNA1 unit contained the input and output interface to various circuits on the machine. Some of the functions of the JNA system included: • • • • • • Controlling the machine’s solenoid-operated hydraulic functions, Monitoring the remote control transmitter stations, Monitoring and controlling motor currents and motor temperatures, Providing motor overcurrent protection, Providing diagnostic data on the display, and Providing an electronic event log for reviewing machine performance. The event log is a listing of the machine status codes and error messages. The JNA event log is not designed to be downloaded; it can only be viewed on the JNA0 display.

The Machine Application Program (MAP) cartridge is a small cartridge that plugs into a socket on the JNA0 unit. The MAP is programmed at the manufacturer’s facility specifically for a certain shearing machine. The MAP cartridge is used by the JNA system to customize the configuration settings, such as motor overload settings, based on the shearer components installed. 2.4 Recovering JNA0 and JNA1 units from Shearer. On July 20, 2010, the main controller enclosure on the longwall shearer at the Upper Big Branch Mine-South was opened, the connections to the JNA0 and JNA1 units were disconnected, and the JNA0 and JNA1 units were secured into protective storage cases. The JNA0 unit, S/N 56602AH003, part number (P/N) 00572110-0020, was designated as Exhibit No. PE-0164. The JNA1 unit, S/N 100304AC006, was designated as Exhibit No. PE-0165. For the purpose of preserving the data, the MAP cartridge, which was installed in the appropriate slot of the JNA0 unit, was not removed from the JNA0 unit during the investigation. The MAP installed in Exhibit No. PE-0164 was P/N 100173695-06. See Appendix A-1 for photographs of the recovery of the JNA units.

5 3 3.1 VIEWING EVENT LOG OF EXHIBIT NO. PE-0164 JNA0 UNIT Procedure. Exhibit No. PE-0164, JNA0 unit, was taken to the Joy Mining Machinery facility in Franklin, PA, on July 23, 2010, for the purpose of viewing the event log. Joy personnel conducted the testing under the direction of the investigation team. The examinations were videotaped and photographed. See Appendix A-2 for photographs. An attempt was made to synchronize the timestamp of the video recording to the real time clock available at www.time.gov. A photograph of both the real time clock displayed on a laptop computer and the video recording’s timestamp shows a one second difference (see Appendix A-2, slide 10). Demonstration Unit. Joy personnel demonstrated how the JNA event log can be viewed on a JNA0 sample unit. The demonstration JNA0 sample unit was powered with a 120 Vac power cord and was controlled using a page turner device. After power was applied and the boot-up sequence finished, the demonstration JNA0 sample unit displayed the main menu. The JNA system’s date and time are also displayed on the screen. The operator then toggled to the “Event Log” on the main menu. The JNA event log contained a chronological detail of the operation of the JNA system, and can include any errors, overload conditions, or status events. Approximately 4,000 of the latest events can be stored in the event log; the oldest event is overwritten by newer events being recorded. Each event contains the time stamp, or date and time, of the event’s occurrence. The user can select an event’s “help text” for more descriptive information explaining an event. It was demonstrated that the demonstration JNA0 sample event log was maintained in memory after powering down and restarting the demonstration unit. Nine (9) events related to the boot-up sequence were stored in the event log every time the demonstration JNA0 sample unit was powered. As expected, some of these events were due to the demonstration JNA0 sample unit not being connected to a JNA1 unit and other sensors as it would be on a machine. Exhibit No. PE-0164 JNA0 Unit. Exhibit No. PE-0164 was taken out of its protective storage case. The JNA0 unit was powered with a 120 Vac power cord and controlled using a page turner device. After the boot-up sequence finished, the JNA0 unit displayed the main menu. The JNA system’s date and time were also displayed on the screen. The operator then toggled to the “Event Log” on the main menu. The nine (9) events that related to the boot-up sequence that had just initiated were recorded, beginning with the event “SYS Power Reset”. Events recorded just prior to the JNA0 unit being powered on July 23, 2010, were dated April 5, 2010. Viewing of Data. Every screen of the event log was recorded via still or video photography. Every screen of data consisted of 20 events, with the latest four events repeated from the previous screen. The date of the

3.2

3.3

3.4

6 recorded events began on April 5, 2010, and continued until March 30, 2010. On the 57th screen, data recorded on March 30, 2010 was immediately preceded by data recorded on January 7, 2009. This data continued until January 3, 2009. It was believed that the January 2009 data was recorded while this JNA0 unit was installed on another shearing machine, since these dates are prior to the time when this particular shearing machine was delivered to the Upper Big Branch Mine-South. The two last two recorded events on April 5, 2010 on the JNA0 unit were: April 5, 2010 April 5, 2010 18:52:41 18:52:39 ERR Right Handheld Dataloss STS Right Handheld Estop

No events were recorded in the event log for approximately 43 minutes prior to the above listed events. A “STS Right Handheld Estop” event would occur if the data from the right handheld unit dropped out for 0.5 to 1.5 seconds. According to the manufacturer, examples of a radio communication dropout include: • • • • The operator pressed the “stop” button on the TX1 remote control unit, The radio communications to the receiver dropped out, The receiver to the JNA communications dropped out, or The internal battery of the TX1 remote control unit was dying.

Also, an “ERR Right Handheld Dataloss” event would occur if the data from the right handheld unit dropped out for more than 1.5 seconds. 3.5 Photographs of Event Log. Slides 12 through 141 of Appendix A-2 show the event log as displayed on the JNA0 unit. The entire procedure of viewing the event log was videotaped; however, not every screen of data of the event log of January 3, 2009 was photographed. Event Log with Adjustments for Time Drift. Efforts were made to determine the actual time that events occurred in the event log (see Time Drift Study in Section 4 below). Based on the time drift analysis, the time of recorded events in the event log was calculated for a range of “earliest” and “latest” possible actual time. The resulting actual time range for the events recorded on April 5, 2010 is shown in Appendix B. Event Log Help Text. “Help Text” information could be selected by the user for more descriptive information explaining an event. Joy provided a “JNA Event Dictionary File” which listed all events that are possible to record in the event log of the JNA system installed at the shearer used on the longwall. The help text information for this large list of events (machine

3.6

3.7

7 status codes and error messages) recorded on April 5, 2010 is shown in Appendix C. 3.8 Exhibit No. PE-0164 JNA0 Parameter Screens. After viewing the event log of the JNA0, the parameter screens and other menus of the unit were viewed, videotaped and photographed. These screens are shown in Appendix A-2, slides 142 to 205. The power was then removed and the JNA0 unit was placed back into its protective storage case. Questions asked of the manufacturer, Joy Mining Machinery. Questions regarding the JNA control system and its electronic event log were gathered from the representatives of parties of the accident investigation team. The questions and Joy’s response, titled “Response to MSHA Questions for Joy”, is filed in the folder for this investigation. TIME DRIFT STUDY OF EXHIBIT NO. PE-0164 JNA0 UNIT Background. An attempt was made to coordinate the recorded time data associated with selected events in the JNA0 electronic event log for Exhibit No. PE-0164 with time from established sources. The time and date recorded by the internal clock of the JNA0 unit was displayed and observed over a period of approximately fourteen months. This time was compared to presumed accurate time clocks. The rate of change was calculated from this data and used to extrapolate the JNA0 unit’s time on April 5, 2010. The JNA0 unit featured an internal clock. The length of a time period measured by these clocks can deviate from the length of the same time period measured by more precise means; one second measured by the JNA0 unit can differ from one second as measured by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). In laboratory environmental conditions, it was noted that the clock did, indeed, differ in time from that obtained from external sources. Given the tolerances of each time measurement, calculations were made to determine the minimum and maximum rates of drift of the JNA0 unit’s internal clocks as compared to the time from external sources. The minimum and maximum rate of drift was compared to the events recorded in the event log which occurred on April 5, 2010. The following were correlated: (a) the time from the JNA0 event log with (b) the actual Eastern Daylight Time when certain events in the data were recorded. The JNA0 unit uses clocks that rely on crystals or resonators connected to integrated circuits. The frequency of the crystal or the resonator determines the operation of the clock. Changes in the frequency of the crystal or resonator, or mismatches in impedance between the

3.9

4 4.1

8 external circuitry and the internal circuitry of the integrated circuit, will have an effect on the clock, causing it to differ from the actual time. One major factor that can affect the frequency of a crystal is its temperature. The manufacturer indicated that when the JNA0 unit is repaired at the Matric Limited rebuild facility, the clock is set to the UST format, according to their test procedure. The acronym “UST” stands for Universal Standard Time; it is analogous to the better-known Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). This means that during Eastern Daylight Time, the clock of the JNA0 unit is set four hours ahead of Matric Limited’s network time, and during Eastern Standard Time, the clock of the JNA0 unit is set five hours ahead of the Matric Limited’s network time. The manufacturer indicated that when the clock is reset, the event log is cleared. 4.2 Measurement Procedures. The JNA0 unit was energized and the displayed time and date were recorded. Simultaneously, the time and date displayed on a MSHA-owned personal computer, with the web browser directed to www.time.gov, were recorded. The data was recorded by handwritten notation in a record book and photographs were taken. The time and date of the JNA0 unit was displayed in the upper right hand corner of the JNA0 Main Menu. At the request of the State of West Virginia Office of Miners’ Health, Safety & Training, measurements were also taken with a Garmin etrex Legend GPS Receiver. Analysis Procedures.

4.3

4.3.1 Precision of measurements. The reference time readings in 2010 and 2011 were taken from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) website at www.time.gov and a Garmin etrex Legend GPS Receiver connected to at least four satellites. 4.3.2 WWW.TIME.GOV. Notes from this website indicate: “This public service is cooperatively provided by the two time agencies of the United States: a Department of Commerce agency, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and its military counterpart, the U. S. Naval Observatory (USNO). Readings from the clocks of these agencies contribute to world time, called Coordinated Universal Time (UTC). Additionally, the website says “This web site is intended as a time-of-day service only. It should not be used to measure frequency or time interval, nor should it be used to establish traceability to NIST or the USNO.” This time is synchronized with NIST every ten minutes.” Additionally, the website displays an accuracy statement. This is provided in the format “Accurate within X.X seconds” on a measurement of the round-trip network delay. This delay is measured using the local computer clock as a timer each time synchronization is made. Most measurements

9 were displayed as less than 1 second, but informal observations, using the widget provided by NIST, indicated delay of up to 4 seconds. 4.3.3 Global Positioning System (GPS) Time. The GPS Navigation Message Words six through 10 of page 18 of subframe four of the GPS broadcast navigation message contain the values of Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) parameters that permit a GPS receiver to determine UTC corresponding to a particular instant of GPS Time. This page is transmitted once during the 12 ½-minute-long navigation message. The parameters include the current number of UTC leap seconds since January 1980, when GPS Time was set equal to UTC, as well as information on the most recent or announced future leap second. The navigation message also transmits the coefficients of a first-order polynomial describing the subsecond relationship between GPS Time and UTC. The parameters of this polynomial also provide data to allow the GPS receiver to accommodate leap seconds. An observation of the time observed on a GPS receiver indicated that the difference between the time displayed by the receiver and MSHA network time was approximately one second. 4.3.4 Calculations. When calculating the differences between the time displayed by the instruments and the reference time, the tolerances of the reference time were initially based on the information found above. E.g., when the MSHA network was used as a reference, it was considered to have a one second tolerance. However, based on the observations of the NIST time widget, and the statement by NIST that the www.time.gov time should not be used for interval measurements, the tolerance was widened. Calculations were made to determine the largest and smallest differences between (a) the observed time on the instrument and (b) the observed reference time. This range for each time measurement was plotted on a linear-linear graph; there were therefore two y-data points (representing the smallest and largest differences) for each x-data point (representing the observation period, with the first observation at time=0). Because the duration of the observations was approximately 420 days, the variation of each data point in the horizontal (x) direction was insignificant. The same tolerance was used for each data point. Additionally, the time recordings were adjusted to allow for daylight savings time as appropriate. Because a straight line would not fit between the upper and lower limits of all data points when these points were plotted, the tolerance was adjusted to nine seconds to allow this straight line to fit because a linear drift was expected. Then, based on observation, the minimum and maximum slopes of the straight lines that fit the points were measured. These slopes were then used to determine the maximum and minimum time drift

10 of the JNA0 system clock. The time drift values were then used to extrapolate the data to recorded events of the event log on April 5, 2010. 4.4 RESULTS

4.4.1 Time recordings. The listing of time recordings can be found in Table 1 below. This data has been adjusted for Daylight Savings Time. The recordings made on July 23, 2010 and on November 19, 2010 were made from video taken at the Joy facility in Franklin, PA and Matric Limited in Seneca, PA, where the video recording’s time was synchronized to www.time.gov. Recordings made from November 30, 2010 through February 9, 2011 were made by comparing the JNA0 unit time to www.time.gov displayed on a MSHA-owned personal computer. Recordings made from May 27, 2011 to September 15, 2011 were made by comparing the JNA0 time to GPS time. Table 1. JNA0 Time Measurements
Date 7/23/2010 7/23/2010 7/23/2010 7/23/2010 7/23/2010 7/23/2010 11/19/2010 11/30/2010 11/30/2010 11/30/2010 1/8/2011 1/8/2011 1/8/2011 1/8/2011 1/26/2011 1/26/2011 1/26/2011 1/27/2011 1/27/2011 1/27/2011 1/28/2011 1/28/2011 1/28/2011 1/31/2011 1/31/2011 1/31/2011 2/1/2011 2/1/2011 2/1/2011 2/3/2011 Reference Time 10:43:59 10:44:03 12:16:43 14:19:11 15:23:50 16:10:32 10:20:00 15:26:00 15:27:00 15:32:00 11:31:57 11:34:37 11:35:00 11:36:00 15:49:05 15:50:37 15:55:10 15:49:41 15:50:55 15:51:54 15:40:38 15:42:10 15:43:38 15:54:14 15:55:47 15:56:45 15:42:25 15:43:25 15:44:34 15:39:16 Instrument Time 14:36:17 14:36:21 16:09:00 18:11:29 19:16:07 20:02:50 14:11:13 19:17:09 19:18:09 19:23:08 15:22:46 15:25:26 15:25:50 15:26:49 19:39:43 19:41:16 19:45:50 19:40:27 19:41:41 19:42:40 19:31:18 19:32:50 19:34:18 19:44:53 19:46:26 19:47:24 19:33:03 19:34:03 19:35:12 19:29:49

11
2/4/2011 2/4/2011 2/4/2011 2/7/2011 2/7/2011 2/7/2011 2/8/2011 2/8/2011 2/8/2011 2/9/2011 2/9/2011 2/9/2011 5/27/2011 5/27/2011 5/27/2011 5/27/2011 6/1/2011 6/1/2011 6/6/2011 6/6/2011 6/8/2011 6/8/2011 6/10/2011 6/10/2011 6/14/2011 6/14/2011 6/17/2011 6/17/2011 6/23/2011 6/23/2011 6/23/2011 6/24/2011 6/24/2011 6/24/2011 6/28/2011 6/28/2011 6/29/2011 6/29/2011 8/12/2011 8/12/2011 8/12/2011 8/23/2011 8/23/2011 8/25/2011 8/25/2011 8/25/2011 9/7/2011 9/7/2011 9/9/2011 9/9/2011 16:16:36 16:17:28 16:18:35 15:08:41 15:11:02 15:12:54 15:28:19 15:29:20 15:30:06 15:41:04 15:42:03 15:43:40 16:23:27 16:24:15 16:26:57 16:29:08 16:06:49 16:10:46 17:11:17 17:16:25 15:37:59 15:39:50 15:41:30 15:42:29 16:19:42 16:21:34 18:08:49 18:15:47 13:59:36 14:00:37 14:01:57 14:36:29 14:37:13 14:38:52 15:39:08 15:40:33 11:39:40 11:49:30 16:34:41 16:36:27 16:37:07 16:13:52 16:19:05 16:54:31 16:56:28 16:58:50 9:01:32 9:05:14 17:04:30 17:06:02 20:07:12 20:08:06 20:09:12 18:59:06 19:01:27 19:03:18 19:18:53 19:19:55 19:20:41 19:31:39 19:32:38 19:34:15 20:13:13 20:14:01 20:16:43 20:18:53 19:56:33 20:00:30 21:00:57 21:06:05 19:27:40 19:29:30 19:31:08 19:32:07 20:09:19 20:11:10 21:58:23 22:05:23 17:49:09 17:50:11 17:51:31 18:26:01 18:26:45 18:28:24 19:28:38 19:30:03 15:29:09 15:38:58 20:23:48 20:25:35 20:26:14 20:02:55 20:08:08 20:43:32 20:45:29 20:47:51 12:50:27 12:54:09 20:53:24 20:54:56

12
9/9/2011 9/15/2011 9/15/2011 17:08:30 16:11:54 16:12:51 20:57:25 20:00:45 20:01:42

4.4.2 Analysis. The data from Table 1 was used to calculate the minimum and maximum deviation of the system clock of the JNA0 unit from Eastern Daylight Time. First, the number of days between the first observation and each subsequent observation was calculated and served as the horizontal axis of Figure 1. Then, through systematic trial and error, the tolerance on the reference time was determined. No tolerance on the JNA0 time observation was used. The smallest tolerance on the time observed on the MSHA network and www.time.gov that would allow a straight line to fit all points, as shown on Figure 1 below, was the minimum allowable tolerance of ±9 seconds. This tolerance was then applied to the reference time, resulting in the points on Figure 1; the points represented by asterisks were the largest possible deviation, and those represented by X were the smallest possible deviation. Once again, by systematic trial and error, straight lines were fit between the two sets of data (largest and smallest deviation) by adjusting the y-intercept and slope of the lines until the minimum and maximum possible slopes were obtained. These slopes were the minimum and maximum rates of drift of the JNA0 system clock. The maximum and minimum slopes were 0.49971 and 0.4824 seconds per day. This means, if the drift was constant from April 5, 2010 until measurements started on July 23, 2010, the actual expected time and date for the last “STS Right Handheld ESTOP” event which was recorded at 6:52:39 PM on April 5, 2010 was between 2:59:32 PM and 2:59:38 PM on April 5, 2010.

13
Figure 1. Calculated Minimum and Maximum Clock Drift Rates, Exhibit No. PE-0164

5 5.1

FUNCTIONAL TESTING OF EXHIBIT NO. PE-0164 (JNA0), EXHIBIT NO. PE-0165 (JNA1) AND EXHIBIT NO. PE-0238 (TX1 REMOTE CONTROL) Procedure. The Exhibit Nos. PE-0164 (JNA0) and PE-0165 (JNA1) were taken for functional testing at the Matric Limited facility in Seneca, PA, on November 19, 2010. The purpose of this functional testing was to ensure that machine control system events monitored by the JNA system are properly interpreted by the JNA system, the proper actions taken by the JNA system, and properly recorded on the JNA0 event log. A Joy shearer test panel was used to mimic the functionality of the shearer, with the JNA system connected to the test panel. Joy personnel conducted the testing under the direction of the investigation team. Joy provided a “JNA event dictionary file” which listed all the events that could have been recorded in the event log of the JNA system installed at the shearer used on the longwall. Joy also provided a document titled “Response to MSHA Questions for Joy”, which included fifty (50) of those events from the dictionary file that the MSHA investigation team asked Joy to simulate during the functionality test of the JNA0 and JNA1 units recovered from the longwall shearer. Appendix D lists those events that the investigation team asked Joy to simulate. Joy indicated that some of the events were no longer used or the events could not be simulated on the Joy test panel. Therefore, some of the events in Appendix D are shaded. The events that are non-shaded or lightly shaded were those that were

14 simulated during the functional test. The events that are darkly shaded could not be simulated during the functional test. The functional testing was videotaped and photographed. See Appendix A-4, slides 1 through 174, for photographs of the functional testing. 5.2 Demonstration of Test Panel with sample JNA0 and JNA1 units. Joy personnel first demonstrated the functions of the Joy shearer test panel by connecting a Joy sample JNA0 unit and a sample JNA1 unit. It was necessary to prepare a replacement MAP cartridge for the Joy sample JNA0 unit. It was shown that the test panel was operating properly by energizing sample components such as relays and motors. Machine functions were initiated by a Joy-supplied umbilical (hard-wire connected) remote control device. Functional testing of Exhibit No. PE-0165 (JNA1) with Joy sample JNA0 unit installed on test panel: Exhibit No. PE-0165 (JNA1) was taken out of its protective storage case and installed on the Joy test panel, with the Joy sample JNA0 unit still installed. Functional testing was conducted of the non-shaded and lightly shaded events shown in Appendix D. Machine functions were initiated by a Joy-supplied umbilical (hard-wire connected) remote control device. The Exhibit No. PE-0165 (JNA1) functioned as expected. Events were stored in the Joy sample JNA0 event log when expected. Functional testing of Exhibit No. PE-0164 (JNA0) with Joy sample JNA1 unit installed on test panel: This testing was prescribed in the original functional testing protocol, but was not conducted. All parties present at the testing felt it was unnecessary and it was agreed to proceed to the next step of the functional testing. Functional testing of Exhibit No. PE-0164 (JNA0) with Exhibit No. PE-0165 (JNA1) on test panel, using Exhibit No. PE-0238 (Model TX1) remote control unit: Exhibit No. PE-0164 (JNA0) was taken out of its protective case and installed on the Joy test panel, with Exhibit No. PE-0165 (JNA1) still installed from the previous step. Joy personnel installed a Joy supplied sample 472 MHz receiver to the right-handheld input to the test panel. Exhibit No. PE-0238, Matric Limited TX1 remote control unit, recovered at Shield 100 of the longwall face, was then used during this step of the functional testing. This TX1 unit was repaired by a Matric Limited technician on November 19, 2010, and restored to working order. Refer to the report “Remote Control Units Recovered from a Mine Explosion at Performance Coal Company” for further information concerning Exhibit No. PE-0238.

5.3

5.4

5.5

15 Functional testing was conducted on the non-shaded and lightly shaded events shown in Appendix D, with machine functions being initiated by Exhibit No. PE-0238 (Model TX1) remote control unit. Exhibit Nos. PE-0164 (JNA0) and PE-0165 (JNA1) functioned as expected. Events were stored in the Exhibit No. PE-0164 (JNA0) event log when expected. Special emphasis and additional tests were conducted to recreate the last two event data recordings for April 5, 2010 shown in Appendix B. Although these event data recordings can be created several ways, as noted earlier, investigators only recreated the last two event data recordings by activating the remote stop function of the TX1 unit at the Matric facility. Each time the remote stop function was actuated, a “ERR Right Handheld Dataloss” occurred within 2 seconds. 6 6.1 VIEWING OF EVENT LOGS OF ADDITIONAL JNA UNITS Background. Additional JNA control units were recovered during the course of the investigation. These additional units were recovered both from the longwall section and from a repair facility. These additional units were kept as spares for the longwall section. Attempts were made to view any event logs stored on these spare JNA0 units. Exhibit No. PE-0173. This exhibit was a JNA unit recovered in the area of survey spad 22699 along “headgate 21”. This unit was later examined at the Matric Limited facility in Seneca, PA, by the team on November 19, 2010. Upon inspection, the unit was a JNA1 unit, S/N 113203AH002, P/N 100133930. No event logs are stored on JNA1 units, so this unit was not powered. No further evaluation was conducted on this JNA1 unit. Exhibit No. PE-0204. This exhibit was a plastic protective case containing a JNA0 unit, S/N 56605AC010, P/N 00572110-0020, recovered in the area of survey spad 22701. The case was taken to the Joy Mining Machinery facility in Franklin, PA, on August 11, 2010, for the purpose of viewing the event log on the JNA0 unit. See Appendix A-3 for photographs. The exterior and interior of the protective case was covered in soot and dirt, as was the JNA0 unit located inside. Upon examination, there was dirt in the empty MAP cartridge slot and other connection slots and ports. Joy personnel cleaned the unit with a vacuum, and wiped the unit clean. Since the event log could not be viewed without a MAP cartridge, a replacement MAP cartridge was prepared to mimic the configuration of the shearer at the Upper Big Branch Mine-South. The MAP cartridge was inserted into the JNA0 unit, and the unit was powered. However, upon examination, the event log was empty. No further evaluation was conducted on this JNA0 unit.

6.2

6.3

16 6.4 Exhibit No. PE-0269: It was determined that a JNA unit was sent back to a Joy repair facility in Bluefield, VA near the date of April 5, 2010. A member of the MSHA accident investigation team recovered it on August 23, 2010. The unit was a JNA0 unit, S/N 50905T0002, P/N 00572110-0020. The unit was later examined at the Matric Limited facility in Seneca, PA, by the team on November 19, 2010. See Appendix A-4, slides 175 through 185, for photographs of this examination. Upon inspection, the unit appeared to have been processed at a repair facility. A Matric Limited tracking tag with the unit showed a received date of April 7, 2010, and a final inspection of April 21, 2010. No MAP cartridge was installed. The unit was powered, and no event log was stored. The real-time clock of the JNA unit was examined. On November 19, 2010, the date and time were compared to UST time, and it was one minute and 37 seconds behind UST, as the JNA0 displayed time was ‘19:02:00’ compared to ‘14:03:37’ from a video timestamp synched to www.time.gov. The manufacturer stated that they serviced the unit on April 21, 2010; their service procedures are reported to include synchronization of the JNA clock to UST. Using these two data points, the rate of drift of the clock of Exhibit No. PE-0269 from April 21, 2010 to November 19, 2010 is comparable to the rate of drift observed on Exhibit No. PE-0164. No further evaluation was conducted on this JNA0 unit. 6.5 Service Reports: The service reports for each of the exhibits were provided by Matric Limited. No repairs relative to this investigation were noted. The service records show the date the unit was built and the last repair date for each of the exhibits: Exhibit No. PE-0164 PE-0165 PE-0173 PE-0204 PE-0269 7 CONCLUSION New Date 03/01/2006 04/27/2001 (not stated) 05/23/2001 06/23/1995 Last Repair Date 05/22/2008 08/29/2008 05/13/2008 05/14/2009 04/21/2010

For Exhibit No. PE-0164, JNA0 unit recovered from the longwall shearer, the electronic event log of April 5, 2010 was viewed. The last two recorded events on April 5, 2010 on the JNA0 unit were: “ERR Right Handheld Dataloss” and “STS Right Handheld Estop.” These records are an error message and a machine status code. No other events were recorded in the event log for approximately 43 minutes prior to the above listed events. Events recorded in the JNA0 event log are time stamped. In order to determine the actual time that events on April 5, 2010 were recorded in the Exhibit No.

17 PE-0164, JNA0 unit’s electronic event log, a time drift analysis was conducted on the system clock of the JNA0 unit. At standard laboratory temperature of approximately 20 ºC, the system clock was drifting at a rate between 0.49971 and 0.4824 seconds per day. Assuming that the environmental conditions of the JNA0 unit before it was delivered to the A&CC were constant, the rate of drift of the system clock would be constant. This means, if the drift was constant from April 5, 2010 until the measurements started, the actual expected time and date for the last “STS Right Handheld ESTOP” event, as recorded on the JNA0 event log, was between 2:59:32 PM and 2:59:38 PM on April 5, 2010. Functional testing was conducted on Exhibit Nos. PE-0164 (JNA0) and PE-0165 (JNA1) on a Joy shearer test panel which mimicked the functionality of the shearer installed at the longwall. The purpose of this functional testing was to ensure that machine control system events monitored by the JNA system are properly interpreted by the JNA system, the proper actions were taken by the JNA system, and the appropriate events were properly recorded on the JNA0 event log. During the functional testing, machine functions were initiated by Exhibit No. PE-0238, Model TX1 remote control unit after being restored to working order. Events were stored in the Exhibit No. PE-0164 (JNA0) event log when expected. The functional testing indicated that Exhibit Nos. PE-0164 (JNA0) and PE-0165 (JNA1) functioned as expected. Attempts were made to view the electronic event logs of additional JNA control units recovered during the accident investigation. No event logs were stored in Exhibit Nos. PE-0173, PE-0204, or PE-0269.

.

18

APPENDIX A-1, PHOTOGRAPHS (JULY 20, 2010)
Photographs taken underground by the MSHA investigation team during the recovery of Exhibit Nos. PE-0164 (JNA0 unit) and PE-0165 (JNA1 unit) at the shearing machine installed at the mine. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. Exhibit No. PE-0164, JNA0 unit display, as seen through window of middle bay of main controller Exhibit No. PE-0164, JNA0 unit, middle bay of main controller enclosure (enclosure cover removed) Foreground: Exhibit No. PE-0164, JNA0 unit, being removed from main controller enclosure; Background: Exhibit No. PE-0165, JNA1 unit Exhibit No. PE-0164, JNA0 unit, without protective cover so that cable connectors may be removed Exhibit No. PE-0164, JNA0 unit, being placed inside protective case Exhibit No. PE-0164, JNA0 unit, inside protective case with connector cover installed Exhibit No. PE-0165, JNA1 unit, inside enclosure with Exhibit No. PE-0164 (JNA0) unit removed Exhibit No. PE-0165, JNA1 unit, with cables connected on reverse side of unit Exhibit No. PE-0165, JNA1 unit, being placed inside protective case

19

APPENDIX A-2, PHOTOGRAPHS (JULY 23, 2010)
Photographs of the procedure of the viewing of data on Exhibit No. PE-0164, JNA0 unit, at the Joy facility in Franklin, PA, on July 23, 2010. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. Exhibit No. PE-0164: Overall case of JNA0 Unit in Box Exhibit No. PE-0164: Overall case of JNA0, Bottom Exhibit No. PE-0164: Overall case of JNA0, Top Exhibit No. PE-0164: Case opened of JNA0 Exhibit No. PE-0164: JNA0 Unit on Table (Removed from Box) Exhibit No. PE-0164: Side view, showing MAP Cartridge still installed Exhibit No. PE-0164: JNA0 Unit with Backplate Removed (Bottom Angle) Exhibit No. PE-0164: JNA0 Unit with Backplate Removed (Top Angle) Exhibit No. PE-0164: Back of Backplate (Removed from JNA0) Exhibit No. PE-0164: Shot of Projector Screen and Laptop Screen (Showing the Official Time) 11. Exhibit No. PE-0164: JNA0 during boot-up Slides 12 through 141: Exhibit No. PE-0164: JNA0 Event Log 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Parameters JNA System Parameters Optional Features Optional Features Optional Features Parameters Optional Features 2 Parameters Overloads Overloads Parameters Motion Parameters Time Delays Time Delays Parameters Event Logger Parameters Machine Position Machine Position

20 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Parameters Parameters Speed Control Speed Control Speed Control Speed Control Parameters Speed Control 2 Speed Control 2 Parameters Transducers Main Menu Main Menu Histograms Left Haul Temp Histogram Main Menu Main Menu Meters Meters View Hourmeters Meters Main Menu Main Menu Overloads All Overloads Overloads LH Pump OL Main Menu Machine Switches Main Menu Motor Circuits Pump Logic Left Cutter Logic Right Cutter Logic Main Menu ESR Circuit Dataloss Logic ESR Circuit ESR Logic Main Menu

21 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Exhibit No. PE-0164: Automatic Control Main Menu Remote Station Status Lights Picture of MAP intact with cover on JNA0 Unit Back in Pelican Box JNA0 sealed in Pelican Box under Evidence tape

22

APPENDIX A-3, PHOTOGRAPHS (AUGUST 11, 2010)
Photographs of the procedure of the viewing of data on Exhibit No. PE-0204, JNA0 unit, at the Joy facility in Franklin, PA, on August 11, 2010. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. Exhibit No. PE-0204: Exhibit No. PE-0204: Exhibit No. PE-0204: Exhibit No. PE-0204: Exhibit No. PE-0204: Exhibit No. PE-0204: Exhibit No. PE-0204: Exhibit No. PE-0204: Exhibit No. PE-0204: Exhibit No. PE-0204: Exhibit No. PE-0204: Exhibit No. PE-0204: Exhibit No. PE-0204: Exhibit No. PE-0204: Exhibit No. PE-0204: Exhibit No. PE-0204: Exhibit No. PE-0204: Exhibit No. PE-0204: Exhibit No. PE-0204: JNA0 Unit in protective case with original seal JNA0 Unit inside protective case connector side of JNA0 Unit with Matric repair tag close-up of MAP socket of JNA0 Unit close-up showing connectors of JNA0 Unit close-up showing connectors of JNA0 Unit connector side of JNA0 Unit, with additional repair tag connector side of JNA0 Unit; two Matric repair tags JNA0 Unit, initial start-up screen JNA0 Unit, start-up sequence JNA0 Unit, start-up sequence JNA0 Unit, start-up sequence JNA0 Unit, start-up sequence JNA0 Unit, start-up sequence JNA0 Unit, main menu JNA0 Unit event log JNA0 Unit event log JNA0 Unit event log JNA0 Unit main menu

23

APPENDIX A-4, PHOTOGRAPHS (NOVEMBER 19, 2010)
Photographs of the procedure of the functional testing of Exhibit Nos. PE-0164 (JNA0) and PE-0165 (JNA1), and the procedure of the viewing of data on Exhibit No. PE-0269 (JNA0) at the Matric Limited facility in Seneca, PA, on November 19, 2010. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. JNA Test Set-up Area Input-Output Layout Chart Vertical Shot: Test Panel With Labels Vertical Shot: Cables/Wiring Test Panel Test Panel Components (JNA Test Set-up) Test Area Shot Joy Demo JNA0 Test Screen Joy Equipment Set-up (JNA Screens) Joy Demo JNA0 Test Screen Joy Equipment Set-up (JNA Screens) Joy Demo JNA0 Test Screen Joy Equipment Set-up (JNA Screens) Panel Labels Control Panel Labels/Buttons/Handles Control Panel Labels Vertical Shot Labels on Control Test Panel Vertical Shot Labels on Control Test Panel PE-0165 JNA Evidence Case (JNA1) PE-0165 JNA Evidence Case Open PE-0165 JNA1 – Tag/Serial # PE-0165 JNA1 – Tag/Serial # Close-up JNA Unit Tag PE-0165 JNA1 – Tag/Serial # Close-up JNA Unit Tag PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: Screen – Start-up Joy Symbol PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: Rt Trm VFD Communication Restored PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: ESR ON – Screen PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: Cutter Feedback (Screen) PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: WRN LtVFD No Amps Reported (Screen) PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: Screen Display SYS INBY LostComm PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: Pump Motor On Screen PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: ERR LCutter Start False Amps Screen PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: SYS Inby Lost Comm With Outby Screen PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: ERR Methane Monitor Interlck Screen PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: ESR Off Screen PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: ESR Off Screen

24 32. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: Display 33. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: Display 34. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: 35. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: 36. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: 37. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: 38. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: DataLoss Screen 39. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: 40. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: DataLoss Screen 41. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: Screen 42. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: 43. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: 44. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: 45. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: 46. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: Screen 47. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: DataLoss 48. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: 49. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: 50. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: Outby Screen 51. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: Outby Screen 52. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: Outby Screen 53. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: 54. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: 55. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: Outby – Screen 56. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: 57. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: Restored Screen 58. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: Outby 59. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: 60. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: Outby – Screen 61. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: 62. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: 63. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: ERR No 110VAC – Screen ERR No 110VAC – Screen Pump Motor On Screen Pump Motor On Screen SYS Inby LostComm Screen SYS Inby LostComm Screen ERR Left Handheld ESR OFF Screen ERR Left Handheld ERR Stuck Button Left Side ESR OFF ERR Stuck Button Right Side ESR OFF Pump Motor On Screen Data On DeSelected – ERR Right Handheld Both Stations Disconnected Right Cutter Jam Overload SYS Inby LostComm With SYS Inby LostComm With SYS Inby LostComm With Tram Right – Screen Tram Right – Screen SYS Inby LostComm With Tram Left – Screen Rt Trm VFD Communication SYS Inby LostComm With ESR OFF – Screen SYS Inby LostComm With ESR ON – Screen Pump Motor ON – Screen Pump Motor ON – Screen

25 64. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: Pump Motor ON – Screen 65. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: Pump Motor ON – Screen 66. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: SYS Inby LostComm With Outby 67. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: SYS Inby LostComm With Outby 68. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: Left Pump Overload Clear – Screen 69. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: Left Pump Overload Clear – Screen 70. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: ESR OFF – Screen 71. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: Pump Motor On 72. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: SYS Inby LostComm With Outby 73. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: SYS Inby LostComm With Outby 74. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: Pump Motor On 75. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: LH Cutter OL – Screen 76. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: SYS Inby LostComm With Outby 77. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: Left Cutter Ovrld Clear In 235 78. PE-0165 JNA1 tested with Joy Sample JNA0: Left Cutter Ovrld Clear In 220 79. PE-0164 Evidence Case – Closed 80. PE-0164 Evidence Case Open 81. PE-0164 Joy Tag – Metal Close-up S/N 56602AH003 82. PE-0164 JNA0 Unit In-Case 83. PE-0164 Joy Screen/JNA Unit 84. PE-0164 Start-up Screen 85. Joy Sample Remote Control Receiver Unit 86. Test Panel Controls 87. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: ESR OFF – Screen 88. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: ESR OFF – Screen 89. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: ERR LCutt – Screen 90. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: Pump Motor On – Screen 91. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: ERR LCutter Start – Screen 92. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: Pump Motor On – Screen 93. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: ESR OFF – Screen 94. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: ERR Methane Monitor Interlck (Screen) 95. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: ESR OFF 96. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: Remote Motor Start – Screen 97. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: ESR ON – Screen 98. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: ERR No 110VAC ESR Feedback

26 99. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: 100. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: 101. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: Amps Reported Screen 102. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: Outby 103. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: 104. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: Outby 105. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: 106. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: 107. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: 108. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: – Screen 109. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: – Screen 110. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: – Screen 111. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: – Screen 112. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: – Screen 113. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: – Screen 114. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: – Screen 115. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: Screen 116. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: Screen 117. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: Screen 118. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: 119. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: 120. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: 121. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: – Screen 122. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: Screen 123. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: Screen 124. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: 125. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: 126. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: 127. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: ESR OFF – Screen Pump Motor On – Screen Pump Motor WRN LtVFD No SYS Inby LostComm With Pump Motor On – Screen SYS Inby LostComm With Pump Motor On – Screen Pump Motor On – Screen Pump Motor On – Screen ERR Right Handheld DataLoss ERR Right Handheld DataLoss ERR Right Handheld DataLoss ERR Right Handheld DataLoss ERR Right Handheld DataLoss ERR Right Handheld DataLoss ERR Right Handheld DataLoss ERR Left Handheld DataLoss – ERR Left Handheld DataLoss – ERR Left Handheld DataLoss – Pump Motor On – Screen ERR Right Handheld DataLoss Data On Deselected – Screen ERR Right Handheld DataLoss ERR Left Handheld DataLoss – ERR Left Handheld DataLoss – Data On Deselected Rite Side Both Stations Disconnected 3 Phase Ac Amp – Screen Right Cutter Jam Overload

27 128. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: Outby 129. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: 130. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: 131. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: 132. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: 133. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: Present 134. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: 135. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: Outby 136. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: 137. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: Outby 138. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: 139. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: 140. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: 141. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: 142. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: 143. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: 144. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: 145. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: Outby Screen 146. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: 147. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: 148. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: Outby 149. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: 226 150. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: 151. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: 152. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: Outby 153. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: Outby 154. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: 155. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: Outby 156. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: 157. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: Outby 158. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: 159. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: 160. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: 161. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: SYS Inby LostComm With Remote Motor Start – Screen Pump Motor On – Screen WRN LtVFD No Amps Reported Tram Right – Screen Rt Tram VFD Off: Current ESR ON – Screen SYS Inby LostComm With WRN LtVFD No Amps Reported SYS Inby LostComm With Tram Right – Screen Tram Right – Screen ESR ON – Screen ESR ON – Screen ESR ON – Screen VFD Trip Cleared – Screen ESR On – Screen SYS Inby LostComm With Pump Motor On Screen Pump Motor On Screen SYS Inby LostComm With Left Pump Overload Clear In ESR OFF Left Pump Jam Overload SYS Inby LostComm With SYS Inby LostComm With Pump Motor On SYS Inby LostComm With Rt Pump Overload Clear In 225 SYS Inby LostComm With Rt Pump Overload Clear In 30 ESR OFF Left Cutter Ovrld Clear In 240 Left Cutter Ovrld Clear In 225

28 162. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: SYS Inby LostComm With Outby 163. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: Pump Motor On 164. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: ESR ON 165. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: STS Right Handheld Estop 166. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: ESR ON 167. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: Pump Motor On 168. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: ESR OFF 169. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: ESR OFF – Screen 170. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: ERR Right Handheld DataLoss 171. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: STS Right Handheld Estop 172. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: ERR Right Handheld DataLoss 173. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: ESR OFF 174. PE-0164 JNA0 tested with PE-0165 JNA1: ESR OFF 175. PE-0269 Evidence Box: JNA Unit – Closed S/N 50905T002 176. PE-0269 Evidence Box: JNA Unit – Closed S/N 50905T002 177. PE-0269 Box Open – Showing – JNA Wrapped in Plastic Inside Box 178. PE-0269 JNA in Plastic Bag 179. PE-0269 JNA on Work Bench 180. PE-0269 JNA Joy Tag 181. PE-0269 JNA Unit Serial #’s 182. PE-0269 JNA Unit #’s Close-up 183. PE-0269 JNA Unit on Bench Table Top 184. PE-0269 Matric Tag - Close-up 185. PE-0269 Matric Tag - Close-up 186. PE-0164 Evidence Case 187. PE-0165 Top of Case – Evidence 188. PE-0165 Evidence Case – Different Angle

29

Event log of April 5, 2010 for JNA0 Unit, Exhibit No. PE-0164, with recorded event times corrected due to time drift analysis.
Recorded Time 4:53:03 4:53:40 4:53:40 4:53:45 4:53:45 4:53:45 4:53:53 4:53:53 4:54:28 4:54:28 6:18:51 7:30:41 7:30:42 9:24:05 9:24:07 9:38:15 9:38:16 9:50:59 9:51:00 9:57:48 9:57:50 9:57:53 10:43:14 10:43:38 10:43:40 10:43:44 10:43:46 10:47:36 10:47:38 10:50:40 10:50:43 10:51:17 10:51:20 10:51:21 10:51:22 10:51:22 10:51:24 10:51:24 10:51:29 10:51:36 10:51:39 10:51:48 Earliest 0:59:56 1:00:33 1:00:33 1:00:38 1:00:38 1:00:38 1:00:46 1:00:46 1:01:21 1:01:21 2:25:44 3:37:34 3:37:35 5:30:58 5:31:00 5:45:08 5:45:09 5:57:52 5:57:53 6:04:41 6:04:43 6:04:46 6:50:07 6:50:31 6:50:33 6:50:37 6:50:39 6:54:29 6:54:31 6:57:33 6:57:36 6:58:10 6:58:13 6:58:14 6:58:15 6:58:15 6:58:17 6:58:17 6:58:22 6:58:29 6:58:32 6:58:41 Latest 1:00:01 1:00:38 1:00:38 1:00:43 1:00:43 1:00:43 1:00:51 1:00:51 1:01:26 1:01:26 2:25:49 3:37:39 3:37:40 5:31:03 5:31:05 5:45:13 5:45:14 5:57:57 5:57:58 6:04:46 6:04:48 6:04:51 6:50:12 6:50:36 6:50:38 6:50:42 6:50:44 6:54:34 6:54:36 6:57:38 6:57:41 6:58:15 6:58:18 6:58:19 6:58:20 6:58:20 6:58:22 6:58:22 6:58:27 6:58:34 6:58:37 6:58:46 Event Sys Power Reset Testing Current Sensors… Tram Cntl in Normal Ops Mode Left Tram VFD Comm Restored Right Tram VFD Comm Restored SYS Inby Lost Comm with Outby Current Sensor Test - Passed Both Stations Disconnected ERR Stuck Button Left Side ERR Right Handheld Dataloss ERR Left Handheld Dataloss STS Left Handheld Estop ERR Left Handheld Dataloss STS Left Handheld Estop ERR Left Handheld Dataloss STS Left Handheld Estop ERR Left Handheld Dataloss STS Left Handheld Estop ERR Left Handheld Dataloss STS Left Handheld Estop ERR Left Handheld Dataloss Both Stations Disconnected ERR Left Handheld Dataloss Both Stations Disconnected ERR Left Handheld Dataloss Both Stations Disconnected ERR Left Handheld Dataloss Both Stations Disconnected ERR Left Handheld Dataloss Both Stations Disconnected ERR Left Handheld Dataloss Both Stations Disconnected ERR Left Handheld Dataloss Both Stations Disconnected ERR Left Handheld Dataloss Both Stations Disconnected ERR Left Handheld Dataloss Both Stations Disconnected ERR Left Handheld Dataloss Both Stations Disconnected ERR Left Handheld Dataloss Both Stations Disconnected

APPENDIX B - EXHIBIT NO. PE-0164 EVENT LOG

30
Recorded Time 10:51:50 10:51:54 10:51:59 10:52:00 10:52:06 10:52:08 10:52:10 10:52:12 10:52:17 10:59:57 11:01:18 11:01:19 11:03:05 11:03:06 11:03:24 11:03:46 11:03:48 11:04:02 11:04:10 11:04:14 11:04:39 11:04:46 11:04:55 11:04:56 11:05:44 11:07:03 11:19:00 11:29:01 11:29:32 11:29:53 11:30:00 11:30:33 11:30:39 11:30:42 11:30:44 11:30:47 11:30:49 11:30:51 11:30:53 11:30:54 11:31:10 11:31:11 11:39:41 11:39:42 11:40:02 11:40:22 11:40:41

Earliest 6:58:43 6:58:47 6:58:52 6:58:53 6:58:59 6:59:01 6:59:03 6:59:05 6:59:10 7:06:50 7:08:11 7:08:12 7:09:58 7:09:59 7:10:17 7:10:39 7:10:41 7:10:55 7:11:03 7:11:07 7:11:32 7:11:39 7:11:48 7:11:49 7:12:37 7:13:56 7:25:53 7:35:54 7:36:25 7:36:46 7:36:53 7:37:26 7:37:32 7:37:35 7:37:37 7:37:40 7:37:42 7:37:44 7:37:46 7:37:47 7:38:03 7:38:04 7:46:34 7:46:35 7:46:55 7:47:15 7:47:34

Latest 6:58:48 6:58:52 6:58:57 6:58:58 6:59:04 6:59:06 6:59:08 6:59:10 6:59:15 7:06:55 7:08:16 7:08:17 7:10:03 7:10:04 7:10:22 7:10:44 7:10:46 7:11:00 7:11:08 7:11:12 7:11:37 7:11:44 7:11:53 7:11:54 7:12:42 7:14:01 7:25:58 7:35:59 7:36:30 7:36:51 7:36:58 7:37:31 7:37:37 7:37:40 7:37:42 7:37:45 7:37:47 7:37:49 7:37:51 7:37:52 7:38:08 7:38:09 7:46:39 7:46:40 7:47:00 7:47:20 7:47:39

Event ERR Left Handheld Dataloss Both Stations Disconnected ERR Left Handheld Dataloss Both Stations Disconnected ERR Left Handheld Dataloss Both Stations Disconnected ERR Left Handheld Dataloss Both Stations Disconnected ERR Left Handheld Dataloss STS Right Handheld Estop Data on Deselected Left Side ERR No 110 VAC ESR Feedback Left VFD Overcurrent Trip VFD Trip Cleared STS Right Handheld Estop STS Right Handheld Estop STS Right Handheld Estop STS Right Handheld Estop ERR Left Handheld Dataloss Both Stations Disconnected STS Right Handheld Estop STS Right Handheld Estop STS Right Handheld Estop ERR Right Handheld Dataloss STS Right Handheld Estop STS Right Handheld Estop Both Stations Disconnected STS Right Handheld Estop ERR Right Handheld Dataloss STS Right Handheld Estop STS Right Handheld Estop STS Right Handheld Estop STS Right Handheld Estop STS Right Handheld Estop STS Right Handheld Estop STS Right Handheld Estop STS Right Handheld Estop STS Right Handheld Estop STS Right Handheld Estop STS Right Handheld Estop STS Right Handheld Estop Both Stations Disconnected Both Stations Disconnected STS Left Handheld Estop ERR Left Handheld Dataloss STS Left Handheld Estop OVL JAM Warning - RH Cutt

31
Recorded Time 11:40:41 11:42:56 11:42:57 11:44:14 11:44:19 11:44:36 11:45:07 11:45:31 11:45:32 11:45:59 11:46:04 11:46:27 11:46:57 11:52:05 12:54:01 13:00:53 13:35:53 14:02:46 14:08:10 14:08:34 14:08:48 14:08:50 14:09:13 14:09:33 14:10:43 14:10:54 14:11:03 14:11:27 14:11:52 14:12:02 14:12:03 14:12:12 14:12:28 14:12:32 14:12:37 14:16:51 14:16:52 14:17:05 14:17:06 14:17:06 14:32:32 14:45:18 14:45:20 15:07:59 15:18:47 15:18:47 15:33:07

Earliest 7:47:34 7:49:49 7:49:50 7:51:07 7:51:12 7:51:29 7:52:00 7:52:24 7:52:25 7:52:52 7:52:57 7:53:20 7:53:50 7:58:58 9:00:54 9:07:46 9:42:46 10:09:39 10:15:03 10:15:27 10:15:41 10:15:43 10:16:06 10:16:26 10:17:36 10:17:47 10:17:56 10:18:20 10:18:45 10:18:55 10:18:56 10:19:05 10:19:21 10:19:25 10:19:30 10:23:44 10:23:45 10:23:58 10:23:59 10:23:59 10:39:25 10:52:11 10:52:13 11:14:52 11:25:40 11:25:40 11:40:00

Latest 7:47:39 7:49:54 7:49:55 7:51:12 7:51:17 7:51:34 7:52:05 7:52:29 7:52:30 7:52:57 7:53:02 7:53:25 7:53:55 7:59:03 9:00:59 9:07:51 9:42:51 10:09:44 10:15:08 10:15:32 10:15:46 10:15:48 10:16:11 10:16:31 10:17:41 10:17:52 10:18:01 10:18:25 10:18:50 10:19:00 10:19:01 10:19:10 10:19:26 10:19:30 10:19:35 10:23:49 10:23:50 10:24:03 10:24:04 10:24:04 10:39:30 10:52:16 10:52:18 11:14:58 11:25:46 11:25:46 11:40:06

Event OVL JAM Trip - RH Cutt STS Right Handheld Estop ERR No 110 VAC ESR Feedback Both Stations Disconnected STS Right Handheld Estop STS Right Handheld Estop STS Right Handheld Estop STS Right Handheld Estop STS Right Handheld Estop STS Right Handheld Estop STS Right Handheld Estop STS Right Handheld Estop STS Right Handheld Estop STS Right Handheld Estop STS Left Handheld Estop STS Right Handheld Estop STS Right Handheld Estop STS Right Handheld Estop Both Stations Disconnected Both Stations Disconnected Both Stations Disconnected STS Right Handheld Estop STS Right Handheld Estop STS Right Handheld Estop Both Stations Disconnected STS Right Handheld Estop STS Right Handheld Estop STS Right Handheld Estop STS Right Handheld Estop STS Right Handheld Estop STS Right Handheld Estop STS Right Handheld Estop STS Right Handheld Estop STS Right Handheld Estop STS Right Handheld Estop STS Right Handheld Estop ERR Right Handheld Dataloss Both Stations Disconnected ERR Right Handheld Dataloss Both Stations Disconnected ERR Left Handheld Dataloss STS Right Handheld Estop ERR Right Handheld Dataloss Both Stations Disconnected ERR Right Handheld Dataloss Data On Deselected Left Side STS Left Handheld Estop

32
Recorded Time 15:33:08 16:37:24 16:37:25 17:25:56 17:26:20 17:26:21 17:30:43 17:42:09 17:42:10 17:50:52 17:50:54 18:09:56 18:52:39 18:52:41

Earliest 11:40:01 12:44:17 12:44:18 13:32:49 13:33:13 13:33:14 13:37:36 13:49:02 13:49:03 13:57:45 13:57:47 14:16:49 14:59:32 14:59:34

Latest 11:40:07 12:44:23 12:44:24 13:32:55 13:33:19 13:33:20 13:37:42 13:49:08 13:49:09 13:57:51 13:57:53 14:16:55 14:59:38 14:59:40

Event ERR Left Handheld Dataloss STS Left Handheld Estop ERR Left Handheld Dataloss Data On Deselected Rite Side STS Left Handheld Estop ERR Left Handheld Dataloss ERR Right Handheld Dataloss STS Right Handheld Estop ERR Right Handheld Dataloss STS Left Handheld Estop ERR Left Handheld Dataloss STS Right Handheld Estop STS Right Handheld Estop ERR Right Handheld Dataloss

33

APPENDIX C – JNA EVENTS HELP TEXT
Help text for events recorded in the electronic event log of April 5, 2010, Exhibit No. PE-0164, JNA0 unit. The event log consisted of a listing of machine status codes and error messages.
Event  SYS Power  Reset  Event Help Text  EVENT 0001:   The JNA System has had it's power  reset.      If this event seems to happen too  often or at unexpected times, then the  events are most likely caused by a  problem with the wiring of the power  to Unit 0.  Check all wires and  connectors in the circuit feeding  power to the unit.    It is also possible that Unit 0 has an  internal power supply fault that would  produce the same symptoms.  ***** END ***** Testing Current  EVENT 3287:  Sensors  No Help Text  Additional Info This event will always be the first  event logged when the JNA system is  powered on. 

Tram Cntl in  Normal Ops  Mode  Both Stations  Disconnected 

EVENT 3436:  The tram system is being controlled by  normal operating parameters.  EVENT 3265:  No Help Text 

The JNA system induces a voltage  through a test winding of the pump  and cutter motor current sensor  during JNA system power up. This  event indicates that the test has  been started.  

OVL Sensor  Failed ‐ LH  Pump 

This event will not always occur on  JNA system power up ‐ it is  dependent on the position of the  station selector switch and if the  left/right radio is powered.  EVENT 3590:  This event indicates the Left Pump  An unexpected reading from the Left  motor has failed the current sensor  Pump motor motor current sensor has  test. The Left Pump will be disabled  occurred. Please check the current  until the circuit is corrected.  sensor's circuit.  If connections seem  to be correct, consider replacing the  current sensor. 

34
Event  OVL Sensor  Failed ‐ RH   Pump  Event Help Text  EVENT 3598:  An unexpected reading from the Right  Pump motor motor current sensor has  occurred. Please check the current  sensor's circuit.  If connections seem  to be correct, consider replacing the  current sensor.  OVL Sensor  EVENT 3606:  Failed ‐ LH Cutt  An unexpected reading from the left  cutter motor current sensor has  occurred. Please check the current  sensor's circuit.  If connections seem  to be correct, consider replacing the  current sensor.  OVL Sensor  EVENT 3614:  Failed ‐ RH  An unexpected reading from the right  Cutt  cutter motor current sensor has  occurred. Please check the current  sensor's circuit.  If connections seem  to be correct, consider replacing the  current sensor.  Current Sensor  EVENT 3288:  Test ‐ Failed  No Help Text  Additional Info This event indicates the Right Pump  motor has failed the current sensor  test. The Right Pump will be disabled  until the circuit is corrected. 

This event indicates the Left Cutter  motor has failed the current sensor  test. The Left Cutter will be disabled  until the circuit is corrected. 

This event indicates the Right Cutter  motor has failed the current sensor  test. The Right Cutter will be  disabled until the circuit is corrected. 

Current Sensor  EVENT 3289:  Test ‐ Passed  No Help Text 

Left VFD  Comm  Restored 

Right VFD  Comm  Restored 

EVENT 3460:  The communication link from the left  tram inverter to the JNA control  system has been restored. All possible  causes for the loss of communication  have been cleared. EVENT 3461:  This event indicates the initial  The communication link from the right  comms link to the Right VFD has  tram inverter to the JNA control  been established.  system has been restored. All possible  causes for the loss of communication  have been cleared.

This event reports the results of the  current sensor test. The JNA system  has deteceted a problem with the  current sensor, current sensor to  JNA wiring or the JNA units. The  failed motor current detection circuit  will be identified by individual  events. This event reports the results of the  current sensor test. The JNA system  has detected that all current sensor  circuits are fully functional.  This event indicates the initial  comms link to the Left VFD has been  established. 

35
Event  SYS Inby  LostComm  with Outby  Event Help Text  The Inby JNA System has lost  communications with the Outby JNA  System.      If this event seems to happen too  often or at unexpected times, then the  events are most likely caused by a  problem with the wiring of the Line  Coupler.    Check all wires and connectors in the  circuit between the JNA Unit and the  Line Coupler and between the Line  Coupler and the high voltage 3 phase  lines and ground.    It is also possible that there is an  internal failure in the JNA Unit that  contains the interface to the Line  Coupler.  EVENT 3263:  No Help Text  EVENT 3264:  No Help Text  EVENT 3252:  The data from the Left Handheld  dropped out for 0.5 to 1.5 seconds. It  is assumed that estop caused this data  dropout  EVENT 3256:  The data from the Right Handheld  dropped out for 0.5 to 1.5 seconds. It  is assumed that estop caused this data  dropout.  EVENT 3253:  The data from the Left Handheld  dropped out for more than 1.5  seconds. This is assumed to be a  dataloss.  EVENT 3257:  The data from the Right Handheld  dropped out for more than 1.5  seconds. This is assumed to be a  dataloss.  Additional Info This event will always be shown  when the JNA system is powered on  if outby comms are down. 

Data on  Deselected  Left Side  Data on  Deselected   Rite Side  STS Left  Handheld  Estop 

Indicates left radio detected when  station selector is set to right only.  Indicates right radio detected when  station selector is set to left only.   

STS Right  Handheld  Estop 

 

ERR Left  Handheld  Dataloss 

 

ERR Right  Handheld  Dataloss 

 

36
Event  OVL Jam  Warning ‐ RH  Cutt  Event Help Text  EVENT 3613:  The right cutter motor is nearing a jam  trip.  Be aware that a jam  trip may  soon occur. For more information,  check the pages in the OVERLOADS  menu.  EVENT 3611:  The right cutter motor jam overload  has tripped.  EVENT 3637:  The right haulage motor is nearing a  jam trip.  Be aware that a jam  trip may  soon occur. For more information,  check the pages in the OVERLOADS  menu.  EVENT 3635: